A critique of creative Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic finance industry with reference to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom by Alkhamees, Ahmad
  
 
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap  
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/65045  
 
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to 
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
A Critique of Creative Shari‘ah Compliance in the 
Islamic Finance Industry with Reference to the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom 
 
By 
Ahmad Alkhamees 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award 
of a Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law 
 
 
 
Supervisor 
 
Professor Dalvinder Singh 
 
 
 
 
The School of Law, University of Warwick 
April 2014  
 
ii 
 
Contents 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... vi 
Declaration................................................................................................................. viii 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ ix 
Glossary of Arabic Terms ........................................................................................... x 
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ xiv 
Table of Cases ............................................................................................................ xvi 
List of Statutes .......................................................................................................... xvii 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... xviii 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................... xviii 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
Defining Shari‘ah Compliance ............................................................................ 6 
Research Questions .............................................................................................. 7 
Research Justification .......................................................................................... 8 
Addressing the Lack of Research..................................................................... 8 
Maintaining Financial Stability ...................................................................... 10 
Protecting Consumers .................................................................................... 11 
Mitigating Legal Risk .................................................................................... 12 
Boosting Economic Efficiency ...................................................................... 13 
Scope of the Study ............................................................................................. 13 
Methodology ...................................................................................................... 14 
Structure of the Thesis ....................................................................................... 15 
Chapter One: An Overview of Shari‘ah .................................................................. 18 
1.1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 18 
1.2. Overview of Shari‘ah and Its Foundation .............................................. 18 
1.3. Schools of Thought ................................................................................ 20 
1.4. Islamic Legal Ruling .............................................................................. 21 
1.5. Main Features of Islamic Finance .......................................................... 24 
1.5.1. Ribā ................................................................................................. 24 
iii 
 
1.5.2. Gharar ............................................................................................. 26 
1.5.3. Maisir and Qim’ar .......................................................................... 27 
1.6. Shari‘ah-Compliant Financial Instruments ............................................ 28 
1.6.1. Equity-Type Contracts .................................................................... 29 
1.6.2. Debt-Financing Contracts ............................................................... 30 
1.7. The Objectives of Islamic Law .............................................................. 32 
1.8. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 40 
Chapter Two: The Form Versus Substance Debate and the Roots of Creative 
Shari‘ah Compliance in Islamic Finance: Why Reinvent the Wheel? .................. 41 
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 41 
2.2. The Definition of Ḥīlah .......................................................................... 43 
2.3. The Origins and the Evolution of Ḥīlah ................................................. 45 
1.3.2.  The Excessive Use of Hypothetical Cases ..................................... 46 
1.3.1.  Political Conflicts and State Oppression ........................................ 48 
2.3.3. The Gap between Shari‘ah Ideology and Society’s Needs ............. 49 
1.2.  Positions on Ḥīlah of Islamic Schools of Thought ................................ 51 
2.4.1. The Shāfiʿī School .......................................................................... 52 
2.4.2. The Ḥanafī School .......................................................................... 56 
2.4.3. The Mālikī School .......................................................................... 59 
2.4.4. The Ḥanbalī School ........................................................................ 60 
2.4.5. Other Schools of Thought............................................................... 61 
2.5. Refuting the Pro-Ḥīlah Arguments ........................................................ 64 
2.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 72 
Chapter Three: Tawarruq as a Case Study of Creative Shari‘ah Compliance .... 74 
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 74 
3.2. Definition of Tawarruq and Selection Rationale ................................... 74 
3.3. The Development of Tawarruq ............................................................. 76 
3.3.1. Jurisprudential Tawarruq ................................................................ 77 
3.3.2. Partly Organised Tawarruq ............................................................. 77 
3.3.3. Fully Organised Tawarruq .............................................................. 77 
3.4. The Differences between Jurisprudential and Organised Tawarruq ..... 80 
iv 
 
3.5. Forms of Tawarruq ................................................................................ 81 
3.6. Shari‘ah Jurists’ Views on Tawarruq .................................................... 83 
3.6.1. Jurisprudential Tawarruq ................................................................ 83 
3.6.2. Arguments against Organised Tawarruq ........................................ 84 
3.6.3. Arguments Supporting Organised Tawarruq .................................. 90 
3.6.4. Is Tawarruq Better than Ribā? ........................................................ 94 
3.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 96 
Chapter Four: Standardisation of Fatwas to Reduce Creative Shari‘ah 
Compliance ................................................................................................................. 98 
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 98 
4.2. Standardisation: A Definition ................................................................ 99 
4.3. Why Is Standardisation Needed? ......................................................... 100 
4.3.1. Arguments for Standardisation ..................................................... 100 
4.3.2. Arguments against Standardisation .............................................. 105 
4.4. Causes of Juristic Differences .............................................................. 109 
4.4.1. Variable Quranic Recitations........................................................ 112 
4.4.2. Using Words with Multiple Meanings ......................................... 113 
4.4.3. Lack of Knowledge of Ḥadīth ....................................................... 114 
4.4.4. Different Requirements for Adopting Ḥadīth ............................... 116 
4.4.5. Adopting Certain Legal Principles ............................................... 118 
4.4.6. Disregarding the Change of Maṣlaḥah ......................................... 120 
4.4.7. The Structure of the Fatwa Question ............................................ 122 
4.5. Remedies for Inconsistency ................................................................. 123 
4.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 132 
Chapter Five:  The Impact of Shari‘ah Governance Practises on Shari‘ah 
Compliance in Contemporary Islamic Finance .................................................... 133 
5.1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 133 
5.2. Shari‘ah Supervisory Board Definition ............................................... 134 
5.3. The Importance of SSBs ...................................................................... 136 
5.4. Regulatory Issues Surrounding Shari‘ah Supervisory Boards ............. 139 
5.4.1. The Ambiguous Role of SSBs ...................................................... 139 
v 
 
5.4.2. SSBs’ Lack of Legal Status .......................................................... 147 
5.4.3. SSBs’ Lack of Accountability ...................................................... 153 
5.4.4. SSBs’ Lack of Transparency ........................................................ 159 
5.4.5. The Lack of Independence of SSBs ............................................. 165 
5.4.6. Conflicts of Interest ...................................................................... 179 
5.4.7. Lack of Competence ..................................................................... 189 
5.5. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 194 
Chapter Six: Public Mechanisms to Remedy Creative Shari‘ah Compliance ... 196 
6.1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 196 
6.2. Overview and Justification of CSSBs .................................................. 196 
6.2.1. Justifications for CSSBs ............................................................... 198 
6.3. Tasks of CSSBs.................................................................................... 201 
6.4. The Central Shari‘ah Board in Sudan .................................................. 203 
6.5. The Central Shari‘ah Board in Malaysia ............................................. 206 
6.5.1. BNM Shari‘ah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial 
Institutions .................................................................................................... 210 
6.6. UK Regulators’ Approach towards Shari‘ah Governance ................... 215 
7.6.  Saudi Regulators’ Approach towards Shari‘ah Governance ............... 226 
6.8. Compulsory Disclosure ........................................................................ 237 
6.9. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 242 
Chapter Seven: Private Mechanisms to Remedy Creative Shari‘ah Compliance245 
7.1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 245 
7.2. Shari‘ah Compliance Rating ................................................................ 246 
7.3. Shari‘ah Indices ................................................................................... 253 
7.4. Private External Shari‘ah Auditing Firms............................................ 255 
7.5. International Islamic Financial Standards ............................................ 260 
7.6. Whistle Blowing .................................................................................. 266 
7.7. Characterising the Articles of Association .......................................... 268 
7.8. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 269 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 271 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 285 
vi 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Gratitude is due to Allah, The Most Compassionate and The Most Merciful, for 
giving me patience, strength, and ability to complete this study.  
I would like to express my gratitude and heartfelt thanks to my distinguished 
supervisor, Professor Dalvinder Singh, for his valuable guidance, encouragement, 
time, and sincere efforts during the course of my research.  
My gratitude also goes to Mr Nicholas H. D. Foster, Dr Musa Usman Abubakar, 
Dr Abou Jeng, Sheikh Faizal Ahmad Manjoo, Salim Al-Ali, and Khiled Al-Muflih for 
their inspiring comments and encouragement.  
I would like also to thank my former and current colleagues at Warwick Law 
School, including Shahbaz A. Cheema, Rajnarah Akhtar, Rumana Islam, Joy Malala, 
Sheharyar Hamid, Hassan Nizami, and Pedro Florencio. Raza Saeed deserves special 
mention for his help and support.   
My heartfelt gratitude goes to my parents and my siblings for their sacrifice, 
encouragement, and prayers for my success. I must extend special gratitude to wife, 
Reem, and my children, Hassan and Judy, who accompany me through this journey, 
never failing to provide me with love and warmth, and have helped to ease the 
pressure of the task of completing this thesis. 
  
vii 
 
Dedication 
 
To my dear parents: Abduallah Alkhamees and Moday al-shamssan   
viii 
 
Declaration 
I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and effort. Where other sources of 
information have been used, they have been acknowledged. It has not been submitted 
in any previous application for any degree apart from an early version of the 
background material in sections 1.1 and 1.2 of chapter one, which was developed 
during the study of my arbitration module in my LLM degree and was published 
during the study of my PhD as: 
 
 Alkhamees, Ahmad. “International Arbitration and Shari'a Law: Context, Scope, and 
Intersections.” Journal of International Arbitration 28, no. 3 (2011): 255–64. 
 
 In addition, I have published the following parts of this thesis:  
 
 An early version of chapter four was presented at “Business in between 
Cultures—The Development of Islamic Finance” in Sarajevo on 15 and 16 
November 2012, and the conference proceedings is to be published by the 
European Association for Banking and Financial History. 
 An early version of chapter five was published under the following citation: 
Alkhamees, Ahmad. “The Impact of Shari’ah Governance Practises on 
Shari’ah Compliance in Contemporary Islamic Finance.” Journal of Banking 
Regulation 14, no. 2 (10 September 2012): 134–63. 
 
 
  
ix 
 
 
Abstract 
Creative Shari‘ah compliance can be defined as compliance with the letter but not 
the objectives of Shari‘ah. In recent years, Islamic finance industry practises have 
come under scrutiny, with strong critiques levelled against many institutions that 
claim to provide Shari‘ah-compliant Islamic financial products and services, while 
such products and services in fact undermine the spirit and the objectives of Shari‘ah. 
Financial instruments based on the profit- and loss-sharing model are deemed by 
Shari‘ah scholars and Muslim academics to be the most compliant with the objectives 
of Islamic law. Nonetheless, research has shown that they are the least practised forms 
of Islamic finance; in contrast, institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) 
offer mainly debt-based instruments. 
While many researchers have noted this gap between the theory and practise of 
Islamic finance, no study has provided a sustained analysis of the issue. This thesis 
undertakes such analysis and, in doing so, significantly contributes to the sphere of 
Islamic finance in three main ways. First, it critically appraises justifications of 
creative Shari‘ah compliance practises. Second, it examines how Shari‘ah supervisory 
board )SSB) governance practises and the inconsistent fatwas (Islamic legal opinions) 
issued by SSBs contribute to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance in 
contemporary Islamic finance. Most importantly, it suggests regulatory mechanisms 
which regulators can employ in Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and in secular 
countries such as the United Kingdom to deal with the issue of creative Shari‘ah 
compliance. 
This thesis concludes that creative Shari‘ah compliance is not a phenomenon new 
to Islamic law, but it is one that has no solid justification in Islamic jurisprudence. 
This study suggests two public mechanisms to remedy the issue of creative Shari‘ah 
compliance: establishing central Shari‘ah supervisory boards and enforcing 
compulsory disclosure. In addition, it proposes private mechanisms to remedy 
creative Shari‘ah compliance which can be employed without governmental 
involvement. These mechanisms include adopting a Shari‘ah compliance rating, 
Shari‘ah indices, private Shari‘ah auditing, international standards related to 
enhancing Shari‘ah compliance, and a whistle-blowing policy for serious Shari‘ah-
compliance violations, as well as characterising an IIFS in its articles of association as 
an entity that fully complies with Shari‘ah ruling. These remedies are particularly 
useful when an IIFS is operating within a jurisdiction where regulators cannot or 
prefer not to be involved in regulating Shari‘ah governance. 
  
x 
 
Glossary of Arabic Terms 
’adl: justice 
ʿadālah: upright character 
aḥād: single 
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Introduction 
 
Over the past few decades, the Islamic financial services industry has witnessed a 
rapid increase in size, with an annual growth rate of 10% to 20%.1 Currently, more 
than 300 Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) are spread over 51 countries around the 
world.2 Standard & Poor’s estimates that the industry is worth approximately $1.4 
trillion,3 a number projected to reach $2.8 trillion by 2015.4 These market figures have 
motivated a number of global financial institutions such as Citibank, Goldman Sachs, 
HSBC, and BNP Paribas to start offering Shari‘ah-compliant financial services.5  
However, claims have arisen that many institutions offer Shari‘ah-compliant 
financial services which in practise appear to risk undermining the spirit and 
objectives of Islamic finance.6 This fear has been increasingly echoed by Shari‘ah 
                                                 
1Siba Sami Ammari, "Islamic Finance Industry Exceeds Growth Expectation as Conventional Finance 
Suffers through Economic Crisis," AME Info FZ LLC / Emap Limited, 
http://www.ameinfo.com/218528.html. accessed 12 September 2011. For the growth of Islamic finance 
industry worldwide  see: M. Mansoor  Khan and M. Ishaq Bhatti, "Islamic Banking and Finance: On Its 
Way to Globalization," Managerial Finance 34, no. 10 (2008). 
2Juan Sole, "Introducing Islamic Banks into Coventional Banking Systems,"  (2007) IMF Working 
Paper No. 07/175(2007) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007924 accessed 12 September 2011. 
3Zeynep Holmes and Surinder Kathpalia, "Standard & Poor’s Islamic Finance Outlook 2014,"  
http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Ratings_EMEA/IslamicFinanceOutlook_2014.pdf. 
accessed 6 March 2014. 
4Dana El Baltaji and Haris Anwar, "Shariah Scholar on More Than 50 Boards Opposes Limit Plan: 
Islamic Finance," Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-23/shariah-scholar-on-more-
than-50-boards-opposes-limit-plan-islamic-finance.html. accessed 25 November 2010. 
5Dahlia El-Hawary, Wafik M. Grais, and Zamir Iqbal, "Regulating Islamic Financial Institutions : The 
Nature of The Regulated,"  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3227, March 2004(2004) 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2004/06/03/000009486_200406031
73425/additional/112512322_20041117151025.pdf accessed 10 December 2010. 
6 Refer to  : Mahmoud Amin El-Gamal, Islamic Finance : Law, Economics, and Practice  (Cambridge 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p12 & 23; Yahia Abdul-Rahman, The Art of Islamic Banking 
and Finance : Tools and Techniques for Community-Based Banking  (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2010), 
P237; Khalid Howladar, "Shari'ah Risk: Understanding Recent Compliance Issues in Islamic Finance," 
Moody’s, 
http://eng.assaif.org/content/download/7643/43051/file/MDYs_ShariahRisk_KHowladar.pdf. accessed 
17 October 2010; Habib  Ahmed, "Maqasid al-Shari’ah and Islamic Financial Products: A Framework 
for Assessment," ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance 3, no. 1 (2011): p150; Tawfique  Al-
Mubarak and Noor Mohammad  Osmani, "Applications of Maqasid al-Shari’ah and Maslahah in 
Islamic Banking practices: An Analysis" (paper presented at the International Seminar on Islamic 
Finance in India, Kochi, India, 4 - 6 /10/ 2010), p15; Houssemeddine Bedoui and Walid Mansour, 
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scholars, academics, and investors with particular interest in Islamic finance.7 For 
instance, Sheikh Saleh Kamel,8 one of the principal architects of the Islamic finance 
industry and the chairman and founder of many Islamic banks, lamented in a recent 
interview that many so-called Islamic banking products and services are not actually 
Islamic.9 Similarly, in 2008, the sukūk (Islamic bond) market suffered a loss of about 
$15 billion in the wake of a renowned scholar’s remark that 85% of the ṣukūk traded 
in the market are not Shari‘ah compliant.10 This phenomenon is so prevalent that in 
2011,11 a popular Saudi Arabian television comedy called Tāsh Mā Tāsh (No Big 
Deal) provoked a huge controversy after accusing Islamic banks of being no different 
from conventional banks. The episode was titled zayd akhūʿubayda, an Arabic idiom 
that means “cut from the same cloth”. Moreover, the issue has been openly discussed 
in various newspapers which characterise the practise of institutions offering Islamic 
financial services (IIFS) as tadlīs (fraud).12 Khan suggests that an IIFS “replaces 
                                                                                                                                            
"Islamic banks performance and Maqasid alShari’ah" (paper presented at the the 9th Asia-Pacific 
Economic Association Conference, Osaka, Japan, 27-28/7/2013), p25.. 
7 See for example: A Fayyad, 'alerqabh alesher'eyh walethedyat alem'easerh ' Umm Al Qura 
University,HG Rammal, 'The Importance Of Shari‘ah Supervision In Islamic Financial Institutions' 
(2006) 3 Corporate Ownership and Control Journal 204. 
8 Saleh Kamel is the chairman of Dallah al Baraka Group in addition to the General Council for Islamic 
Banks. He has been involved in the Islamic finance industry and promoting Islamic economic research 
since1969. In 2010, Malaysia awarded Saleh Kamel the Royal Award for Islamic Finance, 
acknowledging his leadership and personal commitment in promoting the global accessibility of 
Islamic finance. Mohd Syazwan Rahimy Mohd Mokthar, "Malaysia Honours Shaikh Saleh Abdullah 
Kamel," Vocus, http://www.prweb.com/releases/2010/11/prweb4727694.htm. accessed 23 September 
2011. 
9Wael Mahdi, "Most of Islamic Financial Products are not Islamic," ArabianBusiness.com 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/arabic/517729. accessed 10 November 2010. 
10Sara Hamdan, "Non-Sharia Compliance Costs sSukuk Industry Billions," The National, 
http://www.zawya.com/Story.cfm/sidZAWYA20090414051357/Non-
Sharia%20Compliance%20Costs%20Sukuk%20Industry%20Billions. accessed 6 October 2010; 
Mohammed Khnifer, "$ 31 Billion evaporate in 2008 after Osmani's Statements and the Financial 
Crisis", Alaqtsadyh Newspaper, 17 January  2009 
http://www.aleqt.com/2009/01/17/article_185096.html. accessed 10 October 2010.  
11Alarabiya, "ḥalaqah zayd akhū ʿubayd fī ṭāsh 18 takshif wasāʾil al-bunūk al-islāamiyah fī al-taḥāul 
biālribā," Alarabiya.net, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/11/161888.html. accessed 21 April 
2012. 
12 See for example, Hend Al-Ahmad, "al-ghāmidī: ghālibiyyh al-qanawāt al-maṣrifiyyah al-slāmayyah 
lā tuṭabq mabādi al-āqtiṣād al-slāmī", Alsharq Newspaper 30/1/2012 
http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/01/30/104076. accessed 1 May 2013; Mohammad Shoeb, "Present 
Islamic banks no different from other banks, experts lament", Peninsula Newspaper 
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conventional banking terminology with terms from classical Arabic and offers near-
identical services to its clients but at a higher cost”.13 Bedoui and Mansour note that 
the Islamic finance industry “is simply the same conventional industry but with 
makeup”.14 The issue has even been noted by anti-Shari‘ah campaigners such as 
David Yerushalmi.15 In 1999, the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) reviewed and approved murābaḥah (a mark-up sale), the most common 
product offered by IIFS, concluding that “the economic substance of the murābaḥah 
financing transaction is functionally equivalent to either a real estate mortgage 
transaction or an inventory or equipment loan agreement”.16 
The gap between the theory and the practise of Islamic finance has been pointed 
out by many researchers17 and characterised by some as constituting a kind of 
“Shari‘ah arbitrage”18 or “pseudo-Islamic product”.19 In theory, financial instruments 
which are based on the principle of profit- and loss-sharing (PLS) are the ideal form 
of financing in Islamic law.20 However, IIFS offer primarily debt-based instruments,21 
                                                                                                                                            
http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/176705/present-islamic-banks-no-different-from-other-banks-
experts-lament. accessed 3 May 2012 
13Feisal Khan, "How ‘Islamic’ is Islamic Banking?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
76, no. 3 (2010): p818. 
14Bedoui and Mansour, "Islamic banks performance and Maqasid alShari’ah," p25. 
15D. Yerushalmi, "Shari'ah's ``Black Box'': Civil Liability and Criminal Exposure Surrounding 
Shari'ah-Compliant Finance," Utah law review., no. 3 (2008). 
16Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), "Interpretive Letter #867," OCC,, 
http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/nov99/int867.pdf. accessed 1 May 2014 
17 See for example , M. Fahim Khan, "Setting Standards for Shariah Application in The Islamic 
Financial Industry," Thunderbird International Business Review 49, no. 3 (2007): p287; Mohammed 
Nejatullah Siddiqi, "Banking and Finance in Theory and Practice: A Survey of the State of the Art," 
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markets," Opalesque Islamic Finance Intelligence, http://www.kantakji.com/media/7540/c69.pdf. 
accessed 5 May 2013. 
18El-Gamal, Islamic Finance : Law, Economics, and Practice, p21. 
19Ahmed, "Maqasid al-Shari’ah and Islamic Financial Products: A Framework for Assessment," p155. 
20Refer to: Abdulazeem Abozaid and Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki, "The Challenges of Realizing Maqasid al-
Shari`ah in Islamic Banking and Finance" (paper presented at the IIUM International Conference on 
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which Shari‘ah actively discourages.22 The permissibility of several heavily used 
financing instruments in the industry, such as tawarruq, bai' al-‘ina,  and 
murābaḥah,23 is strongly disputed, as many Shari‘ah scholars see them as 
incompatible with the objectives of Islamic finance.24 These transactions have been 
vilified as opening a “back door” to usurious prohibited transactions.25  
The practise which this thesis calls “creative Shari‘ah compliance”, drawing on 
the term “creative compliance” coined by McBarnet and Whelan,26 starts when a ḥīlah 
(legal ruse) is employed to circumvent Islamic finance rules and thus to provide fatwa 
                                                                                                                                            
Islamic Banking and Finance:‘Research and Development: The Bridge between Ideals and Realities’, 
Kuala Lumpur, 23rd – 25th April 2007), p4-5; Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic 
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21 See: Syed Abdus Samad, Norman D Gardner, and Bradley J Cook, "Islamic Banking and Finance in 
Theory and Practice: The Experience of Malaysia and Bahrain," The American journal of Islamic 
social sciences. 22, no. 2 (2005): p79; Nus Sechafia et al., "What Drives An Ideal Islamic Finance? A 
Maqasid Compliance Approach" (paper presented at the International Business and Social Sciences and 
Research Conference, Cancun, Mexico,, 16 - 17 /12/ 2013), p11-13; Ezry Fahmy  Eddy Yusof, Jhordy  
Kashoogie, and Asim  Anwar Kamal, "Islamic Finance: Debt versus Equity Financing in the Light of 
Maqasid al-Shari'ah.," (2009) http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/20722 accessed 10 February 
2014; Khan, "Setting Standards for Shariah Application in The Islamic Financial Industry," p287; 
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Examining the Overpowering of Homoislamicus by Homoeconomicus," p173; Hasan, "Fifty Years of 
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Loss Sharing in Islamic Banking: Management and Control Imbalances." 
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Beyond Legality  " (paper presented at the 8th  International Conference on Islamic Economics and 
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Ahmed, "Contractual Forms in Islamic Finance Law and Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. 
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Journal 27, no. 1 (2003): p174. 
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(Islamic legal opinion) that suits the institution’s products, regardless of the fact that 
these products blatantly contravene the spirit of Islamic law. Creative Shari‘ah 
compliance might involve restructuring conventional products in a way that satisfies 
Shari‘ah requirements in form but not in substance.27 This revised structure usually 
consists of multiple complex contracts and sub-agreements branded with Arabic 
names.28 The aim of these combined contracts is “breaking down the overall 
questionable transaction into two segments—each of which, individually, 
being Shari‘ah compliant—whose combination ends up recreating the overall effect of 
the forbidden transaction”.29 The complexity of such an instrument sometimes makes 
it hard for experts to verify its compliance with Shari‘ah law.30 This procedure has 
been called “Black Box Syndrome” by Shaykh Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo,31 an 
American Shari‘ah scholar and a renowned figure within the industry. He writes: 
I would like to see more faith in what true and diligent Shari‘ah compliance 
actually means to our industry. I am dismayed by quick fixes and shortcuts 
which in many cases circumvent the Shari‘ah. The industry has proved time 
and again that adherence to the principles of Shari‘ah can be profitable, and 
that such adherence does not spell hardship. We have no need of “black 
boxes” and of arm's length transactions that miraculously produce results by 
sacrificing the spirit of the Shari‘ah to the letter of the law. 
The deployment of creative compliance practises to avoid standards is not a new 
phenomenon, especially in relation to standards of practise in accounting and 
                                                 
27Abdul-Rahman, The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance : Tools and Techniques for Community-
Based Banking, p237. 
28 See: Reza Djojosugito, "Mitigating Legal Risk in Islamic Banking Operations," Humanomics 24, no. 
2 (2008): p111; Khan, "How ‘Islamic’ is Islamic Banking?," p818. 
29Osama Athar, "An Outsider's View on Islamic Finance”, Harvard Islamic Finance Forum”," Dinar 
Standard™, http://www.dinarstandard.com/finance/HarvardFin051908.htm. accessed 10 November 
2011; see also: Ahmed, "Maqasid al-Shari’ah and Islamic Financial Products: A Framework for 
Assessment," p150. 
30Howladar, "Shari'ah Risk: Understanding Recent Compliance Issues in Islamic Finance". 
31Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, "The Black Box Syndrome: A New Challenge for Shariah Supervisory 
Boards," Islamic Finance news, 
http://www.shariahfunds.com/pubs/news/Islamic%20Finance%20News%20V4i14.pdf. accessed 11 
March 2014. 
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taxation32 as well as in various legal areas such as environmental law33 and labour 
law.34 McBarnet and Whelan distinguish between “rule compliance”, which adheres 
only to the letter of the law, and “substantive compliance”, which is compatible with 
the law’s overall objectives.35 While creative compliance does not impugn the validity 
of the standard of practise in conventional finance, it does run the risk of making 
contracts and agreements void in Islamic finance,36 which would pose a greater legal 
risk than conventional finance. 
 
Defining Shari‘ah Compliance  
The term “Shari‘ah compliance” has no standard definition;37 different authors 
have used it to refer to different concepts. For instance, Mikail and Arifin38 describe 
as “Shari‘ah compliant” those financial products which have origins in conventional 
finance but have been “Islamised”, while they use “Shari‘ah-based” to refer to 
products which have no foundation in conventional finance. On the other hand, 
Ahmed39 uses “Shari‘ah compliance” to refer to products which conform to the form 
and substance of Shari‘ah but not to the social needs of the community, while using 
the term “Shari‘ah-based” to refer to products which conform to the form and 
                                                 
32McBarnet and Whelan, "The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal 
Control." See also: Doreen J. McBarnet, Crime, Compliance and Control  (Aldershot: 
Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2004). 
33Daniel A. Farber, "Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in 
Environmental Law," Harvard Environmental Law Review 23, no. 2 (1999). 
34Amanda Pyman, "Creative Compliance in Labour Relations: ‘Turning the Law on its Head’," in 
Advances in Industrial & Labor Relations, ed. David Lewin and Bruce E. Kaufman (Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited, 2005) 
35Karen Yeung, Securing  Compliance : a Principled Approach  (Oxford: Hart Pub, 2004), p11. 
36 See: Djojosugito, "Mitigating Legal Risk in Islamic Banking Operations."; Sole, "Introducing 
Islamic Banks into Coventional Banking Systems". p4. 
37Sa'id Adekunle Mikail and Mahamad Arifin, "A Critical Study on Shari'Ah Compliant and Shari'Ah 
Based Products in Islamic Banking Institutions," Journal of Islamic and Human Advanced Research 3, 
no. 4 (2013): p169. 
38Ibid. 
39Ahmed, "Maqasid al-Shari’ah and Islamic Financial Products: A Framework for Assessment," p156. 
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substance of Shari‘ah and satisfy “the legitimate needs of all market segments”,40 
including small entrepreneurs and the poor. In this thesis, the term “Shari‘ah 
compliance” refers to substantive compliance with the form and collective goals of 
Islamic law. 
Research Questions 
This research seeks to engage with the following questions: 
 Is creative Shari‘ah compliance a phenomenon new to Islamic law? Are the 
positions of the various Islamic jurisprudential schools supporting “substance” 
or “form” in Islamic finance? Does Islamic jurisprudence justify using ḥīlah (a 
legal ruse) to practise creative Shari‘ah compliance? 
 To what extent do inconsistencies in the fatwas issued by Shari‘ah supervisory 
boards (SSBs) contribute to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance? What 
are the causes of juristic differences? Will standardisation of Shari‘ah rulings 
benefit or harm the Islamic finance industry? How did Islamic states deal with 
this issue in the past, and is there justification in Islam for enforcing a 
particular view of one school of thought? 
 Are SSB governance practises affecting Shari‘ah compliance in IIFS? 
Specifically, how could issues such as SSBs’ unclear functions and legal 
status, lack of accountability and transparency, and conflicts of interest and 
lack of independence, as well as the poor training and inadequate 
qualifications of SSB members, contribute to the issue of creative Shari‘ah 
compliance in the contemporary Islamic finance industry?   
 To what extent can a national body be involved in addressing the issue of 
creative Shari‘ah compliance? Should states establish a central Shari‘ah 
                                                 
40Ibid. 
8 
 
supervisory board (CSSB)? What are the limitations of a CSSB as a public 
mechanism to deal with creative Shari‘ah compliance? Do the regulatory 
approaches toward Shari‘ah governance that are applied in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) adequately deal with 
creative Shari‘ah compliance? 
 What role can the private sector play in remedying creative Shari‘ah 
compliance? Specifically, how effective are private mechanisms such as 
adopting a Shari‘ah compliance rating, Shari‘ah indices, a whistle-blowing 
policy for serious Shari‘ah-compliance violations, and private Shari‘ah 
auditing in dealing with creative Shari‘ah compliance? Can these remedies be 
used when an IIFS is operating within a jurisdiction where regulators cannot 
or prefer not to be involved in regulating Shari‘ah governance? 
Research Justification 
The rationale for undertaking this research is fivefold, in that the study addresses 
the lack of research in this subject as well as the need to maintain financial stability, 
protect consumers, mitigate legal risk, and boost economic efficiency in the Islamic 
financial industry.  
Addressing the Lack of Research 
Shari‘ah compliance is the backbone of Islamic finance, yet not much attention 
has been paid to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance from a regulatory 
perspective. The existing literature has identified the issue but stopped short of 
profoundly analysing it or addressing key factors which contribute to the 
phenomenon.41 Research in Islamic finance has disproportionately focused on issues 
of agency theory in Islamic investment accounts, corporate governance, and Shari‘ah 
                                                 
41 For example, refer to the sources mentioned in footnote 17.   
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board practises, while devoting little time to issues and challenges of creative Shari‘ah 
compliance.42 My study remedies the paucity of research in this area by critically 
appraising justifications of creative Shari‘ah compliance practises and examining the 
relationship between SSB governance practises and creative Shari‘ah compliance in 
contemporary Islamic finance. It also offers researchers who do not read Arabic 
critical access to the classical and present-day discourse of Shari‘ah scholars. 
Most importantly, the thesis suggests regulatory mechanisms which can be 
employed by regulators in Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and secular 
countries such as the United Kingdom to deal with the issue of creative Shari‘ah 
compliance. The choice of Saudi Arabia is motivated by the fact that despite the huge 
and growing market for Islamic finance, regulation of the industry is nonexistent, as 
there are neither the legal instruments nor an appropriate body to oversee the industry. 
In fact, as Rodney Wilson43 has observed, “The sensitive issue of Shari‘ah 
was not really addressed by SAMA [the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency]”,44 nor was 
it tackled by the Capital Markets Law of 2003.45 These omissions are particularly 
ironic given the number of ṣukūk issuances and hedge funds as well as large Shari‘ah-
compliant mutual funds businesses in Saudi Arabia.46 Islamic banking business 
                                                 
42See for example: Anwar Khalifa  AI-Sadah, "Corporate Governance of Islamic Banks: Characteristics 
and Effects on Stakeholders and the Role of Islamic Banks Supervisors" (PhD thesis, University of 
Surrey,School of Management, 2007); Faris Mahmoud Abumouamer, "An Analysis of the Role and 
Function of the Shariah Control in Islamic Banks" (PhD thesis, University of Wales, College of 
Cardiff, 1989); Zulkifli  Hasan, "Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, 
GCC countries and the UK" (PhD thesis University of Durham, School of Government and 
International Affairs, 2011). 
43Rodney Wilson, "The Development of Islamic Finance in the GCC,"  LSE Centre for the Study of 
Global Governance, May 2009(2009) 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/kuwait/documents/Wilson.pdf accessed 10 
November 2010 
44Ibid., P5,7. 
45Saudi Arabia, "Capital Market Law  " Capital Market Authority (CMA), 
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/AboutCMA/CMALaw/Documents/CAPITAL%20MARKET%20LAW-26-
8-009.pdf. accessed 25 September 2011 
46Wilson, "The Development of Islamic Finance in the GCC"; Zulkifli Hasan, "Regulatory Framework 
of Shari’ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the UK," Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic 
Area Studies on Islamic Finance 3, no. 2 (2010). 
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accounts for 64% of the overall market share in Saudi Arabia.47 The choice of the 
United Kingdom relates to its status as a secular country with a growing Islamic 
banking industry and a large Muslim population that has a vested interest in the 
Islamic banking system. London is the largest international hub for Islamic finance 
outside of Islamic countries.48 It has the largest number of IIFS in Western Europe, 
with twelve Islamic banks in addition to ten main international banks that have 
established divisions to offer Islamic financial services.49 
Maintaining Financial Stability 
Compliance with Shari‘ah law is one of the fundamental tenets of Islam, which 
requires Muslims to incorporate its principles into every aspect of their lives. Any 
financial services offered to the Muslims, therefore, must comply with Shari‘ah 
principles.50 Parkinson suggests that the growth of Islamic finance will increase to 
such levels that it will be the standard in many Muslim countries; conventional 
banking might well become the exception,51 since clients of conventional finance can 
buy Islamic finance products, but not vice versa.52 Failure to ensure Shari‘ah 
compliance could pose a serious threat to the stability of the Islamic financial services 
industry, 53 as it may lead to a lack of confidence from clients that results in what 
                                                 
47Khan and Bhatti, "Islamic Banking and Finance: On Its Way to Globalization," p714. 
48 The Islamic Bank of Britain was the first British Islamic bank to be licensed. HSBC, Lloyds TSB, 
Barclays Capital, and other conventional banks offer Islamic finance products for their clients. See Abu 
Umar Faruq Ahmad and Muhammad Fazlul   Karim, "Legal and Regulatory Issues in Islamic Finance 
Industry: The Evidence from UK and Australia,"  6th  International Islamic Finance Conference 
(2008) http://www.kantakji.com/fiqh/Files/Markets/c35.pdf accessed 10 November 2010. 
49U. K. Trade Investment, The City: UK excellence in Islamic Finance 
  (London: UK Trade & Investment,, 2008), P2. See also, Rodney Wilson, Islamic Finance in Europe  
(Florence: European University Institute, 2007), p2; Abdul Karim Aldohni, The Legal and Regulatory 
Aspects of Islamic Banking : a Comparative Look at The United Kingdom and Malaysia  (London: 
Routledge, 2011), p21. 
50Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance, p475. 
51Giles  Parkinson, "Faith in The System," Intheblack, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5393/is_200708/ai_n21294575/ accessed 16 March 2011. 
52Ibid. 
53 See: Khan, "Setting Standards for Shariah Application in The Islamic Financial Industry," p288. 
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might be called an “Islamic bank run”.54 Unlike depositors in conventional banks, 
depositors in Islamic banks might withdraw their money not mainly out of fear of 
losing it, but out of concern about its usage for investment purposes that they may 
deem as non-Shari‘ah compliant, given that Shari‘ah compliance is one of the key 
motivations for dealing with an Islamic bank in the first place.55 Jonathan 
Ercanbrack56 points out this distinctive reputational risk of Islamic finance products 
and criticises the financial regulators in the UK for failing to mitigate that risk by 
regulating the religious aspect of these products, instead applying the same regulatory 
treatment to Islamic and conventional financial sectors.57According to a study 
conducted by Chapra and Ahmed, nearly 86% of depositors in Bahraini Islamic 
banks, in addition to 95% in Sudanese Islamic banks, would be prepared to withdraw 
their money if the banks were found not to be complying with Shari‘ah law.58 
Protecting Consumers 
Consumer protection and effective financial systems are the key objectives of all 
financial regulators.59 The absence of an effective and standardised framework which 
ensures Shari‘ah compliance could result in consumers discovering that they have 
                                                 
54 This phrase was coined by Professor Dalvinder Singh.  
55Abdul Karim Aldohni, "Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate Governance:The Dilemma of 
The Shari'a Supervisory Board," Company Lawyer 29, no. 5 (2008). 
56Jonathan Ercanbrack, "The Regulation of Islamic Finance in the United Kingdom," Ecclesiastical 
Law Journal 13, no. 1 (2011): p69-71. 
57The HM tax arrangement for Islamic financial products suggests an awareness that the economic 
substance of these products does not differ from that of the conventional ones. H. M. Treasury, "The 
Development of Islamic Finance in the UK the Government's perspective," HM Treasury, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120306210332/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/islamic_finance101208.pdf. accessed 10 May 2013. 
58M. Umer Chapra and Habib Ahmed, Corporate Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions  
(Jeddah: Islamic Development Bank, 2002), p119; Assem Safieddine, "Islamic Financial Institutions 
and Corporate Governance: New Insights for Agency Theory," Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 17, no. 2 (2009): p146. 
59 See for example : United Kingdom, "Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 : Chapter 8," The 
National Archives, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/pdfs/ukpga_20000008_en.pdf. 
accessed 15 May 2013; "Financial Services Act 2012," The National Archives, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/pdfs/ukpga_20120021_en.pdf. accessed 17 May 2013 
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purchased a non-Shari‘ah-compliant product.60 In 2009, Taqi Usmani, a leading figure 
in the field of Islamic finance, stated that “many structures presenting themselves as 
Islamic didn’t meet the definition of true Shari‘ah compliance”.61 Moreover, a study 
funded by the Dutch Central Bank suggests that Islamic financial consumers enjoy 
less protection than their counterparts in conventional finance.62 
Mitigating Legal Risk 
Creative Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic finance industry manifests itself in 
many ways which run the risk of legal challenge. This is especially the case when 
Islamic parties lack the capacity to sign a non-Shari‘ah-compliant contract. It is 
suggested that this can call into question the enforceability of the contract in both 
Muslim and secular countries. Concerns have also arisen over the legality of Islamic 
financial instruments and the uncertainty of law in relation to Shari‘ah.63 In 
Investment Dar v Blom Development Bank,64 for instance, a claimant who defaulted 
on a $100 million ṣukūk argued in its defence that the contract in question was not 
Shari‘ah compliant, despite the fact that its own Shari‘ah board had approved it as 
such. On the other hand, Rider65 argues that if an IIFS offered a Shari‘ah-compliant 
product that does not actually comply with Islamic law, it might be liable for breach 
of contract or misrepresentation. It could be also liable for mis-selling under various 
consumer protection laws and regulations. 
                                                 
60See: Hamdan, "Non-Sharia Compliance Costs sSukuk Industry Billions"; Mahdi, "Most of Islamic 
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Exploratory Analysis  (Amsterdam: De Nederlandsche Bank, Eurosysteem, 2008), p32. 
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Banks into Coventional Banking Systems". p4. 
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Boosting Economic Efficiency 
Creative Shari’ah compliance in the Islamic finance industry presents the 
additional problem of increasing economic costs. The process of restructuring 
conventional products to meet Shari‘ah requirements to the letter necessitates a 
network of complex contracts. These might involve establishing many special-
purpose vehicles which ultimately increase the legal cost of the transaction, although 
they neither present economic benefits nor add value for clients other than the 
deceptive appearance of Shari‘ah compliance.66As Nikan Firoozye notes,67 
questioning the Shari’ah authenticity of a product offered as Shari‘ah compliant, 
The Shari‘ah compliant option was altogether worse than its conventional 
counterpart. For one thing, the fee was likely to be larger than an option 
premium, including portions to reimburse bankers, structures, Shari‘ah 
scholars, salesmen and shareholders for their time and capital. All this for 
merely repackaging a forex call or put option and calling it a wa’d or 
promissory note. 
Scope of the Study 
The primary focus of this research is the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance in 
the Islamic finance industry from a regulatory perspective. This thesis does not 
attempt to discuss the economic or religious justifications of Islamic finance, since 
these issues are well recognised in the literature.68 
In addition, the discussion of this study is limited to the discourse of sunni Islamic 
schools of thought, starting with the four major sunni madhhab (schools of thought), 
Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī, which have the greatest impact on contemporary 
Islamic finance. Nonetheless, it occasionally addresses the position of other schools 
which have less impact over the industry but could play an active role in the future.  
                                                 
66El-Gamal, Islamic Finance : Law, Economics, and Practice, p6,21-23; Abdul-Rahman, The Art of 
Islamic Banking and Finance : Tools and Techniques for Community-Based Banking, p238. 
67Firoozye, "Wa’d and the completeness of Islamic markets". 
68 Refer to survey provided by Siddiqi, "Banking and Finance in Theory and Practice: A Survey of the 
State of the Art," p1. 
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Although this thesis makes special reference to Saudi Arabia and the UK, due to 
the fluid and integrated nature of Islamic finance, the research refers to other 
jurisdictions when necessary. 
Methodology 
This research is primarily library based. It analyses classical and contemporary 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) literature in addition to relevant legislation, official 
reports, textbooks, articles, and online databases both in Arabic and in English. The 
thesis mainly takes a non-doctrinal approach,69 since investigating the issue of 
creative Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic finance industry is, in a way, examining 
the gap between the “law in books” and “law in action”. This research acknowledges 
the positions of regulators in Islamic and secular countries and suggests reforms to the 
current framework which can benefit the stakeholders and protect the consumers of 
Shari‘ah-compliant products. However, as Dobinson and Johns note,70 an extensive 
study tends to include a doctrinal part where the researcher attempts to determine the 
existing law in a specific area before highlighting its deficiency and suggesting 
alternatives. Such is the case here. 
In dealing with the classical and contemporary Islamic jurisprudence literature, 
the thesis combines the approach of “Scholastic Neo-traditionalism”71 with a 
“maqāṣid [objective]-based” approach.72 The former is not restricted to one Islamic 
school of thought. It studies how each school of thought concluded its view and 
                                                 
69Ashish Kumar Singhal and Ikramuddin Malik, "Doctrinal and socio-legal methods of research: merits 
and demerits," Educational Research Journal 2, no. 7 (2012): p253. 
70Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns;, "Qualitative Legal Research," in Research Methods for Law, ed. 
Wing McConville Mike Hong Chui (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2007), p20. 
71Jasser Auda, Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: a Systems Approach  (London: 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008), p164. 
72Ibid., p176; Halim Rane, "Issues in Legal Thought," in Islam and Contemporary Civilisation : 
Evolving ideas, Transforming Relations (Melbourne, Vic.: Melbourne University Publishing, 2010), 
p93 
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whether that view is supported by the primary sources of Shari‘ah.73 It is currently, as 
noted by Auda,74 the most widely applied approach to Islamic legal research. The 
latter places particular importance on the maṣlaḥah (public interest), the objectives of 
the legal texts, and the intent of the lawgiver rather than merely on specific words or 
verses.75 The objective-based approach is highly relevant to the topic of this thesis, 
since the practises of creative Shari‘ah compliance flout the objective which Islamic 
law tries to achieve. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of this introduction, seven chapters, and a conclusion. Chapter one, 
“An Overview of Shari‘ah“, provides a short introduction to Shari‘ah (Islamic law) 
and the key features of Islamic finance, familiarising the reader with the basic 
concepts of Islamic law before presenting the main topic of this thesis. Chapter two, 
“The Form Versus Substance Debate and the Roots of Creative Shari‘ah Compliance 
in Islamic Finance: Why Reinvent the Wheel?” moves into the thesis’s primary area 
of exploration, examining whether creative Shari‘ah compliance is a phenomenon 
new to Islamic law. It investigates the positions of the various schools of thought on 
issues related to “substance” and “form” in Islamic finance, and it surveys whether 
classical Islamic jurisprudence justifies using ḥīlah (a legal ruse) to practise creative 
Shari‘ah compliance.  
Chapter three, “Tawarruq as a Case Study of Creative Shari‘ah Compliance”, 
illustrates creative Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic finance industry by examining 
tawarruq, one of the most common structures used by IIFS to offer Shari‘ah-
                                                 
73 See: Mahdi Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social 
Science Research Methods for Islamic Research," Arab law quarterly Arab law quarterly 18, no. 3-4 
(2003): p223. 
74Auda, Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: a Systems Approach, p164. 
75Ibid., p172. 
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compliant products and services. The next chapter, “Standardisation of Fatwas to 
Reduce Creative Shari‘ah Compliance”, examines the inconsistency in the fatwas 
issued by Shari‘ah supervisory boards (SSBs) that reside in various financial 
institutions as a key factor contributing to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance. It 
evaluates the suitability of standardisation as a mechanism to reduce conflict in the 
opinions of Shari‘ah scholars concerning the permissibility of financial products, 
addressing the arguments for and against standardisation and investigating the causes 
of juristic differences. This chapter traces the legal theories offered in classical 
Islamic jurisprudence to deal with this issue, then suggests potential remedies and 
highlights the limitations of implementing them in Islamic and secular countries. 
Chapter five, “The Impact of Shari‘ah Governance Practises on Shari‘ah 
Compliance in Contemporary Islamic Finance”, explores definitions of SSBs in 
Islamic finance literature as well as highlighting the importance of SSBs to IIFS 
structure. It then examines the impact of regulatory issues surrounding SSBs on 
Shari‘ah compliance in the contemporary Islamic finance industry, identifying seven 
challenges as major factors in reducing the level of Shari‘ah compliance in IIFS. 
These are the SSBs’ conflicting responsibilities, unclear functions and legal status, 
and lack of independence, accountability, and transparency, combined with the poor 
training and the inadequate qualifications of SSB members. 
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Chapters six and seven draw on the findings of earlier chapters to propose remedies 
for creative Shari‘ah compliance. Chapter six, “Public Mechanisms to Remedy 
Creative Shari‘ah Compliance”, suggests two public mechanisms that involve a 
national body in remedying the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance: establishing 
central Shari‘ah supervisory boards (CSSBs) and enforcing compulsory disclosure. It 
addresses the limitations of CSSBs, considering the central Shari‘ah boards in Sudan 
and Malaysia, and examines regulators’ approaches in the UK and the KSA towards 
Shari‘ah governance and CSSBs. The following chapter, “Private Mechanisms to 
Remedy Creative Shari‘ah Compliance”, suggests six mechanisms to remedy creative 
Shari‘ah compliance which can be employed by private actors in the industry without 
government involvement. Four of these mechanisms are external: adopting a Shari‘ah 
compliance rating, Shari‘ah indices, private Shari‘ah auditing, and international 
standards related to enhancing Shari‘ah compliance. The remaining two mechanisms 
are internal: a whistle-blowing policy for serious Shari‘ah-compliance violations and 
a clause in IIFS articles of association that characterises the IIFS as an entity that fully 
complies with Shari‘ah ruling. These remedies are particularly useful when an IIFS is 
operating within a jurisdiction where regulators cannot or prefer not to be involved in 
regulating Shari‘ah governance. 
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the study’s findings, drawing on them to offer 
suggestions and recommendations to reduce the practise of creative Shari‘ah 
compliance in the industry and to enhance general Shari‘ah compliance in IIFS. 
Chapter One: 
An Overview of Shari‘ah 
1.1.  Introduction   
This chapter provides a short introduction to Shari‘ah (Islamic law) and the key 
features of Islamic finance, familiarising the reader with the basic concepts of the law 
before reaching the main topic of this thesis. Since the scope of this research is 
limited, and these issues are well recognised in the literature, the discussion is 
confined to a general overview of the subject. 
This chapter consists of eight parts, including this introduction. Part 1.2 presents 
an overview of Shari‘ah and its origins, Part 1.3 provides a short history of the 
schools of Islamic law, Part 1.4 gives a necessary introduction to Islamic legal rulings, 
Part 1.5 addresses the main features of Islamic finance, Part 1.6 outlines the key 
Shari‘ah-compliant financial instruments, Part 1.7 highlights the objectives of Islamic 
law, and finally, Part 1.8 concludes the chapter.    
1.2.  Overview of Shari‘ah and Its Foundation 
Shari‘ah is an Arabic word which means literally “the path” or “the way”.76 In a 
religious context, it refers to the path that Allah (God) has formed for human beings to 
follow. Shari’ah covers the spiritual as well as the daily practises of Muslim life, as 
Islam assumes no division between the secular and the religious. The complete power 
of God is a fundamental faith of the Islam. Hence, Allah, according to Islam, “is the 
source of authority and the sole sovereign lawgiver”.77  
                                                 
76 S.  Kunhibava and Rachagan S., "Shariah and Law in Relation to Islamic Banking and Finance," 
Banking and Finance Law Review 26, no. 3 (2011): p544; Charles P Trumbull, "Islamic Arbitration: A 
New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts " Vand. L. Rev 59, no. 2 (2006): p626. An earlier 
version of this section was published as: Ahmad Alkhamees, "International Arbitration and Shari'a 
Law: Context, Scope, and Intersections," Journal of International Arbitration 28, no. 3 (2011). 
77 Faisal Kutty, "The Shari'a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration," Loyola of Los Angeles 
international & comparative law review Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law 
Review 28, no. 2 (2006): p578. 
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However, a distinction should be drawn between Shari‘ah and Islamic 
jurisprudence, commonly called “fiqh”, because some non-Muslim researchers tend to 
equate these terms.78 Islamic jurisprudence is a subset of Shari‘ah, composing a single 
area of the broader concept. Shari‘ah serves as the basis of all principles formed and 
expanded under fiqh, whereas the term “Islamic jurisprudence” generally refers to 
scholarly comprehension and findings derived from the primary and secondary 
sources of Shari‘ah.79  
The main sources of Islamic law are the Quran80 and the sunnah. The expression 
sunnah means the accumulation of the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, which 
includes his sayings, actions, decisions, and implicit approbation or disapproval of 
things.81 The secondary sources include ijma and qiyas. Ijma refers to the uncontested 
approval of qualified scholars on a certain matter of Islamic jurisprudence. Qiyas 
describes a methodical process of analogical reasoning that is applied when one 
considers an issue not explicitly treated in the primary sources of Shari‘ah. This 
procedure allows one to get from an identified injunction to a new injunction that 
applies Shari‘ah opinion to the issue in question.82 Some schools of thought recognise 
additional secondary sources for determining the Shari‘ah position on certain issues.83 
These include urf, the Arabic for “custom”, maslahah mursalah (public interest), and 
                                                 
78 See: Abdulrahman Baamir and Ilias Bantekas, "Saudi Law as Lex Arbitri: Evaluation of Saudi 
Arbitration Law and Judicial Practice," Arbitration International 25, no. 2 (2009): p262. 
79  See: Auda, Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: a Systems Approach, p57. 
80 “Quran” is an Arabic word which literally means “recitation”. The Quran is the holy book which 
Muslims believe was revealed from Allah (God) to the Prophet Muhammad.  It is considered to be the 
highest religious text in Islam. See: "Quran," Oxford University Press, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/opr/t125/e1945. accessed 04/12/2010 
81 Kutty, "The Shari'a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration," p585. Trumbull, "Islamic 
Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts " p626-27. Mohammad Hashim 
Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Third ed. (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 2003), 
p58. 
82 Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p264. 
83 Ibid., p306 and the following chapters.  
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sadd al-dhariāʾi84 (precautionary legal prohibition), which entitle the blocking of 
actions that could lead to unlawful ends.85 
1.3.  Schools of Thought 
Although the main principles of Shari‘ah and the essential doctrines of Islamic 
jurisprudence are identical, Islamic scholars have always debated the proper 
understanding of Shari‘ah commands regarding the secondary issues, along with 
whether a certain rule can be applied in a particular situation.86 This debate has 
resulted in the formation of many different sunnī schools of thought, or madhabs, as 
they are known in Arabic. These can be categorised into two general schools of 
thought: the school of ahl al-raʾy87 (literally “the people of good sense”) in Iraq and 
the school of ahl al-ḥadīth88 (the traditionalists) in Medina. The former generally 
includes those in favour of using independent legal arguments to conclude a Shari‘ah 
ruling. The latter includes those who endeavour to base the law on the traditions of the 
Prophet and his companions. According to their view, it is illegitimate to favour or 
solely rely on unrestricted human reasoning, especially when it conflicts with an 
authentic ḥadīth (tradition). 
Several sunnī schools have ramified from these two major schools of thought. Of 
these, however, only four major schools remain in the Islamic world today. This thesis 
primarily investigates the position of these schools of thought, since they have a great 
                                                 
84 Literally “the blocking of means”; the blocking of actions that could lead to unlawful ends. See:  
ibid., p397. 
85 See: ʿAbdAllāh Ibn Bayyah, Sadd al-Dharīʿah wa Taṭṭbīqātuh fī Majāl al-Muʿāmalāt  (Islamic 
Development Bank, 1997), p48; Mir Siadat Ali Khan, "The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and 
How They Are Evaded," Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 11, no. 4 (1929): 
p240; Aḥmad ibn ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyah, al-Qawāʿid al-Nawrānīh al-Fiqhiyah, ed. Muḥammad 
Ḥāmid al-Faqī (Maktabah al-Sunnah al-Muḥammadiyyh, 1951), p119. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Peter C Hennigan, "Ahl al-raʾy," in Encyclopaedia of Islam (Brill, 2012) 
<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/ahl-al-ray-COM_22177> 
accessed 1 April 2012. 
88 See: Joseph Schacht, "Ahl al-Ḥadīt̲h̲," ibid.  
<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ahl-al-hadith-SIM_0379>  
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impact on contemporary Islamic finance.89 These schools are the Ḥanafī School, 
named after its founder, the scholar Abū Ḥanīfah (d.150 AH/767 CE); the Mālikī 
School, named after its founder, Mālik Ibn Anas (d.179/795); the Shāfiʿī School, 
named after the scholar Al-Shāfiʿī (d.204/820); and finally the Ḥanbalī School, named 
after the scholar Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). Nevertheless, as Shari‘ah scholars 
are not considered infallible in Islam, all of the scholars’ fatwas concerning the 
secondary issues are regarded as equally applicable. 
1.4.  Islamic Legal Ruling 
Unlike other legal systems in which immoral action is not necessarily illegal, in 
Islam it is very difficult to separate the two, as Shari‘ah law acts as the judge of what 
is legal in addition to what is good and evil.90 Immoral actions can have a 
consequence in this world and the hereafter. For example, practicing usury not only is 
a sin, but also can result in the usurious contract being deemed fāsid (void). The 
immorality of certain actions may sometimes be hidden (e.g., bad faith), causing the 
judge to consider those actions ṣaḥīḥ qaḍāʾan (valid). Nonetheless, a person can be 
held accountable for such immoral action in the hereafter. The rest of this section 
further describes this framework. 
Understanding these two notions within the Islamic legal ruling is necessary to 
appreciate the arguments in chapter two. The legal ruling of Shari‘ah (al-ḥukm al-
sharʿī) is divided into two categories: al-ḥukm al-taklīfī (defining law) and al-ḥukm 
al-waḍʿī (declaratory rulings or correlative law).91 These apply to human actions 
                                                 
89 Occasionally, the thesis might explore the position of other schools of thought where it is relevant 
(e.g.. where their views are cited in classical and contemporary literature on comparative 
jurisprudence) 
90 Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return  (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law Internat., 1998), p41. 
91 Auda, Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: a Systems Approach, p137-40; Kamali, 
Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p413. 
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which, in Shari‘ah, generally have two dimensions: hidden and manifest.92 Al-ḥukm 
al-taklīfī is concerned with the inward hidden dimension and the accountability of a 
person in the hereafter, while al-ḥukm al-waḍʿī has more to do with the outward 
manifest dimension and individuals’ rights and relations in this world.93 For example, 
if two people connive to testify falsely against another person, their agreement is 
prohibited from the al-ḥukm al-taklīfī perspective, but the testimony itself before a 
judge is valid from the al-ḥukm al-waḍʿī perspective, assuming there is no evidence of 
their false testimony.94 Another example is the action of selling property to avoid 
payment of zakāh (obligatory charity tax). The hidden side of this action is subject to 
the classification of the defining law, which prohibits the transaction as it aims to 
avoid obligation.95 The manifest side is subject to classification of the correlative law, 
which deems the transaction valid since it appears to be a legal exchange.96     
Al-ḥukm al-taklīfī defines the scope of a person’s liberty of action.97 It can 
embody a demand that the mukallaf (religiously accountable person) take an action or 
refrain from one, or it can allow him to choose between the two. Al-ḥukm al-waḍʿī 
plays a descriptive role in relation to al-ḥukm al-taklīfī. It is a communication from 
the lawgiver (Allah) which decrees something into sabab (a cause), a sharṭ 
                                                 
92 See: ʿAbdAllāh Marzūq al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī  (Namaa for Research 
and Studies Centrer, 2012), p320; Aḥmad ibn ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyah, al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, ed. 
Muḥammad ʿaṭā and ʿabd al-Qādir ʿaṭā, vol. 6 (Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyyh, 1987), p190. 
93 See: al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, 6, p190; al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p320; Wael 
B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh  (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p41.   
94 Aḥmad ibn ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, ed. Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-
Majīd  al-Salafī (al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1988), p309; Muḥammad bn Abī Bakr Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-
Mawqiʿayn ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, ed. Ṭah ʿAbd al-Raʾuf  Saʿd, vol. 3 (Dār al-Jīl, 1973), p281. 
95 For the prohibition of avoiding zakāh in this case see: Iʿlām al-Mawqiʿayn ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, 3, 
p208; Aḥmad ʿUmar al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal  (Maṭbaʿah al-Qāhirah, 1896), p6; Yaʿqūb Ibrāhīm 
Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj  (Dār al-Maʿrifh, 1979), p82. 
96 See generally: al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p210. 
97 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p413. 
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(condition), or a māniʿ (hindrance), or declares an action to be ṣaḥiḥ (valid) or fāsid 
(void).98   
Al-ḥukm al-taklīfī subdivides actions into five classes: wājib (obligatory), 
mastaḥab (recommended), muḥarram (prohibited), makrūh (discouraged), and mubāḥ 
(neutral or indifferent). Actions classified as prohibited or obligatory fall under the 
umbrella of law, since law by its nature imposes obligation and prohibits certain 
actions, and it usually rewards those who follow it and punishes those who defy it. 
However, recommended (mastaḥab) and discouraged (makrūh) acts cannot be 
considered part of a legal framework, at least directly, because complying with the 
recommendation attracts a reward, but failure to comply carries no punishment. 
Nevertheless, both kinds of classifications are integral components of the Islamic 
legal system,99 as Shari‘ah pays similar attention to recommended and disapproved 
acts as to prescribed and prohibited acts. Likewise, the neutral classification (mubāḥ) 
cannot be subsumed under the heading of law, although classical scholars have 
debated whether arguments exist that would justify its inclusion under the category of 
defining rulings.100 The neutral level is not only out the realm of obligatory and 
prohibited classification, but also outside the recommended and disapproved classes. 
It falls outside the two categories as it attracts neither reward nor punishment.101    
                                                 
98 See for example:  Ibrāhīm Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt, ed. Mashhūr Ḥasan Salmān, vol. 1 (Dār 
Ibn ʿAffān, 1997), p297; Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p413. Muḥammad ʿAlī al- 
Āmidī, al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām, ed. Sayyid al-Jamīlī, vol. 1 (Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1984), p137. 
The majority of schools uphold that there are no different levels of invalidity. However, the Ḥanafī 
School differentiates between two degrees of invalidity: bāṭil (void or null) and fāsid. A contract is 
deemed bāṭil if it lacks an essential element; it is considered nonexistent and establishes no legal effect. 
However, if the contract only lacks a non-essential element such as a condition, it is called fāsid. This 
is a degree between valid and void where the contract produces some of its legal effects. For example, 
a fāsid transaction establishes the ownership of the purchaser, but it does not entitle him to the usufruct 
intifāʿ. 
99 Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law  (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1998), p19-22. 
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh, p40-41. 
100 al- Āmidī, al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām, 1, p170. 
101 Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law, p20. 
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With regard to al-ḥukm al-waḍʿī, this thesis is concerned with the classification of 
an action as valid or void. The notion of validity (al-ṣiḥḥah) as a part of declaratory 
rulings is based on whether an action has been performed correctly, resulting in an 
obligation being fulfilled or a transaction taking effect.102 If, for example, a deal is 
concluded in way that does not comply with Shari‘ah requirements for a contract of 
sale, it will not create the binding legal effect of transferring ownership. 
1.5.  Main Features of Islamic Finance 
In Shari‘ah, the starting assumption for all contracts and conditions is 
permissibility.103 Verse 2:275 of the Quran reads, “Allah has permitted trade and has 
forbidden interest”.104 However, for a contract to be Shari‘ah compliant, it must avoid 
certain restrictions, or be free of a number of prohibitions. Below is a summary of the 
three main factors which can render a contract non-Shari‘ah compliant.    
1.5.1.  Ribā  
The prohibition of ribā is perhaps the most distinctive feature of Islamic 
finance.105 The Arabic word ribā literally means an increase or growth. Ribā tends to 
be translated in English as “usury” or “interest”, although it has a wider meaning in 
Shari‘ah.106 However, this thesis uses these translations interchangeably. A 
transaction will be deemed ribawī (usurious) if it has one or both of the following 
elements:    
                                                 
102 See: ibid., p21; Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p438. 
103 Wahbah al-Zuḥaylī, Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence, trans. El-Gamal Mahmoud A. 
and Eissa Muhammad S., vol. 1 (Damascus, Syria: Dar al-Fikr, 2007), p7. 
104 Saheeh International, Translation Of The Meanings Of The Glorious Quran  (al-Muntada al-Islami, 
2004). 
105 El-Gamal, Islamic Finance : Law, Economics, and Practice, p49. 
106 Tarek El Diwany, ed. Islamic Banking and Finance : What it is and What it could be (Bolton: 1st 
Ethical Charitable Trust, 2010), p99. 
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1. “An excess (al-faḍal) in the amount of one countervalue over the other in 
barter transactions of specific commodities”.107  
2. “A delay (al-nsaʾ) in the settlement of one or both countervalues”.108 
Accordingly, two types of ribā are recognised: ribā al-qurūḍ (the usury of loans) 
and ribā al-buyūʿ (the usury of trade).109 An example of the former is lending one 
ounce of gold now and collecting two ounces of gold in return two weeks later. An 
example of the latter is exchanging one kilogram of good-quality dates for three 
kilograms grams of poor-quality dates.        
One thing to bear in mind is that unlike other sins, ribā is strictly prohibited in 
Islam.110 This prohibition can be drawn from several verses of the Quran and a 
number of hadīth. For example, verses 2:278–279 read: 
O you who have believed, fear Allah and give up what remains [due to you] 
of interest, if you should be believers. And if you do not, then be informed of 
a war [against you] from Allah and His Messenger. But if you repent, you 
may have your principal—[thus] you do no wrong, nor are you wronged.111     
Besides, a contract will be invalidated if it includes a ribā clause.112 The lender and 
the borrower in addition to the writer and the witness of a usury contract are all 
equally guilty of the wrongdoing, as stated in the following hadīth:      
Jabir said that Allah's Messenger cursed the accepter of interest and its payer, 
and one who records it, and the two witnesses, and he said: They are all 
equal.113 
                                                 
107 These commodities are mentioned in a hadīth which has been narrated on the authority of Abu Sa'id 
al-Khudri. In it, the prophet said, “Gold is to be paid for by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, 
barley by barley, dates by dates, salt by salt, like by like, payment being made hand to hand. He who 
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Although Shari‘ah scholars unanimously agree on the prohibition of ribā, they 
dispute its scope and some of its rules which have been discussed extensively in 
Islamic jurisprudence literature.114 The details of such discussion are beyond the limit 
of this thesis; the important point here is that there is a general agreement on the 
prohibition of interest-bearing loans.115       
1.5.1.1.  Time Value of Money  
Shari‘ah’s prohibition on usury does not mean that it entirely dismissed the notion 
of the time value of money.116 For instance, if a seller opts to sell his property on a 
deferred basis, he is permitted to charge a higher price than what he usually charges 
on a cash basis.117 Moreover, in an investment, the supplier of capital can gain a 
return for his capital in a profit- and loss-sharing agreement with the investor. Yet the 
return is not guaranteed, because in contrast to conventional finance, Shari‘ah does 
not recognise money as a commodity but as a medium of exchange.118 The capital 
provided to the investor is thus subject to the same uncertainties faced by other 
partners in the enterprise.  
1.5.2.  Gharar 
Another important principle of Islamic finance is the prohibition of gharar, which 
tends to be translated as risk or uncertainty.119 It is difficult to provide a 
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comprehensive definition for gharar,120 since the Arabic root of the word can be 
associated with various notions such as fraud, deception, danger, fallaciousness, and 
uncertainty.121 Al-Zarqa' defines gharar as “the sale of probable items whose 
existence or characteristics are not certain, due to the risky nature which makes the 
trade similar to gambling”.122 Al-Suwaylim attempts to quantitatively define a gharar 
transaction by equating it to “a zero-sum game with uncertain payoffs”.123 Gharar can 
occur when uncertainty surrounds the existence, possession, availability, price, and 
deliverability of the object of a contract. It also can occur where the terms of a 
contract are uncertain (e.g., making a sale contingent on a future event such as “snow 
on day X”). A classic example of a gharar transaction is selling a fish in the sea. 
Importantly, minor gharar is forgiven; only major gharar (excessive risk or 
uncertainty) will invalidate a contract.124 By forbidding gharar, Shari‘ah aims to 
reduce the chances of exploitation and dispute in society.125 In the financial context, 
the principle of avoiding gharar is relevant to determining the Shari‘ah view on the 
insurance market and financial derivatives.126  
1.5.3.  Maisir and Qim’ar 
Another important principle in Islamic finance is the prohibition of maisir and 
qim’ar.127 The former can be translated as “gambling”, where wealth can be acquired 
by chance or easily without compensating for it or incurring liability against it. The 
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latter can be translated as “a game of chance”, in which two competitive parties take 
on a risk of loss, and the gain for one is the loss of the other.128 On the subject of 
maisir, verse 5:90 of the Quran reads:  
O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, [sacrificing on] 
stone alters [to other than Allah], and divining arrows are but defilement from 
the work of Satan, so avoid it that you may be successful.129 
In the same vein, verse 2:219 reads: 
They ask you about wine and gambling. Say, “In them is great sin and [yet, 
some] benefit for people. But their sin is greater than their benefit”.130 
According to Ayub,131 qim’ar is an important subset of maisir (gambling), which 
itself is a form of gharar since gamblers are uncertain about the outcome of their 
gamble. The principle of avoiding maisir and qim’ar is highly relevant to the Shari‘ah 
view on investing in companies with gambling as a primary source of income. It is 
also relevant to assessing the Shari‘ah compliance of public and private sector 
schemes where resources are mobilised on the basis of lotteries and draws.132    
1.6.   Shari‘ah-Compliant Financial Instruments 
Authors have taken different approaches when presenting Shari‘ah-compliant 
contracts.133 This thesis categorises Shari‘ah-compliant financial instruments into two 
groups: equity-type contracts and debt-financing contracts. Examples of relevant 
instruments from each group are provided below.   
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1.6.1.  Equity-Type Contracts 
Instruments of equity-type contracts are based on the principle of profit- and loss-
sharing (PLS) which is the backbone of the Islamic financial system.134 Although this 
type of contract is the most compliant with the objectives of Islamic law,135 it is the 
least practised form of Islamic finance.136 This section discusses two forms of this 
type of contract, mushārakah and mudaraba. 
Mushārakah (partnership)137 is a PLS agreement between two or more parties in 
which all the partners provide capital and have the right to manage the business 
venture. The ratio of profit distribution must be pre-agreed, but it can be negotiated 
between the parties and does not necessarily need to reflect the percentage of capital 
contribution.138 However, unlike in conventional finance, where parties are free to 
negotiate the ratio of loss distributions, in mushārakah the loss is shared between all 
partners in ratio to their capital participation. In addition, each partner is jointly liable 
to a third party for the actions of other partners (e.g., negligence).139 
Mudaraba (silent partnership or trustee profit-sharing)140 is a partnership 
agreement in which one party known as rabb ul-mal (investor or silent partner) 
provides capital to another party known as mudarib (entrepreneur or trustee of the 
venture) to invest in a business venture. Funds and labour are equally recognised 
methods of creating wealth. Therefore, both parties generally share the profit of the 
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venture.141 The ratio of profit distribution must be pre-agreed and can be negotiated 
between the parties. Unlike in conventional finance, the capital provider is guaranteed 
a definite return or a fixed annual payment. In the event of a loss, the investor loses 
his capital, while the trustee of the venture loses his time and effort in running the 
business.142 In case the trustee of the venture takes action that does not comply with 
the conditions and limitations agreed upon with the investor, his action is deemed 
ultra vires and he is liable for any loss or damage resulting from his action.143  
The above-mentioned accounts of mushārakah and mudaraba only cover the basic 
notion of the two instruments. Shari‘ah scholars’ discussion on issues related to the 
two forms, as well as challenges in applying these instruments in the modern financial 
system, is well researched in the literature.144    
1.6.2.  Debt-Financing Contracts 
The forms in this category are the most used instruments in the Islamic finance 
industry.145 This is because from an economic viewpoint, they share many similarities 
with conventional finance instruments. Moreover, they pose a lower risk in 
comparison to equity-type instruments.146 Accordingly, it is not surprising that the 
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Shari‘ah compliance of some of these instruments is very controversial among 
Shari‘ah scholars, since they are seen as deviating from the objectives of Shari‘ah.147 
Although this category includes many instruments, this section briefly describes the 
most common ones in the industry, namely murābaḥah, tawarruq, and īnah.  
Murābaḥah (a mark-up sale)148 is a form of finance where a client orders the bank 
to buy a commodity or property with a binding promise to buy it from the bank. The 
bank then sells it to the client via deferred payment at a cost that includes a profit 
margin.  
Tawarruq149 is defined in the Islamic jurisprudence literature150 as a form of 
finance where buyer A purchases a commodity from a seller for a deferred payment 
and then resells it to buyer B for cash at a price that is usually lower than the original 
cost. Buyer A does not intend to use the commodity, but rather purchases it intending 
to sell it to obtain liquidity. Buyer A does not have a prior arrangement to sell the 
commodity to a specific buyer B in this case. Chapter 3 examines tawarruq as a case 
study for creative Shari‘ah compliance. 
Bai' al-‘ina151 is a form of finance where an owner sells his asset on a deferred 
basis and then buys it back from the purchaser on a cash basis at a price that is usually 
lower than the original selling price. While the owner profits from the difference 
between the first purchase price and the buyback price, the first buyer secures 
liquidity without engaging directly in a usurious loan. However, the majority of 
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Shari‘ah scholars deem such a transaction as muḥarram (prohibited) because they see 
it as ḥīlah (a legal ruse) to circumvent the Shari‘ah prohibition against ribā (usury).152 
Chapters two and three provide more insight about these types of transactions.   
1.7.  The Objectives of Islamic Law 
A study of the objectives of Shari‘ah law, known in Arabic as maqāṣid al-
sharīʿah, is necessary to properly identify practises of creative Shari‘ah compliance in 
the Islamic finance industry.153 How can we know that a particular transaction does 
not comply with the objectives of the law if we do not know these objectives? In 
addition, knowing maqāṣid al-sharīʿah is a significant tool for assessing the 
justifications used for some creative Shari‘ah compliance practises.154 As will be seen 
later, the objectives of Shari‘ah can be divided into different levels which have 
different priorities. In some situations, a low-priority objective of Shari‘ah has been 
used as an excuse not to conform to a rule that serves a higher objective of 
Shari‘ah.155 For example, the usury prohibition serves two higher objectives of 
Shari‘ah, which are to circulate and protect wealth as well as to remove social 
injustice. A lower-priority objective of Shari‘ah, removing hardship, has been used to 
justify some circumventions of the usury prohibition, although these practises violate 
the two higher objectives of Shari‘ah that are associated with the prohibition.156 
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Accordingly, identifying which objective prevails over another is crucial to refuting 
such justifications. 
Maqāṣid al-sharīʿah has almost become a separate discipline within Islamic legal 
theory, with a vast collection of classical and modern literature directed to this 
subject. As the limited scope of this thesis does not allow a thorough introduction to 
maqāṣid al-sharīʿah, it gives readers a brief overview of the subject here. Maqāṣid in 
Arabic is the plural of maqṣad, which can be translated as “destination, intent, 
purpose, object, goal, aim, and end”.157 Maqāṣid al-sharīʿah consists of the wisdom 
and underlying objectives of Shari‘ah rulings.158 Muslim legal theorists agree that the 
overall objective of Shari‘ah is to bring benefit to and remove harm from all human 
beings.159 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī160 (d. 505 AH/1111 CE), one of the most notable 
Muslim legal theorists, gives a more detailed account of this overall objective of 
Shari‘ah. He holds that Shari‘ah promotes the well-being of people by protecting five 
principles: the preservation of religion (dīn), the preservation of life (nafs), the 
preservation of intellect (ʿaql), the preservation of posterity (nasl), and the 
preservation of wealth (māl). According to al-Ghazālī, anything that contributes to the 
preservation of these five principles benefits the public and is desired, while anything 
that harms them is detrimental to the public and should be eliminated. These five 
elements identified by al-Ghazālī have become known in Islamic legal theory as the 
five essential maqāṣid (objectives). 
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Dusuki and Bouheraoua161 identify four main characteristics of maqāṣid al-
sharīʿah. The first is that they are regarded as the foundation of legislation. This is 
because laws aim to benefit the public and protect against harm. Any rule that does 
not serve this purpose is not part of Shari‘ah, even if some interpretations claim it to 
be. Shari‘ah jurists have arrived at this conclusion through an inductive reading 
(istiqrāʾ) of the primary sources of Shari‘ah. Dusuki and Bouheraoua quote the 
following statement of Ibn al-Qayyim (d.751/1350): 
The Shari‘ah is based on wisdom and achieving people’s welfare in this life 
and in the hereafter. The Shari‘ah is all about justice, mercy, wisdom, and 
good. Thus, any ruling that replaces justice with injustice, mercy with its 
opposite, common good with harm, or wisdom with nonsense, is a ruling that 
does not belong to the Shari‘ah even if it is claimed to be so according to 
some interpretations.162 
The second characteristic of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah is its universal nature, given that 
Shari‘ah is meant to benefit all human beings. Islam is not restricted to certain groups 
of mankind, and Muslims believe that Shari‘ah is applicable to all people until the end 
of this world. Verse 34:28 reads, “We have not sent you, [O Muhammad,] except to 
mankind as a whole”.163 The third characteristic of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah is its 
applicability to all human deeds, from a personal act of worship of god to an 
interaction with other human beings. Verse 16:89 reads, “And we sent down to you 
the Book as a clarification for everything and as guidance and a mercy and good 
tidings to the Muslims”.164 The fourth characteristic of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah is that it is 
comprehensive, in the sense that it has been based on different collections of legal 
texts, as opposed to rules that are based on a single item of legal evidence. Dusuki and 
Bouheraoua provide several examples of legal maxims in Islamic legal theory which 
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have this characteristic, such as al-umwr bimaqāṣidihā (“Acts are judged by 
intentions”), al-kharāj biālḍamān (“The right to gain and profit comes with liability to 
loss and damage”), and al-ḍarūriyāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt (“Necessity legalises 
prohibitions”).    
Islamic legal theorists divide the objectives of Islamic law into two categories, 
maqāṣid ʿāmmah (general objectives) and maqāṣid khāṣṣah (specific objectives).165 
While the former provides the overall objectives for the whole legal system, the latter 
presents the aims of a particular aspect of Islamic law—for example, the objectives of 
Islamic finance or of Shari‘ah criminal law. However, considering the great deal of 
intersection and integration between the general and specific objectives of Islamic 
law, dealing with these categories in a discrete way might be naïve.166 
Al-Shāṭibī (d.790/1388),167 a renowned classical theorist in the area of maqāṣid al-
sharīʿah, further subdivides the general objectives of Shari‘ah into three groups based 
on a hierarchy of importance: ḍarūriyāt (the necessities), ḥājiyyāt (the complementary 
or the needs), and taḥsīyynāt (the luxuries).168 The necessities group, comprising 
elements that are essential to human welfare, includes the five objectives of al-
Ghazālī mentioned earlier: safeguarding religion, life, intellect, posterity, and 
wealth.169 Other scholars have added objectives to this category, including protecting 
justice, equality, freedom and the environment.170 The safeguarding of these elements 
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is crucial to the well-being of individuals and society in both religious and worldly 
matters; the erosion of these elements can result in disorder and chaos.171 The second 
group, ḥājiyyāt, includes elements of a lower priority than the five core elements in 
the first category. The fulfilment of these objectives eliminates hardship and 
predicament while facilitating daily life. Unlike the necessities group, neglecting these 
elements will not lead to disorder and chaos.172 The group of taḥsīyynāt (luxuries or 
embellishments) includes interests oriented toward improving life, as well as good 
conduct and actions such as donating to the needy beyond the compulsory zakah. 
These three groups are interconnected.173 The necessities are vital to the needs and 
luxuries groups, as any scarcity in the first group unavoidably results in scarcities in 
the second two groups. Similarly, a complete shortage in the needs and luxuries 
groups might result in scarcity to some extent in the necessities group. 
The management of institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) should 
consider how their decisions and actions will affect the interests of the three groups. 
For example, IIFS should not become involved in a business that could hurt one of the 
five essentials, such as the manufacturing of drugs and alcohol, which can hurt 
intellect and life. Similarly, investing in a casino breaches the objectives of preserving 
religion and wealth. At the second level, the complementary, IIFS should ensure 
adequate training, fair pay and comfortable workplaces for their employees. These 
amenities will remove hardship, although their absence will not directly hurt the 
essential five elements. At the third level, the embellishments, IIFS can fulfil their 
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social responsibility and contribute to the improvement of public life via such 
mechanisms as donations and sponsorship of charitable events.174  
With regard to the objectives of Islamic finance, Shari‘ah theorists tend to 
centralise their discussion on the notion of wealth protection, as pointed out by al-
Ghazālī,175 and wealth circulation. The circulation of wealth initiates with the 
mobilisation of surplus capital and continues until the capital is utilised in the deficit 
sector. The circulation of wealth includes all procedures associated with its creation, 
utilisation and allocation. The objective of wealth circulation is drawn from verse 
59:7 of the Quran, which justifies the command of distributing a person’s wealth 
among different needy groups in society “in order that it [wealth] may not [merely] 
make a circuit between the [rich] among you”.176 Shari‘ah aims to circulate resources 
in the economy so that individuals can fulfil their potential to foster the well-being of 
the community and future generations.177 Wealth is deemed Allah’s bounty, which 
mankind is entrusted178 to allocate in the best possible way. Kamali179 notes that ’adl 
(justice) has been mentioned in the Quran 53 times, which shows that it is a principal 
objective of Shari‘ah. He explains that ’adl literally means “to place things in their 
right and proper order [.] … [It] is to seek to establish an equilibrium between rights 
and obligations, so as to eliminate all excesses and disparities, in all spheres of life”. 
Recognising private ownership does not mean only stratifying personal needs and 
neglecting the needs of society. Financial transactions and commercial exchanges are 
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seen as a means of circulating resources among all parts of the community and are not 
to be dominated by a small group of people.180 In other words, social justice is 
realised in Shari‘ah via resource circulation, efficiency in resource consumption, and 
the satisfaction of people’s basic needs. 
In addition, Shari‘ah scholars have affirmed the safeguarding of wealth in several 
key dimensions such as preserving ownership, preserving the value of wealth, 
protecting wealth from damage,181 associating transactions with real economic 
activities, and prohibiting the sale of debt. A Shari‘ah legal principle such as al-kharāj 
biālḍamān (the right to gain and profit comes with liability to loss and damage) 
reflects the spirit of social justice which Islamic finance tries to achieve.182   
The prohibition of ribā and gharar serves to achieve the same result of social 
justice. Ribā is seen as unjustified growth in wealth and has been associated with 
wrongful acquisition at the cost of the fair circulation of resources, as well as the 
welfare of the public.183 The prohibition of riba suggests that Shari‘ah encourages 
cooperative and participatory funding (equity-based financing), which is thus 
regarded as a fair mechanism for mobilising wealth which increases productivity and 
achieves social well-being.184 Moreover, by preventing negative factors such as ribā 
and gharar that disturb equality or give one party the chance to increase its wealth at 
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the expense of others, Shari‘ah aims to establish a level playing field between 
different parties in a transaction. One of the main characteristics of ribā is that it shifts 
risk to one party while protecting the other with a fixed return. In a usurious loan, risk 
is transferred to the borrower, who is required to pay the capital plus interest 
regardless of any loss that he may incur.185 The widespread practise of interest-based 
loans increases debt proliferation, which has harmful effects that Shari‘ah aims to 
remove.186 Siddiqi187 argues that a financial system based on debt is unfair because it 
redistributes wealth in favour of the providers of finance regardless of the productivity 
of the fund provided. It is also an inefficient way of creating wealth, since the fund 
goes to the most creditworthy debtor and not to the most productive project. He also 
notes that  
To exchange money now for more money later is fundamentally unfair due to 
the uncertainty that accompanies the passage of time. Money needs to be 
converted into goods and services before it can enter into the process of 
production, the source of possible additional value creation. The results of 
such process[es] of production have to be reconverted into money before 
money can be paid back to the one who gave it in the first instance.188  
On the other hand, gharar is forbidden due to its impact on efforts to negotiate a 
fair financial contract.189 This is because the uncertainty surrounding the subject of the 
contract in terms of its existence, possession, availability, price, and deliverability 
increases the role of pure speculation and leaves one party to the transaction 
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dissatisfied and disappointed. This in turn causes harm and tends to lead to 
disputes.190   
1.8.  Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of Islamic law and its key features to 
prepare readers for a substantive discussion of their application in the Islamic 
financial industry in subsequent chapters. The policies and objectives of IIFS, as 
businesses based on Shari‘ah-compliant products, should be strongly influenced by 
the objectives of Islamic law. Moreover, these objectives should be used as criteria to 
assess the compliance of IIFS with Shari‘ah principles. Thus, understanding the 
sources, principles, distinctions, and organisation of Shari’ah law is crucial to 
understanding this thesis’s discussion of creative Shari’ah compliance. 
The next chapter, “The Form Versus Substance Debate and the Roots of Creative 
Shari'ah Compliance in Islamic Finance: Why Reinvent the Wheel?” draws on this 
foundational information to examine whether creative Shari‘ah compliance is a 
phenomenon new to Islamic law. It investigates the positions of the various schools of 
thought on issues related to “substance” and “form” in Islamic finance, and it surveys 
whether classical Islamic jurisprudence justifies using ḥīlah (a legal ruse) to practise 
creative Shari‘ah compliance. 
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Chapter Two: 
The Form Versus Substance Debate and the Roots of 
Creative Shari‘ah Compliance in Islamic Finance: Why 
Reinvent the Wheel? 
 
You should never neglect the intention of the speaker and his motives; if you 
do, you would harm him, and you would harm the Shari‘ah by attributing to 
it something that does not befit it. A sound-minded jurist would ask, “What 
did you intend?” and a shallow-minded jurist would ask, “What did you 
say?”191 
—Ibn al-Qayyim (d.751 AH/1350 CE) 
2.1.  Introduction  
The issue of financial contracts’ legal form versus their economic and ethical 
substance has been frequently debated in the Islamic finance industry.192 It has 
recently attracted more attention after the outcome of several English cases which 
called into question the enforceability of some contracts widely used to structure 
Islamic financial products.193 In 2011,194 the International Shari‘ah Research Academy 
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Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) and the Institute of Islamic Banking and 
Insurance (IIBI) organised a thematic workshop where Shari‘ah scholars, lawyers, and 
practitioners gathered to discuss the challenges of form versus substance in Islamic 
finance transactions and to assess how credibility could be restored to allay concerns 
about authenticity in the Islamic finance industry. 
However, as this chapter shows, the debate of form and substance is not 
completely new to Islamic law literature, though it has been addressed using different 
terminology. Classical jurists have extensively debated the issue using the term ḥīlah 
(legal ruse).195 It is not clear why the term ḥīlah is avoided when the issue arises in 
some of the contemporary literature, conferences, and workshops such as the one 
mentioned earlier. Is it because the subject is sensitive and the word ḥīlah might be 
offensive, since it implies a sense of deception, or is it because the usage might cause 
harm to the marketing of Islamic financial products?  Whatever the reason, disguising 
a known issue in the literature under new terminology does not take the debate 
forward. Accordingly, this chapter recognises that discussing the issue of form versus 
substance in Islamic finance is basically discussing ḥīlah. This chapter therefore aims 
to examine the treatment of ḥīlah in sunni Islamic jurisprudence, and it surveys 
whether classical Islamic jurisprudence justifies using ḥīlah to practise creative 
Shari‘ah compliance.  
This chapter’s key argument is that addressing the issue of form and substance in 
Islamic finance necessitates a distinction between two connotations: permissibility 
(ṣaḥīḥ diyānatan) and validity (ṣaḥīḥ qaḍāʾan).196 In Islam, every action generally 
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has two dimensions: hidden and manifest. “Permissibility” here refers to the inward, 
hidden dimension of a contract, where it is characterised, for example, as prohibited 
or permissible. This dimension concerns the accountability of a person to Allah in the 
hereafter. “Validity”, in this research, refers to the outward, manifest dimension of a 
contract, where a judge rules whether it is valid and thus legally enforceable or not. 
The outward dimension is concerned with individuals’ rights in this world. From a 
permissibility perspective, the research argues that there is no authority for utilising a 
form to circumvent the spirit of Shari‘ah law in finance. However, from a judicial 
validity perspective, if such a form had been used in a contract and disputed before a 
judge, it could be deemed valid according to some schools of thought, including 
Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī.  
The chapter is structured in six parts including this introduction. Part 2.2 briefly 
explores definitions of ḥīlah in Islamic jurisprudence; Part 2.3 addresses the causes 
and the origin of ḥīlah; Part 2.4 investigates the view of Islamic schools of thought on 
ḥīlah; Part 2.5 examines the arguments for and against ḥīlah; finally, Part 2.6 
concludes the chapter.    
2.2.  The Definition of Ḥīlah   
Ḥīlah (plural ḥīyal) can be defined as a legal ruse or stratagem which uses 
legitimate means to achieve illegitimate ends.197 By applying a formalistic approach 
to contracts, it complies with the letter of the Shari‘ah while circumventing its 
substance.198 For example, to evade the Shari‘ah prohibition of collecting interest on 
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loans, the lender would use an ʿīnah contract,199 which involves double selling as 
follows: the lender sells a commodity to a prospective debtor for a fixed price on a 
deferred payment basis, and then buys it back immediately for cash at a lower fixed 
price. The debtor gets the cash he needs, while the lender keeps the asset used in the 
transaction in addition to the original purchase price, with a profit element which will 
be paid in instalments. In this example, the sale contracts in form appear to be 
Shari‘ah compliant because each transaction is separately a legitimate contract, but 
the complete process of the two transactions achieves an illegitimate end, which is 
charging interest on a loan. The debtor does not intend to purchase the asset, and the 
lender usually uses the same commodity to complete this procedure with other 
prospective debtors.  
However, it is important to point out that the same word has been used with a 
different meaning in the classical and contemporary literature. The word ḥīlah can 
also refer to a clever way of using the law which achieves a legitimate end.200 Al-
Shaʿbī (d.104 AH/722 CE), for example, defines ḥīlah as a tactic in which a person 
can take a permissible action and avoid breaching prohibition and committing sins.201 
The original root of the word in Arabic justifies such use.202 However, other scholars 
such as Ibn Taymiyah (d.728/1328), Ibn al-Qayyim (d.751/1350), and al-Shāṭibī 
(d.790/1388) use the term for both meanings, but add the qualifications of 
reprehensible ḥīlah and commendable ḥīlah to differentiate between the two 
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usages.203 The former serves to conclude illegitimate ends, whereas the latter achieves 
a result that does not contradict the spirit of the law. Contemporary scholars seem to 
favour referring to the permissible ḥīlah with the term makhraj fiqhī (jurisprudential 
leeway),204 while using “ḥīlah” to refer to an unlawful ruse.205 
2.3.  The Origins and the Evolution of Ḥīlah   
The use of legal ruses to comply with the letter of the law is a phenomenon not 
limited to one society;206 legal stratagems have been used in different legal systems 
throughout history.207 In the Islamic context, Ibn Taymiyah208 notes that the 
advocating of ḥīlah only started after the first Islamic century (700–740 AH). Several 
theories have been advanced as to why ḥīlah developed in Islamic societies.209 Given 
its limited space, this chapter discusses the three most commonly cited theories, 
namely, the excessive use of hypothetical cases as a method of teaching Islamic 
jurisprudence; political conflicts and state oppression; and the gap between the 
ideology of Shari‘ah and the needs of the society. 
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2.3.1.  The Excessive Use of Hypothetical Cases 
Historically, different schools of thought commonly used hypothetical questions 
as method of teaching Islamic jurisprudence.210 In particular, the Ḥanafī School in 
Iraq was famous for discussing legal challenges and speculating about situations that 
might arise in the future.211 However, the heavy engagement of Ḥanafī jurists in this 
practise led to the development of imaginary cases where the use of ḥīlah was the 
only legally valid solution. Although these discussions and debates were more of a 
scholastic nature and were not necessary presented as fatwas, they eventually become 
a part of the school’s jurisprudence and were used by the following generation of 
jurists as grounds for issuing fatwas.212  
Most of these ḥīyal initially involved questions about how to avoid obligations 
committed under vows or oaths.213 Historically, some rulers tended to force people, 
particularly political dissenters, to swear an oath of allegiance to ensure their loyalty. 
In addition, it was a common practise in the early Islamic centuries for a person to 
impose a penalty on himself if he did not fulfil his oath or vow. Another widespread 
practise was for a person to declare the divorce of his wife or the manumission of his 
slave subject to the happening of “a certain event, such as: if I do such and such a 
thing, or if such and such a thing happens, my wife is repudiated, or my slave is 
manumitted”.214 Shari‘ah generally discourages using an oath or vow in such a way 
but obligates its fulfilment once it has been undertaken. Therefore, ḥīlah was sought 
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to provide relief from the religious and legal duties attached to these oaths. Ibn 
Taymiyah215 cites an incident in which Abū Ḥanīfah (d.150/767) was asked about a 
man saying to his wife while she was climbing a ladder, “If you go up, you are 
divorced, and if you come down, you are divorced”. As a way around divorce, Abū 
Ḥanīfah suggested that others carry the wife off the ladder and put her on the floor. 
However, as Amīn points out, the practise of ḥīlah moved from presuming rare 
incidents to debating situations and cases that could not possibly happen. In addition, 
later followers of the school extend these ḥīyal from a few vows-related cases to 
cover other aspects of Islamic jurisprudence.216 
Such practises, nevertheless, were strongly rejected by scholars such as Mālik Ibn 
Anas (d.179/795) and Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and other figures of the school 
later known as ahl al-ḥadīth217 (the traditionalists).218 Al-Bukhārī219 (d.256/870), in 
his book al-ṣaḥīḥ, allocated a whole chapter objecting to the Ḥanafī School’s view on 
ḥīlah. Moreover, Ibn ʿAbd al-Bar al-Namarī (d.463/1071) reports numerous incidents 
in which a person would ask a renowned scholar about his fatwa on a case or 
situation, and then the scholar would ask, “Did it happen?” If the man said no, then he 
would say, “Leave it until it happens”.220 Such a position was motivated by a piety 
that sees issuing fatwas as a huge religious responsibility which could hold a scholar 
accountable to Allah if he made an error in judgment. It is no wonder, then, to see that 
Ibn Taymiyah links the origin of ḥīlah with the promotion of al-raʾy (a method of 
                                                 
215 Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p33. 
216 Amīn, Ḍuḥā al-Islāam, 2, p192. 
217 The ahl al-ḥadīth school includes those who endeavour to base the law on the Prophetic Traditions 
and the Prophet’s Companions. According to their view, it is illegitimate to favour or solely rely on 
unrestricted human reasoning, especially when it conflicts with an authentic ḥadīth. See Schacht, "Ahl 
al-Ḥadīt̲h̲." 
218 See for example: Sulamān ʿAbd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī, Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Rawḍah, ed. ʿAbdAllāh ʿAbd 
al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, vol. 3 (Muʾsasah al-Risālh, 1987), p287; Ibrāhīm Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-Āʿtiṣām, ed. 
Salīm ʿĪd al-Hilāalī, vol. 1 (Dār Ibn ʿAfān, 1992), p137. 
219 Schacht, "Ḥiyal." 
220   Yūsuf  Ibn ʿAbd al-Bar al-Namarī, Jāmiʿ Bayān al-ʿIlm wa Faḍlih, ed. Abī al-Ashbāl al-Zaharī, 
vol. 2 (Dār abn al-Jawzī, 1994), p1054. 
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reasoning). According to him, most ḥīyal were validated by jurists who belonged to 
the school of ahl al-raʾy.221   
Another harmful effect of using hypothetical questions as a method of teaching 
and researching Islamic jurisprudence is that the religious piety and morality of 
Shari‘ah were lost in the course of legal discussion.222 Scholars and their followers 
started to investigate actions in question from a purely legal point of view, though 
those actions had a religious dimension.223 People would use ḥīlah with a clear 
conscience as long as it was validated by a scholar, notwithstanding that it might not 
be considered permissible.   
2.3.2.  Political Conflicts and State Oppression 
By the end of the first Islamic century, the Muslim world had experienced several 
unrests and revolutions. During the ruling of the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750) and 
the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258), people in some parts of the Islamic state were 
forced to swear allegiance to the Caliphate.224 Jurists were asked about the validity of 
such forced vows.225 Some scholars were also persecuted by the authorities due to 
their political views.226 For example, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d.95/713), a renowned 
figure within the ahl al-raʾy school, instructed his students to use tawriyah 
                                                 
221 Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p209. The ahl al-raʾy school (literally “the people 
of good sense”) generally includes those in favour of using independent legal argumentation as a 
method of concluding a Shari‘ah ruling. See: Hennigan, "Ahl al-raʾy." 
222 See: Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, p66.  Ibrāhīm, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyyah fī 
al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyyah, p64. 
223 See: Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, p66. Ibrāhīm, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyyah fī 
al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyyah, p64. 
224 ʿAbd al-Raḥman Ibn Khuldūn, Tārīkh Ibn Khuldūn, ed. Khalīl Shaḥādah, vol. 1 (Dār al-Fikr, 2001), 
p261. 
225 See: Abu al-Walīd Muḥammad Ibn Rushd, al-Bayān wa al-Taḥṣīl wa al-Shirḥ wa al-Tawjīh wa al-
Taʿlīl limasāʾil al-Mustakhrajah, ed. Muḥammad Ḥijy, 2ed ed., vol. 18 (Dār al-Gharb al-Islāamī, 
1988), p526. 
226 See many examples in: ʾAbū al-ʿArb Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Tamīmi, Kitāb al-Miḥan, ed. Yaḥyā 
Wahyb al-Jabbwry, 3ed ed. (Dār al-Gharb al-Islāamī, 2006), p187; ʿAbd al-Ghanī Saʿīd al-Azdī, Kitāb 
al-Mutawārīn, ed. Mashhūr Ḥasan Salmān (Dār al-Qalam 1989). 
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(misleading double entendres)227 to protect his hiding place.228 Later, this established 
permissibility of using double meanings was used to support the pro-ḥīlah 
argument.229  
In this period of conflict, many people were forced to conclude fictitious 
transactions to transfer ownership of their property to non-persecuted individuals to 
protect it from seizure by unjust rulers. A number of ḥīyal were formed for this 
purpose.230 Classical debates thus arose between different schools of jurisprudence 
regarding the validity of bayʿ al-taljiʾh (fictitious or temporary sale used to avoid 
seizure by unjust rulers).231  
Moreover, to avoid political enmity in this oppressive climate, scholars shifted 
their interests away from the thorny issues of the day to less threatening 
theological debates and discussions of implausible legal cases. This environment 
gradually provided a fertile soil for developing ḥīlah.232   
2.3.3.  The Gap between Shari‘ah Ideology and Society’s Needs 
One theory which accounts for the emergence of ḥīlah regards it as a natural result 
of the gap between the idealistic teachings of Islam and the practical needs of Muslim 
society.233 For example, the prohibition of ribā and gharar (uncertainty) in Islamic 
commercial law presents an impractical standard, taking into account the needs of 
                                                 
227 Tawriyah generally refers to words or phrases which can be understood in two ways; the listener 
usually understands the word’s more apparent meaning, but the speaker actually intends the less 
apparent meaning. See: Li  Guo, The Performing Arts in Medieval Islam  (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012).  
228 Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Mawqiʿayn ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, 3, p193. 
229 Ibid. 
230 See: Aḥmad al-Ḥaddād, "Maʿāyīr al-Tamīz ban al-ʿUqūd al-Ṣūriyyih wa al-Ḥaqiyyiqiyah" (paper 
presented at the The 10th Conference of Shari'a Supervisory Boards of Islamic Financial Institutions, 
Bahrain, 26/5/2010), p12. 
231 See: al-Bayān fī Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, al-ʿUmrānī, Yaḥyā, ed. Qāsim Muḥammad al-Nūrī, 
vol. 5 (Dār al-Minhāj, 2000), p105; Muḥammad Amīn  Ibn ʿābidīn, Raddu al-Muḥtār ʿAlā al-Durri al-
Mukhtār sharḥ Tanwīr al-Abṣār, ed. ʿĀdil ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī ʿAwaḍ, vol. 4 (Dār al-Kutub al-
ʻIlmīyah, 2003). vol 5 p273; ʿAbd Allāh Aḥmad Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī, al-Mughnī fī Fiqh al-Imām 
Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal al-Shaybānī, vol. 4 (Dār al-Fikr, 1985), p300. 
232 Ibrāhīm, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyyah fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyyah, p57. 
233 Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p78; Vesey-Fitzgerald, "Nature and Sources of the 
Sharīʿa," p107; Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p138. 
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business environments.234 This standard bans any contract which includes uncertain 
risk, creating economic difficulty for merchants, as according to proponents of this 
theory, it is not possible for any society to function without a system of usury.235 
According to Khan, pro-ḥīlah jurists realised this fact early.236 Thus, by adhering to 
the minimum requirements of the letter of the law, ḥīlah provided a way of life that 
balanced the theory with the practical daily needs of Muslim life.237 At first sight, 
jurists who advocated ḥīlah might be perceived as betrayers of Shari‘ah, when they 
were supposed to be its guardians.238 Nonetheless, Coulson239 argues that those 
scholars had no choice but to allow ḥīlah because it was the only way that the theory 
could remain a symbol of authority over what was already practised in reality.  
However, this account of the origin of ḥīlah, mainly advanced by Orientalists,240 
is not necessarily convincing.241 First, where it was necessary to deal with usury, 
scholars had a better alternative to inventing ḥīlah: namely, directly allowing usurious 
trading on grounds of necessity. Shari‘ah recognises the maxim that necessity knows 
no law (al-ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt).242 Because that maxim is tied with another 
legal maxim, “What is permitted due to necessity is restricted to the necessity (al-
                                                 
234 A History of Islamic Law, p138. 
235 See: ibid.; Khan, "The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded," p239; 
Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p80. 
236 Khan, "The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded," p239. 
237 Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p80. 
238 Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p140. 
239 Ibid. 
240 There are several definitions of Orientalism, but my use of it here refers to the western appropriation 
of the literature, language, religion, or thought of eastern cultures to negatively stereotype those 
cultures and assert western dominance over them. According to Edward Said, Orientalism is an 
imperialist ideology which constructs “the East” as a monolith, setting up a false binary between 
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mythical Other. See: John M. MacKenzie, Orientalism : History,Theory, and the Arts  (Manchester; 
New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), p xii. 
241 See: Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p138; Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p78; 
Vesey-Fitzgerald, "Nature and Sources of the Sharīʿa," p107. 
242 See: ʿAlī Aḥmad al-Nadawī, Mawsūʿah al-Qawāʿid wa al-Ḍawwābiṭ al-Fiqhiyyh al-Ḥākimah lil-
Muʿāmalāat al-Māliyah, vol. 1 (Dār ʿĀlm al-Maʿrifah, 1999), p136; Khan, "The Mohammedan Laws 
against Usury and How They Are Evaded," p239. 
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ḍarūrāt tuqaddr biqadarihā)”,243 this alternative to ḥīlah would discourage people 
from taking unnecessary debts, because they know that doing so is primarily 
prohibited and has only been allowed as an exception for a limited time. In contrast, 
with ḥīlah, people would practise usury with a clear conscience since they are not 
taking an illegal action. 
Second, it is inaccurate to claim that Shari‘ah bans any contract that has any form 
of uncertain risk. Islam accepts uncertainty to a limited extent in contracts and makes 
some exceptions to the general prohibition of gharar,244 although the details of such 
exceptions are beyond the scope of this chapter.   
Lastly, this account implies that Shari‘ah as law is not suitable to govern the 
commercial life of Muslims. It is no wonder that many contemporary scholars have 
strongly criticised such a theory.245 Muslims jurists unanimously agree that Shari‘ah 
ruling is apt for all times and places.246 Moreover, the argument that no society can 
function without a system of usury seems untenable.247 A large community of Muslim 
and non-Muslim traders from the time of the Prophet up until today have managed 
successful businesses without practicing usury.  
2.4.  Positions on Ḥīlah of Islamic Schools of Thought 
This section examines the treatment of ḥīlah within Islamic jurisprudence, starting 
with the four major sunni madhhab (schools of thought): the Ḥanafī; Shāfiʿī, Mālikī, 
                                                 
243 al-Nadawī, Mawsūʿah al-Qawāʿid wa al-Ḍawwābiṭ al-Fiqhiyyh al-Ḥākimah lil-Muʿāmalāat al-
Māliyah, 1, p138. 
244 See: al-Saati, "The Permissible Gharar (Risk) in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence "; al-Darir, Al-
Gharar in contracts and its effects on contemporary transactions. 
245 See: Ibrāhīm, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyyah fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyyah, p40; Rosman, "al-Ḥiyal wa al-
Makhārij fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah," p79; Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, Abū Ḥanīfah 
Ḥaātuh wa ʿAṣruh Arāʾuh wa Fiqhuh  (Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1991), p379. 
246 See: Muḥammad al-Khiḍr Ḥsayn, al-Sharīʿah ṣāliḥh likul Zamān wa Makān, ed. Muḥammad  
ʿImārah (Nahḍah Maṣr, 1999); Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī, Sharīʿah al-Islāam Ṣāliḥh lil-Taṭbīq fī Kul Zamān w 
Makān, 2ed ed. (Dār al-Ṣaḥwah, 1993). 
247 On the argument that an interest-free economy is in fact feasible, see Arshad Zaman and Asad 
Zaman, "Interest and the Modern Economy," Islamic Economic Studies 8, no. 2 (2001). 
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and Ḥanbalī schools, which have the greatest impact on contemporary Islamic 
finance. It also addresses the position of other schools which have less impact on the 
industry but could play an active role in the future.  
Generally, early jurists and founders of schools did not directly state their position 
on ḥīlah, but a theory about their view can be formed by examining their ruling on 
different contracts.248 Later jurists have tried to articulate the general principles of 
some of these schools and their founders on this issue.249 However, as with every 
general rule, some exceptions exist where the jurists did not follow the principles of 
their schools due to certain justifiable reasons250—for example, a prophetic tradition 
could exempt a transaction from the general prohibition. Such exceptions need to be 
excluded to form an overall theory.   
2.4.1.  The Shāfiʿī School 
The reason to begin by examining the position of the Shāfiʿī School is that many 
controversial Shari‘ah-compliant products in the industry, particularly in Malaysia, 
are based on the views of this school.251 Shāfiʿī jurists did not directly approve the use 
of ḥīlah, but it can be drawn from their fatwa in relation to usury, shufʿah (pre-
emption), and waqf (charitable endowment).252 In particular, their position can be 
understood from rulings on the validity of four conventional contracts, namely bay’ 
al-ʿīnah transactions, selling grapes to a wine maker, selling weapons during a time of 
                                                 
248 See for example: Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, Maṣādir al-Ḥaq fī al-Fiqh al-Islāamī, vol. 4 (Cairo: 
Jāmiʿah al-Duwal al-ʿArabīh  1967), p54; Wahbah al-Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāamī wa Adilatuh 4th ed., 
vol. 4 (Dār al-Fikr, 1997), p3034; al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p177. 
249 See for example: Aḥmad Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, ed. 
Muḥmmad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī, vol. 12 (Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1963), p328; Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-
Mawqiʿayn ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, 3, p281; Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p134. 
250 ʿabd al-Salām al-Ḥiṣayn, al-Qawāʿid wa al- Ḍawābiṭ al-Fiqhiyah lil-Muʿāmalāat al-Māliyah ʿind 
Ibn Taymiyah, vol. 2 (Dār al-Taʾṣīl, 2002), p199. 
251 See: Nagaoka  Shinsuke, "Beyond the Theoretical Dichotomy in Islamic Finance:Analytical 
Reflections on Murābaḥah Contracts and Islamic Debt Securities," Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area 
Studies on Islamic Finance 1, no. 2 (2007): p79; Rosman, "al-Ḥiyal wa al-Makhārij fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-
Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah," p358. 
252 "al-Ḥiyal wa al-Makhārij fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah," p103. 
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disorder, and nikāḥ al-taḥlīl, a formalistic contract allowing women to remarry a 
former husband after three divorces.253 Al-Shāfiʿī (d.204/820), the founder of the 
school, made it clear that the motives of parties to a contract which is valid ab initio 
are immaterial and would not affect the validity of the contract:   
The rule I follow is that I do not void any contract which appears valid, 
because I suspect the intention of the parties or their practice but I validate it 
based on its form. However, I reprehend the intention which, when made 
explicit, would void the sale, as I reprehend a person who purchase a sword 
with intent to use for murder. In this case, the seller is not prohibited from 
selling the sword to a person he thinks would use it for murder because the 
buyer might not use it to commit murder. Therefore, I do not void this 
transaction. Likewise, I reprehend a transaction in which the seller sells 
grapes to whom he thinks would make wine from it; but I do not invalidate it 
if he sold it because grapes were permissible at the time of the transaction 
and the purchaser might not ever use it to make wine; just as the purchaser of 
the sword might not ever use it to commit murder.254  
Furthermore, al-Shāfiʿī states that a contract can only be invalidated based on the 
terms explicitly stated in the contract. It is not voided by pre-contract or post-contract 
arrangements, nor shall it be voided because an illegal motive such as practicing usury 
is suspected or because it can lead to impermissible action.255 Similarly, al-Nawawy 
(d.676/1278), an authoritative scholar within the Shāfiʿī School, asserts this rule: 
“What matters according to our School, is the form of contract not the intention of the 
parties; therefore, we validate ʿīnah transaction and nikāḥ al-taḥlīl”.256 
However, it should be noted that al-Shāfiʿī’s validation of the form of these 
contracts does not mean that he considers the use of ḥīlah permissible.257 The context 
of his statement and the evidence which he cites to support his view show that he was 
                                                 
253 See: Muḥammad Idrīs  al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, ed. Muḥammad Zuhrī   al-Najār, vol. 3 (Mmaktabah al-
Kullīāt al-Azhariyah, 1961), p74; Muḥyyī al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Nawawy, Rawḍah al-Ṭālibīn wa ʿUmdah 
al-Muftīn, ed. Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh, vol. 3 (al-maktab al-islāmī, 1385), p417; Fatḥī al-Duranī, al-
Naẓariyāt al-Fiqhīh, 4th ed. (Jāmiʿah Dimashq, 1996), p237; al-Sanhūrī, Maṣādir al-Ḥaq fī al-Fiqh al-
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254 al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 3, p74. 
255 Ibid. vol 7 p 297 
256 Muḥyyī al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Nawawy, al-Majmūʿ Sharḥ  al-Muhadhdhab, ed. Muḥammad Najīb al-
Muṭīʿī, vol. 9 (Maktabah al-Irshād, 1971), p314. 
257 al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p206. 
54 
 
arguing from a judicial perspective. If a dispute on such a contract comes before a 
judge, it shall be deemed valid from the al-ḥukm al-waḍʿī perspective.258 In the 
quotation above, al-Shāfiʿī states clearly that the contract would be deemed void if the 
illegal intention were made explicit. He also states that he regards this intention as 
reprehensible from the perspective of al-ḥukm al-taklīfī. The word makrūh which he 
used can mean “prohibited” or “reprehensible” in the terminology of early jurists.259 
Thus we see the Shāfiʿī jurists debate whether the use of ḥīlah in the form of these 
contracts is just reprehensible or actually prohibited, which is the view of the majority 
of Shāfiʿī jurists.260 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d.852/1448) seems in favour of the 
latter.261 According to him, whoever intends the collection of usury through the 
contract of sale is not exempted from sin. Likewise, any means used to circumvent a 
forbidden matter is prohibited. There is no difference between the prohibition of the 
illegitimate end and the prohibition of the means that is used to reach the forbidden 
end.262 In fact, some of the early prominent Shāfiʿī scholars, such as Abū Isḥāq al-
Isfariyanī (d.418/1027) and Abū Muḥammad al-Juwaynī (d.438/1047), not only 
prohibit the ʿīnah transaction, but also void a sale contract if one of the parties 
involved makes a habit of using the īnah transaction.263 In addition, many Shāfiʿī 
jurists state that scholars are forbidden to teach or draw people’s attention to such 
legal ruses to avoid obligation or breach prohibition, and people are prohibited from 
                                                 
258 See generally: Abozaid and Dusuki, "The Challenges of Realizing Maqasid al-Shari`ah in Islamic 
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asking a fatwa from whomever has been known to do so.264 As al-ʿAsqalānī does, Abū 
Ḥātim al-Quzwīnī (d.440/1048), the author of the only surviving Shāfiʿī book on 
hīlah, states a clear difference between prohibited ḥīlah and permissible ḥīlah.265 
This understanding of the Shāfiʿī School position is further supported by al-
Shāfiʿī’s view on other ribā-related cases. Ibn al-Qayyim points out that al-Shāfiʿī 
prohibits an exchange related to ribā al-faḍal266 known as mudd ʿajwah, where two 
ribawī items are exchanged and one of them includes an additional item of a different 
sort—for example, the exchange of one kilo of dates and five grams of silver for two 
kilos of dates.267 This transaction, according to al-Shāfiʿī, is not permissible and is 
seen as a way of breaching the prohibition of ribā al-faḍal. Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim 
argues that some ḥīlah-related transactions that are validated by the Shāfiʿī School are 
more worthy of prohibition because they lead to breaching of ribā al-nasīʾah (the 
usury of delay), which, unlike the transaction in question (mudd ʿajwah), is 
unanimously prohibited.268 Moreover, Ibrāhīm notes that although al-Shāfiʿī validates 
ʿīnah transactions, he voids other types of ḥīlah related to al-kirāʾ (lease) and al-qirāḍ 
(silent partnership).269 In short, the Shāfiʿī School’s position on ḥīlah is that even 
though some instances of it are deemed legally valid, using it to achieve unlawful 
ends is prohibited.  
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265 Ibrāhīm, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyyah fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyyah, p76. 
266 Literally “the usury of surplus.” Such sales involve an excess or delay in exchange of certain types 
of goods (ribawī) that all fall within a single category. See: Vogel and Hayes, Islamic Law and 
Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return, p302. 
267 See: al-Shāfiʿī, al-ʿUmrānī, Yaḥyā, 5, p196. 
268 Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Mawqiʿayn ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, 3, p188. 
269 Al-qirāḍ or muḍārabah is a type of partnership where one partner provides the capital (rab al-māl (
to another partner (muḍārib) who manages the investment. See El-Gamal, Islamic Finance : Law, 
Economics, and Practice, p120. 
56 
 
2.4.2.  The Ḥanafī School  
The Ḥanafī School generally takes a similar position to the Shāfiʿī School in 
disregarding parties’ motives behind contracts.270 Its founder Abū Ḥanīfah validates 
the selling of grapes to a winemaker and hiring Muslims to carry wine, as well as the 
contract of nikāḥ al-taḥlīla and selling materials which can be used to make weapons 
at a time of disorder.271 In addition, books containing practises of valid ḥīlah are 
attributed to scholars within the Ḥanafī School, such as Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-
Shaybāny (d.189/805)272 and Abū Bakr al-Khaṣṣāf (d. 261/874).273   
However, the validation of some ḥīlah does not necessarily imply its 
permissibility, according to the Ḥanafī School. Many jurists within the school, 
including Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Shaybāny, and al-Khaṣṣāf, have made it clear that ḥīlah 
becomes prohibited when it is misused to harm or deny other people’s rights.274 Such 
an understanding also seems clear to late Ḥanafī scholars, as attested in the book of 
al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyah: “The view of our scholars is to prohibit any ḥīlah used by a 
person to void others’ rights or to make people suspect it as well as disguising what it 
is null and void”.275  
Like Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Shaybāny, one of most authoritative  jurists in the Ḥanafī 
School, prohibits the ʿīnah transaction and sees it as being invented by the consumers 
of usury. He describes the burden of evil of engaging in such transaction as being as 
                                                 
270 al-Sanhūrī, Maṣādir al-Ḥaq fī al-Fiqh al-Islāamī, 4, p56; al-Duranī, al-Naẓariyāt al-Fiqhīh, p233. 
271 See: Ibn ʿābidīn, Raddu al-Muḥtār ʿAlā al-Durri al-Mukhtār sharḥ Tanwīr al-Abṣār, 4, p268; al-
Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāamī wa Adilatuh 4, p3033. 
272 Muḥammad  Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybāny, al-Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal  (Maktabah al-Thanqāfah al-Dīnīh, 
1999).. Some researchers dispute the authenticity this book’s attribution to al-Shaybāny; see: Ibrāhīm, 
al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyyah fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyyah, p27; Rosman, "al-Ḥiyal wa al-Makhārij fī al-
Muʿāmalāt al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah," p6; al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, 
p158; Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Naqīb, al-Madhhab al-Ḥanafī, vol. 1 (Maktabah al-Rushd, 2001), p413. 
273 See: Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p81. 
274 See: al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 12, p331; al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, 5; al-
Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt, 1. Vol 5, p188. 
275 Niẓām al-Dīn al-Balkhī and Others, al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyah fī Madhhab al-Imām al-Aʿẓam abī 
Ḥanīfah al-Nuʿmān, vol. 6 (Dār al-Fikir, 1991), p390. 
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heavy as mountains.276 Similarly, Abū Yūsuf )d.182/798), another 
authoritative scholar who was a student of Abū Ḥanīfah and the Chief Justice in his 
time, wrote about the prohibition against using ḥīlah to avoid the payment of 
obligatory tax in his renowned book al-Kharāj (Treatise on Taxation), which he 
authored at the caliph’s request. The text reads:  
It is not permissible for a person who believes in Allah and the day of 
judgment to not pay the ṣadaqah )obligatory charity tax), or to split his 
property or divide it by a formalistic sale or any kind of legal tricks to avoid 
the payment of ṣadaqah.277 
Furthermore, the position of the Ḥanafī School appears clear to other schools of 
thought. For instance, Ibn Ḥajar of the Shāfiʿī School states, 
The advocating of ḥīlah has been widely attributed to Ḥanafī School because 
Abū Yūsuf has authored a book on the subject. However, their jurists are 
known to limit its implementation to what is right".278     
In fact, al-Qurashī argues that there is a very strong voice—at least theoretically—
within the Ḥanafī School supporting substance over form.279 However, although such 
a position suits their heavy reliance on qyās (analogy) as a source of Shari‘ah, he later 
admits that it might not be the case in practise.280 Similarly, Hassan argues that the 
Ḥanafī School considers intention where indications of intent can be drawn from the 
circumstances and norms surrounding the action.281 He cites the example of 
pronouncing a divorce at the time of death-sickness (maraḍ al-mawt); while the 
Shāfiʿī School completely validates such a divorce and excludes the wife from 
inheritance, the Ḥanafī allow the wife to inherit her share according to Shari‘ah 
inheritance law as long as she is still in the ʿiddah (a legal waiting period before the 
                                                 
276 Ibn ʿābidīn, Raddu al-Muḥtār ʿAlā al-Durri al-Mukhtār sharḥ Tanwīr al-Abṣār, 4., vol 5 p273. 
277 Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, p80. 
278 al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 12, p326. See also: al-Shāṭibī vlo5, p188. 
279 al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p169. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Hussain Hamed Hassan, Naẓarīh al-Maṣlaḥah f al-Fiqh al-Islāmī  (Maktabah al-Mutanabī, 1981), 
p295. 
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women can remarry). The rationale for such a ruling is that the husband, by divorcing 
his wife after the illness that is likely to cause his death, is seen as trying to 
circumvent the Shari‘ah inheritance law. However, unlike the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī 
schools of thought, Ḥanafī does not extend such a ruling after the passing of ʿiddah 
time. Thus, this case is an exception to the school’s general theory on disregarding 
intention from a validity perspective, and it is not sufficient to support the argument 
of Hassan.282   
Nonetheless, it is important not to accept the outright characterisation of the 
Ḥanafī School as pro-ḥīlah. The authenticity of such a claim must be cross-checked 
with the view stated in the authoritative books of the school, rather than in history and 
biography books.283 In addition, the isolated opinions or practises of a few individual 
scholars should not be attributed to the whole school.284 Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn al-
Qayyim point out that numerous ḥīyal invented by jurists from different schools of 
thought contradict the principles of the founders of these schools.285 Ibn Baṭah al-
ʿUkbarī (d.387/997) narrates a story in which he asks a respected Shāfiʿī jurist about a 
ḥīlah that was attributed to al-Shāfiʿī. The scholar is surprised about this claim and 
cites Abū ʿAbdi Allāh al-Zubayrī (d.306/929), an authoritative scholar within the 
Shāfiʿī madhhab, who firmly denounces the existence of such opinion of al-Shāfiʿī.286 
Even within the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī Schools, where the positions of Mālik Ibn Anas 
and Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, the school founders, are very strict against ḥīlah, such a 
practise has been recorded. According to Ibn Taymiyah, some of the Ḥanbalī scholars 
                                                 
282 For the position of different schools on pronouncing divorce at the time of death-sickness, see: 
Wzārah al-Awqāf al-Kuwaytiyah, al-Mawsūʿah al-Fiqhiyyah, vol. 32 (Wzārah al-Awqāf al-
Kuwaytiyah, 1995), p75; Hassan, Naẓarīh al-Maṣlaḥah f al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, p295. 
283 al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p161. 
284 Ibid., p88; Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p130. 
285 Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p134; Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Mawqiʿayn ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, 
3, p281. 
286 Ibn Baṭah al-ʿUkbarī, Ibṭāl al-Ḥiyal, ed. Sulaymān al-ʿUmayr (Al-Resalah 1996), p144. 
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went as far as using ḥīlah to legalise specific cases that were explicitly prohibited by 
Ibn Ḥanbal himself.287   
Besides, many ḥīyal  validated by late Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī scholars were based on 
individual cases that do not necessarily correspond to the original ruling of the 
schools’ founders.288 This process is called takhrīj, where in the absence of an 
opinion from the founding scholars on the case in question, a jurist would derive an 
opinion from a ruling of the school’s founder on a different case, or the jurist would 
use his legal methodology to derive an opinion from the original sources of 
Shari‘ah.289 However, in some cases, according to Ibn al-Qayyim,290 the follower 
jurists extended the ruling beyond what the school’s founder had originally authorised 
and attributed it to him. He argues that some of these ḥīyal cannot possibly be allowed 
by the founding scholars, taking into account their religious piety and the general 
principles of the school.291 In summary, the position of the Ḥanafī School is generally 
similar to the Shāfiʿī School view: although it validates some ḥīyal from the 
perspective of al-ḥukm al-waḍʿī, the misuse of ḥīlah to achieve illegal ends is 
prohibited from an al-ḥukm al-taklīfī perspective.        
2.4.3.  The Mālikī School  
According to the Mālikī School, the use of ḥīlah is prohibited and it invalidates 
contracts.292 Al-Shāṭibī, a Mālikī scholar, has written extensively on the subject.293 In 
                                                 
287 Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p134. . See also: al-ʿUkbarī, Ibṭāl al-Ḥiyal, p143. 
288 See: Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p130; Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Mawqiʿayn 
ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, 3, p281; al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p88; Ibrāhīm, al-
Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyyah fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyyah, p31. 
289 Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law  (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), p161. For an extensive study of takhrīj see: Yaʿqūb ʿAbd al-Wahāb al-Bāḥsayn, al-
Takhrīj ʿind  al-Fuqahāʾ w al-Aṣūlīan  (Maktabah al-Rushd, 1994). 
290 Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Mawqiʿayn ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, 3, p281. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p31; Rosman, "al-Ḥiyal wa al-Makhārij fī al-
Muʿāmalāt al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah," p123; Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p141; al-Qurashī, 
Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p331; Ibrāhīm, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyyah fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-
Māliyyah, p30. 
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fact, the Mālikī school has been criticised for applying the principles of sad al-
dhariāʾi294 (precautionary legal prohibition) to ban many contracts on the basis that 
they may lead to unlawful ends.295 For example, ʿīnah, al-tawarrq, and some forms of 
murābaḥah296 contracts are deemed prohibited by the Mālikī school of thought.297  
2.4.4.  The Ḥanbalī School 
Similarly, the Ḥanbalī School strongly forbids the use of ḥīlah and deems it 
void.298 Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal,299 the school’s founder, characterises the people who use 
ḥīlah as malicious.300 Many of the classical works of literature opposing the use of 
legal ruse were written by Ḥanbalī jurists. For example, Ibn Baṭah al-ʿUkbarī301 
dedicated a book to the subject titled Ibṭāl al-ḥiyal (The Voiding of Legal Ruses). He 
describes those who advise how to circumvent the teaching of Shari‘ah as hypocrites 
who should not be called scholars. He argues that by trying to deceive Allah, one only 
deceives himself, as Allah knows the true intention behind any actions.302 However, 
two Ḥanbalī scholars have taken the lead in the battle against ḥīlah: Ibn Taymiyah on 
                                                                                                                                            
293 See: al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt, 1, p124; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An 
Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh, p173. 
294 Literally, “the blocking of means”; the blocking of actions that could lead to unlawful ends. See:  
Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p397. 
295 See: Ibn Bayyah, Sadd al-Dharīʿah wa Taṭṭbīqātuh fī Majāl al-Muʿāmalāt, p48; Khan, "The 
Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded," p240; Ibn Taymiyah, al-Qawāʿid al-
Nawrānīh al-Fiqhiyah, p119. 
296 Al-tawarrq and murābaḥah are two common methods used to structure Islamic financial services. 
The two methods have various definitions and applications. For further information, see chapter 1 p30 
and chapter 3 p74. 
297 al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p344. 
298 Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p31; Rosman, "al-Ḥiyal wa al-Makhārij fī al-
Muʿāmalāt al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah," p123; Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p141; al-Qurashī, 
Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p363; Ibn Taymiyah, al-Qawāʿid al-Nawrānīh al-Fiqhiyah, 
p118. 
299 See Majmūʿ Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islāam Ibn Taymiyah, ed. Abd al-Raḥman Ibn Qāsim, vol. 20 
(Mujammaʿ al-Malik Fahd liṭibāʿat al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, 2004), p230. 
300 al-ʿUkbarī, Ibṭāl al-Ḥiyal, p120. 
301 Ibid., p94,108. The editor mentions other books written by Ḥanbalī scholars on the subject; see p42. 
302 Ibid.  
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the contract of nikāḥ al-tahlīla, and later his student Ibn al-Qayyim.303 Most of the 
contemporary literature on ḥīlah is based on their work.  
2.4.5.  Other Schools of Thought  
Although the primary aim of this chapter is to investigate the position of the major 
sunni Islamic schools of thought which have the most impact on contemporary 
Islamic finance, it is worth exploring the positions of other schools of thought that 
may play a future role in the Islamic finance industry.   
The Ẓāhirī School is not widely followed at the present time.304 However, because 
some of its views are cited in the classical and contemporary literature on comparative 
jurisprudence, it is worth addressing its treatment of ḥīlah. The Ẓāhirī School does not 
directly support ḥīlah, but due to its literalist approach, it has taken the same position 
of pro-ḥīlah schools on some of the jurisprudential issues305 such as the ʿīnah 
transaction and nikāḥ al-tahlīla.306 For instance, on the issue of the ʿīnah transaction, 
Ibn Ḥazm strongly defends its lawfulness, basing his argument on the general 
permissibility of sale, which is stated in Quranic verse, “Allah has permitted trade”. In 
fact, he goes as far as arguing that parties should not be blamed even if their intention 
was to collect interest through an ʿīnah transaction; rather, they should be rewarded, 
as they used two legitimate transactions rather than one usurious transaction to 
achieve their end! In his view, those who invalidated the sale are the ones to be 
                                                 
303 See: Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Mawqiʿayn ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, 3; Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā 
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304 For more about Ẓāhirī School see: Ignaz Goldziher, The Zahiris:Their Doctrine and Their History, 
ed. Wolfgang Behn, trans. Wolfgang Behn (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008); Abdel-Magid Turki, "al-
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accessed 30 April 2012 
305 Ibrāhīm, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyyah fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyyah, p30. 
306 See: ʿAlī Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā bi-al-ʾĀthār, ed. ʿAbd al-Ghaffār Sulaymān al-Bnadārī, vol. 
7 (Dār al-Fikr, 1988), p554.; also vol 12, p195. 
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blamed for mistrusting the intention of people and accusing them of using ḥīlah to 
commit the prohibited.  
However, it is notable that Ibn Ḥazm validates īnah transaction and nikāḥ al-
taḥlīla not because he legalises the use of ḥīlah, but rather because the literal 
approach which he follows does not prohibit these contracts. Hence, other contracts 
allowed by pro-ḥīlah schools are deemed prohibited under the Ẓāhirī School. For 
example, while Abū Ḥanīfah permits the selling of grapes to a wine maker, Ibn Ḥazm 
considers it a forbidden and void transaction.307 In fact, on another issue related to 
punishment of adultery, he attacks the view of Abū Ḥanīfah and states that the Ḥanafī 
view on this issue and on other jurisprudential matters has taught people how to use 
ḥīlah to avoid punishment.308 In short, the inconsistency of the Zāhirī position towards 
ḥīlah is due to its literal method, which rejects other schools’ use of analogy and does 
not extend the objectives of the law beyond those explicitly stated in the letter of the 
law.309    
The shīʿī imāmīh school of thought, which is active in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain,310 
generally prohibits the use of ḥīlah, though some of it is deemed legally 
enforceable.311 The Zaydiyyah school of thought, which has spread in Yemen, has a 
position very close to that of the sunni schools which are against ḥīlah, such as the 
                                                 
307 Ibid., p522. p522.  
308 Ibid., 12: p196. Vol 12, p196 
309 See: Goldziher, The Zahiris:Their Doctrine and Their History, p42. Goldziher gives an example of 
the Ẓāhirī postion on the law of usury, noting that “The Ẓāhirite school . . . views such syllogism as an 
arbitrary notion which is falsely and arbitrarily attributed to the purpose of the legislator. It delimits the  
law exclusively to the personal or non-personal cases enumerated in the law. According to the view 
ofthe  Ẓāhirite school, one must not search for the cause of any of God’s laws, just as the cause for the 
creation of any of God’s works must not be investigated. The only cause for their creation is God’s 
sovereign will; exactly the same applies to law.” 
310 It is worth pointing out that in Bahrain, some Shari’ah supervisory boards consist of sunni and shīʿī 
scholars. See: Quṭb al-ʿArabī, "al-Baḥrayn al-Maṣārif al-Islāamiyah Tūḥḥad al-Shīʿah wā al-sunnah," 
Alarabiya.Net, http://www.al-asfoor.org/?id=1002. accessed 10 April 2012 
311 See: al-Muḥaqq al-Ḥilī, Sharāʾiʿ al-Islāam fī Masāʾil al-Ḥalāal wa al-Ḥarām, ed. al-Sayyd ṣādiq al-
Shīrāzī, vol. 3 (Intishārāt Istiql-āal, 1983), p596; Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī, al-Ḥadāʾiq al-Nāḍirah fy Aḥkām 
al-ʿUtrah al-Ṭāhirah, ed. Muḥammad Taqī al-Ayrawānī, 2ed ed., vol. 25 (Dār al-Aḍwāʾ, 1989), p375; 
al-Mīlāanī, "al-Iftirāḍ al-Qānūnī wa al-Ḥīlah al-Sharʿiyyah". 
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Mālikī and Ḥanbalī Schools.312 It explicitly invalidates ʿīnah transactions and other 
ḥīlah that are used to circumvent the prohibition of ribā.313 al-ʿAnasy (d.1390/1970), 
an authoritative Zaydī jurist, states, “According to our school, the hidden motive in 
ribā-related contracts is considered as if it is stated. Therefore, such a contract is 
invalid, as well as any other ḥīlah”.314 Similarly, the literature of the ibāḍī school, 
which is dominant in Oman, where Islamic finance was recently introduced,315 shows 
a strong position against ḥīlah.316 
Contemporary Shari‘ah supervisors seem to be in favour of supporting substance 
over form in principle. al-Ḥaddād317 cites many examples of Shari‘ah supervisory 
board fatwas which include conditions aiming to avoid sham contracts. However, in 
practise, he argues that such provisions are not taken into consideration and they are 
hardly applied. 
In some cases, different schools debate over certain contracts not because one 
party is supporting form over substance, but because they dispute whether it 
contradicts with the objectives of Shari‘ah or not. This explains why a few ḥīlah have 
been accepted by the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools, although their position is very strict 
against it.318 For example, Ḥanbalī deems the contract of nikāḥ al-taḥlīla a legal ruse 
which circumvents the prohibition of remarrying a former husband after triple 
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318 al-Maṣrī and al-Būṭī discuss Ibn al-Qayyim’s approval of ḥīlah that is seen as in conflict with 
Shari’ah.  See: al-Būṭī, Ḍawābiṭ al-Maṣlaḥah fī al-Sharīʿah al-Islāmiyyah, p323; al-Maṣrī, "al-Ḥīl al-
Fiqhiyaah bayn al-Būṭī wā Ibn Qaim al-Jawziyyah" p45. 
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divorces, and which conflicts with the objective of the prohibition, namely, restricting 
husbands’ freedom to divorce wives to make them take the matter more seriously. In 
contrast, the Mālikī School validates the contract on the ground that it allows the 
reunion of the family and protects the interest of children of the divorced couple, 
which Shari‘ah encourages.319 In this example, each school has a different take on the 
objective of the law. This might offer an explanation to the question raised by some 
researchers over the inconsistency of some schools towards ḥīlah.320  
In summary, from a permissibility point of view (al-ḥukm al-taklīfī), there is 
generally no authority for employing a form to circumvent the spirit of Islamic 
finance, as the position of different schools of thought shows. However, from a 
judicial validity perspective (al-ḥukm al-waḍʿī), if such a form has been used, it can 
be deemed valid according to some schools of thought, such as Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī.  
2.5.  Refuting the Pro-Ḥīlah Arguments 
Several arguments have been put forward for and against the validity of ḥīlah. The 
legal question is whether the validity of a contract should be based on its external 
structure regardless of motives behind it, or whether it should be deemed void due to 
any suspected unlawful motives.321 As appropriate to the purposes of this thesis, this 
section will only examine arguments directed at the use of ḥīlah within Islamic 
finance. It will not discuss any cases which both parties agree fall into the category of 
permissible ḥīlah (makhraj fiqhī) or prohibited ḥīlah.    
The view of validating a ḥīlah contract in the judicial context is based on several 
prophetic traditions and rational justifications. First, proponents argue that motive 
                                                 
319 Ibrāhīm Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt, ed. Mashhūr Ḥasan Salmān, vol. 3 (Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1997), 
p125; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh, p185. 
320 See for example: Schacht, "Ḥiyal."; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to 
Sunni Usul al-Fiqh, p185. 
321 Khan, "The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded," p233. 
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falls outside the essentials requirement of a contract; as long as the form of the 
transaction was concluded according to the free will of the parties and with no explicit 
illegitimate conditions, intention should not affect its legal enforceability.322 
Investigating motives behind contract is beyond the powers of the judge, as only 
Allah can judge a person’s intentions. Therefore, a judge can base his judgment only 
on the visible action.323Al-Shāfiʿī goes further to argue that this was the norm for 
Prophet Muhammad, and cites the ḥadīth where the Prophet states, 
I am only a human being, and you people have disputes. May be someone 
amongst you can present his case in a more eloquent and convincing manner 
than the other, and I give my judgment in his favour according to what I hear. 
Beware! If ever I give (by error) somebody something of his brother's right 
then he should not take it as I have only, given him a piece of Fire.324 
Ibn Taymiyah325 accepts that intention is irrelevant to the validity of a contract 
when there are no evidentiary indications of it; however, he argues that if the parties’ 
actions and the circumstances surrounding the contract inform us that the substance of 
the contract differs from its form, then intention becomes relevant. Accordingly, 
taking into consideration this circumstantial evidence is not merely judging intention, 
but rather judging the appearance of actions. He argues that it is insensible, for 
example, to assume that a person who is well-known for conducting the contract of 
nikāḥ al-taḥlīla or for using ḥīlah-related transactions to collect usury actually 
intends a real marriage or an actual trade every time.326 Following Ibn Taymiyah’s 
logic, it is similarly difficult to assume that when financial institutions which mainly 
                                                 
322 al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 3.  vol 7 p 297 
323Ibid. vol 4 p114; Khan, "The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded," p234. 
324 Muhammad Ismā`īl al-Bukhārī, "Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī," Sunnah.com, http://sunnah.com/urn/65530. 
accessed 1 April 2012, vol. 9, Book 86, Hadith 97 
325 Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p282..  See also Paul R. Powers, Intent in Islamic 
Law : Motive and Meaning in Medieval Sunni Fiqh  (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006), p117-18. 
326 Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p282.  See also Powers, Intent in Islamic Law : 
Motive and Meaning in Medieval Sunni Fiqh, p117-18. 
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lend money at interest offer ḥīlah-based Shari‘ah-compliant products, those products 
are not intended to circumvent the prohibition of usury.327      
In addition, every legal systems ban certain motives that affect the validity of 
contracts to protect the welfare of the public.328 For instance, contracting a criminal to 
commit a crime is void, although it fulfils the basic requirement of a contract. The 
freedom of contract can be limited when the purpose of undertaking the contracts is 
illegal.329 
With regard to the argument that Allah is the only one who can judge the intention 
of a person, al-Shāfiʿī seems to indicate that qarāʾin (indirect evidence  ( is 
inadmissible if it can be concluded from the circumstances surrounding the contract 
but it is not part of the contract.330 However, as stated by Ibn al-Qayyim,331 most 
scholars accept this sort of evidence in their judgment. The ḥadīth cited in al-Shāfiʿī’s 
argument “I base my judgment according to what I hear” does not reject the 
acceptance of indirect evidence. The ḥadīth shows that a judge would consider all the 
evidence (direct and indirect) represented before him by the parties prior to issuing his 
judgments. In addition, the ḥadīth is more of a moral appeal to the conscience of the 
winning parties not to take what is not their right.332 
Another important argument of those who support the validation of ḥīlah is that 
the Prophet authorises the use of a legal ruse to avoid ribā al-faḍal, as the following 
ḥadīth shows:  
Narrated Abu Said al-Khudri: Once Bilal brought Barni [i.e., a kind of dates] 
to the Prophet and the Prophet asked him, “From where have you brought 
                                                 
327 See: al-Qurashī, Ishkāliyyh al-Ḥiyal fī al-Baḥth al-Fiqhī, p267. 
328 Khan, "The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded," p235. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid., p236. 
331 See: Muḥammad Ibn Abī Bakr Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Ṭuruq al-Ḥukmiyyah fī al-Siyāsih al-Sharʿiyah, 
ed. Nāyif al-Ḥamad (Dār ʿālam al-Fawāʾid, 2007); ʿabdAllāh al-ʿAjlāan, al-Qaḍāʾ  bi-al-Qarāʾin al-
Muʿāṣirh  (Jāmiʿah al-Imam Moḥammad bin Saud al-Islamiyah, 2006). 
332 Khan, "The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded," p237. 
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these?” Bilal replied, “I had some inferior type of dates and exchanged two 
ṣāʿ s333 of it for one ṣāʿ of Barni dates in order to give it to the Prophet to 
eat”. Thereupon the Prophet said, “Beware! Beware! This is definitely Riba 
[usury]! This is definitely Riba! Don’t do so, but if you want to buy [a 
superior kind of dates] sell the inferior dates for money and then buy the 
superior kind of dates with that money.334 
This tradition shows that the Prophet asked Bilal not to exchange the bad dates 
with the good dates directly, but rather asked him to sell the bad dates first for money, 
and then use it to buy good dates. Initially, acquiring money was unintended, but it 
was used as a means to achieve the desirable end, which was to obtain the good dates. 
Therefore, according to this view, the use of ḥīlah should be accepted.335  
This argument is valid assuming that the Prophet’s instruction to Bilal contradicts 
the objective of the lawgiver. However, this is not the case, because allowing the 
exchange of bad dates with good dates directly results in one party being 
disadvantaged; a trade at any ratio that departs from the market ratio would 
inevitability lead to this situation.336 Therefore, the instructions in the ḥadīth directed 
Bilal to sell the first kind of date at the highest possible market price and then to 
purchase the other kind at the lowest available market price. Ultimately, efficiency in 
exchange is achieved by making the ratio of marginal utilities equal to the market 
price ratio.337    
On the other hand, the argument against ḥīlah is based on several Quranic verses 
and Prophetic ḥadīth. The Quran refers to the story of some Jews who tried to 
circumvent the prohibition against fishing on the Sabbath (Saturday). On Friday, they 
                                                 
333 A measure for grain used by the people of Medina, equivalent to 2.35 kilograms. See: ʿabdAllāh 
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would dig ditches which could hold the fish until they could be caught on Sunday.338 
The verse reads: 
And ask them about the town that was by the sea—when they transgressed in 
[the matter of] the Sabbath—when their fish came to them openly on their 
Sabbath day, and the day they had no Sabbath they did not come to them. 
Thus did we give them trial because they were defiantly disobedient.339 
Ibn Taymiyah340 points out that the Jews were punished although they did not directly 
breach the prohibition against fishing on Saturday, but complied with the letter of the 
law. He argues that the legal ruses used to legalise the collection of usury are worse 
than the tricks used by those people.341  
Ibn Taymiyah342 cites another incident in the Quran to support his argument. The 
Quran records the story of the people of the garden, where the poor used to have the 
right of picking up what falls from the trees if they plucked the fruits during the 
daytime. However, when the owners vowed to cut the trees’ fruit at night so the poor 
would not be able to pick anything, an affliction sent by Allah came upon the garden 
while they were asleep, and it was as if the garden were wrested away.343 This is a 
warning for anyone who uses ḥīlah to violate Allah commands or people’s rights.344   
Furthermore, supporters of the invalidation of ḥīlah record many incidents in 
which the Prophet warns his companions against the use of deceitful artifices. In one 
ḥadīth, the Prophet states, “Do not commit what the Jews did, and violate Allah’s 
prohibition using deceitful ḥiyal”.345 In another report, the Prophet foretells that 
people from his nation will circumvent a prohibition by relying on the form, saying, 
                                                 
338 Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p43. 
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340 Ibn Taymiyah, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Ibṭāl al-Taḥlīl, p41-46. 
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“There will be some of my nation who will make wine [and intoxicants] legal by 
changing its name”.346 A third hadīth on this subject reads: 
Narrated Jabir bin ‘Abdullah: I heard Allah’s Apostle, in the year of the 
Conquest of Mecca, saying, “Allah and His Apostle made illegal the trade of 
alcohol, dead animals, pigs and idols”. The people asked, “O Allah’s 
Apostle! What about the fat of dead animals, for it was used for greasing the 
boats and the hides; and people use it for lights?” He said, “No, it is illegal.” 
Allah’s Apostle further said, “May Allah curse the Jews, for Allah made 
the fat (of animals) illegal for them, yet they melted the fat and sold it and ate 
its price”.347    
This ḥadīth shows that although the form and name of the fat changed after it is 
melted, it remains forbidden to benefit from the substance by using or selling it. 
Therefore, the text indicates that any legal ruse used to achieve illegitimate ends 
would not change the original fact of the prohibition against those ends.348 
The Prophet also warned against some practises that might be used in avoiding the 
payment of zakāh. These are similar to tactics used by present-day accountants to 
avoid or reduce taxes. The ḥadīth reads: 
Narrated Anas: Abu Bakr wrote to me what was made compulsory by Allah’s 
Apostle and that was [regarding the payments of zakāh]: Neither the property 
of different people may be taken together nor the joint property may be split 
for fear of [paying more, or receiving less] zakāh.349 
Ibn al-Qayyim350 argues this is clear evidence for prohibiting the use of ḥīlah. Al-
Khaṣṣāf of the Ḥanafī School accepts that such a person is committing a sin in 
avoiding zakāh by selling the property before the due date of zakāh. However, he 
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argued that judicially, this person’s action is valid, since his act appears to be merely a 
permissible trade.351  
The argument of invaliding ḥīlah contracts is also supported by the prophetic 
ḥadīth which states, “The reward of deeds depends upon the intentions and every 
person will get the reward according to what he has intended”.352 Ibn al-Qayyim353 
deems this ḥadīth sufficient to invalidate ḥīlah. He argues that it shows that deeds 
follow motive and a person can only get what he intended. If he intended usury by a 
contract of sale, then he is a usurer.354 However, this ḥadīth does not directly support 
the argument of Ibn al-Qayyim. It seems directed to address the accountability aspect 
of ḥīlah in the hereafter, rather than the validity aspect in this world, and the former is 
not disputed by pro-ḥīlah schools of thought. All scholars agree that using ḥīlah in a 
deceptive manner is not permissible.355 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī,356 a Shāfiʿī scholar, 
stated in his commentary on this ḥadīth that whoever intended the collection of usury 
through the contract of sale is not exempted from sins. Likewise, any means used to 
circumvent a forbidden matter is prohibited, as there is no difference between the 
prohibition of the illegitimate end and the prohibition of the means used to reach the 
forbidden end.357 
In addition to drawing on tradition, the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools of thought 
provide many legal maxims and rational arguments to support their position.358 One 
argument is that by prohibiting usury, for example, the lawgiver intends to achieve a 
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benefit (jalb al-maṣlaḥah) and prevent harm (darʾ al-mafsadah). It is inconceivable 
that the lawgiver will prohibit something and then permit, let alone instruct, others to 
achieve it through deception. If the law were to recognise a form of sale contract 
intended to collect usury, or a sham transaction intended to avoid zakāh, then it would 
be enforcing what is prohibited, evading obligations, and aiding and abetting sins. 
This cannot be authorised under the ruling of Shari‘ah.359  
Moreover, Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn al-Qayyim360 argue that the harm which the 
lawgiver has forbidden usury to prevent exists further in the legal ruses used to 
circumvent the proscription of usury. This is because to achieve the desirable 
illegitimate ends, multiple transactions and extra efforts are required by all parties. 
Accordingly, Shari‘ah cannot ban a harmful action and permit a more harmful one.361  
In addition, al-Muzayni362 argues that some of these ḥiyal have been advocated by 
jurists on individual cases as exceptions to the general rule. However, applying them 
in a systemic way, as financial institutions currently do, removes their legitimacy. If 
classical scholars had known about the current implementation of their view, they 
would rule differently.363  
The arguments of the pro-ḥīlah school seem to be directed towards protecting 
judicial certainty, while the anti-ḥīlah argument aims to protect the welfare of society 
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by achieving the objectives of the law.364 Nevertheless, the pro-ḥīlah argument arises 
in a judicial context where a contract is disputed before a judge, and therefore it does 
not justify the current practise of creative Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic finance 
industry. More criticisms are directed at Shari‘ah-compliant products for focusing on 
form over substance at the structuring and approving stages rather than the litigation 
stage.365 Unlike judges, Shari‘ah supervisory boards are assumed to oversee the 
permissibility aspect as well as the validity aspect.       
2.6.  Conclusion  
This chapter has investigated whether creative Shari‘ah compliance is a 
phenomenon new to Islamic law and concluded that it is not: Shari‘ah scholars have 
addressed the practise under the term ḥīlah (a legal ruse) since the classical period of 
Islam. The chapter examined the position of Islamic schools of thought on ḥīlah and 
surveyed whether classical Islamic jurisprudence justifies using ḥiyal to practise 
creative Shari‘ah compliance. 
The research argued for a distinction between two notions when addressing the 
issue: permissibility (ṣaḥiḥ diyānatan) and validity (ṣaḥiḥ qaḍāʾan). From a 
permissibility perspective (al-ḥukm al-taklīfī), it concluded that there is no authority 
for utilising a form to circumvent the spirit of Shari‘ah law in finance. However, from 
a judicial validity perspective (al-ḥukm al-waḍʿī), if a dispute regarding such a 
contract comes before a judge, it can be deemed valid according to some schools of 
thought, such as Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī.  
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In addition, the research showed that there is confusion between permissible ḥīlah 
and prohibited ḥīlah. While the former serves to conclude illegitimate ends, the latter 
achieves a result that does not contradict the spirit of the law. Scholars seem to favour 
referring to the latter by the term makhraj fiqhī (jurisprudential leeway), while using 
ḥīlah to refer to unlawful ruses. 
Classical jurists accepted some ḥīlah on individual cases as an exception to the 
general rule or in the judicial context. However, applying a ḥīlah on a systemic level, 
as many financial institutions currently do, removes its legitimacy. Accordingly, 
Shari‘ah supervisory boards as institutions should not rely on such precedents to 
structure or Islamise financial products. Modern economic and finance knowledge put 
contemporary scholars in a better position than that of classical jurists to determine 
whether a certain product complies with the spirit of Islamic law or not. Insisting on 
justifying the use of some ḥīlah because they were mentioned in the classical 
literature would only harm the industry of Islamic finance. Ultimately, people would 
come to realise that there is no difference between conventional products and so-
called Shari‘ah-compliant products except that the latter are more expensive!      
  
74 
 
Chapter Three: 
Tawarruq as a Case Study of Creative Shari‘ah Compliance 
3.1.  Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the issue of form and substance in Islamic finance 
and whether the practise of creative Shari‘ah compliance can be justified within that 
framework. This chapter illustrates creative Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic 
finance industry by examining tawarruq, one of the most common structures used by 
institutions offering Shari‘ah-compliant products and services.  
The chapter is structured in seven parts including this introduction. Part 3.2 briefly 
defines the concept of tawarruq in Islamic jurisprudence and explains why it has been 
selected as a case study for creative Shari‘ah compliance; Part 3.3 provides an 
overview of the historical development of tawarruq; Part 3.4 addresses the main 
differences between jurisprudential and organised tawarruq; Part 3.5 illustrates 
common forms of organised tawarruq used in credit facility and liquidity 
management; Part 3.6 examines Shari‘ah jurists’ views regarding jurisprudential and 
organised tawarruq; and finally, Part 3.7 concludes the chapter.   
3.2.  Definition of Tawarruq and Selection Rationale 
In Islamic jurisprudence literature,366 tawarruq367 is defined as a form of finance 
wherein buyer A purchases a commodity from a seller for a deferred payment and 
then resells it to buyer B for cash at a price that is usually lower than the original cost. 
Buyer A does not intend to use the commodity, but rather purchases it intending to 
sell it to obtain liquidity. When buyer A first purchases the commodity, he has no 
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arrangement to sell it to buyer B. However, as Kahf and other researchers note,368 this 
classical definition of tawarruq is far removed from tawarruq as implemented today 
in the financial industry, since institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) 
play an intermediary role in this series of transactions and arrange all aspects of it. To 
differentiate between the two realizations of tawarruq, the contemporary literature 
often refers to the former as al-tawarruq alfigh (jurisprudential tawarruq) and the 
latter as al-tawarruq al-Munaẓm or al-Maṣrifī (organised or banking tawarruq).369 
The differences between these two concepts are discussed in more detail in part 3.4370     
This thesis uses tawarruq as a case study for three main reasons. First, tawarruq is 
by and large the most commonly used product in the industry for liquidity 
management and credit finance.371 It is the main financing structure for more than 
£600 billion in the Islamic finance industry. Mashal estimates that out of all liquidity 
management that uses Shari‘ah-compliant tools, more than 95% uses tawarruq.372 In 
Saudi Arabia, tawarruq financing is the most popular financial instrument, accounting 
for 183 billion riyals, which represents 67% of funding in the Saudi Islamic finance 
market.373 Moreover, according to Issa, 75% of individuals in Saudi Arabia and Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries who buy cars via banks practise tawarruq by 
reselling to a third party to obtain liquidity.374    
                                                 
368 Monzer Kahf, "Outlines Of a Brief Framework of Tawarruq (Cash Procurement) And Securitization 
In Shariah and Islamic Banking ", (2004) 
http://monzer.kahf.com/papers/english/a_brief_framework_of_Tawarruq_AND_SECURITIZATION.p
df accessed 10 Novmber 2013. 
369 Salah AlShalhoob, "Organised Tawarruq in Islamic Law: a Study of Organised Tawarruq as 
Practised in the Financial Institutions in Saudi Arabia" (paper presented at the IIUM International 
Conference on Islamic Banking and Finance, Kuala Lumpur 23-25/4/ 2007), p2.. 
370 See Part 3.4. 
371 Nourah  Aleshaikh, "Jurisprudence on Tawarruq: Contextual Evaluation on Basis of Customs, 
Circumstances, Time and Place" (Durham University, 2011), p50. 
372 ʿAbd al-Hādī Ḥabtūr "Mukhtaṣūn: al-Bunūk al-Islāamiyah tastakhdim al-Tawarruq fī dārah al-
Suūlah rughm al-Taḥafuẓāt al-Sharʿiyyh", al-Āqtiṣādiyyah, 8 January 2012 
http://www.aleqt.com/2012/01/08/article_614257.html. accessed 10 Novmber 2013. 
373 Aleshaikh, "Jurisprudence on Tawarruq: Contextual Evaluation on Basis of Customs, 
Circumstances, Time and Place," p72. 
374 ʿīsā, " Taṭbīqāt al-Tawaruq wa Astikhdāmātuh fī al-ʿamal al-Maṣrifī al-Islāamī " p463. 
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The second reason to choose tawarruq as a case study is that despite its 
popularity, it has attracted a lot of criticism with regard to its Shari‘ah compliance.375 
In recent years, many products offered by IIFS, such as murābaḥah and some Ṣukūk 
structures, have been under attack by many Shari‘ah scholars. However, tawarruq as 
practised by IIFS has received the strongest objection from Shari‘ah scholars. This 
was especially the case in 2009, when the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC),376 one of the most highly ranked 
bodies of Shari‘ah scholars, issued its fatwa prohibiting organised tawarruq.  
Finally, tawarruq provides a good example of creative Shari‘ah compliance with 
the objectives of Islamic law. In addition to its secure return, it shares many features 
of conventional finance and poses a lower risk and cost in comparison to other 
Shari‘ah-compliant products based on profit- and loss-sharing.377 A further benefit is 
its general acceptance by regulators in many jurisdictions, including non-Muslim 
countries like the United Kingdom.378     
3.3.  The Development of Tawarruq   
To fully understand the jurisprudential discussion surrounding tawarruq, it is 
important to understand how it has developed from the time of classical Shari‘ah 
jurists up to the modern practises of IIFS. The development of tawarruq can be 
categorised into three stages: 
                                                 
375 Rafe Haneef, Is the Ban on "Organised Tawarruq" the Tip of the Iceberg?  (Kuala Lumpur: 
International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), 2009), p1. 
376 OIC Fiqh Academy, "Resolution 179 (19/5),"  
http://www.kantakji.com/fiqh/Files/Fatawa/w246.pdf. accessed 10 May 2013. 
377 Khan, "Why Tawarruq Needs To Go? AOIFI and the OIC Fiqh Academy: Divergence or 
Agreement?". 
378 See Haneef, Is the Ban on "Organised Tawarruq" the Tip of the Iceberg?, p29. 
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3.3.1.  Jurisprudential Tawarruq   
Jurisprudential tawarruq is usually executed by individuals and takes place 
outside the financial system.379 It has been the traditional way for Muslims to obtain 
liquidity. In this system, a commodity, such as wheat or sugar in the past or cars 
today, is bought on a deferred basis and then sold on the spot for a lower price. Most 
fatwa that deem tawarruq permissible are directed towards this type of tawarruq.380 
Other names given to this type are al-tawarruq al-fardī381 (individualised tawarruq), 
classical tawarruq, and non-organised tawarruq.     
3.3.2.  Partly Organised Tawarruq 
This type has been one of the most popular methods of obtaining cash in recent 
years.382 In this case, the bank sells a commodity—usually a car or a stock share—to 
its client, who later sells it to a third party without the bank’s interference. This 
structure has been approved by many Shari‘ah supervisory boards (SSBs) subject to 
certain conditions.383 
3.3.3.  Fully Organised Tawarruq  
 In this type of tawarruq, IIFS handle and arrange all aspects of the transactions, 
starting with buying a commodity on the market and selling it to a client on deferred 
terms. The IIFS then acts as an agent, selling the commodity on behalf of the client in 
the market and finally depositing the cash into the client’s account.384 This 
                                                 
379 Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p17. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Shochrul Rohmatul Ajija, Mia Fathia, and Agusdiwana Suarni, Tawarruq: Issue & Challenge, 
(Brunei Darussalam2010), 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/215447064_TAWARRUQ_ISSUES_AND_CHALLENGES 
accessed Access Date. p3; Aleshaikh, "Jurisprudence on Tawarruq: Contextual Evaluation on Basis of 
Customs, Circumstances, Time and Place," p30. 
382 ʿīsā, " Taṭbīqāt al-Tawaruq wa Astikhdāmātuh fī al-ʿamal al-Maṣrifī al-Islāamī " p463. 
383 See, for example, Mohamed Elgari, "al-Tawarruq  Kamā tujrīh al-Maṣārif    " (paper presented at the 
17th session of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Makkah, 13-17/12/2003). 
384Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p18.; Kahf, "Outlines Of 
a Brief Framework of Tawarruq (Cash Procurement) And Securitization In Shariah and Islamic 
Banking ". 
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development is not surprising, given that it reduces the time and cost associated with 
transactions such as delivery, storage, shipping, and marketing.385 Since neither IIFS 
nor their clients are interested in the commodity, they will welcome any arrangement 
that might relieve them of the extra burden of handling it. 
Fully organised tawarruq was first offered in 2000 by the Commercial Bank 
(NCB)386 and several banks in Saudi Arabia, and other IIFS in GCC countries 
followed shortly.387 IIFS utilised the classical concept to offer a Shari‘ah-compliant 
product for financing and to be able to compete in the credit market, which was and is 
dominated by conventional institutions.388 Today tawarruq is offered in most 
jurisdictions where Islamic finance is practised, including Saudi Arabia and the 
United Kingdom.  
Diagrams 1 and 2 show typical examples of jurisprudential and fully organised 
tawarruq.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
385 Sami Al-Suwailem "Tawarruq Banking Products" (paper presented at the 19th session of the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy, Sharjah, UAE, 26/4/2009), p22. 
386 AlShalhoob, "Organised Tawarruq in Islamic Law: a Study of Organised Tawarruq as Practised in 
the Financial Institutions in Saudi Arabia," p3. 
387 Ibrahim Fadhil Dabu, "Tawarruq, Its Reality and Types" (paper presented at the 19th session of the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy, Sharjah, UAE, 26/4/2009). 
388 Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p5. 
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Diagram 1. Jurisprudential Tawarruq 
 
Diagram 2. Organised Tawarruq 
 
 
  
Trader Client Third Party 
Islamic Financial 
Institution 
Trader A 
Counterparty Trader B 
 
Note: The majority of commodity murabahah transactions use London Metal Exchange base 
metals as an asset, since they meet all criteria for a commodity (i.e., non-perishable, freely 
available and uniquely identifiable) and are easily identifiable via warrants. 
 
1. Pay on spot 
1. Deliver warrants 
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warrant 
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1- Occurs outside the financial system. 
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3.4.  The Differences between Jurisprudential and Organised Tawarruq  
This section addresses the main differences between jurisprudential and organised 
tawarruq, providing a basis for understanding the arguments against tawarruq. In 
jurisprudential tawarruq, the commodity used in the transaction is usually owned by a 
merchant who tends to sell his stock for cash and on deferred payment. In organised 
tawarruq, the financer does not own the commodity before the clients approach him 
for financing, and the financer only buys the commodity to use it in the tawarruq 
transaction.389  
Another contrast between the two kinds of tawarruq is the knowledge of the 
parties involved. In jurisprudential tawarruq, on the one hand, the merchant is not 
necessarily aware of the buyer’s intention, and he is not involved in the second sale of 
the commodity. In organised tawarruq, on the other hand, neither party is actually 
interested in the commodity; both know it is only a means of obtaining income.390 
IIFS assist in the whole process, which includes acting as agents to resell the 
commodity on behalf of the client. In fact, in large tawarruq transactions, the link 
between the three contracts is expressed in a legal document.391 Moreover, to mitigate 
price volatility, IIFS usually have agreements in place with other companies to 
repurchase the commodities used in tawarruq transactions at a pre-set price.392 In 
some cases,393 the same commodity will go back to the first seller and might be used 
over and over to finance other clients, a practise which casts doubt over the legitimacy 
of these sales contracts. 
                                                 
389Muhammad Taqi Usmani, "Verdicts on At-Tawarruq and Its Banking Applications" (paper presented 
at the The 17th session of the  International Islamic Fiqh Academy, Makkah, 13- 17/12/ 2003), p15; 
Al-Suwailem "Tawarruq Banking Products," p21. 
390 AlShalhoob, "Organised Tawarruq in Islamic Law: a Study of Organised Tawarruq as Practised in 
the Financial Institutions in Saudi Arabia," p7. 
391 Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p23. 
392Al-Suwailem "Tawarruq Banking Products," p22. Ajija, Fathia, and Suarni, Tawarruq: Issue & 
Challenge. p17. 
393 Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p28. 
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3.5.  Forms of Tawarruq   
Tawarruq can take different structures in the current Islamic industry, but it is 
mostly used by IIFS either as a liquidity facility (e.g., inter-bank placement) or as a 
credit facility (e.g., consumer credit financing). The following charts illustrate some 
of the most common models of tawarruq in the industry.  
Diagram 3. Inter-bank placement 
 
 
Inter-bank placement (Diagram 3) is a three-step process: 
1. Bank B, which needs some liquidity, will arrange to buy commodities on 
deferred terms from Bank A, which has extra cash. The general terms of 
tawarruq inter-bank placements between the two banks are usually agreed 
before any tawarruq transaction takes place.   
2. Bank A will purchase the commodity from Supplier A for an immediate 
payment, and then resell it to Bank B for a deferred payment. 
3. Bank B will then sell the commodity to Buyer B on a spot-payment basis and 
get the liquidity it needs.394  
However, if Bank A has no experience dealing with the commodity market, it 
might appoint Bank B to act as an agent for it to buy the commodity for an immediate 
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payment. Bank A then sells the commodity plus a profit to Bank B, which will be paid 
on a deferred basis. Bank B then sells the commodity to Buyer B on a spot-payment 
basis and get the liquidity it needs. The process is shown in Diagram 4. 
Diagram 4. Inter-bank placement 
  
Another form practised in the industry, known as reverse tawarruq,395 is used as a 
deposit-mobilising instrument. In this form, the client is using tawarruq to receive a 
fixed return for his deposit. The client will buy a commodity or appoint the bank as an 
agent to buy it for him. He will then sell it to the bank on deferred terms. The bank 
then will sell it in the market on a spot basis and use the capital to finance another 
client. The form is illustrated in Diagram 5.   
  
                                                 
395 Dusuki, Can Bursa Malaysia Suq al-Sila' (Commodity Murabahah House) Resolve the Controversy 
over Tawarruq?, p4; Al-Suwailem "Tawarruq Banking Products," p38. 
Source: Haneef 
(2009) 
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Diagram 5. Reverse Tawarruq 
 
 
3.6.  Shari‘ah Jurists’ Views on Tawarruq  
This section summarizes the Shari‘ah jurists’ views regarding jurisprudential and 
organised tawarruq. The discussion in this section focuses on the latter, which 
includes partly and fully organised tawarruq, since those are the forms most 
commonly practised in the Islamic finance industry.     
3.6.1.  Jurisprudential Tawarruq  
The literature396 shows that Shari‘ah scholars have three different views on 
jurisprudential tawarruq: 
                                                 
396 The discussion in this section is based on the following references: ʿAlI al-Sālūs "al-ʿīnah wa al-
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1. The majority of scholars, including those from the Ḥanafī and Mālikī schools 
as well as some within the Ḥanbalī School, deem tawarruq as makrūh 
(discouraged).397 
2. Another view within the Ḥanbalī School, upheld by prominent scholars Ibn 
Taymiyah (d.728/1328) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d.751/1350), deems tawarruq as 
muḥarram (prohibited).398 
3. The Shāfiʿī School regards tawarruq as mubāḥ (permissible); this is also the 
dominant opinion within the Ḥanbalī School as well as the stance of Abu 
Yosef, a prominent jurist within the Ḥanafī School. Although this view is 
favoured by the majority of contemporary Shari‘ah scholars and fatwa 
bodies,399 many prominent contemporary Shari‘ah scholars400 deem 
jurisprudential tawarruq as muḥarram (prohibited). 
3.6.2.  Arguments against Organised Tawarruq  
Contemporary Shari‘ah scholars have two different views regarding the 
permissibility of organised tawarruq. The majority of contemporary scholars deem 
organised tawarruq impermissible.401 This is also the view of the International 
Islamic Fiqh Academy of the OIC.402 These scholars base their view on several 
Shari‘ah, economic, and maslahah (public interest) arguments. 
                                                 
397 Zayn  Ibn Ibrāhīm  Bakr, al-Baḥar al-Rāʾiq vol. 6 (Beirut  Dār al-Maʿrifh), p256; ʿAlī al-Mirdāwī, 
al-Inṣāf fī maʿrifah al-Rājiḥ min al-Khilāaf   vol. 11 (1956), p195; Muḥammad al-Ḥaṭṭāb Mawāhib al-
Jalīl sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Khalīl vol. 4 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr), p405; ʿAbdAllāh   al-Saʿīdī "al-Tawaruq 
kamā tujrīh al-Maṣārif fī al-Waqt al-ḥāḍir " Majalah al-Mjamaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmi, no. 18 (2004): p197. 
398 Muḥammad bn Abī Bakr Ibn al-Qayyim, Tahdhīb Sunan Abī Dāwd, vol. 5 (Makkah: Dar al-baz, 
1980), p801. al-Mirdāwī, al-Inṣāf fī maʿrifah al-Rājiḥ min al-Khilāaf   11, p195. 
399 Like the Islamic Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League,  the Permanent Committee for Islamic 
Research and Issuing Fatwas in Saudi, and many SSBs in IIFS. See al-Ḥuwayṭī, "al-Tawarruq 
ḥaqīqatuh , Anwāʿuuh," p13.  
400 Like Hssan Hammad Hssan , Rifeq Al-Massry, Saleh Al hossian. See Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-
Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p29. 
401 Ibid., p32. 
402 OIC Fiqh Academy, "Resolution 179 (19/5)". It is worth noting that AAOIFI’s Standard 30 on 
Tawarruq does not conflict with the OIC decision. For a detailed discussion, see Khan, "Why Tawarruq 
Needs To Go? AOIFI and the OIC Fiqh Academy: Divergence or Agreement?". 
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First, from an Islamic jurisprudence perspective, opponents of organised tawarruq 
argue that it is ḥīlah (a legal ruse) to circumvent the prohibition of ribā (usury), since 
the ultimate goal of structuring three contracts in this order is to provide a sum to be 
paid later with a fixed return. This principle is illustrated in the following example.403 
Two people need financing of £10,000. The first one applied for a £10,000 usurious 
loan to be paid back within two years. The second person applied for an organised 
tawarruq. The bank bought an amount of iron for £10,000, sold it to the second 
person for £11,000 on a deferred term of two years, and then sold it to the market on 
behalf of the client for £10,000. The final outcome is that both people are charged a 
sum greater than what they have received, and the bank is the creditor in both 
situations. In fact, organised tawarruq might be more costly, since the price of the 
commodity may change, and the bank may charge administration and brokerage fees. 
IIFS and their clients are not interested in these commodities, which have only been 
used as a means to overcome the restrictions on giving a usurious loan in Shari‘ah.404 
It is not unusual to find that some clients are not aware of the commodity which 
they—in theory—bought and sold during the process of organised tawarruq.405 For 
instance, IIFS often use palladium, a commodity unfamiliar to many individual 
consumers, in their tawarruq financing.  
Second, opponents of organised tawarruq have objected that the use of 
commodities in these transactions does not comply with Islamic legal standards. They 
argue that these transactions breach one of the fundamental tenets of Shari‘ah law, 
                                                 
403 AlShalhoob, "Organised Tawarruq in Islamic Law: a Study of Organised Tawarruq as Practised in 
the Financial Institutions in Saudi Arabia," p10. 
404 Al-Suwailem "Tawarruq Banking Products," p35; Khan, "Why Tawarruq Needs To Go? AOIFI and 
the OIC Fiqh Academy: Divergence or Agreement?". 
405 Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p37. 
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which states that goods must be valuable and useable for legitimate purposes.406 A 
commodity must also be specified, and it should match the description provided to the 
buyer. The scholarly concern surrounds the genuineness of some of the goods used in 
organised tawarruq. For instance, Dr Al-Qara Daghi,407 a renowned Shari‘ah scholar 
in the industry, describes an organised tawarruq contract that was submitted to the 
Shari‘ah board for approval in which the underlying commodity sold was junk 
Russian aluminium. The broker chose this item deliberately for tawarruq because it 
was not possible to sell it on the market. Another issue is that there are no assertions 
that the same goods will not be sold to more than one buyer at the same time. 
Dusiki408 considers the problem of fictitious commodities a key reason for Shari‘ah 
scholars to prohibit organised tawarruq. 
In addition, Shari‘ah scholars have raised concerns related to the possession and 
the delivery of goods used in organised tawarruq. For a contract to be valid under 
Shari‘ah, the seller must own the commodity before selling it. This is because a sale 
contract is intended for transferring the ownership of the item to the buyer and the 
ownership of the payment to the seller. Accordingly, selling a commodity before 
acquiring possession of it or restricting the buyer from controlling what he bought 
defies the purpose of the sale contract and invalidates the transaction. In some 
organised tawarruq deals, the possession of the commodity does not occur. This is 
especially the case when the contract includes a clause stating that the buyer should 
                                                 
406 Dusuki, Can Bursa Malaysia Suq al-Sila' (Commodity Murabahah House) Resolve the Controversy 
over Tawarruq?, p15. 
407 Ali Al-Qara Daghi " Murājʿat Fatāwā Nadwat al-Barakah. ,"  http://www.isra.my/media-
centre/downloads.html?task=finish&cid=102&catid=21. accessed 10 Novmber 2013). 
408 Dusuki, Can Bursa Malaysia Suq al-Sila' (Commodity Murabahah House) Resolve the Controversy 
over Tawarruq?, p15. 
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not intend to take delivery or imposing extra fees if he wants to do so.409 Dusuki410 
notes that such delivery restrictions have become a standard practise in the market.      
Furthermore, to mitigate the risk of price volatility mentioned earlier, some IIFS 
contract with a third party to repurchase the commodities used in the tawarruq at a 
fixed price regardless of their actual price that day in the market.411 In this situation, 
IIFS commit to selling something before owning it and before being appointed as 
agents by the principals (i.e., the clients).412 Moreover, this arrangement breaches the 
agency agreement, because if the price goes up in the market, IIFS will be acting 
against the best interests of their principal since they have a standing agreement with a 
third party to buy this commodity at a fixed price. This indicates that the process of 
organised tawarruq aims merely to provide a sum to be paid later with a fixed return, 
which is labelled a profit rather than interest.       
With the regard to economy, opponents offer three main objections. First, they 
argue that the wide use of organised tawarruq increases debt proliferation, creating a 
harmful economic impact opposed by Shari‘ah.413 As argued by Siddiqi414 earlier in 
this thesis,415 finance based on debt is unfair because it redistributes wealth in favour 
of the providers of finance regardless of the productivity of the fund provided. It is 
also an inefficient way to create wealth, since the fund goes to the most credit-worthy 
debtor and not to the most productive project.  
                                                 
409Khan, "Why Tawarruq Needs To Go? AOIFI and the OIC Fiqh Academy: Divergence or 
Agreement?".  
410 Dusuki, Can Bursa Malaysia Suq al-Sila' (Commodity Murabahah House) Resolve the Controversy 
over Tawarruq?, p15; Khan, "Why Tawarruq Needs To Go? AOIFI and the OIC Fiqh Academy: 
Divergence or Agreement?". 
411 Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p41. 
412 Ajija, Fathia, and Suarni, Tawarruq: Issue & Challenge. p16; Al-Suwailem "Tawarruq Banking 
Products," p31. 
413 Dusuki, Can Bursa Malaysia Suq al-Sila' (Commodity Murabahah House) Resolve the Controversy 
over Tawarruq?, p12. Fahmy et al., "Revisiting  OIC  Fiqh  Academy  Rules  on  Organised  
Tawarruq". p8. 
414 Siddiq, "Economics Of Tawarruq: How Its Mafasid Overwhelm The Masalih" p1-2. 
415 See chapter 1 at p 32. 
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Second, opponents criticise organised tawarruq for driving national capital 
outside the country.416 The issue is that most of the commodities it uses are traded on 
the international market,417 which results in depriving local markets and communities 
of national capital.   
Third, organised tawarruq opponents also condemn the excessive profit margin 
IIFS make with tawarruq compared to the return on a conventional loan.418 This is 
because while the interest rate is set by central banks, the profit rate is not necessarily 
subject to the same control, since tawarruq is technically a sale contract.419 The flat-
profit rate of tawarruq usually ranges from 6% to 14%. The profit “is calculated on a 
non-reducing balance”,420 resulting in consumers effectively paying a profit based on 
an annual percentage rate (APR) of 12% to 28%. Some IIFS tend to stress the lower 
flat rate rather than informing consumers about the high APR they will pay if they 
select tawarruq as a credit facility.421 Consumers’ lack of financial knowledge might 
prevent them from noticing the difference.  
From a public interest perspective, opponents of organised tawarruq present three 
arguments. First, they argue that approving organised tawarruq and similar structures 
raises questions about the credibility of the Islamic finance industry422 in both Muslim 
and non-Muslim countries, because using such a structure eliminates differences 
between conventional finance and Islamic finance. Islamic finance has been defended 
by its advocates as an ethical system based on profit- and loss-sharing, and if that 
changed—for example, with the approval of tawarruq—people would soon start 
                                                 
416 Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p60. 
417 Elgari, "al-Tawarruq  Kamā tujrīh al-Maṣārif    " p15. 
418 Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p54. 
419 Haneef, Is the Ban on "Organised Tawarruq" the Tip of the Iceberg?, p24. 
420 Ibid. 
421 Rafīq Ūnis al-Maṣrī, " al-Tawaruq fy al-Bunūk hl hū Mubārak Am Mashʾūm    " Markaz Abḥāth al-
Āqtiṣād al-Islāmī    http://islamiccenter.kau.edu.sa/arabic/Hewar_Arbeaa/abs/164.htm. accessed 10 
December 2013 
422 Ajija, Fathia, and Suarni, Tawarruq: Issue & Challenge. p17. 
89 
 
wondering what the difference is between a usurious loan and a Shari‘ah-
compliant product.423 This might be especially the case in some countries where 
Shari‘ah-compliant products have tax disadvantages compared to conventional loans 
or mortgages. 
Second, they also argue that the increasing use of organised tawarruq affects the 
need for innovation and development in the Islamic financial sector.424 Currently, 
many IIFS and research centers support and invest in the development of Shari‘ah-
compliant financial products based on profit- and loss-sharing. But if the tawarruq 
were deemed to be Shari‘ah compliant, there would be no need to invest in 
developing further products in line with the objectives of Islamic law.  
The third argument from the public interest perspective is that using such a 
structure hinders negotiations between IIFS and regulators.425 The Islamic finance 
industry has always argued that a conventional legal framework does not suit its needs 
and that IIFS need to be relieved from certain restrictions (e.g., they should be 
allowed to share ownership of real estate). Some central banks have started to realize 
that IIFS need a different framework, and progress has been made in this regard (e.g., 
different calculation methods of capital adequacy; special arrangements with regard to 
the lender of last resort). However, with IIFS increasing the use of organised 
tawarruq and similar debt-oriented products, there will be no need for these changes, 
since the difference between conventional financial institution and IIFS is in the 
process rather than the substance of the product.426 
                                                 
423 In 2011, a popular Saudi Arabian television comedy called Tāsh Mā Tāsh (No Big Deal) provoked a 
huge controversy after accusing Islamic banks of being no different from conventional banks. The 
episode was titled zayd akhū ʿubayd, an Arabic idiom that means “cut from the same cloth. See 
Alarabiya, "ḥalaqah zayd akhū ʿubayd fī ṭāsh 18 takshif wasāʾil al-bunūk al-islāamiyah fī al-taḥāul 
biālribā".        
424 Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p55. 
425 Ibid., p58. 
426 Muḥy al-Dīn Aḥmd  Aḥmad " al-Taṭbīqāt al-Maṣrifiyyh liʿaqd al-Tawarruq" (paper presented at the 
Dawr al-Muʾsasāt al-Maṣrifiyah fī al-āstithmār wa al-Tanmiyyah, Sharjah, UEA, 7-9 May 2002), p458. 
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3.6.3.  Arguments Supporting Organised Tawarruq 
Despite these arguments against organised tawarruq, some contemporary scholars 
do consider it permissible, since the general rule of sales in Islam, stated in verse 
2:275 of the Quran, reads, “Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest”.427 
They hold that organised tawarruq is nothing but a combination of sales contracts, 
which each meet all the conditions of a permissible contract in Islam.428 According to 
this line of thinking, the intention of combining these contracts is irrelevant and does 
not affect the validity of the contract. However, the permissibility of an individual 
contract in Shari‘ah does not mean that the whole combination of transactions is 
permissible. For example, the majority of Shari‘ah jurists, including those who allow 
organised tawarruq, deem īnah contracts (double sales) as prohibited, although they 
are a combination of two sale contracts.429   
Haneef 430 takes a more pragmatic approach than many supporters of organised 
tawarruq. Although he seems to acknowledge a similarity between organised 
tawarruq and ribā (usury),431 he does not think this is the right time to renounce 
organised tawarruq. Haneef believes that the OIC ban on organised tawarruq reflects 
Shari‘ah scholars’ dissatisfaction over the direction of the devolvement of the Islamic 
finance industry. Tawarruq opponents want to send a message to IIFS that they have 
to change the way they offer Shari‘ah-compliant products if they wish to comply with 
the objectives of Shari‘ah. Haneef explains that the lack of a physical link with 
commodities in organised tawarruq transactions have made them an easy target for 
critics. The commodity is used only as a means of getting income, so consumers do 
                                                 
427 Saheeh International, Translation Of The Meanings Of The Glorious Quran. 
428 See Dusuki, Can Bursa Malaysia Suq al-Sila' (Commodity Murabahah House) Resolve the 
Controversy over Tawarruq?, p6; al-Ḥuwayṭī, "al-Tawarruq ḥaqīqatuh , Anwāʿuuh," p27. 
429 AlShalhoob, "Organised Tawarruq in Islamic Law: a Study of Organised Tawarruq as Practised in 
the Financial Institutions in Saudi Arabia," p3. 
430 Haneef, Is the Ban on "Organised Tawarruq" the Tip of the Iceberg?, p11. 
431 Ibid. 
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not care if IIFS use copper, stock shares, or even airtime to structure their credit 
financing. 
Haneef supports his argument with a statement from a leading scholar in the 
Islamic finance industry and a member of many SSBs, Sheikh Taqi Usmani,432 who 
notes that transactions such as tawarruq and murrabah were tolerated by Shari‘ah 
scholars forty years ago, at the dawn of the Islamic finance industry, who took into 
consideration the circumstances of these newly established IIFS and the unfriendly 
nature of the conventional financial system. The move was intended to facilitate 
Islamic finance and to give IIFS some ground in the market. However, Usmani points 
out that  
it was not in the calculation of the jurists who ruled to permit these 
procedures that these institutions would sit contentedly satisfied with these 
way outs for an unlimited time, adopting it as the targeted goal for the 
establishment of Islamic banks and the basic activity, which centres around 
their dealings forever.433  
Usmani argues that today, IIFS—with their market share—can offer Shari‘ah-
compliant products which in actuality do comply with the forms and the objectives of 
Islamic law.434 
Haneef,435 however, disagrees with Usmani and other tawarruq opponents. 
According to him, the Islamic finance industry is not yet mature enough to influence 
the financial system. Specifically, Haneef argues, the Islamic finance industry does 
not have enough market share to make a shift in the financial industry. Its global size 
is not large enough to adopt the ideal form of commercial financing in Shari‘ah, 
which is based on profit- and loss-sharing. To support his point, he436 cites the 
industry in Malaysia, where the government has been promoting Islamic finance since 
                                                 
432 Usmani, "Verdicts on At-Tawarruq and Its Banking Applications," p18. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Haneef, Is the Ban on "Organised Tawarruq" the Tip of the Iceberg?, p15. 
436 Ibid., p16. 
92 
 
1980. However, in 2009, the share of Islamic banking made up only 13% of the total 
banking market. With this small market share, IIFS have no power to drive consumers 
towards profit- and loss-sharing products or to pressure regulatory authorities to 
modify the financial framework to accommodate authentic Shari‘ah-compliant 
products. 
Haneef asserts that IIFS are bound to stimulate the risk profile of conventional 
finance products.437 It is unrealistic for Shari‘ah scholars to think that IIFS, with their 
current market share, will be able to fundamentally shift consumers’ and regulators’ 
attitudes towards Islamic finance, let alone change the economic system from a debt-
based system to a profit- and loss-sharing–based economy. Haneef contends that the 
pricing, along with the Shari‘ah compliance, is primarily what attracts consumers to 
Islamic finance. Islamic finance would lose its appeal if its price were higher than that 
of its conventional counterparts, which would be the case with the profit- and loss-
sharing Shari‘ah products. Haneef believes that in order for the Islamic finance 
industry to survive, it must increase its share of the market even if its products are not 
in compliance with the ideal profit- and loss-sharing system of financing in Shari‘ah. 
Once IIFS control at least two thirds of the market share, they can move towards 
offering truly Shari‘ah-compliant products.438 Without gradually acquiring a huge 
market share, it would be impossible to shift to this ideal system.439  
Furthermore, Haneef440 argues that if tawarruq has been used sensibly, it can 
benefit the community and fulfil its social needs. Without tawarruq, Muslim 
consumers will be forced to use conventional financing facilities. In addition, the 
harmful effects of tawarruq which Siddiqi described can also result from other 
                                                 
437 Ibid., p17. 
438 Ibid., p20. 
439 Ibid., p21. 
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products, such as murābaḥah and ijārah, which are approved by some of the Shari‘ah 
scholars who oppose tawarruq. He also441 suggests that the misuse of organised 
tawarruq should not be solved by banning it, but rather by means such as responsible 
marketing tactics, thoughtful credit approval, consumer suitability tests, and 
alternative saving plans. For instance, some IIFS take advantage of religious seasons 
such as Ramadan to launch their tawarruq marketing, encouraging consumers to 
accrue unnecessary debt and spend on luxury goods. Shari‘ah encourages Muslims to 
live within their financial ability and only use debt as a last measure for serious 
needs.442 Adopting the culture of “buy now and pay later” in IIFS marketing 
campaigns is not in line with the teaching of Shari‘ah, and Haneef urges that SSBs 
prevent such disjunctions by playing a role in guiding marketing policies of the 
Shari‘ah-compliant products they approve.443  
In short, Haneef444 concludes that despite the ban on organised tawarruq, it is 
unlikely that the Islamic finance industry will soon find alternatives. Tawarruq 
growth was primarily due to the fact that other alternatives were not feasible. The law 
in some countries, including those with Muslim majorities, was not developed to 
allow systems other than tawarruq. For example, in Saudi Arabia, regulators only 
chose the tawarruq structure out of many Shari‘ah-compliant proposals in order to 
finance a company-won telecom licence. Therefore, according to Haneef, tawarruq 
will remain in use among IIFS.445 He recommends that critics direct their energies 
towards teaching IIFS about ethical marketing and consumers’ credit-suitability tests, 
and that academic Shari‘ah scholars and practitioners try to find practical solutions 
that will enable IIFS to gradually offer products based on equity-based models. Until 
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then, Haneef argues, IIFS should be allowed to offer tawarruq and to compete for a 
larger market share.      
However, as this part of the chapter attests, Haneef’s argument is based in 
pragmatism rather than in Shari‘ah law. He seems to base his argument on two 
premises: that Islamic finance can only be applied within the banking domain, and 
that organised tawarruq is better than usury. Finding or assessing any alternative 
structures to organised tawarruq is beyond the scope of this chapter, which aims to 
provide a case study of creative Shari‘ah compliance, or indeed of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, I shall briefly discuss the second premise, since it is shared by some of 
the opponents of organised tawarruq.  
3.6.4.  Is Tawarruq Better than Ribā?  
Despite the strong criticisms of organised tawarruq, some of its opponents, such 
as AlShalhoob,446 think it is a better option than ribā (a usurious loan). Needless to 
say, this position is also shared by tawarruq supporters who acknowledge that it is not 
in line with the objectives of Shari‘ah. The rationale behind this view is that although 
Shari‘ah scholars unanimously prohibit usury, a minority of scholars believe that 
organised tawarruq is permissible. Accordingly, it is preferable to a transaction that is 
completely prohibited. This view allows organised tawarruq if a conventional loan is 
the only alternative.     
However, not all the opponents of tawarruq agree with this justification. They 
argue it poses a higher financial and social cost than an interest-based loan,447 because 
of the complex nature of the structure and the series of transactions required to get the 
client the sum he needs. The only way to reduce the cost of these transactions is to not 
                                                 
446 AlShalhoob, "Organised Tawarruq in Islamic Law: a Study of Organised Tawarruq as Practised in 
the Financial Institutions in Saudi Arabia," p59. 
447 Kahf, "Outlines Of a Brief Framework of Tawarruq (Cash Procurement) And Securitization In 
Shariah and Islamic Banking ". p3; Albahooth, al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-
āqtiṣādiyah, p59. 
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implement it in practise, which results in a conventional loan with more paperwork. 
Moreover, opponents argue that provisional solutions in the financial industry will 
only make the situation worse, having a negative impact on the future of the industry 
as well as on the economy as whole. Such provisional solutions will cast doubt on the 
authenticity of Islamic finance and will lead to IIFS losing their identity as institutions 
offering truly Shari‘ah-compliant products. This reputational damage is very difficult 
to repair.  
What is more, opponents of tawarruq argue that seeking liquidity through a 
clearly usurious loan is better than seeking it via organised tawarruq. This is because 
when a Muslim practises usury, he knows that it is strictly prohibited and therefore 
will limit his dealing to situations of absolute necessity.448 On the other hand, 
disguising a structure that achieves the same outcome under a different name and 
marketing it as Shari‘ah compliant could lead consumers using this product to buy 
accessories and luxury goods that create unnecessary debt. In short, a Muslim might 
be hesitant to buy a smartphone or new laptop using a usurious loan, but he or she 
might be more willing to buy it using organised tawarruq, especially if it is marketed 
with comforting names like al-tawarruq al-mubark (the blessed tawarruq).449 In 
short, organised tawarruq does not carry any social, economic, or equity benefits and 
shares the same disadvantages as the usurious loan.450              
Interestingly, the renowned classical scholar Ibn Taymiyah (d.728/1328) realised 
this point, which led him to advocate for the prohibition of tawarruq in all its forms. 
His student and close associate Ibn al-Qayyim (d.751/1350), also a prominent Ḥanbalī 
scholar, states the following regarding Ibn Taymiyah’s position on tawarruq:     
                                                 
448  al-Tawarruq al-Maṣrifī al-Munaẓm wa āthāruh al-āqtiṣādiyah, p59. 
449For example, see: Arab National Bank (ANB), "al-Tawarruq al-Mubark," ANB, 
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Our teacher (God bless his soul) forbade tawarruq. He was challenged on 
that opinion repeatedly in my presence, but never approved it. He said: “The 
precise economic substance for which ribā was forbidden is present in this 
contract, and transaction costs are increased through purchase and sale at a 
loss of some commodity. Sharia would not forbid a smaller harm and permit 
a greater one!451 
Given the harmful consequences of tawarruq enumerated above, one might 
wonder why it has been allowed by some scholars since the early days of the Islamic 
state (circa 700 CE). Siddiqi452 believes the answer is twofold. First, early jurists lived 
in a different economic world where debt had no major role in the economy; debt 
instruments barely existed, let alone a debt market. The speculation of dealers was 
directed at the prices of actual goods and services rather than at the prices of debt 
instruments. The role of debt in financing business was limited. Business and 
agriculture were mostly funded by personal wealth, trade credit, and partnership. 
Second, Siddiqi argues that earlier Shari‘ah scholars lacked the tools of 
macroeconomic analysis; they were not able to appreciate the negative impact of 
tawarruq on the economy as a whole, while it was much easier to see the benefit of 
tawarruq for a particular situation in which liquidity was provided at the time of need. 
Even today, Siddiqi thinks that Shari‘ah scholars’ discussion has been more centred 
on the contractual elements of tawarruq rather than on the negative consequences of 
the tawarruq transaction for the economy and public policy.  
3.7.  Conclusion  
This chapter has aimed to illustrate creative Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic 
finance industry by examining tawarruq, one of the most common structures used by 
IIFS. After defining tawarruq and its various forms, the chapter addressed Shari‘ah 
                                                 
451 Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Mawqiʿayn ʿan Rab al-ʿĀlamīn, 3, p170. Translation of Dr El-Gamal (with 
amendments) in  El-Gamal, Islamic Finance : Law, Economics, and Practice, p71.  
452 Siddiq, "Economics Of Tawarruq: How Its Mafasid Overwhelm The Masalih" p6. See also, Zubair 
Hasan, "Islamic Finance: The Structure-Objective Mismatch and its Consequences," ISRA 
International Journal of Islamic Finance 2, no. 1 (2010): p45. 
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scholars’ views on the permissibility of tawarruq. It has shown that while most 
scholars deem jurisprudential tawarruq as makrūh (discouraged), the majority of 
scholars deem organised tawarruq used by IIFS as prohibited and see it as ḥīlah (a 
legal ruse) to circumvent the Shari‘ah prohibition on ribā (usury). The ultimate goal 
of the organised tawarruq structure is to provide a sum to be paid later with a fixed 
return. IIFS and their clients are not interested in the underlying commodity, which is 
only used as a means to overcome the restriction against giving a usurious loan in 
Shari‘ah. Last, the chapter has argued that organised tawarruq is worse than ribā 
since it casts doubt on the authenticity of Shari‘ah-compliant products; does not create 
any social, economic benefits; and has the same disadvantages as a usurious loan. 
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Chapter Four: 
Standardisation of Fatwas to Reduce Creative Shari‘ah 
Compliance 
4.1.  Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the thesis critically appraised justifications of creative 
Shari‘ah compliance practises, and chapter three provided a case study of one of the 
most common practises of creative Shari‘ah compliance, known as tawarruq. This 
chapter examines the inconsistency in the fatwas issued by Shari‘ah supervisory 
boards (SSBs) that reside in various financial institutions as a key factor contributing 
to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance. A product that is deemed Shari‘ah-
compliant by an SSB in one institution offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) may 
not be regarded as such by another SSB. This inconsistency is affecting the 
compliance level in the industry significantly, since stakeholders are left confused 
about which products are Shari‘ah compliant and which are not, and about what 
Shari‘ah compliance means. 
This chapter aims to examine the appositeness of standardisation as a mechanism 
to reduce conflict in the opinions of Shari‘ah scholars concerning the permissibility of 
financial products.453 The chapter is structured in six parts including this introduction. 
Part 4.2 defines standardisation and other relevant terms; Part 4.3 addresses the 
arguments for and against standardisation; Part 4.4 examines the causes of juristic 
differences; Part 4.5 traces the legal theories offered in classical Islamic jurisprudence 
to deal with this issue, suggests potential remedies, and highlights the limitations of 
implementing them in Islamic and secular countries; finally, Part 4.6 concludes the 
chapter.    
                                                 
453 The chapter is not concerned with standardising inconsistent applications of one fatwa, since that is 
more of a governance issue than a juristic one. See: Ahmad Alkhamees, "The Impact of Shari’ah 
Governance Practices on Shari’ah Compliance in Contemporary Islamic Finance," Journal of Banking 
Regulation 14, no. 2 (2012).     
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4.2.  Standardisation: A Definition  
“Standardisation” as a process or term can have different meanings depending on 
its usage; these meanings depend especially on disciplinary context and on the nature 
of the participants involved. But according to the Oxford Dictionary of English,454 to 
standardise something is to cause it “to conform to a standard” which is “used as a 
measure, norm, or model in comparative evaluations”. Foster455 notes that the term 
“standardisation” is used by financiers more than lawyers, who tend to discuss it as 
part of the concept of legal certainty. In the context of Islamic finance, however, 
standardisation can be defined as setting up global Shari‘ah standards by codifying the 
principles and precepts of Islamic commercial law.456 
This thesis addresses two notions of standardisation: national standardisation and 
international standardisation. The former refers to standardisation of a specific 
interpretation of Shari‘ah on an Islamic financial matter which will be enforced in a 
national jurisdiction of one country, whereas the latter is concerned with 
standardisation of Shari‘ah-compliant criteria among different jurisdictions. It is 
worth noting that some aspects of Shari‘ah such as ʿaqīdah (dogma) and ʿibādāt 
(rituals) are not subject to standardisation because they are deemed to be beyond the 
scope of ijtihād457 and national legislation.458 Thus, this chapter’s discussion of 
standardisation is limited to the domain of Islamic commercial law.  
                                                 
454Angus Stevenson, "Oxford Dictionary of English," Oxford University Press, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/BOOK_SEARCH.html?book=t140. accessed 1 November 
2011. 
455 Foster, "Islamic Finance Law as an Emergent Legal System," p188. 
456 Wafica Ali  Ghoul, "The Standardization Debate in Islamic Finance: A Case Study " (paper 
presented at the 8th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Doha, 18/12/2011), 
p2. 
457 Ijtihād can be defined as “the processes of reasoning that the jurist employed in order to arrive at the 
best guess of what he thought might be the law pertaining to a particular case.” Wael B. Hallaq, An 
introduction to Islamic law  (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p27. 
458 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, "Shari’ah and Civil Law: Towards a Methodology of Harmonization," 
Islamic Law and Society 14, no. 3 (2007): p397. 
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4.3.  Why Is Standardisation Needed? 
Industry leaders are increasingly becoming uneasy that inconsistencies in SSB 
rulings can occur in the same bank over time, between different SSBs in one country, 
or at the international level between SSBs operating in different jurisdictions.459 Many 
of these leaders have voiced their concern that the lack of consistency among SSBs 
fatwas is currently hindering the growth of Islamic finance and that unless a standard 
framework is adopted, the market will continue to be fragmented.460 For instance, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) stated in its 
September 2008 report that “as the Islamic securities markets continue to expand both 
geographically and in terms of market size, the development of regulatory standards, 
standardisation of documentation, practises and the ratings of products will be 
essential”.461 
4.3.1.  Arguments for Standardisation 
Proponents of the standardisation of Shari‘ah interpretations in the Islamic finance 
industry have offered several justifications. These include protecting financial 
stability, promoting growth, and maintaining public confidence in the Islamic finance 
industry; saving cost and time; increasing IIFS efficiency and international 
marketability; encouraging innovation and development; mitigating Shari‘ah risk; and 
easing the task of regulators. 
One argument for supporting standardisation is that it would help to ensure 
financial stability, promote growth, and maintain consumer confidence in the 
                                                 
459 Wafik Grais and Matteo Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions 
Offering IslamicFinancial Services,"  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4054(2006) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=940711 accessed 2 December 2010. 
460 El Baltaji and Anwar, "Shariah Scholar on More Than 50 Boards Opposes Limit Plan: Islamic 
Finance". 
461 Executive Committee of The International Organization Of Securities Commissions, "Analysis of 
The Application of IOSCO’s Objectives And Principles of Securities Regulation For Islamic Securities 
Products " International  Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
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market.462 When SSBs issue conflicting fatwas as to whether or not a specific product 
is Shari‘ah compliant, they confuse not only the public, but also the practitioners in 
the industry.463 The value of the international ṣukūk market shrank from about $50 
billion in 2007 to about $15 billion in 2008.464 The loss was said to be partly caused 
by the statement of Taqi Usmani (a leading Shari‘ah scholar within Islamic finance 
industry) that “many structures presenting themselves as Islamic did not meet the 
definition of true Shari‘ah compliance”.465  
The inconsistency of Shari‘ah models results in these models’ limited mobility on 
the national as well as on the global levels.466 This inconsistency thus impedes the 
market from fulfilling its potential. An example of inconsistency on the national level 
is the dispute over organised tawarruq, as discussed in chapter three. While it is 
accepted by many SSBs in Saudi Arabia, it is rejected by other prominent Shari‘ah 
scholars in the Kingdom.467 On an international level, the contract of ʿīnah is 
approved by some SSBs in Malaysia as Shari‘ah compliant, while some SSBs in Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries deem it an illegitimate legal ruse employed to 
circumvent Shari‘ah’s prohibition of usury.468  
                                                 
462 Ghoul, "The Standardization Debate in Islamic Finance: A Case Study " p4; Grais and Pellegrini, 
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Another reason for promoting standardisation is that it saves cost and time for 
IIFS.469  Standardising popular contracts will minimise the need to wait for SSB 
approval, resolve the issue of the shortage of Shari‘ah scholars in some countries, and 
help save the cost of SSB services. These outcomes would eventually increase IIFS 
efficiency, reduce the overall transaction cost, and provide a level playing field for the 
Islamic finance industry to compete with its conventional counterpart.470 
The current lack of uniformity in Shari‘ah rulings is also affecting the efficiency 
of the Islamic finance industry. For instance, in 2008, the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) delayed its plan to issue ṣukūk after the SSBs at Citibank of 
Dubai and CIMB Malaysia, the two banks selected to structure the deal, gave 
conflicting views of the proposed structure’s Shari‘ah compliance.471 To 
accommodate the two conflicting opinions, the issuance structure had to be based on 
the mushārakah model rather than the originally proposed murābaḥah model. This 
lack of uniformity in SSB opinions increases cost, transaction time, and the issuer’s 
sensitivity to risk.  
Another benefit of standardisation is boosting the international marketability of 
Shari‘ah-compliant products.472 Currently, a product which is deemed Shari‘ah 
compliant in Malaysia, such as bayʿ al-dyn (the selling of debt), may not be accepted 
by GCC Shari‘ah scholars.473 Shari‘ah standardisation will mean that a product can be 
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approved in Dubai and marketed in Malaysia without confusion, uncertainty, and 
complication.474  
In addition to improving the marketability of existing products, standardising 
basic contracts would motivate SSBs and the management of IIFS to introduce new 
products and services in order to compete with other players in the market.475 Ozgur 
Tanrikulu,476 speaking as the head of Islamic finance at McKinsey, a global 
management consulting firm, argued that innovation will only occur once the 
essentials are standardised, but that a market where the basics are frequently 
questioned will impede growth. 
Moreover, supporters of standardisation argue that it will help to mitigate Shari‘ah 
risk—that is, the risk that a contract can be deemed invalid and its enforceability thus 
called into question in both Muslim and secular countries. This is especially the case 
when Islamic parties’ articles of association restrict them from signing a non-
Shari‘ah-compliant contract.477  In Investment Dar v Blom Development Bank,478 for 
example, the claimant defaulted on a $100 million ṣukūk and argued in its legal 
defence that the contract in question was not Shari‘ah-compliant, despite the fact its 
own Shari‘ah board had approved it as such. Global rating agencies such as Moody’s 
are concerned with such risk, as it may have an adverse impact on the assessment of 
credit risk.479     
Finally, proponents of standardisation argue that standardising Shari‘ah fatwa 
makes the task of regulators simple and fairly straightforward. Conflicting Shari‘ah 
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interpretations and practises make it difficult for regulators to oversee the industry and 
safeguard the public.480 With financial institutions utilising inconsistent fatwas to 
maximise their profit, it is difficult to ensure that clients are receiving value for the 
premium they have paid to protect their faith, given that Islamic financial products 
tend to be more expensive than conventional ones.481 This uncertainty can make some 
countries reluctant to open their market to Shari‘ah-compliant products. Supervising a 
financial system with conflicting Shari‘ah models would be ineffective, costly, and 
unwieldy.482 Without a semblance of consistency, it would be difficult to establish 
sound national and international compliance practises. 
But with a Shari‘ah standard, financial institutions will be able to follow 
uncomplicated guidelines to ensure and report Shari‘ah compliance to stakeholders in 
a more consistent and transparent manner.483 It is the case, too, that standardisation 
helps regulators to design an adequate regulatory framework that suits the nature of 
Islamic finance. Paul M. Koster,484 the former CEO of Dubai Financial Services 
Authority (DFSA) stated in a speech at the 6th Summit of the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) that standardisation is a serious challenge in Islamic finance 
domain. He argued that the issue is more problematic for non-Islamic regulators as—
in the absence of an Islamic financial standard—they have to rely on conventional 
standards to inadequately address an issue unique to Islamic finance. This view is also 
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shared by John B. Taylor, the former Under Secretary of the United States Treasury 
for International Affairs. He stated that 
The lack of uniformity of standards for Islamic banking practises across 
Islamic countries makes it difficult to apply the same prudential regulatory 
standards (e.g. capital adequacy requirements) across the board. This calls for 
more harmonization of Islamic banking practises, which in turn calls for 
harmonization of Shari‘ah standards at the national and international 
levels.485   
4.3.2.  Arguments against Standardisation  
Despite the strong case advanced by proponents of standardisation, there are also 
equally passionate voices of resistance offering several reasons to justify their 
position. First, some experts do not see the lack of consistency as a serious issue. 
Ayub486 has suggested that standardisation is more of a “buzzword” than assumed 
substantive issue. He concedes that although a few issues emerged in the early days of 
the industry, most of these, he argues, have been dealt with by the scholarly works of 
Shari‘ah jurists. Similarly, Laldin487 holds that differences among SSB fatwas are 
exaggerated. He also believes that the practise of Islamic finance is becoming less 
controversial in the marketplace. Grais and Pellegrini488 refer to a study conducted by 
the General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI) which 
suggests that there is a consensus in 90% of the Shari‘ah fatwas. According to 
Khan,489 a CEO at an international Islamic investment firm, the remaining conflicting 
fatwas give the industry room for innovation to design Shari‘ah-compliant products. 
                                                 
485 John B.  Taylor, "Understanding and Supporting Islamic Finance: Product Differentiation and 
International Standards" (paper presented at the Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues, 
Cambridge, 8 /5/ 2004), p3.. 
486 Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance, p465. 
487 Remo-Listana, "Islamic Finance Standardisation Needs to be Tackled Carefully". 
488 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services". 
489 Ghoul, "The Standardization Debate in Islamic Finance: A Case Study " p4. 
106 
 
In theory, most Shari‘ah fatwas exhibit either a consensus or an agreement on the 
principles of Islamic finance, such as the prohibition of ribā and gharar.490 However, 
the practise shows a fair degree of divergence in the application of such principles—
for instance, whether or not a particular contract such as ʿīnah breaches the Islamic 
finance principle of prohibiting ribā. Because the CIBAFI study cited by Grais and 
Pellegrini is inaccessible—it has not been published and remains unavailable to the 
public491— it is not possible to assess the credibility of its findings or its approach in 
collecting and analysing data, nor to verify the representative nature of its samples. 
Nevertheless, assuming that the study’s findings are accurate, one could well argue 
that the need for standardisation remains because most Shari‘ah-compliant products 
offered on the market are based on the 10% of disputed fatwas. For example, 
organised tawarruq, remains “the most used single liquidity providing scheme”492 in 
the industry, notwithstanding the resolution of the International Council of Fiqh 
Academy on the prohibition of organised tawarruq. Similarly, a large proportion of 
Shari‘ah-compliant products are based on murābaḥah structure, which is disputed by 
some scholars.493 This should not be surprising, since the two structures (organised 
tawarruq and murābaḥah) share similarity with interest-based products and pose a 
small risk to IIFS.  
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Opponents of standardisation also argue that it is against the diverse nature of 
Islam.494 Shari‘ah is not a ready-made law; instead, the sources of Shari‘ah provide 
general principles which are interpreted through the tool of ijtihād to understand the 
Islamic view on a certain transaction.495 Ijtihād has been a fundamental element of 
Shari‘ah law and has contributed for centuries to the richness of Islamic 
jurisprudence. It is what gives Shari‘ah the dynamic ability to survive and the capacity 
to be applicable to a given time and place. Conflicting opinions will always exist; 
there is no Pope in Islam, and Muslims are only bonded by Quran and sunnah (the 
primary sources of Shari‘ah)  .496 Therefore, opponents argue, it is not appropriate to 
have an international body to distinguish the “right” interpretation from the “wrong” 
one.497 
Besides, a regulatory enforcement of one Shari‘ah interpretation over others might 
not be accepted by Muslim societies subscribing to various schools of thought, 
whether in one or multiple countries.498 Moreover, such enforcement might not suit 
institutions which operate in varied circumstances either on the domestic or global 
level. For instance, a Shari‘ah fatwa issued by SSBs in a fully flagged Islamic bank 
might be difficult to implement in a conventional bank with Islamic windows, or in a 
conventional bank in the process of converting into an Islamic bank.  
Furthermore, opponents of standardisation argue that it would slow down 
innovation and hinder the development of new products. Currently, the industry is 
said to be taking advantage of the conflicts in fatwas to increase its share of the 
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growth in the global market.499 Salman Younis,500 the former managing director of 
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia), suggests that “there are issues on Shari‘ah 
interpretation, but they are not a hurdle to the growth of Islamic banking. In fact, we 
firmly believe that if you have Shari‘ah harmonization, it may kill innovation”. 
Moreover, lack of consistency can be good for business in the sense that it allows 
financial institutions to introduce various products directed to specific consumers or 
markets.501 
However, it is doubtful whether standardisation would actually hinder innovation, 
considering that standardisation has been a feature of conventional finance for many 
decades without slowing down financial engineering. There is no restriction on 
introducing new products to the market after receiving approval of the regulatory 
body or the central Shari‘ah supervisory board. In fact, as mentioned earlier, 
proponents of standardisation argue that it would boost development and create an 
incentive for financial institutions to focus on innovation to be able to compete in the 
market. Admittedly, enforcing a standard might have an impact on the speed of 
approving new innovative products,502 but protecting the market from Shari‘ah 
arbitrage and maintaining stakeholder’s confidence justifies such delay.  
A final strong argument put forward by opponents of standardisation is that setting 
international Shari‘ah standards is impractical because compliance with such 
standards could not be enforced or supervised unless the standards were imposed by 
national regulators.503 For example, the standard of the Accounting and Auditing 
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Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) is approved by Shari‘ah 
scholars from different schools of thought and sects. However, in practise, few 
countries enforce it on the national level. What the industry needs is to regulate the 
implementation of existing AAOIFI standards, rather than to establish new 
standards.504 Nonetheless, the experience of AAOIFI and the limited implementation 
of its standards do not subdue the need for standardisation and the long-term harm 
that is likely to occur in its absence. Rather, the situation should encourage an 
examination of why AAOIFI standards were not effective and of better alternative 
remedies, an issue which is further discussed in Part 4.5 of this chapter.       
4.4.  Causes of Juristic Differences 
To resolve the issue of inconsistency in SSB fatwas, it would be useful to 
understand the causes of such disagreements in the first place. However, it is 
important to emphasise that conflicts do not occur in the fundamental principles of 
Shari‘ah, but rather in the secondary issues.505 For instance, there is no dispute with 
regard to the faith, i.e., the unity of Allah, the prophecy of Muhammad, and the 
authenticity of the Quran. There is also no major divergence in how the five pillars of 
Islam, such as the five daily prayers, fasting, and pilgrimage, are performed. 
Differences mainly occur in applying some of the Shari‘ah principles to certain 
cases.506   
Islamic law has not been received as ready-made rules for implementation.507 
Unlike modern laws, in which interpretation is not always required,508 in Shari‘ah, 
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interpretation of its sources is necessary to understand the intention of the Lawgiver. 
If the sources of Shari‘ah were self-evident, there would be no need for interpretation, 
because they would be the law itself rather than its sources.509 The interpretation 
process does not have a speculative nature, but is rather governed by a well-stated 
approach and methodical tool known as ijtihād, which a jurist uses to extract the law 
on a given matter.510 Hallaq511 defines ijtihād as “the maximum effort expended by 
the jurist to master and apply the principles and rules of usul al-fiqh (legal theories) 
for the purpose of discovering God’s law”. Similarly, Baker512 quotes a definition of 
ijtihād provided by al-Amidī (d.631 AH/1233 CE) which indicates that the scholar’s 
ijtihād or conclusion of his interpretation shall be deemed void if he neglects to 
employ his scholarly skill to find out evidence which he was competent to discover. 
Interpretations can take the form of a fatwa, a judge’s decision, or a commentary on 
the Quran or sunnah. 513 Accordingly, because ijtihād is in essence an interpretive 
process, it will indirectly lead to conflicting opinions among Shari‘ah scholars.514   
The science of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) has been built on attempts at practising 
ijtihād.515 The practise of ijtihād began during the Prophet’s life, while he was able to 
approve or reject the conclusion of any ijtihād.516  Therefore, at this stage, ijtihād did 
not create any diversity in the Islamic society.517 However, after the death of the 
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Prophet, his companions and Shari‘ah scholars after them were challenged with 
unprecedented cases in different circumstances and had to exercise ijtihād to arrive at 
a legal conclusion.518 As the Prophet was not alive to approve or reject conclusions, 
various judgments have existed based on different methodologies and legal 
arguments. 519   
However, before proceeding to the causes of jurists’ disagreements, a brief 
reminder is warranted about the difference between Shari‘ah and Islamic 
jurisprudence, commonly called “ﬁqh”.520 As discussed in chapter one, Islamic 
jurisprudence is a subset of Shari‘ah, composing a single area of the broader concept. 
Shari‘ah serves as the basis of all principles formed and expanded under fiqh, whereas 
the term “Islamic jurisprudence” generally refers to scholarly comprehension and 
findings derived from the primary and secondary sources of Shari‘ah. In this respect, 
Shari‘ah is a divine law, whereas fiqh is a human interpretation of these divine 
sources to arrive at God’s law in a specific case.521 In other words, a fatwa issued by a 
Shari‘ah scholar is not deemed entirely definitive; it is rather a personal statement of 
what the mujtahid believes to be the intention of the Lawgiver.522 
Reading the legal history of Islamic jurisprudence informs us about many causes 
of disagreements between Shari‘ah jurists. Several attempts have been made in 
classical and contemporary literature to explain and classify the causes of 
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disagreement between Shari‘ah scholars.523 This section discusses the most common 
reasons which are believed to have a major impact on the inconsistency of fiqh. 
4.4.1.  Variable Quranic Recitations 
 Some verses of the Quran can be recited in two linguistically acceptable ways. 
These two readings sometimes result in two different meanings.524 One commonly 
cited example is the following verse: “O you who believe! When you intend to offer 
As-Salat [the prayer], wash your faces and your hands [forearms] up to the elbows, 
rub [by passing wet hands over] your heads, and [wash] your feet up to ankles”. 525 
The issue in this example is whether the feet should be washed or wiped to validate 
wuḍūʾ )ablution  (. There are two grammatical possibilities for the word “feet” in the 
original Arabic text. One reads the word as accusative (wa arjulakum), which 
indicates that the feet should be washed along with the face and the hands. The second 
reading of the word pronounces it as a genitive (wa arjulikum), which requires only 
wiping the feet, as is the case with the head.526 The majority of scholars, including the 
four sunni schools of thought, uphold the first reading, which makes washing the feet 
obligatory in ablution. The shīʿah imāmiyyah school of thought adopts the second 
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reading, which deems wiping the feet as sufficient to validate the ablution.527 The 
majority position is supported by the recorded regular practise of the Prophet of 
washing his feet when performing ablution. 528 
4.4.2.  Using Words with Multiple Meanings  
Disagreement between jurists can occur because of the use of mushtarak words in 
Shari‘ah sources.529 The term mushtarak literally means “homonymous” or 
“semantically ambiguous”. 530 A mushtarak word or sentence can have two or more 
equivalent meanings. It can also take place in the Quran and the sunnah with no direct 
clarification by the Lawgiver. Differences among Shari‘ah scholars arise when they 
try to establish the exact meaning of these words.531 One example of a mushtarak 
word which resulted in two different jurisprudential opinions is the word qurūʾ (time) 
used in the Quranic verse 2:228. The verse reads, “Divorced women remain in 
waiting for three qurūʾ”. 532 According to the verse, divorced women cannot remarry 
other men before the passing of three qurūʾ. Linguists and Shari‘ah scholars agree that 
the word qurʾ, which is the singular of the word qurūʾ mentioned in the verse, means 
“time”. However, they dispute whether ‘time’ here applies to “menstruation or to the 
period between two menstruations”. 533 Both meanings have valid origins in Arabic. 
The jurisprudential impact of this dispute is that in the view of the Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī 
schools of thought, women have to wait three periods of menstruation before 
remarrying, while in the Mālikī and Shāfiʿī schools of thought, they are required to 
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wait three periods of purity. The waiting period in the latter view is shorter than in the 
former.534 To make their decision, jurists had to rely on other evidence and texts to 
determine the Lawgiver’s intention in using the word qurūʾ in this specific verse. This 
is due to the fact that a mushtarak word presents two equivalent meanings that can be 
understood from a single word, and it is difficult to select the intended meaning 
without any external evidence.535 
4.4.3.  Lack of Knowledge of Ḥadīth 
Despite the fact that sunnah536 is the second main source of Islamic law, and 
Muslims are obligated to follow it, a large part of the disagreement in Islamic 
jurisprudence is caused by issues related to sunnah.537 A jurist can take a position that 
is different from that of other scholars because he lacks knowledge of a particular 
tradition concerning the case in question.538 This happened to the companions of the 
Prophet after his death. They had different levels of familiarity with the prophetic 
ḥadīth, since some of the companions had been busy with other things such as 
business or farming or had enrolled in the army.539 In addition, the companions of the 
Prophet settled in different regions of the Islamic empire, and different schools of 
thought were established prior to the authoring of comprehensive collections of 
                                                 
534 al-Khin, Athar al-Akhtilāaf fī al-Qawāʿid al-Uṣūliyyah fī Akhtil-āaf al-Fuqahāʾ, p78. 
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ḥadīth.540 In fact, the most famous collections of the ḥadīth only became available in 
the last part of the ninth century and the first half of the tenth century, whereas the 
founders of the four major schools of thought lived between the middle of eighth 
century and the first part of the ninth century.541 
According to Ibn Taymiyyah (d.728/1328),542 even some of the eminent 
companions had no comprehensive knowledge of the Prophet’s ḥadīth, and they 
issued fatwas that conflicted with a ḥadīth which they didn’t know at the time. For 
instance, in the case of ʿiddah (a waiting period for women after the death of their 
husbands), verse 2:234 states, “And those of you who die and leave wives behind 
them, they [the wives] shall wait [as regards their marriage] for four months and ten 
days”.  543  However, verse 65:4 reads, “And for those who are pregnant [whether they 
are divorced or their husbands are dead], their 'iddah [prescribed waiting period] is 
until they deliver [their burdens]”.  544 To conciliate between the two verses, two 
companions, ʿAlī Ibn Abī Ṭālib and Ibn ʿAbbās, held the view that if a husband 
passes away while his wife is pregnant, the wife has to wait for the longer of the two 
ʿiddah (four months and ten days or until giving birth) .545 On the other hand, the 
majority of the companions and Shari‘ah scholars held the view that the ʿiddah of a 
pregnant wife in this situation ends when she gives birth to her baby.546 The basis of 
this view is a ḥadīth reported by Al-Bukhārī: “Subai'a Al-Aslamiya gave birth to a 
child a few days after the death of her husband. She came to the Prophet and asked 
                                                 
540 Philips, Evolution of Fiqh : Islamic Law and the Madh-habs, p126; Hammad, Islamic Law: 
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543 Hilali and Khan, "The Noble Quran". 
544 Ibid. 
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permission to remarry, and the Prophet gave her permission, and she got married”. 547 
In this instance where the minority opinion conflicts with a prophetic ḥadīth, the 
disagreement between the minority and majority opinions stemmed from the minority 
not knowing that this ḥadīth existed.548 Moreover, in some situations, differences arise 
because one of the scholars relies on a weak (inauthentic) ḥadīth to justify his 
fatwa.549 This happens because not all jurists are specialists in the science of ḥadīth, a 
field of study that enables a scholar to examine the authenticity of a prophetic ḥadīth.    
Nevertheless, Hammad points out that in the present day, the lack of knowledge of 
ḥadīth should not be used to justify a particular jurisprudential view, since nearly all 
ḥadīth collections are available to scholars. Technological advancements make it easy 
for jurists to search the collection of ḥadīth and investigate their authenticity before 
issuing a fatwa.550 
4.4.4.  Different Requirements for Adopting Ḥadīth 
As mentioned earlier, issues related to the second source of Shari‘ah, the sunnah, 
have led to many conflicting opinions within Islamic jurisprudence. Unlike the Quran, 
some jurists dispute the authenticity of some of the reported sunnah.551 Ḥadīth can be 
classified into two types, each defined by the number of people who reported a ḥadīth 
at every level of the chain of transmission: mutawātir (consecutive) and aḥād 
(single).552 The former include ḥadīth that have been transmitted by a majority of 
people, which makes errors in what they narrated very rare. The latter include ḥadīth 
narrated by fewer people at each level of the chain of transmission. Aḥād forms the 
                                                 
547 al-Bukhārī, "Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī". 
548 Ibn Taymiyah, Rafʿ al-Malāam ʿan al-Aʾimah al-Aʿlāam, p16; Bakar, "Conflict of Law and The 
Methodology of Tarjih: a Study in Islamic Legal Theory," p73. 
549 Philips, Evolution of Fiqh : Islamic Law and the Madh-habs, p127. 
550 Hammad, Islamic Law: Understanding Juristic Differences, p39.  
551 al-Khin, Athar al-Akhtilāaf fī al-Qawāʿid al-Uṣūliyyah fī Akhtil-āaf al-Fuqahāʾ, p53; al-Turkī, 
Asbāb Akhtil-āaf al-Fuqahāʾ, p114. 
552 See: Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p93; Hallaq, An introduction to Islamic law, p17. 
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majority of the prophetic ḥadīth. It is also unanimously deemed as speculative (ẓanni) 
in its chain of transmission, in its interpretation, or in both.553 
For this reason, and to examine the authenticity of such tradition, each school of 
thought has certain requirements which this type of ḥadīth should meet before it can 
be accepted. For example,554 to accept an āḥād ḥadīth, Ḥanafī School requires the 
practise of the narrator to be in line with his narration (e.g., the way he performs a 
prayer should match his narration describing the performance of the prayer) .555 In 
addition, if the subject of the tradition is one which concerned a majority of people, it 
should be reported by a large number of narrators. This is because if the ḥadīth were 
authentic, it would not fail to be narrated by many people.556 Moreover, unless the 
narrator was a jurist (faqīh), the ḥadīth would not be accepted if it were found to be in 
conflict with analogy (qiyās) .557 
The legal views which Ḥanafī concluded based on this rule are sometimes 
inconsistent with the views of other schools of thought who do not approve Ḥanafī’s 
rules for examining the reliability of āḥād ḥadīth. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that other schools of thought do not have their own requirements for accepting āḥād 
ḥadīth. For instance, the Mālikī School rejects this type of ḥadīth if it is found to be 
inconsistent with the established practise of the people of Medina (ʿamal ahl al-
Madīnah).558 The latter is given priority over the former because the practises in 
Medina are deemed as a continuous tradition narrated by generations from the time of 
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the Prophet up until the time of the School’s founder, Mālik Ibn Anas (d.179/795) .559 
As the examples above demonstrate, these various conditions naturally lead to 
conflicting legal conclusions.   
4.4.5.  Adopting Certain Legal Principles 
Different schools of thought have adopted various principles and rules into their 
legal theory of how to interpret the original sources of the law. The aim of these 
theories was to ensure that legal arguments have a solid ground and sound reasoning. 
For example, according to the Ḥanafī School, the generality of Quranic verse is not to 
be restricted by an āḥād ḥadīth.560 On the basis of this principle, the Ḥanafī School 
does not accept a ḥadīth which allows, in the absence of two witnesses, the testimony 
of one witness in addition to the plaintiff oath.561 The school deemed this allowance to 
conflict with the minimum requirements of testimony set by the Quranic verse (two 
men or one man and two women) .562 Similarly, the Ḥanbalī School has its own 
special principles to establish law. One of these is that, in legal consideration, it 
favours a weak ḥadīth over a merely human reasoning. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, the 
School’s founder, states that he prefers a weak ḥadīth over a man’s opinions.563 Some 
scholars do not agree with that; they see no authority for such a ḥadīth, since it is not 
authentic. Nevertheless, this diversity of approaches towards establishing a law is 
bound to result in different juristic opinions.  
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The adoption of different views in regard to the hierarchical order of the authority 
of legal sources of Shari‘ah has further contributed to the disagreements in Islamic 
jurisprudence.564 It is unanimously agreed that the Quran is the highest source in terms 
of authority, followed by the sunnah. However, most of the disputes occur in the rank 
of the secondary sources, as there is no uncontested standard to determine which one 
of these should have priority over the other. Instead, some jurists give priority to 
sources which support their particular view.565 According to Baker,566 Al-Shafi'i, in his 
book al-Risālah, regarded by some researchers as the first book written in Islamic 
legal theory, argues that a lot of jurisprudential conflicts were caused by not following 
a systemic method in dealing with Shari‘ah sources to justify a legal view. Al-Shafi'i 
believes that legal decisions should be grounded on the following sources: Quran, 
sunnah, ijmāʿ (consensus), and qiyās (analogy), in that order.567 He criticises many of 
his predecessors and contemporary jurists for basing their jurisprudential views on a 
lower level of Shari‘ah sources rather than a higher one. However, Al-Shafi'i’s ideal 
proposal does not work in practise as it looks in theory.568 Some of his School 
followers, not to mention his opponents, do not observe his theory. In fact, Baker 
argues that Al-Shafi'i himself was not consistent in applying his own theory.569  
While some legal sources and principles are accepted by most schools of thought, 
each school can have its own definitions, interpretations, view of authority, and limit 
of application of each source or principle.570 For instance, while all schools agree on 
the definition of the Quran, disagreements arise on issues relating to the secondary 
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sources of law such as ijmāʿ (consensus), qiyās (analogy), Istiḥsān (juristic 
preference) ,571 istiṣḥāb (assumption of permanence of past conditions in a present 
situation) ,572 ʿurf (custom), maṣlaḥah )protecting the public interest), qawl- al-saḥābī 
(interpretation or the fatwa of the companion of the Prophet), and sadd al-dhariāʾi 
(precautionary legal prohibition).573 These differences in the legal theories of schools 
result in conflicting legal conclusions. One example is the Ẓāhirī School’s refusal to 
use analogy as a source of law, although it is accepted by the other major schools of 
thought.574 This had led to the Ẓāhirī School’s refusal to extend the scope of ribā 
(usury) beyond that explicitly stated in the letter of the law.575     
4.4.6.  Disregarding the Change of Maṣlaḥah 
One of the behaviours which widened disagreements in Islamic jurisprudence is 
ignoring the underlying purpose of jurisprudential rulings.576 Many Shari‘ah theorists 
such as Ibn al-Qayyim (d.751/1350) and al-Shāṭibī (d.790/1388) have stated that 
Shari‘ah rulings are established to serve the human interest in this world and in the 
hereafter.577 Accordingly, some rules can change when the underlying cause on which 
they were founded is absent or no longer active. As a major part of jurisprudence is 
based on maṣlaḥah (public interest) and causes which are influenced by certain 
changeable elements such as custom and circumstances, many jurists change their 
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fatwas when the previous ruling no longer serves the welfare of the public.578 This can 
happen to one jurist at different stages of his life or to different scholars in different 
places or times. For example, when al-Shāfiʿī relocated from Iraq to Egypt, he 
changed some of his ijtihād following the needs and the circumstances of the 
Egyptian society.579 These different views are known within the Shāfiʿī school as “the 
old opinion” and “the new opinion”, and both form the jurisprudence of the Shāfiʿī 
school.580 He had different students in both countries who spread his teaching across 
the world. 
Another example comes from the Ḥanafī school. While Abū Hanīfah generally 
accepted testimonies of two witnesses with ʿadālah (upright character), his two 
renowned students, Abū Yūsuf )d.182/798) and Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-
Shaybāny (d.189/805),  did not accept any testimony in court unless each witness was 
accredited by a trustworthy person (tazkiyah) .581 This is because unlike in the time of 
Abū Hanīfah, such inquiry was deemed necessary in their era to protect the public 
interest. Eventually, all these conflicting legal opinions became part of the wider 
Islamic jurisprudence.582 
In more contemporary times, the fatwas of a Shari‘ah scholar can be influenced by 
the society where he lives. For instance, it is said that Malaysia’s Shari‘ah rulings tend 
to be moderate because the community is formed of different races and religions.583 
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4.4.7.  The Structure of the Fatwa Question 
The way in which the fatwa question is presented can cause disagreement.584 This 
is because a fatwa is a religious response to an inquiry voluntarily put forward by an 
individual or by an IIFS about the permissibility of certain contracts. Scholars will 
answer according to the information presented in the question, which is controlled, to 
some extent, by the inquirer, who can choose what details to reveal in the question 
and how to present it. It is claimed585 that some institutions present the fatwa question 
in a way that guarantees its permissibility. Normally, scholars start their answer by 
stating that if the contract is structured as presented in the question, then it is 
permissible. The outcome of the fatwa is then reported later without the question, and 
the IIFS states that its product is approved as Shari‘ah compliant. However, other 
scholars who are specialists in the field of Islamic finance and aware of the real 
implementation of such contracts in the market might issue a fatwa in conflict with 
the fatwa provided by the first Shari‘ah scholar.586 The inconsistency in this case is 
not caused by a difference in legal principles; rather, it is a result of the lack of an 
institutionalised process of issuing fatwas which takes into account the full context of 
the fatwa as well as the impact of the fatwa on public policy.587      
As the foregoing discussion shows, some causes of juristic disagreement such as 
variable Quranic recitations and linguistic vagueness are inevitable, since they are 
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relatively outside of human control.588 They are natural causes in the sense that they 
are not affected by any particular mindset in Islamic legal theory. Other causes of 
disagreement, such as the adoption of certain legal principles, are generally human-
made, and are said to cause most of the disagreements in Islamic jurisprudence.589 
Since the basis of these legal theories is human intellect, they can be speculative and 
relative. It is natural for people to have different levels of competency to understand 
legal texts and the issues associated with them. When two opinions of Islamic 
jurisprudence seem to conflict, it shows that one of the legal sources which was the 
basis of the conflicting view has been wrongly understood or implemented.590 Human 
reasoning is imperfect; hence it is the responsibility of later jurists to identify the fault 
in earlier arguments, and to choose their preference after putting much effort into 
carefully considering the evidence behind the two opinions.  
4.5.  Remedies for Inconsistency   
With the causes of disagreements between Shari‘ah scholars addressed, this 
section investigates how classical and contemporary jurists have dealt with this issue. 
It suggests potential remedies and highlights the limitations of implementing them in 
Islamic and secular countries. As the earlier discussion attests, conflicts in Islamic 
jurisprudence have taken place in the past and will continue to do so.591 Nevertheless, 
Islamic rulers and Shari‘ah theorists offer various mechanisms to tackle the issue of 
inconsistent fatwas from a juristic or an administrative point of view or from both.   
With regard to the juristic remedies, first, conflicting opinions in Islamic 
jurisprudence can be reconciled by using a tool known in Islamic legal theory as al-
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jamʿ,592 where two different opinions are declared jointly valid for applications in 
different times or conditions. Although this tool is merely of a scholastic nature and 
has no bearing on enforcement, it can be used to harmonise various opinions and 
minimise differences before setting a standard. Another possible tool suggested by 
Baker is the use of talfīq,593 amalgamation or “the fusing of different legal opinions”, 
594 where a jurist combines different views to establish an opinion that is not accepted 
as a whole by any one school.595 For instance, to justify a Shari‘ah-compliant product, 
a scholar might rely on a structure which has one component recognised by the Ḥanafī 
school and another other part recognised by another school. Yet no school of the 
thought will validate the whole structure. However, while such a tool has been used to 
draft a code for Islamic law,596 the extensive use of talfīq might widen existing 
disagreements and can lead to circumventing the substance of the Shari‘ah by 
selecting a combination of views which serve the interest of a single individual or 
institution.597 
In addition, institutionalising the process of product approval as well as promoting 
the issuing of collective fatwas would limit the inconsistency in fatwas.598 Such a 
governing institution should be aware of how Shari‘ah-compliant products are applied 
in practise and take into consideration the objective of Islamic finance. It is generally 
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al-Qādirī, 1998), p183. 
596 Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p197. 
597 See generally: al-Bānī, ʿUmdah al-Taḥqīq fi al-taqlīd wa al-talfīq, p224. 
598 Osāmah al-Ashqar, Fawḍā al-Iftā  (Dār al-Nfāʾis, 2009), p99. 
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accepted that juristic opinions which are in line with the objective of Shari‘ah should 
prevail over the ones that only comply with the letter of the law.599   
However, as may be apparent, the aforementioned tools are more of a scholastic 
nature and are not directly related to standardisation. The central issue is not which 
opinion is the right interpretation, but rather how to enforce it, and indeed whether 
enforcing a particular opinion can be justified in Shari‘ah. Historically, attempts to 
tackle the issue have used political will to standardise different rulings. One of the 
earliest examples cited in the literature is a suggestion made by ʿAbdAllāh Ibn al-
Maqaffaʿ (d.139/757) .600 Unsatisfied with the inconsistent rulings of jurists, he wrote 
a memorandum addressed to the Abbasid caliph at that time, Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr (d. 
159/775), urging him to use his political power to end the conflict in jurists’ fatwas. 
He argued that Islamic law is divided into two parts, “the non-derogable or 
uninterruptable and the variable or interpretable”.601 The former includes absolute 
obligations which are not open to discretion. For example, the ruler has no choice but 
to implement prayers and fasting. The latter is the non-definitive part of the Shari‘ah, 
which is open to interpretation, and the ruler has the authority to enforce the most 
appropriate opinion for the public interest. In response, the caliph al-Manṣūr asked 
Mālik Ibn Anas, the founder of Mālikī school of thought in Medina, to author a book 
which would be enforced across the empire. Mālik later received a similar suggestion 
from another caliph, Hārūn al-Rashīd (d.193/808). However, although Mālik authored 
the book, he advised the caliphs not to enforce it. He argued that some of the juristic 
                                                 
599 Bakar, "The Shari'a Supervisory Board and Issues of Shari'a Rulings and their Harmonisation in 
Islamic Banking and Finance," p87. 
600 See:  Khan, "Setting Standards for Shariah Application in The Islamic Financial Industry," p292.; 
Joseph E. Lowry, "The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn al-Muqaffa' on Interpretation, Authority, and 
the Structure of the Law," Journal of the American Oriental Society 128, no. 1 (2008): p153; Yḥyā al-
Khilālyh, "Taqnīn al-Sharīʿah al-Islāmiyyh bayn al-Naẓẓrīh wa al-Taṭbīq" (PhD thesis International 
Islamic University, 2002). 
601 Lowry, "The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn al-Muqaffa' on Interpretation, Authority, and the 
Structure of the Law," p30. 
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views in Medina might not be accepted by the people of Iraq, who might have 
adopted a different set of legal theories based on ḥadīth reported by the Prophet's 
companions who moved to Iraq after his death.602 The debate at that time was very 
strong between the school of ahl al-raʾy603 in Iraq and ahl al-ḥadīth604 (the 
traditionalists) in Medina. Islamic jurisprudence was in its formative period, and the  
major four schools of thought had not yet been formed as schools of distinct 
principles.605 As an alternative solution,606 the caliph al-Rashīd appointed Abū Yūsuf, 
an authoritative Ḥanafī scholar, as a Chief Justice. Abū Yūsuf was responsible for 
appointing judges in the empire who were mostly said to be followers of the Ḥanafī 
school.607 
Nevertheless, classical Shari‘ah jurists seem to have realised the scope of the 
problem and have formed two legal maxims to tackle the issue of conflicting 
opinions. The first one states that a ruling of a judge shall conclude the disagreement 
between scholars on that particular issue (ḥukm al-ḥākim yarfaʿ al-khilāaf) .608 For 
example, if jurists have conflicting views over the validity of a certain contract, and a 
judge has favoured one view, then that view is the enforceable one in that judge’s 
jurisdiction. On a larger scale, if a state has selected the view of one school of thought 
on a specific legal matter, it is the only valid view in that jurisdiction. A party might 
                                                 
602 Masud, "Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha: Diversity in "Fiqh" as a Social Construction" p66. 
603 Ahl al-raʾy school (literally: the people of good sense) generally includes those in favour of using 
independent legal argumentations as a method of concluding a Shari’ah ruling. See: Hennigan, "Ahl al-
raʾy." 
604 Ahl al-ḥadīth school includes those who endeavour to base the law on the Prophetic Traditions and 
the Prophet’s Companions. According to their view, it is illegitimate to favour or solely rely on 
unrestricted human reasoning, especially when it conflicts with an authentic ḥadīth. See Joseph 
Schacht, "Ahl al-Ḥadīt̲h̲," ibid.  <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-
2/ahl-al-hadith-SIM_0379>   
605 Khan, "Setting Standards for Shariah Application in The Islamic Financial Industry," p292. 
606 Riḍwān al-Sayyd, "al-Fiqh wa al-Siyāsah fī al-Tajrubah al-Islāamiyyah al-Wasīṭah," Majalah al-
Tafāhum, no. 25 (2009). 
607 Ismāʿīl al-Aghbarī, "Taqnīn al-Fiqh al-Islāamī: Qānūn al-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣiyah al-ʿUmānī 
Unmūdhajan," Taddart, http://www.taddart.org/ar/?p=12767#_ftn18. accessed 8 October 2012. 
608 Muḥammad Ṣdqī al-Būrnū, Mawsūʿah al-Qawāʿid alFfqhyyh, vol. 5 (Maktabah al-Tawbah, 2000), 
p72. 
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not be able to reject the enforcement of a judge’s ruling on the ground that it conflicts 
with the opinions of other Shari‘ah scholars. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d.370/981),609 an authoritative 
Ḥanafī scholar, states that “all scholars agree that when a judge relies on one 
jurisprudential view in his judgment, his decision shall be enforceable and shall not be 
rejected on the ground of other ijtihād. It shall be enforceable even if the two parties 
believe otherwise”. Similarly, al-Qarāfī (d.684/1285),610 a renowned Mālikī scholar, 
upholds the statement of al-Jaṣṣāṣ and goes further to state that according to the view 
of the majority of scholars, jurists belonging to other schools of thought should 
change their fatwas to correspond to the judicial decision. 
The second legal maxim which completes the first one is that an ijtihād of a judge 
cannot be revoked by an ijtihād of other judges in the future (al-ijtihād lāa yunqaḍ 
bimithlih) .611 For example, if a disputed contract was validated by a judge from the 
Ḥanafī School, it cannot be invalidated by another judge who belongs to another 
school of thought. Also, if the same judge changes his view in the future, it cannot be 
applied retrospectively to his old cases. Both legal maxims were justified in the 
classical books by their ability to ensure stability in transactions and prevent 
conflicts.612 
Although such legal maxims might have worked in the Caliphate state, they are 
not sufficient to work in today’s model of the state. Therefore, many contemporary 
jurists have strongly advocated the idea of codifying Islamic jurisprudence to solve 
                                                 
609 Aḥmad  ʿalī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, ed. Muḥamad al-Ṣādiq Qamḥāwī, vol. 1 (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-
Turāth al-ʿarabī, 1985), p316. 
610 Aḥmad Idrīs al-Qarāfī, al-furūq, ed. Khalīl al-Manṣūr, vol. 2 (Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyyh, 1998), 
p179. 
611 Muḥammad Ṣdqī al-Būrnū, Mawsūʿah al-Qawāʿid alFfqhyyh, vol. 1 (Maktabah al-Tawbah, 2000), 
p430. 
612 See: al-Qarāfī, al-furūq, 2, p180. 
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the issue of inconsistency.613 For example, Muṣṭafā al-Zarqā (d.1420/1999),614 a 
renowned Shari‘ah scholar, emphasises the need to enforce a code which is not 
restricted to one school of thought. He acknowledges that diversity of opinions in 
Islamic jurisprudence can offer a window of ease for Muslims in different times and 
circumstances. However, while he regards unifying fatwas as almost impossible,615 he 
believes that codifying a particular view in the form of written rules is a necessity in 
today’s world to establish legal certainty.616 This is because a fatwa issued by a 
Shari‘ah scholar is not binding, while ḥukum (judgement) which is issued by a 
Shari‘ah scholar who at the same time is appointed by the authority as a judge is 
binding. Both are religious opinions, but the latter has an enforcing power.617 
Any attempts to unify fatwas will be difficult to enforce even if there is political 
will. In 2010, the Saudi king issued a royal decree restricting the issuing of public 
fatwas to the members of the official Council of Senior Ulemas and to those licensed 
by the Council.618  However, in the age of the Internet and social media, such a rule is 
hardly followed. In fact, it might encourage people to seek a fatwa from more 
independent scholars.619 Hence, a degree of uncertainty in terms of conflicting fatwas 
will always exist. 
                                                 
613 For an extensive debate about the codifying of Shari’ah, see: Abdulmomen Shuja'a Aldeen, 
"Mawqif al-Fuqahāʾ min Taqnīn Aḥkām al-Sharīʿah al-Islāamiyah,"  Organization House of Law 
http://ohlyemen.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=110 accessed 10 June 2012; al-
Khilālyh, "Taqnīn al-Sharīʿah al-Islāmiyyh bayn al-Naẓẓrīh wa al-Taṭbīq."; Muḥamaad Zakī 
ʿAbdālbar, Taqnīn al-Fiqh al-Islāamī, ed. ʿAbdAllāh al-Annṣārī (Dār al-Turāth al-Islāamy, 1986); 
ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Jarʿī, "Taqnīn al-Fiqh al-Islāamī Bayn al-Māniʿīn Wa al-Mujīzīn,"  Islam 
Today(2005) http://islamtoday.net/bohooth/artshow-86-5987.htm accessed 15 July 2012. 
614 Muṣṭafā al-Zarqā, al-Madkhal al-Fiqhī al-ʿām, vol. 1 (Dār al-Qalam, 1998), p314. 
615 Fatwas issued by Shari’ah scholars are not binding, while ḥukum (judgment) is issued by a Shari’ah 
scholar who is appointed by the authority as a judge. Both are religious or legal opinions, but the latter 
has an enforcing or binding power. 
616 Muṣṭafā al-Zarqā, al-Fiqh al-Islāamī Wa Madārisah  (Dār al-Qalam, 1995), p86. 
617 al-Ashqar, Fawḍā al-Iftā, p13. 
618 Al Arabiya News, "Saudi king limits clerics allowed to issue fatwas," Alarabiya.net, 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/08/12/116450.html. accessed 8 September  
619 See for example: Christopher  Boucek, "Saudi Fatwa Restrictions and the State-Clerical 
Relationship," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
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Nevertheless, judicially enforcing one opinion should maintain certainty and 
eventually limit the effect of other fatwas in the industry. One of the earliest examples 
of codifying Islamic jurisprudence was the Majallah al-Aḥkām  al-ʿAdliyah  set of 
civil laws for Muslims written during the Ottoman Caliphate (1876 CE).620 It consists 
of 1,851 articles based on the jurisprudence of the Ḥanafī school of thought.621 
Following this, several attempts were made to codify Islamic jurisprudence according 
to major schools of thought by the Islamic Research Academy of Al-Azhar 
University, the Arab League, and individual scholars.622 However, a better measure 
would be for a proactive regulatory body to assume the responsibility of enforcing 
ijtihād in the Islamic finance industry, as is the case in countries such as Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and Sudan, which have established a central Shari‘ah supervisory board.623  
It is important to note that selecting one interpretation as the national standard 
does not mean that other views are wrong or are non-Islamic.624 Rather, it means this 
particular view will be enforced by authorities in that particular state for the sake of 
stabilising the financial market and establishing certainty in the judicial system. Also, 
it does not mean that the standards adopted by the authority cannot be changed in the 
future. As with any modern rules or standards, Shari‘ah standards can be changed and 
updated to accommodate new needs or circumstances.   
However, standardising Shari‘ah interpretation through a governmental body has 
two main limitations. First, it might not be possible in secular countries where 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=aboutSada. accessed 12 September 2012; al-Ashqar, 
Fawḍā al-Iftā, p72. 
620 Turkey, The Mejelle: Being an English Translation of Majallah El-Ahkam-i-Adliya and a Complete 
Code on Islamic Civil Law, trans. Charles Robert Tyser, D. G. Demtriades, and Ismail Haqqi Effendi 
(Islamic Book Trust, 2001). 
621 Khan, "Setting Standards for Shariah Application in The Islamic Financial Industry," 293. 
622 Ibid.; Aldeen, "Mawqif al-Fuqahāʾ min Taqnīn Aḥkām al-Sharīʿah al-Islāamiyah". p8; al-Khilālyh, 
"Taqnīn al-Sharīʿah al-Islāmiyyh bayn al-Naẓẓrīh wa al-Taṭbīq," p154. 
623 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services". 
624 Bakar, "The Shari'a Supervisory Board and Issues of Shari'a Rulings and their Harmonisation in 
Islamic Banking and Finance," p88. 
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authorities lack the legal power or the will to enforce such standards. For example, the 
former Financial Services Authority in the UK625 was aware of the importance of 
standardisation, yet they have clearly stated that they do not have the legal standing to 
intervene in a religious matter, although generally encouraging the effort of Shari‘ah 
standard-setting organisations such as AAOIFI and the IFSB.626 Nevertheless, the 
general duties of regulators to protect consumers and maintain financial stability can 
provide justification for a regulatory body to instruct an IIFS to be more transparent 
with its clients and to disclose which school of thought its product complies with, 
rather than using the general label of “Shari‘ah compliant”.    
Secondly, since there is no accepted international Shari‘ah standard, enforcing a 
particular Shari‘ah interpretation might be problematic for an IIFS active in multiple 
jurisdictions,627 as some of its products can be regarded as Shari‘ah compliant in one 
country and not Shari‘ah compliant in another. Khan and Feddad628 have suggested a 
gradual global standardisation of Shari‘ah ruling in Islamic finance. However, 
establishing a global Shari‘ah standard might be ineffective due to the lack of political 
will in different countries, and compliance with such a standard cannot be enforced or 
supervised unless it is enforced by national regulators.629 It has been mentioned earlier 
that although the AAOIFI standard was intended to be an international standard, and 
                                                 
625 As of 2013, the responsibilities of the FSA have been divided among two new separate entities, the 
Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. See: United Kingdom, 
"Financial Services Act 2012". 
626 Michael Ainley et al., Islamic Finance in The UK : Regulation and Challenges  (London: Financial 
Services Authority,, 2007), p16; Antonio, "What is the Future Outlook of Shar’iah Harmonization?," 
p14. 
627 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services". 
628 Habib Ahmed, "Islamic Law, Adaptability and Financial Development " Islamic Economic Studies 
13, no. 2 (2006): p93. Since AAOIFI also sets accounting standards for Islamic financial institutions, 
they suggest the establishing a new nonprofit organisation (International Organization of Standards for 
Shari‘ah Application in Finance Industry) which solely focuses on this task.  
629 Oxford Analytica, "Islamic Finance Moves Toward Common Standards" p4; Ghoul, "The 
Standardization Debate in Islamic Finance: A Case Study ". 
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is approved by Shari‘ah scholars from different schools of thought and sects, it is in 
practise enforced by very few countries at the national level.  
To overcome these limitations, effort should be directed towards establishing a 
global Shari‘ah standard which classifies different practises of Islamic finance even if 
they are deemed controversial or highly disputed.630 The standard should not state the 
prevalence of any jurisprudential view, but rather it should list the requirements for 
implementing each particular view. IIFS can use it as a reference to disclose to 
regulators, consumers, and rating agencies which fatwa or school of thought they are 
adopting.631 This should allow for a better assessment of the compliance level of the 
institution. Given the difficulty associated with establishing such standards, Khan632 
suggests setting an international body similar to International Organization for 
Standardisation (ISO), which could be called the “International Organization for 
Standardisation for Shari‘ah Application in the Finance Industry (IOSSAFI)”. 
Although Khan does not clarify who would oversee this body and how it would be 
funded, the broad nature of the suggested standard which accommodates various 
schools of thought can overcome the limitations of existing standards such as the one 
issued by AAOIFI. It can be used by any financial institution around the world 
irrespective of whether it is operating in an Islamic or secular country. With an 
appropriate mechanism of disclosure, it is hoped that the market would eventually 
adopt best practises and avoid controversial ones such as the contract of ʿīnah.633   
                                                 
630 See: Khan, "Setting Standards for Shariah Application in The Islamic Financial Industry," p304; 
Abdulbari Mashal, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah llimaṣrif al-Markazī ʿalā al-Muʾsasāt al-Māliyyh al-
Islāamiyyh" (paper presented at the Islamic Financial Institutions: Reality Features and Future 
Prospects, UAE, 15/5/2005), p21. 
631 See Khan, "Setting Standards for Shariah Application in The Islamic Financial Industry," p293. 
632 Ibid., p303. 
633 Laldin notes that the market already has started to shift from the controversial practise of Islamic 
finance to a less controversial one. See: Remo-Listana, "Islamic Finance Standardisation Needs to be 
Tackled Carefully". 
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4.6.  Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to examine the suitability of standardisation as a 
mechanism to reduce conflict in the opinions of Shari‘ah scholars concerning the 
permissibility of financial products. This inconsistency in the fatwas issued by SSBs 
is a key factor contributing to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance. The study 
showed that juristic differences are inevitable and pose a serious challenge to 
compliance in the Islamic finance industry. After addressing the causes of the 
disagreements between Shari‘ah scholars, it argued that it is possible for a state to 
enforce a particular Shari‘ah interpretation and that such a solution has been justified 
by classical and contemporary Shari‘ah jurists. However, it might be difficult to use 
this remedy at a global level due to the lack of political will or legal power to regulate 
religious matters in secular countries. Accordingly, this chapter has suggested that 
efforts be directed towards establishing a Shari‘ah standard which codifies various 
practises of Islamic finance, even if they are deemed highly controversial. Such well-
defined standards would facilitate the task of regulators, courts, and rating agencies, as 
well as gradually encouraging IIFS to be more transparent with their clients about 
which fatwa or school of thought they are adopting, rather than using the general label 
of “Shari‘ah compliant”. With such a level of disclosure, the market would hopefully 
move towards adopting best practises. 
The next chapter examines how Shari‘ah supervisory board governance practises 
contribute to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance in contemporary Islamic 
finance. 
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Chapter Five: 
 The Impact of Shari‘ah Governance Practises on Shari‘ah 
Compliance in Contemporary Islamic Finance 
 
5.1.  Introduction  
This chapter examines the extent to which Shari‘ah supervisory board (SSB) 
governance practises contribute to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance in the 
contemporary Islamic finance industry.634 To gain the trust of their Muslim clients, 
institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) normally incorporate a religious 
board in the form of an SSB. In theory, the SSB is there to ensure that IIFS operate 
within Shari‘ah norms and teachings. However, concerns have been raised about the 
feasibility of a viable and functional Shari‘ah governance culture in IIFS. Doubts 
relate mainly to these boards’ unclear functions and legal status, lack of accountability 
and transparency, and conflicts of interest and lack of independence, as well as to the 
poor training and inadequate qualifications of SSB members.  
This chapter argues that the prevalence of these critical governance issues largely 
reduces the level of Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic finance industry. Thus, the 
chapter recommends that regulators in Islamic and secular countries intervene and 
regulate Shari‘ah governance in IIFS so as to ensure a sound financial system and 
investor confidence. The chapter is structured in five parts including this introduction. 
Part 5.2 explores definitions of SSBs in Islamic finance literature; Part 5.3 highlights 
the importance of SSBs in IIFS structure; Part 5.4 examines the impact of regulatory 
issues surrounding SSBs on Shari‘ah compliance in the contemporary Islamic finance 
                                                 
634 An early version of chapter five was published under the following citation: Alkhamees, Ahmad. 
“The Impact of Shari’ah Governance Practises on Shari’ah Compliance in Contemporary Islamic 
Finance.” Journal of Banking Regulation 14, no. 2 (10 September 2012): 134–63. 
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industry, identifying seven challenges as major factors in reducing the level of 
Shari‘ah compliance in IIFS; and finally, Part 5.5 concludes the chapter.    
5.2.  Shari‘ah Supervisory Board Definition 
The literature does not provide a standard definition or name for SSBs or for 
Shari‘ah supervision more generally.635 SSBs have variously been called, for example, 
Shari‘ah committees, religious committees, Shari‘ah councils, and fatwa 
authorities.636 However, “SSBs” seems to be the more common term in recent 
literature and is preferred by international standard-setting bodies such as the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).637  
Definitions found in the literature fall into two broad categories.638 The first one 
includes definitions that focus on the functional aspect of SSBs and the 
objectives they seek to achieve. In this category, the IFSB’s “Guiding Principles on 
the Shari‘ah Governance System” uses the term “Shari‘ah Governance System”, 
which refers to a “set of institutional and organisational arrangements through which 
an IIFS ensures that there is effective independent oversight of Shari‘ah 
compliance”.639 Similarly, the older standard-setting body, the AAOIFI, defines 
                                                 
635 Samy Nathan  Garas and Chris  Pierce, "Shari'a Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions," 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 18, no. 4 (2010): p387. 
636 Zighībah "Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah 
Ahammiyyathā Muʿawwiqāt ʿAmalhā wa Ḥulūl Muqtaraḥah  " p13. 
637 See: Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), "Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems 
for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services," IFSB,, http://www.ifsb.org/standard/IFSB-
10%20Shariah%20Governance.pdf. accessed 29 March 2011; Accounting and Auditing Organization 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), "Accounting, Auditing & Governance Standards for 
Islamic Financial Institutions " in Shari’a Review (Bahrain: AAOIFI, 2002). 
638 Riyāḍ Muḥammad al-Khalīfī, "al-Naẓariyyah al-ʿĀmmah Lil-hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah " (paper 
presented at the Third Conference of Shari'a Supervisory Boards of Islamic Financial Institutions, 
Bahrain, Bahrain, 5-6/10/2003), p16. 
639 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), "IFSB Guiding principles on Shariah governance systems 
for institutions offering Islamic financial services". 
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Shari‘ah supervision as the process of examining the institution’s commitment 
to adherence to Shari‘ah in all its activities.640  
Abū Ghuddah provides a more detailed definition in this first category.641 
According to him, Shari‘ah supervision is a process of examination and analysis of 
activities, actions, and processes undertaken by the institution to certify that they are 
in accordance with the provisions and principles of Islamic law. SSBs should 
use appropriate means to identify errors and suggest legitimate solutions to correct 
them, in addition to submitting a report which incorporates Shari‘ah 
opinions and decisions along with recommendations for earning lawful income in the 
present and the future.642  
The second category includes definitions stressing the nature of the body entrusted 
with the task of Shari‘ah supervision. In this regard, al-Ṣāliḥ defines SSBs as a group 
of jurisprudence scholars and economists who direct and supervise bank activities to 
ensure compliance with the provisions of Shari‘ah.643 al-Shabīlī’s definition 
emphasises the legal status of SSB resolutions. He defines SSBs as bodies comprising 
a number of scholars who specialise in fiqh al-muʿāmalāt (Islamic commercial 
jurisprudence), issue binding Shari‘ah guidelines, and supervise their enforcement to 
ensure correct implementation.644 
                                                 
640 Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), "Accounting, 
Auditing & Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions ". 
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642 Ibid. 
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The disparities in SSB names and definitions are a vestige of different stages of 
development in modern Islamic finance.645 They also reveal the confusion over the 
role and function of SSBs, which may vary from one institution to another according 
to the legal environment in which they operate, an issue that Part 4.4 of this chapter 
discusses in detail. 
5.3.  The Importance of SSBs 
Compliance with Shari‘ah is one of the fundamental values of Islam. Muslims are 
required to adhere to the principles of Islam in every aspect of their lives, including 
their financial transactions.646 The importance of SSBs results from the fact that only 
scholars who are well versed in Shari‘ah have the competence to judge whether or not 
certain products or services are consistent with Islamic law. In the early stages of 
Islamic history, traders were accompanied by a scholar who advised them on lawful 
transactions. In the present climate, IIFS executives do not have sufficient knowledge 
or time to acquire the relevant expertise to evaluate Islamic finance. Therefore, the 
presence of SSBs in the IIFS structure is crucial to assist IIFS directors in conducting 
Shari‘ah-compliant services and businesses.647  
Another feature which highlights the importance of SSBs in IIFS structure is that 
as a group of respected scholars, board members provide stakeholders with crucial 
confidence and assurance that IIFS management does not violate Shari‘ah in its 
business.648 Public confidence is a vital element of any financial institution profile. In 
                                                 
645 al-Khalīfī, "al-Naẓariyyah al-ʿĀmmah Lil-hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah " p16. 
646 Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance, p475. 
647 Garas and Pierce, "Shari'a Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions," p388.; al-Khalīfī, "al-
Naẓariyyah al-ʿĀmmah Lil-hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah " p5. 
648 Hussain Gulzar Rammal, "The Importance Of Shari’ah Supervision In Islamic Financial 
Institutions," Corporate Ownership and Control Journal 3, no. 3 (2006). 
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a survey conducted by Hassan et al.,649 respondents unanimously agreed that SSBs 
play a significant role in this regard. In short, IIFS cannot market businesses as 
Shari‘ah compliant without the presence of an SSB, which provides institutions with 
an Islamic identity.650  
Furthermore, SSBs add economic value to Islamic financial institutions. Their 
performance increases institutional profits by innovating Shari‘ah-compliant products 
and services.651 Moreover, SSBs can play an indirect role in marketing IIFS 
businesses when they take part in different conferences and workshops around the 
world.652 By contributing to the media and giving public lectures, they utilise their 
knowledge and social position to inform people about Islamic finance and to convince 
stakeholders to support Shari‘ah-compliant products.    
Having an SSB also reduces the legal costs of IIFS and minimises exposure to 
Shari‘ah risk.653 The involvement of an SSB in the early development of a product can 
save IIFS from having to pay legal expenses at a later date to bring the product in line 
with Islamic law.654 It also mitigates the risk of engaging in non-Shari‘ah-compliant 
activities, which may be deemed beyond the capacity of the institution and call into 
question the enforceability of existing contracts in Muslim and secular countries. 655 
                                                 
649Rusni  Hassan et al., An Analysis of the Role and Competency of the Shari'ah Committees (SCs) of 
Islamic Banks and Financial Service Providers (Kuala Lumpur: International Shari’ah Research 
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Naẓariyyah al-ʿĀmmah Lil-hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah " p8-11. 
652 El-Gamal, Islamic Finance : Law, Economics, and Practice, p11. 
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Compliance Risk," Chicago Journal of International Law 7, no. 2 (2007). The enforceability of a 
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the capacity to sign a non-Shari‘ah-compliant contract. Djojosugito, "Mitigating Legal Risk in Islamic 
Banking Operations." 
654 Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, "Shari`ah Supervision in Modern Islamic Finance,"  
http://www.nzibo.com/IB2/Shari'ahsupervision.pdf. accessed 8 February 2011 
655 For more about Shari‘ah risk, see:  "Shari'ah Compliance Risk." ‘Shari‘ah Compliance Risk’ 
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In addition to reducing legal costs, SSBs can be a legal requirement of providing 
Islamic financial services.  In countries such as Malaysia,656 Jordan,657 Kuwait,658 and 
Lebanon,659 regulators require the presence of an SSB in the institution as a condition 
for offering any Shari‘ah-compliant services.660 An SSB may also be required for 
admission to certain international institutions, as in the case of the International 
Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB).661 
However, the need for SSBs has been questioned from two different perspectives. 
First, Mudawi662 argues that Islamic financial institutions which operate within a 
country where Islamic law is applied may not need to have an SSB, as the state should 
have its own mechanism to issue any required fatwas and resolutions. This argument 
seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the role of SSBs. Ensuring IIFS 
compliance with Shari‘ah is not just about issuing fatwas or reviewing products a 
single time; rather, it is a continuing process of monitoring which starts when the 
product is being structured and ends when the product is implemented. In addition, 
this argument assumes that IIFS operate locally in a model Islamic state, where the 
state plays a major role in the religious affairs of the public. It ignores the fact that 
such a body does not exist in many Muslim countries, where states follow a secular 
system. Even where such official organs exist, they are unlikely to have sufficient 
resources and expertise to deal with complex financial instruments. It is also doubtful 
                                                 
656 "(ACT 701) Central Bank of Malaysia Act " Bank Negara Malaysia,, 
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September 2011 article 93 
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Liban http://www.bdl.gov.lb/circ/lawpdf/Law575_en.pdf. accessed 24 September 2011 article 9 
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2000), p226. 
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that such entities could be efficient enough to meet the demands of a business 
environment. 
The second challenge to the need for an SSB argues that the presence of an SSB is 
a formality,663 since IIFS management can easily access the most recent research and 
training courses provided by institutions—for instance, the Institute of Islamic 
Banking and Insurance or the IIUM Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance.664 This 
argument shares the first question’s unclear understanding of SSB function. It 
overlooks the complexity of Islamic finance, even for those trained in Shari‘ah in 
general. It also discounts stakeholders’ lack of confidence in IIFS executives’ 
compliance with Shari‘ah. In short, the need for SSBs in IIFS is similar to the need for 
lawyers in the conventional finance industry: even given its long-term establishment 
and rich resources, the industry still needs legal advisors to structure its financial 
products.  
With the importance and the definitions of SSB addressed, the following section 
examines the extent to which SSB governance practises contribute to the issue of 
creative Shari‘ah compliance in the contemporary Islamic finance industry. 
5.4.  Regulatory Issues Surrounding Shari‘ah Supervisory Boards  
5.4.1.  The Ambiguous Role of SSBs 
As discussed, the main purpose for establishing SSBs in financial institutions is to 
oversee the Shari‘ah compliance of IIFS business activities.665 However, there is no 
standard in the industry to clearly define how SSBs should perform this task. The 
scope of SSB work varies from one institution to another, and there is no agreement 
                                                 
663 Warde, Islamic Finance in The Global Economy, p228; Rammal, "The Importance Of Shari’ah 
Supervision In Islamic Financial Institutions," p204-05.  
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Supervision In Islamic Financial Institutions," p204-05.  
665 Garas and Pierce, "Shari'a Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions," p388.; al-Khalīfī, "al-
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on the duties of its members.666 In fact, many institutions sign contracts with Shari‘ah 
supervisors without specifying the nature of the work, their rights, or their duties.667 
Accordingly, while some SSBs have a proactive role in institutions, which might 
involve operational tasks, others might not even hold a single meeting or issue one 
decision during a whole year.668  The ill-defined description of SSB roles and duties 
could be regarded as a bad governance practise which might contribute to weak 
compliance in the industry. 
The vague scope of SSB function is arguably traceable, in part, to different phases 
of historical development in modern Islamic finance. In the early days of Islamic 
finance, around 1970, IIFS mainly used Shari‘ah scholars as a marketing tool to 
promote the ideology of Islamic finance in their societies.669 The process of issuing a 
fatwa to approve the permissibility of products was less formal and conducted in a 
non-institutional style.670 A member of the public or a company would provide a 
Shari‘ah scholar with a brief description of the products or the contract, and then the 
scholar would issue a fatwa either approving or rejecting it. In fact, until 2000, most 
SSB scholars at Al Rajhi Bank, one of largest Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia, 
                                                 
666 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
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reviewed the Shari‘ah compliance of its products and contracts on a volunteer basis 
and sent their decision to the external auditor of the bank.671   
The existence of various institutions offering different levels of Islamic financial 
service might also have contributed to uncertainty about the SSB role. While some 
IIFS were fully established as Islamic banks, others gradually converted their services 
at a later stage to those of Islamic banks, or only offer Islamic windows as an 
additional service to their main conventional banking.672  
Furthermore, few regulators around the globe have recognised Shari‘ah 
supervision as an independent profession overseen by a regulatory body.673 Even 
where it is officially acknowledged as a profession, as in Pakistan and Bahrain, SSB 
members might not have a legal status that requires performing specific tasks related 
to their speciality.674   
Like the industry, academic research also seems to be confused over SSBs. A 
variety of classifications, duties, and assumptions appears in Islamic finance literature 
discussing the functions of SSB members.675 Al-Khalīfī, for example,676 classifies the 
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scope of SSB functions into four areas: reviewing contracts and financial transactions 
and agreements, reviewing general policies of the financial institution, reviewing 
internal codes and regulations, and monitoring the conduct of financial institution 
staff in terms of its code of ethics. The first area is the centre of most SSB work in the 
industry. The effort of its members is mainly concentrated on fulfilling this role, and a 
couple of advanced steps have been made in this regard. This is partly because 
contracts and financial products represent the main activities of IIFS, so they naturally 
allocate the most effort to this area. 
The general policies of the second area include reviewing the financial 
institution’s investment policies, for example, recommending a focus on equity-based 
rather than debt-based products, as the former are more desirable from an Islamic 
finance development perspective. It also includes monitoring accounting policies, for 
instance, ensuring the fairness of profit and loss allocation in Islamic investment 
accounts, assets evaluation, and zakāh calculation. Finally, this area involves 
supervising marketing policies to ensure that they do not breach the principles of 
Shari‘ah. For instance, giving commissions and gratuities to some company staff to 
win a contract is deemed a type of bribery, which is prohibited under Islamic law. 
The third area of responsibility that Al-Khalīfī describes includes ensuring the 
Shari‘ah compliance of internal codes and rules, which regulate the running of the 
institution and the duties and rights of its employees, shareholders, and stakeholders. 
Al-Khalīfī cites the example of an Islamic bank in Kuwait, where the articles of 
association clearly state that any overdue payment of capital is subject to a substantial 
7% annual interest rate. Such a clause directly violates the prohibition of usury in 
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Shari‘ah. The fourth area involves the inspection of the code of conduct of IIFS staff 
to ensure that it meets the ethical standards of Shari‘ah, which include, inter alia, 
honesty and fairness in contracts and transactions, commitment to promises and 
appointments, the effective implementation of agreements, and avoidance of fraud, 
corruption, and all disgraceful deeds or behaviour.677 
These areas of responsibility show how wide the scope of SSBs actually is, and 
how unlikely individual boards are to fully oversee all these areas in practise, 
particularly in secular countries. Nevertheless, a typical list of SSB duties in an 
Islamic financial institution can include the following678: 
1. Issuing fatwas to approve IIFS financial instrument products.  
2. Auditing the process of applying SSB decisions through the Shari‘ah internal 
review unit. 
3. Certifying that IIFS have conducted their business according to Shari‘ah by 
issuing an annual shareholder report.  
4. Calculating the required zakāh and advising management on channelling non-
Shari‘ah compliant revenue towards charitable activities. 
5. Approving the distribution of loss and profit between investment account 
holders and shareholders. 
6. Educating and training IIFS staff on Shari‘ah principles, responding to clients’ 
inquiries, and increasing social awareness of Islamic finance objectives.   
7. Developing new Shari‘ah- compliant products and services.  
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Although these responsibilities are often mentioned in the literature, few SSBs 
perform all these tasks in practise. In fact, most SSBs are only concerned with ex ante 
Shari‘ah review without auditing how products are actually implemented in the 
market.679 Besides, some SSB members are still debating whether some of these 
duties, such as developing products, should be included amongst their 
responsibilities.680  
This overload of duties suggests that SSB functions have been shaped without an 
appreciation of the current framework of global financial markets, which legally 
requires IIFS to assign certain tasks to “Approved Persons”.681 It seems that the 
ambitious goal of ensuring Shari‘ah compliance has even led some SSB members to 
overlook the political systems of most countries. This assumption can be supported by 
the following three examples.  
First, it was suggested that SSBs can play a vital role in controlling financial 
offences in IIFS, because financial crimes, such as fraud, manipulation, and insider 
dealing, are prohibited under the rule of Shari‘ah. Therefore, ensuring Shari‘ah 
compliance should theoretically prevent such illegal activities from occurring. 
However, it is unlikely that SSB members would have the necessary expertise and 
resources or the legal authorisation to undertake such a task.682 
Secondly, as a solution to weak Shari‘ah compliance at a micro level, it has been 
suggested that the Shari‘ah compliance officer should be appointed as a branch 
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manager.683 Similarly, the Malaysian Central Bank recommends the appointment of 
an SSB chairman as a non-executive director on the IIFS board.684 The Faisal Islamic 
Bank in Cyprus did so, arguing that it would enable the SSB to communicate 
effectively with the board of directors and that it would be in a better position to 
ensure the Shari‘ah compliance of the institution.685 On the other hand, it is doubtful 
whether such an action would be tolerated in countries such as the UK, where a “Fit 
and Proper Test for Approved Persons” is required before an individual can register 
under the Financial Conduct Authority’s Approved Persons regulations.686 In addition, 
there is the question of whether most SSB scholars with multiple memberships would 
successfully pass the non-executive director independence test.687  
In some institutions such as the Al Rajhi Bank, SSB duties involve the additional 
human resources function of selecting the institution’s employees, particularly for key 
positions. Candidates for employment are assumed to support Islamic finance policies 
and to be willing to implement their practise.688 Although having personnel with a 
proper understanding of Islamic finance principles enhances Shari‘ah compliance in 
an institution, such a task can be achieved without the involvement of SSB members, 
as this might possibly threaten their disinterested auditing.   
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Finally, it has been suggested that SSBs should play a mediating role between 
IIFS and their clients.689 For instance, Article 18 of Act 48 on the establishment of 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt states that in the case of the parties’ refusal to choose an 
arbitrator, or in the absence of an agreement on the choice of chairmen in an arbitral 
tribunal, the SSB will choose an arbitrator or chairman, and its decision will be 
binding. However, the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt ruled this article 
unconstitutional, as it breaches the principles of arbitration and denies a natural right 
of access to court.690   
 As can be seen from the diverse functions mentioned earlier, ambiguity clearly 
surrounds the actual duties of SSB members. The ensuring of Shari‘ah compliance, 
which is the main purpose of establishing an SSB, has been weakened as its members 
are engaged in unrelated tasks which they might not be qualified to perform. To 
overcome such confusion, Shari‘ah supervision should first be recognised as an 
independent profession.691 Like lawyers and accountants, its members should act 
within a framework that defines their role and responsibilities. In the case where an 
IIFS is operating within a jurisdiction which does not facilitate Islamic finance 
compliance or where regulation is passive, SSB members can form a professional 
association that standardises its supervisors’ contracts with financial institutions. 
Alternatively, it is possible to state SSB functions in an institution’s articles of 
association.692 In addition, SSB functions ought to be categorised according to the 
level of Shari‘ah-compliant activities that their home institution conducts. The SSBs 
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in Islamic banks, for example, tend to have a greater role than their counterparts in 
conventional banks which only offer Islamic windows. Stakeholders should be made 
aware of this discrepancy, which might affect the institution’s degree of compliance.    
5.4.2.  SSBs’ Lack of Legal Status  
A related but separate issue affecting the Shari‘ah compliance of IIFS is the SSBs’ 
lack of legal status. In some countries, there is no legal basis for establishing an SSB 
in Islamic finance institutions. Even where there are legal provisions, it is not clear 
whether SSB decisions are deemed mandatory or merely advisory. This section 
investigates the legal position of SSBs and its impact on the Shari‘ah compliance of 
institutions. 
An SSB can draw its legal authority from different sources. In countries such as 
Malaysia,693 Pakistan,694 UAE,695 Kuwait,696 Jordan,697 and Lebanon,698 national 
regulations require establishing an SSB before granting Islamic financial services. In 
addition, IIFS articles of association might include provisions for setting up an SSB 
and defining its power. 699A lower ground of SSB authority can be based on the terms 
of the contract signed between the board of directors, on behalf of shareholders, and 
the SSB, where rights are awarded to review IIFS business. 
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699 Garas and Pierce, "Shari'a Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions," p389. 
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However, some Shari‘ah scholars offer a different perspective for legitimatising 
SSB power.700 According to them, the authority of the SSB stems from the Islamic 
notion of ḥisbah, where individual Muslims have a duty to command right behaviour 
and forbid wrongdoing to keep society in line with the teachings of Islam. 
Accordingly, SSB members have a natural duty to ensure that IIFS activities are 
conducted within Shari‘ah.701 However, the nature of SSB work does not suit the 
concept of ḥisbah. This is because SSB members are appointed and paid privately to 
ensure the Shari‘ah compliance of the institution, whereas muḥtasib (a person 
conducting ḥisbah) is more concerned with public matters and is usually appointed 
and paid by the state.702 Besides, in modern states, ḥisbah in Islamic countries is 
restricted to moral issues and antisocial behaviour.703   
Even where legal grounds are found for establishing an SSB, though, it is not clear 
whether SSB judgments have an advisory nature or a mandatory one.704 If they are 
merely advisory, then the primary motivation for setting up SSBs—that is, ensuring 
Shari‘ah compliance—has not been achieved. The role of SSBs is narrowed to that of 
a marketing tool, as the boards’ decisions are only enforced at the IIFS 
administration’s pleasure. Countering this situation, the AAOIFI Shari‘ah governance 
standard states that SSB pronouncements shall be binding and fully implemented.705 
                                                 
700 ʿAbdAllāh Mabrūk  al-Najjār, "Muftariḍāt al-Masʾūliyyah fī Niṭāq al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿalā al-
Muʾassasāt al-Māliyyah " (paper presented at the 19th session of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Sharjah, 
UEA, 26/4/2009), p13-14. 
701 al-Khalīfī, "al-Naẓariyyah al-ʿĀmmah Lil-hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah " p14; Zighībah "Hayʾāt al-Fatwā 
Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah Ahammiyyathā Muʿawwiqāt 
ʿAmalhā wa Ḥulūl Muqtaraḥah  " p37. 
702 al-Najjār, "Muftariḍāt al-Masʾūliyyah fī Niṭāq al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿalā al-Muʾassasāt al-
Māliyyah " p13-27. 
703 For more about ḥisbah see: M. A. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in 
IslamicThought  (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
704 Hassan et al., An Analysis of the Role and Competency of the Shari'ah Committees (SCs) of Islamic 
Banks and Financial Service Providers p54. 
705Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAIOIFI), " No. 1 - 
Shari’a Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report.," in AAIOIFI Governance 
Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions (Bahrain: AAIOIFI, 1999) Bakar, "The Shari'a Supervisory 
Board and Issues of Shari'a Rulings and their Harmonisation in Islamic Banking and Finance," p81. 
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Nevertheless, even where such a standard is adopted, or where regulators or IIFS 
articles of association have stipulated the mandatory nature of SSB decisions, these 
measures are insufficient to ensure compliance with Shari‘ah, because SSBs only 
issue fatwas on cases brought to them by IIFS management.706 In other words, if 
directors think the SSB will not approve a particular transaction, they can avoid the 
issue simply by not referring the matter to the Shari‘ah board. This helps explain why 
some regulators and academic researchers have suggested appointing one of the SSB 
members as a non-executive director on the board of the financial institution.707 
However, it is unlikely that Shari‘ah scholars, with their multiple memberships in 
SSBs in different institutions, would successfully fulfil the independence 
requirements for a position as either an executive or non-executive director.708   
In addition, designating SSB decisions as mandatory may raise concerns amongst 
regulators over their impact on the financial institution’s operations.709 Although 
researchers such as Aldohni710 have argued that forming a Shari‘ah board in a UK 
corporate structure is not legally problematic, since the Companies Act 2006 is elastic 
with regard to a two-tier board structure,711 they overlook the legal issues arising from 
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) requirements for persons to be appointed on 
such a board. The “Fit and Proper Test for Approved Persons”, mentioned above, 
                                                 
706 ʿUmar, "Aʿmāl al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Bayn al-Iāstishāriyyah al-Fardiyyah Wa al-Mihniyyah al-
Muʾassasiyyah  " p11; ʿAbd al-Razzāq Raḥīm  al-Hītī, "Athar al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿalā Ail-tizām 
al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah bi-al-ʾAḥkāmi al-Sharʿiyyah  " (paper presented at the Islamic Banking 
Between Reality and Expectations, Dubai, UAE, 31/5/2009 - 3/6/2009), p19; ʿAbd al-Munʿim 
Muḥammad  al-Ṭayyib, "Taqyīm al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah fī Ẓil al-Niẓām al-Maṣrifī al-Islāmī al-
Shāmil" (ibid.31/5- 3/6/2009), p26. 
707 Singh, "BNM mulls 5 Shariah Advisors for Islamic Banks." 
708 Ainley et al., Islamic Finance in The UK : Regulation and Challenges, p13-14. 
709 Abdul-Rahman, The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance : Tools and Techniques for Community-
Based Banking, p79; ʿAṭiyyah  Fayyāḍ, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Wa al-Taḥaddiyāt al-Muʿāṣirah " 
(paper presented at the TheThird International Conference on Islamic Economics, Mecca, 31/5-
2/6/2005), p40. 
710 Aldohni, "Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate Governance:The Dilemma of The Shari'a 
Supervisory Board," p157; Paul L. Davies, Introduction to Company Law  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), p195. 
711 Aldohni, "Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate Governance:The Dilemma of The Shari'a 
Supervisory Board," p157; Davies, Introduction to Company Law, p195. 
150 
 
considers competence and capability factors, among other things.712 It expects that a 
person appointed for a directorial position has sufficient relevant experience, a 
condition which might not be met by most SSB members, who tend to lack 
financial and banking experience.  
Rider713 notes that SSB members in most common law countries can be regarded 
as shadow directors714 if the board of directors regularly acts on SSB advice. This 
designation means that SSB members are subject to same legal duties as directors, and 
in some situations, they can be held accountable for misconduct and negligence in the 
general management of the company. Rider continues, however, that issuing SSB 
advice in a professional capacity is not alone sufficient to deem SSB members 
shadow directors. Additional factors are taken into account to determine whether a 
person is a shadow director; for example, he must be in a dominant position and not 
appointed to a particular post within the structure of the company.715 Notably, 
although Jamieson and Hughes716 note that English law remains unsettled on the 
identification of shadow directors, SSB members might meet the criterion of being in 
a dominant position in situations where the management of a fully flagged Islamic 
bank needs ex ante or ex post approval of SSB members to engage in business 
contracts.  
                                                 
712 See: Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), "What is an approved person?"; "The Fit and Proper test 
for Approved Persons," FCA, http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCA/FIT.pdf. accessed 4 April 
2014 
713 Rider, "Corporate Governance of Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services," p168. 
714 A shadow director is defined as “a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act (but so that a person is not deemed a shadow director 
by reason only that the directors act on advice given by him in a professional capacity)”. See: United 
Kingdom, "Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986," The National Archives, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/46/pdfs/ukpga_19860046_en.pdf. accessed 10 May 2013  
Chapter 46 Section 22.   
715 Rider notes that recent court decisions show a more flexible position over what constitutes a shadow 
director. See: Rider, "Corporate Governance of Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services," p168. 
716 Neil Jamieson and Kelly  Hughes, "The Identification of Shadow Directors under English law: what 
guidance might Buzzle provide?," Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial law. 
27, no. 6 (2012): p366. 
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Currently, the FCA considers the SSB’s role merely advisory.717 This 
characterisation can seriously reduce the level of Shari‘ah compliance in institutions, 
since IIFS management has no compulsion to enforce SSB decisions regarding 
compliance in its products and services. For an SSB to ensure Shari‘ah compliance, it 
must be involved in decisions that affect the operational aspect of the financial 
institution.718 The AAOIFI standard states that Shari‘ah supervisors are “entrusted 
with the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising the activities related to Islamic 
finance to ensure they are in compliance with Shari‘ah rules and principles. The views 
of the Shari‘ah advisor shall be binding in the specific area of supervision”.719 In 
short, an SSB cannot ensure true Shari‘ah compliance unless its decision is deemed 
mandatory and is enforced in practise. 
Accordingly, in terms of the real function of SSBs, a legal status needs to be 
considered for SSB members, who currently hold a unique position somewhere 
between being external auditors and non-executive directors.720 Indeed, recognising 
Shari‘ah supervision as an independent profession would help to shape the legal 
standing of SSB members.  Nevertheless, the weight of Shari‘ah board 
pronouncements against IIFS management’s decisions and the consequences of 
                                                 
717 See: Hasan, "Regulatory Framework of Shari’ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries 
and the UK," p110. 
718 Ezry Fahmy, "Shari’ah Scholars as an Independent Director: A Proposal", Shirkah 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/50058751/3/Comprehend-the-position-of-Independent-director-and-
Shari%E2%80%99ah-Scholars. accessed 10  May 2011 
719 Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAIOIFI), " No. 1 - 
Shari’a Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report." 
720 Interestingly, while English literature in the area seems to indicate the resemblance of SSB 
members’ roles to those of non-executive directors, most Arabic literature highlights the similarity of  
SSBs to external auditors. Compare Aldohni, "Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate 
Governance:The Dilemma of The Shari'a Supervisory Board."; Ainley et al., Islamic Finance in The 
UK : Regulation and Challenges; Fahmy, "Shari’ah Scholars as an Independent Director: A Proposal," 
p16; Rodney Wilson, "Regulatory Challenges Posed by Islamic Capital Market Products and Services," 
Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance 24[2], no. 2 (2007); Hussain Hamed  Hassan, "al-ʿAlāqah 
Bayn al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah  wa al-murājiʿīn al-khārijiyyīn " (paper presented at the The First 
Conference for Shari'a Supervisory Boards, Bahrain, 9/10/2001); al-Zarqā, "al-Haykal al-Sharʿī Lil-
ṣṣināʿat al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah Jawānib al-Khalal wa Ṭarīq al-Iṣlāḥ "; Mohamad Akram Laldin, 
"Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah" (paper presented at the 19th 
session of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Sharjah, UEA, 26/4/2009).    
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breaching SSB pronouncements need to be addressed by regulators,721 or at least be 
stated in the IIFS articles of association. Currently, some of IIFS personnel do not 
comply with SSB decisions unless those decisions are authorised by the directors of 
the financial institution.722 In other words, an IIFS charter should include a default 
clause which identifies the relationship between the board of directors and the SSB, as 
well as the applicable procedure for addressing a conflict between the two boards. 
Moreover, conflict between the two bodies can be further reduced if a financial 
institution’s articles of association characterise it as an entity that fully complies with 
Shari‘ah ruling.723 In Saudi Arabia, where there is no framework for Shari‘ah 
governance in the financial sector,724 Al Rajhi Bank has clarified its policy towards 
the power of the SSB: it regards SSB decisions as obligatory for the departments and 
management of the institution. Executive directors on all levels are responsible for 
implementing SSB resolutions. Any violation of SSB pronouncement while offering 
products or services, without seeking prior authorisation from the board, is firmly 
prohibited, and all culpable are disciplined.725  Such steps seem to be more visible 
than involvement from regulators, particularly in non-Islamic countries.   
                                                 
721 For example, Article 17 from the Yemeni act on Islamic banks states that SSB decisions on the 
compliance of bank instruments are to be binding on the institution. The SSB shall issue an annual 
report on the bank's adherence to Shari‘ah and to SSB instructions, and this report must be distributed 
to shareholders. Yemen, " Act 21(1996) as amended by Act 16 (2009) on Islamic Banks in Yemen," 
Central Bank of Yemen, http://www.centralbank.gov.ye/App_upload/Islamic_Pank_low_Ar_Upd.pdf. 
accessed 8 July 2011 
722 al-Ṭayyib, "Taqyīm al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah fī Ẓil al-Niẓām al-Maṣrifī al-Islāmī al-Shāmil," p28. 
al-Saʿad, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah WaʾAtharhā Fī al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah," p17. 
723 Mahmood, "Islamic Governance, Capital Structure, and Equity Finance: Examining the Possibilities 
of American Financial Shari'ah Boards." 
724 Hasan, "Regulatory Framework of Shari’ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and 
the UK," p97. 
725 Alrajhi Bank, "The Sharia Group". 
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5.4.3.  SSBs’ Lack of Accountability 
Accountability in a general sense has deep roots in Islam,726 as all individuals are 
accountable to God for their actions. People’s destiny in the hereafter is 
determined according to their deeds in this world. The word ḥisāb (account) is 
mentioned at least eight times in the Quran,727 which states that on the Day of 
Judgment, Allah will show each person his account, where all good and bad actions 
are recorded.728 In theory, Muslims cannot separate their life into religious and secular 
aspects, since all their economic, political, religious, and social activities are bound up 
with the teachings of Shari‘ah.729  
However, one of the factors affecting compliance in the Islamic finance industry 
is the lack of accountability for SSB members. Surprisingly, such an essential body in 
the institution, with great power over the direction of the market, is exempt from 
scrutiny and liability.730 Islamic finance regulations and standards, such as those of 
the AAOIFI, completely disregard this issue. Even in countries with an advanced 
Shari‘ah governance framework, such as Malaysia and Pakistan, SSB accountability 
is poorly addressed.731 Their frameworks do mention procedures for dismissing SSB 
members, but not in the context of accountability.732 
                                                 
726 Mervyn K Lewis, "Accountability and Islam,"  Fourth International Conference on Accounting and 
Finance(2006) http://www.unisa.edu.au/commerce/docs/Accountability%20and%20Islam.pdf accessed 
25 July 2011 
727 Ibid. 
728 The Quran, in verses 54:52-53, states that “All that they do is noted in [their] Books [of Deeds]: 
Every matter small and great is on record”. Similarly, verses 99:7-8 have, “Then shall anyone who has 
done an atom's weight of good, see it! And anyone who has done an atom's weight of evil, shall see it”. 
Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an :Text, Translation and Commentary  (Brentwood, Md.: Amana 
Corp, 1983).    
729 Zafar Iqbal and Mervyn Lewis, An Islamic Perspective on Governance  (Cheltenham, U.K.; 
Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2009), p257. 
730 Wright, "The Shariah Scholar Cartel"; Aldohni, "Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate 
Governance:The Dilemma of The Shari'a Supervisory Board," p159.  
731 As stand on 31 August 2011.  
732 Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ghaffār  al-Sharīf, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿAlā al-Muʾassasāt al-
Tamwīliyyah al-Islāmiyyah" (paper presented at the TheThird International Conference on Islamic 
Economics, Mecca, Mecca, 31/5-2/6/2005), p16-17; al-ʿYāashyi al-Ṣādiq Fidād, "al-Raqābah al-
Sharʿiyyah Wa Dawruhā Fī Ḍabṭ Aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah" (paper presented at the 19th session 
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Arguably, SSB liability is overlooked for two main reasons, the first of which is 
the lack of legal status amongst SSBs. As discussed earlier, in most countries, 
Shari‘ah board members have no legal standing in financial institutions, making it 
difficult to hold them liable for actions over which they have no legal power. Even 
where SSBs are officially recognised, there is no legislation detailing their liability 
and incriminating their wrongdoing.733 The second reason which might prove an 
obstacle to SSB accountability is that SSB members are usually highly respected in 
society; they are perceived as guardians of Shari‘ah who fear no one but Allah.734 
Although there is no infallibility for Shari‘ah scholars in Islam,735 some 
ordinary Muslims seem to see criticism of Shari‘ah scholars as criticism directed 
towards Islam itself.736    
Nonetheless, historically, scholars have debated whether a mujtahd (a person who 
practises ijtihād) is liable for ijtihād.737 The majority position is that the mujtahd is not 
liable for any mistakes in his fatwas since he issues rulings to the best of his ability.738 
The grounds for this position is the ḥadīth of the Prophet which states that when the 
                                                                                                                                            
of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Sharjah, UAE, 26/4/2009), p21. However, unlike Pakistan, the BNM 
Shari‘ah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions at least alludes to the accountability 
of SSB members. See: Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), "Shari’ah Governance Framework for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (BNM/RH/GL_012_3)" p11.  
733 Sulaymān Naʿīm  al-Rāʿī, "Athar Hayʾāt al-Fatwā wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Muʾasasāt al-
Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah  " (paper presented at the Islamic Financial Institutions: Reality Features and 
Future Prospects, UAE, 15-17/5/2005), p370; Bāryān, "Asālīb Tafʿīl Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī 
al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah " p24. 
734 For a general description of the role of the Shari‘ah scholar, see: Joseph A Kechichian, "The Role of 
the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia," International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 18, no. 1 (1986): p55.;  Meir Hatina, Guardians of Faith in Modern Times : 
`Ulama in The Middle East  (Boston: Brill, 2009). 
735 Charles P. Trumbull, "Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts," 
Vanderbilt Law Review 59, no. 2 (2006): p627. 
736 Aly  Khorshid, "Shariah Board Accountability," Academy UK, 
http://www.academyuk.org/publications/view.aspx?id=19. accessed 10 December 2010 
737 According to  Wael  B. Hallaq,  ijtihād “is the maximum effort expended  by  the jurist  to  master 
and  apply  the  principles and  rules of  usuil al- fiqh  (legal  theory)  for  the  purpose  of  discovering 
God's  law.” Hallaq, "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?." 
738 al-Najjār, "Muftariḍāt al-Masʾūliyyah fī Niṭāq al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿalā al-Muʾassasāt al-
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Jināʾiyyah Lil-hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah " (paper presented at the Third Conference of Shari'a Supervisory 
Boards of Islamic Financial Institutions, Bahrain, 5-6/10/2003), p8-9; Fidād, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah 
Wa Dawruhā Fī Ḍabṭ Aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah," p22. 
155 
 
ruler performs ijtihād and reaches the right conclusion, he will be rewarded twice, but 
if he makes an error, he will be rewarded just once for making the ijtihād.739 The only 
exceptions to this position occur when a definitive principle has been breached or 
when an individual has issued a fatwa without having the competence to do so.740      
However, this section is not primarily concerned with the classical discussion of 
scholarly liability in this context, but rather with the harm that arises from an SSB’s 
failure to fulfil its duties—for example, declaring a financial institution Shari‘ah 
compliant without carrying out a sufficient review, deliberately failing to report 
violations of Shari‘ah in a product or service, not holding SSB meetings, or allowing 
frequent absences in meetings. Such negligence might cause a great deal of damage to 
stakeholders and increase the risk profile of institutions, which is unlawful in Shari‘ah 
teaching.741   
Indeed, increasing SSB accountability should enhance the quality of Shari‘ah 
compliance in the institution. This is because Shari‘ah board members would ideally 
scrutinise IIFS activities closely to avoid risking any legal responsibility. Currently, 
SSBs are not liable for any damage arising from their remissness; they lose nothing 
from circumventing Islamic finance restrictions.742 The worst-case scenario for its 
members is termination of their contract, which is unlikely as it might cause further 
                                                 
739 Rushdi Siddiqui, "A Sharia Scholar’s Place on The Board," Gulf News, 
http://gulfnews.com/business/features/a-sharia-scholar-s-place-on-the-board-1.625445. accessed 30 
October 2010 
740 ʿAbd āl-Ḥamid  al-Baʿlī, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah al-Faʿʿālah Fī al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah al-
Islāmiyyah " (paper presented at the TheThird International Conference on Islamic Economics, Umm 
Al Qura University,Mecca, 31/5-02/06/2005), p39. Some jurists have stated that in case, the scholar 
was incompetent, IIFS may take the responsibility for not conducting due diligence. See al-Najjār, 
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741 Qaṭṭān, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah al-Faʿʿālah Fī al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah " p23-25. 
742 Lahem al-Nasser, "Waḍʿ al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah Murbik Wa Naḥn Biḥājah ilā Wilādah 
Jadīdah ", Islamic Finance and Investment  01/09/2010 
http://www.almasrifiah.com/2010/09/01/article_438969.html. accessed 1  November 2010  
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damage to the institution. In Investment Dar v Blom Development Bank,743 the 
claimant argued in its legal defence that the contract in question was not Shari‘ah-
compliant, despite the fact that it had been approved by its own Shari‘ah board. The 
SSB of Investment Dar did not announce its resignation or sue the company to protest 
the challenge to its credibility. It merely issued a majority statement backing up its old 
ruling and asking the company not to use SSB decisions in further litigation.744 If 
SSBs were held accountable for such incidents, we would have seen a stronger 
reaction.    
An additional accountability issue requiring clarification is whether the 
responsibility for ensuring Shari‘ah compliance lies with the SSB or with the 
management of the IIFS. While some researchers suggest that ensuring Shari‘ah 
compliance is the responsibility of the SSB,745 others suggest that it is the 
responsibility of IIFS executive directors, and that SSB responsibility ends with 
forming Shari‘ah opinion on the compliance of proposals for products or services 
without concern for their actual implementation.746 The AAOIFI standard seems to 
support the latter stance.747 Such a position is understandable if one assumes that the 
AAOIFI considers the SSB’s role as merely an advisory one, with no impact on the 
operational aspect. However, as discussed earlier, AAOIFI standards also state that 
                                                 
743 Investment Dar Co KSCC v Blom Developments Bank Sal. 
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Dawrhā fī Ḍabṭ ʿAmal al-Maṣārif," p22; Bakar, "The Shari'a Supervisory Board and Issues of Shari'a 
Rulings and their Harmonisation in Islamic Banking and Finance," p76.  
746 ʿAbd al-Ḥaq  Ḥamīsh, "Hayʾah al-Fatwā Wa al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah " 
(paper presented at the Islamic Financial Institutions: Reality Features and Future Prospects, UAE, 
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Shari‘ah supervisors are “entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and 
supervising the activities related to Islamic finance to ensure they are in compliance 
with Shari‘ah rules and principles. The views of the Shari‘ah adviser shall be binding 
in the specific area of supervision”.748 Consequently, it is not safe to leave SSB 
members holding such power without sharing responsibility for their actions. 
Nonetheless, Al-Khalīfī and other researchers argue that ensuring Shari‘ah 
compliance is not only a duty of the SSB, but also the collective responsibility of 
stakeholders.749   
Finally, when discussing SSB members’ accountability, it is often argued that 
Shari‘ah scholars are held accountable to God.750 These ʿulamāʾ or scholars are 
assumed to be the most trusted people, who would never compromise or hide the 
truth. The Quran states, “It is only those who have knowledge among His slaves that 
fear Allah”.751 Iqbal and Lewis752 note that Islam regards some governance problems, 
such as corruption, as ethical issues which can be resolved by enhancing internal 
strength rather than by applying external legal forces. In contrast, the majority of 
Western scholars seem to deem corruption to be the result of bad governance, rather 
than focusing on its moral dimension. The authors suggest that Islamic countries can 
                                                 
748 " No. 1 - Shari’a Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report.." 
749 al-Khalīfī, "al-Naẓariyyah al-ʿĀmmah Lil-hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah " p21; al-Hītī, "Athar al-Raqābah al-
Sharʿiyyah ʿalā Ail-tizām al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah bi-al-ʾAḥkāmi al-Sharʿiyyah  " p14; ʿĀdil 
ʿAbdAllāh  Bāryān, "Asālīb Tafʿīl Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah " 
(ibid.31/5- 3/6/2009), p47. 
750 Aldohni, "Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate Governance:The Dilemma of The Shari'a 
Supervisory Board," p158; Wright, "The Shariah Scholar Cartel". 
751Taqi al-Din Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan, "The Noble Quran," Muslim Directory, 
http://quran.com/35/28. accessed 7 August 2011. Ibn  Katheer commented on  this verse: “Only those 
who have knowledge truly fear Him as He should be feared, because the more they know about the 
Almighty, All-Powerful, All-Knowing Who has the most perfect attributes and is described with the 
most beautiful Names, the more they will fear Him.” Ismail ibn Umar Ibn Kathir, "Tafsir Ibn Kathir " 
Darussalam, http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1906&Itemid=. 
accessed 8 August 2011 
752 Iqbal and Lewis, An Islamic Perspective on Governance, p306-12. 
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improve their governance practise by implementing mechanisms and reform strategies 
currently applied in the Western model.753   
Nevertheless, no matter how high the ethical standards of any individual, there 
will always be exceptions.754 As Hirschman emphasises,755  
Under any economic, social, or political system, individuals, business firms, 
and organizations in general are subject to lapses from efficient, rational, law-
abiding, virtuous, or otherwise functional behaviour. No matter how well a 
society's basic institutions are devised, failures of some actors to live up to 
the behaviour which is expected of them are bound to occur.756  
Therefore, extra measures must be taken to protect the public interest. There are many 
examples cited in early Islamic history where rulers were subjected to accountability 
by the Prophet and the first four Caliphs, despite being regarded as role models in 
their time and for future Muslim generations. In particular, the second Caliph Umar 
Ibn Al-Khattab (ruled 634–644 CE) held some of his governors to public 
accountability, regardless of their status as prominent and pious Companions of the 
Prophet Muhammad.757 
Accordingly, subjecting SSB members to accountability should not be perceived 
as showing less respect to Shari‘ah scholars or doubting their credibility, but rather 
dealing professionally with an essential group in the industry and adding a layer of 
protection for public interest. This is particularly important if the IIFS is operating in 
a global market where the local reputation of the Shari‘ah board members’ reliability 
                                                 
753 Ibid. 
754 Historically, these individuals are known as ulama-e soo (vicious scholars or hypocrite scholars) 
who would circumvent the teaching of Shari‘ah in order to protect their interests or the rulers’ interest 
or to provide justification for their wrongdoing. See Moinuddin Ahmed, Ulama : the Boon and Bane of 
Islamic Society  (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1990), p77; Ghazzali, The Book of Knowledge;  Ihya `ulum 
al-din. , trans. Nabih Amin Faris, 2nd ed. (Lahore: S.M. Ashraf, 1966), Section VI. 
755 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p1. 
756 Ibid. 
757 See, for example, the stories of Caliph Umar with the following Companions: Saad Bin Waqas, 
Khalid Bin Waleed, Said ibn Aamir, and Amr ibn al-Aas. See Mian Usman, "The Islamic Concept of 
Leadership," Allvoices, Inc, http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/4804200-the-islamic-concept-
of-leadership. accessed 9 August 2011; Badr ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd  Hmīsah, "Muḥāsabah al-Wulāh " Ṣayd al-
Fawāʾid http://www.saaid.net/Doat/hamesabadr/205.htm. accessed 9 August 2011  
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may not be sufficient to allay stockholder suspicions over the SSB’s lack of 
accountability.  
5.4.4.  SSBs’ Lack of Transparency 
One of the main criticisms directed at IIFS is their general lack of transparency, 
particularly in relation to Shari‘ah governance. Although transparency is regarded as 
an essential element of modern corporate governance,758 it does not seem to be 
common practise among Islamic financial institutions, which operate in a less 
transparent environment than do conventional financial institutions.759  
Wilson760 notes that regulators and official bodies in Muslim countries tend to deal 
with Islamic finance issues as a sensitive subject and do not expose them to public 
view. This is because the governors of central banks are careful not be seen taking 
action which violates Shari‘ah principles.761 In addition, severe competition in the 
industry might block the disclosure of details of innovative Islamic financial products. 
The reliability of the transaction is not based on the level of transparency and 
disclosure, but rather on people’s acceptance and trust of the Shari‘ah scholar who has 
approved the product.762  
Furthermore, the subject has received little attention in the AAOIFI standards and 
guidelines.763 For instance, AAOIFI’s recommendations for the contents of an SSB 
annual report are superficial and disregard the disclosure of important information. 
Neither does the standard promote revealing key information about IIFS Shari‘ah 
board members, such as membership duration, procedures for selection and 
                                                 
758 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, "Transparency and Corporate Governance," 
(2007) http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/HW_mkts_v5.pdf accessed 28 August 2011 
759 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services"; Ghoul, "Shariah Scholars and Islamic Finance: Towards a more Objective 
and Independent Shariah-Compliance Certification of Islamic Financial Products," p88; Alsayyed, 
"Shari’ah Board, The Task of Fatwa, and Ijtihad in Islamic Economics, and Finance". 
760 Wilson, "Regulatory Challenges Posed by Islamic Capital Market Products and Services," p20.  
761 Ibid.  
762 Alsayyed, "Shari’ah Board, The Task of Fatwa, and Ijtihad in Islamic Economics, and Finance". 
763 Khorshid, "Shariah Board Accountability".  
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reappointment, or qualifications and professional background.764 Moreover, as with 
members of a board of directors, SSB members’ financial rewards and their work 
affiliations with other financial institutions (including the number of SSBs they serve) 
should be revealed.765  
Most importantly, stakeholders should be made aware of the SSB’s duties, the 
legal power of its decisions (whether binding or advisory in nature), and the process 
of Shari‘ah supervision and decision-making. Some IIFS are advertised as completely 
under the supervision of the Shari‘ah board, while their SSB in practise only conducts 
ex ante Shari‘ah review.766 Other institutions claim to have an internal Shari‘ah review 
unit while, in fact, they only have one officer responsible for auditing its branches.767 
Besides, it is important to disclose how SSBs collect their data. Most SSBs state that a 
sample of IIFS transactions has been examined without saying when or revealing how 
much this sample represents the IIFS business operations.768  
Another important point is that IIFS should disclose the disposal of non-Shari‘ah 
compliant income.769 Shareholders need to know how much of the IIFS operations this 
income represents, and whether it was correctly distributed. Many SSB reports state 
that IIFS operations were fully Shari‘ah compliant without referring to the percentage 
of non-Shari‘ah compliant earnings that must inevitably be generated in practise.770 
                                                 
764 Alsayyed, "Shari’ah Board, The Task of Fatwa, and Ijtihad in Islamic Economics, and Finance". 
765 Fidād, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Wa Dawruhā Fī Ḍabṭ Aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah," p19. 
766 al-Hītī, "Athar al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿalā Ail-tizām al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah bi-al-ʾAḥkāmi al-
Sharʿiyyah  " p21-25. 
767 ʿĀdil ʿAbdAllāh  Bāryān, "Asālīb Tafʿīl Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Maṣārif al-
Islāmiyyah", p35. 
768 al-Saʿad, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah WaʾAtharhā Fī al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah," p15-19; al-Ṭayyib, 
"Taqyīm al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah fī Ẓil al-Niẓām al-Maṣrifī al-Islāmī al-Shāmil," p27; ʿAbd al-
Razzāq Raḥīm  al-Hītī, "Athar al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿalā Ail-tizām al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah bi-al-
ʾAḥkāmi al-Sharʿiyyah  " (ibid.31/5/2009 - 3/6/2009), p21. 
769 Muḥammad ʿAlī Yūsuf   Ahmad, "Dawr al-Suluṭāt al-Riqābiyyah Fī al-Riqābah ʿAlā al-Muʾassasāt  
al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah " (paper presented at the The 2nd Conference of Islamic Financial Services., 
Tripoli-Libya, 27-28/4/2010), p19. 
770 Ahmad al-Islāmbūlī, "Dawr al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ Aʿmāl al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah al-
Islāmiyyah  " (paper presented at the 19th session of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Sharjah, UAE, 
26/4/2009), p19. 
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The following indices that I have compiled compare Shari‘ah supervision disclosure 
in 12 Saudi banks771 along with nine UK banks772 offering Islamic financial services 
                                                 
771 Source of date: information posted on the websites  and annual reports of the following banks: 
Alrajhi Bank, "The Sharia Group"; "Annual Report 2010," Alrajhi Bank, 
http://www.alrajhibank.com.sa/en/media-centre/reports/Documents/annual-report2010-en.pdf. accessed 
28 August 2011; Bank Albilad, "Sharia Board,"  http://www.bankalbilad.com/ar/shariah.asp, 
http://www.bankalbilad.com/en/shariah.asp. accessed 28 August 2011; "Financial Statements for 
2010,"  http://www.bankalbilad.com/en/BILAD31-12-2010.pdf. accessed 28 August 2011; Alinma 
Bank, "Shariah Board,"  
http://www.alinma.com/wps/portal/alinma/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3hzf2cLDy
93A0t3d1c3A093Ixd3_yBfI29TA_3g1Dz9gmxHRQA7laOC/. accessed 28 August 2011; "Annual 
Report 2010," Alinma Bank,, 
http://www.alinma.com/wps/wcm/connect/512dd680467a8afb930ebb690642abc7/Alinm_annual_repor
t_2010_eng%28may22%29+22.5.11.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=512dd680467a8afb930ebb69
0642abc7. accessed 28 August 2011; Bank AlJazira (BAJ), "Corporate Profile,"  
http://www.baj.com.sa/about-us.aspx?page=corporate-profile&id=139. accessed 28 August 2011; 
"Annual Report,"  http://www.baj.com.sa/pdf/Baj%20Annual%20Report%20English.pdf. accessed 28 
August 2011; The National Commercial Bank, "Annual Report "  http://www.alahli.com/en-
US/About%20Us/News_Reports/Documents/Reports%202010/NCB%20AR10%20English.pdf. 
accessed 28 August 2011; "The NCB Shariah Board "  http://www.alahli.com/ar-
SA/About%20Us/ibdg/Pages/TheNCBShariahBoard.aspx. accessed 28 August 2011; Saudi Hollandi 
Bank (SHB), "Shari’ah Board Members,"  
http://shb.com.sa/en/about/AboutSHB/ShariahBoardmembers.aspx. accessed 28 August 2011; Saudi 
Hollandi Bank(SHB), "Annual Report "  
http://www.shb.com.sa/PDF/SHB%20Annual%20Report%202010_English.pdf. accessed 28 August 
2011; SAMBA, "Islamic Products," Samba Bank, 
http://www.samba.com/ENGLISH/CONSUMER/HTML/CONSISLAMICPRODUCTS_01_01_en.htm
l. accessed 28 August 2011; "Annual Reports," Samba Bank, 
http://www.samba.com/English/Common/HTML/abtSambaFReports_01_01_en.html. accessed 28 
August 2011; Riyad Bank, "Islamic Banking "  
http://www.riyadbank.com/English/PersonalBanking/IslamicBanking.html. accessed 28 August 2011; 
"Annual Report," Riyad Bank, 
http://www.riyadbank.com/PDF/reports/annualreports/en/2010/AnnualReport2010.pdf. accessed 28 
August 2011; Bank Saudi Fransi (BSF), "Islamic Finance "  
http://www.alfransi.com.sa/en/article/corporate-services/corporate-banking/islamic-finance.html. 
accessed 28 August 2011; "Annual Report,"  
http://www.alfransi.com.sa/en/general/download/file/1369. accessed 28 August 2011; Arab National 
Bank (ANB), "Islamic Banking Division Profile,"  http://www.anb.com.sa/about_islamic.asp. accessed 
28 August 2011; "Annual Report,"  
http://www.anb.com.sa/pdf/Reports/2010/ANB_English_review.pdf. accessed 28 August 2011; SABB, 
"Shariah Committee," SABB  Bank, http://www.sabb.com/1/2/sabb-en/about-
us/profile/sahariah_advisory_commitee. accessed 28 August 2011; "Annual Report," SABB  Bank 
http://www.sabb.com/1/PA_1_083Q9FJ08A002FBP5S00000000/content/SABB/en/about_us/attachme
nts/annual_reports/sabb_annual_report_2010_en.pdf. accessed 28 August 2011; The Saudi Investment 
Bank (SAIB), "Islamic Banking,"  http://www.saib.com.sa/english/islamic.aspx. accessed 28 August 
2011; "Financial Statements,"  
http://www.saib.com.sa/Docs/Financial%20Statements%202010%20English.pdf. accessed 28 August 
2011 
772Source of data: information posted on the websites and annual reports of the following banks: 
Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), "Sharia Supervisory Committee,"  http://www.islamic-bank.com/sharia-
finance/sharia-supervisory-committee/. accessed 28 August 2011; Islamic Bank of Britain IIBI, 
"Annual Report and Financial Statements "  http://www.islamic-
bank.com/GetAsset.aspx?id=fAAzADkANgB8AHwAVAByAHUAZQB8AHwAMAB8AA2. accessed 
28 August 2011; Ahli United Bank (UK) (AUB), "Our Sharia'h Board "  
ww.iibu.com/shariaa_board/sboard.aspx. accessed 28 August 2011; "Annual Report,"  
http://www.ahliunited.com/pdfs/ar/AUB_AnnualReport_2010.pdf. accessed 28 August 2011; HSBC 
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(see Table 1 and Table 2). They show the average disclosure and the desirable 
disclosure in the following areas: SSB composition, Shari‘ah scholars’ professional 
background, affiliation with other SSBs, SSB members’ financial rewards, the SSB 
annual report to shareholders, the publication of fatwas or decisions, SSB duties, SSB 
decision power (binding or advisory), supervision processes, and selection procedures 
(by shareholders, the board of directors, or banking management). 
As the average results of the two countries show, a transparency culture in banks 
offering Islamic financial services seems to be to be more prevalent in the UK than in 
Saudi, although the UK is a secular country with minority Muslim population and 
Saudi is an Islamic country. IIFS in the UK are in a better position with regard to 
disclosing Shari‘ah scholars’ membership in other SSBs. These countries’ political 
systems might have influenced this outcome, since unlike the absolute monarchy in 
Saudi,773 the democratic system of the UK promotes transparency. Besides, 
professional banking practises were established a long time ago in the UK, and 
modern corporate governance originated in the West.774 Nevertheless, the disclosure 
of SSB remuneration appears to be a sensitive subject in both countries, to the extent 
that it has never been revealed. Lastly, the indices show that, despite the benefits of 
                                                                                                                                            
Amanah, "Shariah Supervision,"  http://www.hsbcamanah.com/amanah/about-amanah/islamic-
banking/shariah-supervision. accessed 28 August 2011; United National Bank, "Islamic Products,"  
http://www.unbankltd.com/islamic-products/. accessed 28 August 2011; ABC International Bank plc 
(ABCIB), "Shariah Compliance," ABCIB,, http://www.alburaq.co.uk/shariah_compliance.asp. 
accessed 28 August 2011; Lloyds TSB, "Islamic Business Bank Account,"  
http://www.lloydstsbbusiness.com/accounts/islamic.asp. accessed 28 August 2011; European Islamic 
Investment Bank plc’s (EIIB), "Sharia Board," EIIB,, http://www.eiib.co.uk/html/sharia_board.asp. 
accessed 28 August 2011; "Annual Report " EIIB,, 
http://www.eiib.co.uk/documents/EIIBAnnualReport2010Final.pdf. accessed 28 August 2011; 
QIB(UK), "Our People " QIB Bank(UK) http://www.qib-uk.com/html/our-people.asp. accessed 28 
August 2011; Gatehouse Bank, "Shariah Supervisory Board,"  http://www.gatehousebank.com/about-
us/shariah-supervisory-board/. accessed 28 August 2011; "Annual Report,"  
http://www.gatehousebank.com/common/documents/annual-
reports/Gatehouse_Bank_Annual_Report_2009.pdf. accessed 28 August 2011 
773 See generally, Khaled Hussainey and Ali Al-Nodel, "Corporate Governance Online Reporting by 
Saudi Listed Companies," in Corporate governance in less developed and emerging economies, ed. 
Matthew Tsamenyi and Shazad Uddin (Bingley: Emerald Jai, 2008), p42 
774 Randall Morck and Lloyd Steier, The Global History of Corporate Governance : an Introduction  
(Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005). 
163 
 
publishing SSB fatwas, such as educating the public about Islamic finance and 
engaging stakeholders in overseeing IIFS compliance with SSB rulings,775 very few 
financial institutions have taken the incentive to publish the decisions of their SSB. 
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775 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services"; Howladar, "Shari'ah Risk: Understanding Recent Compliance Issues in 
Islamic Finance". 
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Table 2. Shari ‘ah Governance Disclosure Indexes in KSA Banks  
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5.4.5.  The Lack of Independence of SSBs 
Independence, according to Oxford Dictionary of English, is the state of being 
“free from outside control; not subject to another's authority”.776 Any factor that 
compromises the independence of fiduciaries (such as directors, agents, and external 
auditors) will affect their judgment, reliability and public confidence.777 However, the 
standard of independence and acting in a good faith as a fiduciary duty can vary from 
one profession to another.778 Contemporary Islamic finance literature seems to offer a 
similar but less strict mindset posed in guidelines and codes issued by accounting and 
auditing regulatory and professional bodies.779Al-Khalīfī, for example, defines the 
independent authority of SSBs as a way of exercising their functions impartially and 
in complete freedom. They should not be influenced by any kind of pressure, whether 
from IIFS management or shareholders, that may negatively affect their decisions.780  
Al-Shabīlī781 outlines three elements of SSB independence. The first is 
employment independence: the external Shari‘ah supervisor should not be an 
employee of the IIFS, but should be appointed from outside the IIFS staff. In addition, 
the level of the internal Shari‘ah department in the IIFS structure should be 
                                                 
776 Stevenson, "Oxford Dictionary of English". 
777 Zabihollah Rezaee, Corporate Governance and Ethics  (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 
p270. 
778 See generally: Gerard M. D. Bean, Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures :The Collaborative 
Fiduciary Relationship  (Oxford; New York, N.Y.: Clarendon Press, 1995), p27-35; Robert A. Pearce, 
John Stevens, and Warren Barr, The Law ofTrusts and Equitable Obligations  (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), p909-15; Martha Bruce, Rights and Duties of Directors  (London: 
Tolley Publishing Co Ltd, 2002), p42-49. 
779 Most guidelines and codes issued by regulatory and professional bodies highlight two notions of 
auditor independence: independence in fact (or mind) and independence in appearance. The former 
requires auditors to have a state of mind that is not influenced by any factors which may affect 
professional judgment. An auditor must be able to perform the task with honesty, impartiality and 
“professional scepticism.” The latter requires auditors to avoid any significant facts or situations that 
might result in a reasonable conclusion on the part of an informed third party that the auditor’s honesty, 
impartiality, or “professional scepticism” has been affected. Christiane Strohm, United States and 
European Union Auditor Independence Regulation: Implications for Regulators and Auditing Practice  
(Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 2006), p18. 
780 al-Khalīfī, "al-Naẓariyyah al-ʿĀmmah Lil-hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah " p26. 
781 al-Shabīlī, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿAlā al-Maṣārif:Ḍawābiṭhā Wa Aḥkāmhā Wa Dawrhā fī Ḍabṭ 
ʿAmal al-Maṣārif," p20. 
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sufficient to accomplish its responsibilities. It should not be lower than the level of 
the internal audit unit, which should report directly to the SSB, not to the management 
of the bank. The second element is financial independence, which is achieved when 
an SSB member’s fee is not determined by the number of products or contracts he has 
approved, but according to the effort he has made in conducting such a job. In the 
case of internal Shari‘ah auditors, financial independence is achieved by ensuring that 
their remuneration is not linked with the content of their reports. The third element is 
independence in appointment and dismissal. The SSB member must be 
appointed by the highest authority in the IIFS, which is the annual general meeting 
(AGM) of shareholders. The internal Shari‘ah auditor can be appointed and 
dismissed by an administrative decision, subject to the approval of the SSB. 
In theory, Shari‘ah Board members have an obligation to provide an impartial 
report on any breach of Islamic law that takes place within an Islamic financial 
institution. However, the existence of two boards in the IIFS structure, with the board 
of directors having a superior power over an SSB, may cause a serious conflict of 
interest. The fact that the IIFS board or management can appoint, dismiss, or fix the 
remuneration of the SSB member leaves the door open for IIFS management to use 
such leverage to influence Shari‘ah board judgments.  For instance, the board of 
directors may try to pressure the SSB to issue a fatwa approving a certain product or 
service to maximise the IIFS profit, regardless of its compliance with Shari‘ah 
principles. Or they might threaten SSB members with termination of their contracts to 
prevent them from reporting non-Shari‘ah compliant activities, which is likely to 
shake stakeholders’ confidence.782 
                                                 
782 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services"; Siti Faridah  Abd Jabbar, "The Sharia Supervisory Board of Islamic 
Financial Institutions: A Case for Governance," The Company Lawyer 30, no. 8 (2009): p244; Abdul-
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In the context of Shari‘ah supervision, five factors can possibly compromise SSB 
independence,783 namely, the approach to appointments, high remuneration, the 
provision of credit facilities to SSB members, ownership of shares in the IIFS, and the 
holding of an executive position. 
5.4.5.1.  The Approach to Appointments 
The Islamic finance industry has no standard practise for appointing Shari‘ah 
advisors. Generally, SSB members are appointed either directly by the IIFS board of 
directors or management, or else in the annual general meeting  of shareholders. It is 
not clear which method is the most popular in the industry. According to a study 
conducted by Bahjat784 on sixteen Islamic institutions, only seven SSBs have ever 
been appointed at an AGM. Five were appointed by a board of directors, and it was 
not clear which method was used for appointing the members of the remaining four 
SSBs. In another study, Hussain Hamed Hassan,785 a prominent international Shari‘ah 
                                                                                                                                            
Rahman, The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance : Tools and Techniques for Community-Based 
Banking, p79. 
783 External auditors’ independence, to which some Islamic finance literatures make reference (HH 
Hassan, 'al'elaqh beyn alhey'eat alesher'eyh w alemraj'eyen alekharejyen' Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions AAOIF), can be compromised by several threats. The 
Ethical Standards issued by The Auditing Practices Board (APB) in addition to The International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants identify six general 
threats: self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity or trust, management, and intimidation.  The 
threat of self-interest is found when an auditor hesitates to act independently because it may endanger 
his interests (for example, shares in the audited institution). The threat of self- review occurs when an 
auditor provides a non-auditing service to be incorporated in the financial statement. The threat of 
advocacy appears when an auditor plays the role of an advocate to an audited company which requires 
him to adopt a position in support of that taken by the management. The threat of familiarity or trust 
can emerge when an auditor does not sufficiently question the point of view of the audited company. A 
common example is where a close personal relationship has developed with the staff of the audited 
entity. Moreover, a management threat can occur when an auditor makes a decision on behalf of the 
administration of the audited financial institution. This usually takes place when an audited entity asks 
the audit firm to provide non-audit services that will influence judgments made by the management. 
Finally, the intimidation threat occurs when the performance of an auditor is affected by fear or 
menaces. This could be the situation when an auditor deals with aggressive and controlling 
management. See: Brenda Porter, David J. Hatherly, and Jon Simon, Principles of External Auditing  
(Chichester, England: John Wiley, 2008), p104-06. 
784 Muḥammad Fuʾād Bahjat, "Naḥw Miʿyār Lil-rriqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Bunūk al-Islāmiyyah," 
Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics 3, no. 2 (1994). Cited in Fayṣal ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīz Faraḥ, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah al-Wāqiʿ Wa al-Mithāl " (paper presented at the TheThird 
International Conference on Islamic Economics, Mecca, 31/5-2/06/2005), p26. 
785 Hassan, "al-ʿAlāqah Bayn al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah  wa al-murājiʿīn al-khārijiyyīn " p9. 
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scholar, suggests that 89% of the SSBs in IIFS are appointed by a board of directors 
and 11% are appointed at an AGM.  
The first method, appointment by the board of directors, is associated with two 
issues. First, the board may use its leverage to influence SSB decisions. Given that the 
board usually represents big shareholders in an institution, such pressure is likely to 
be used to protect any financial interests. The danger is greater in cases where there is 
only a single Shari‘ah advisor in the institution. The second issue is the lack of 
objectivity in selecting SSB members.  This is because board members tend to choose 
scholars with whom they have personal or friendly relationships.786 Such familiarity 
can be an impediment for SSBs when endeavouring to perform their task in a 
professional manner.787   
Although appointing SSBs in the shareholders’ AGM is thought to boost SSB 
independence,788 and although it represents the current practise supported by AAOIFI 
standards, this method is also not without its flaws. This is because the board of 
directors recommends the appointment of certain individuals at general meetings, and 
these recommendations are usually approved without objection.789  Board 
recommendations tend to be influenced by management views. Therefore, it is 
unlikely to assume that IIFS management will have no power over the selection of 
SSBs appointed in an AGM.  
Furthermore, even where shareholders directly make the selections, the decisions 
of the AGM can be influenced by a few individuals who control the majority of a 
                                                 
786 Qaṭṭān, "Hayʾah al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Akhtiyār Aʿḍāʾihā Wa Ḍawābiṭhā  " p20. 
787 ʿAbd al-Majīd Maḥmūd  al-Ṣalāḥīn, "Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Wa Dawruhā Fī 
al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah  " (paper presented at the IslamicFinancial Institutions: Reality Features 
and Future Prospects, UAE, 15-17/5/2005), p257. 
788 Hassan et al., An Analysis of the Role and Competency of the Shari'ah Committees (SCs) of Islamic 
Banks and Financial Service Providers p55. 
789 Alsayyed, "Shari’ah Board, The Task of Fatwa, and Ijtihad in Islamic Economics, and Finance".  
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company's shares.790 This might be the case in both private and government 
companies which become publicly traded in the stock market. For example, Al Rajhi 
Bank, the largest Saudi Islamic bank and the second biggest Islamic bank in the 
world, was listed in the Saudi stock market in 1988.791 However, the Al Rajhi family 
holds a majority share in the company, and family members occupy six out of the 11 
seats on the board of directors. These include the chairman of the board and his son, 
who is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). In this example, the CEO will likely have 
a major influence on his father, as well as on the rest of the family members on the 
board. Therefore, it is unrealistic to claim that selecting SSB members in the AGM, 
which is the norm in Al Rajhi Bank, is sufficient to provide autonomy for SSB 
members.792  
Another criticism directed at this method is that it prevents investment account 
holders from participating in the selection of SSBs.793 Unlike conventional banks, 
investment account holders in Islamic finance are affected by SSB selections because 
they share profit and risk with the institution. Therefore, they should be involved in 
the process of SSB appointment.  
To avoid such limitations, some experts have suggested that a regulatory body 
oversee the selection of SSB members in the AGM.794 This would provide another 
layer to protect SSB independence from the board of directors’ influence. It would 
                                                 
790 Bakar, "The Shari'a Supervisory Board and Issues of Shari'a Rulings and their Harmonisation in 
Islamic Banking and Finance," p79 n13; al-Hītī, "Athar al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿalā Ail-tizām al-
Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah bi-al-ʾAḥkāmi al-Sharʿiyyah  " p32. 
791 Alrajhi Bank, "About Us,"  http://www.alrajhibank.com.sa/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx. accessed 
18 April 2011 
792The board members’ names as they appeared on the bank website on 18/04/2011, ibid. 
793 Qaṭṭān, "Hayʾah al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Akhtiyār Aʿḍāʾihā Wa Ḍawābiṭhā  " p10; ʿAbd al-Hādī 
Ḥabtūr, "Hayʾāt Riqābiyyah Sharʿiyyah fī al-Maṣārif al-IslāmiyyahTaʿmal k " Muassasāt Khayriyyat " 
Dūn Ṣifah Qānūniyyah ", al-Āqtiṣādiyyah, 20 June 2010 
http://www.aleqt.com/2010/06/20/article_408864.html. accessed 20 October 2010 
794 al-Ṣalāḥīn, "Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Wa Dawruhā Fī al-Maṣrifiyyah al-
Islāmiyyah  " p258; Ṭah Muḥammad Fāris, "Ḍawābiṭ Wa Āliyyāt Akhtiyār Aʿḍāʾ Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa 
al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah " (paper presented at the Islamic Banking 
Between Reality and Expectations, Dubai, UAE, 31/5- 3/6/2009), p48-51. 
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also ensure greater objectivity in selecting SSB members. Such a practise is already 
applied in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)795 as well as in Malaysia,796 where Islamic 
banks are required to submit the names of SSB candidates to a supreme Shari‘ah 
board for final approval. However, this mechanism cannot be applied at the present 
time in countries such as Saudi Arabia, owing to the absence of regulations of Islamic 
finance, or in countries such as the UK, where a secular system is applied and the 
regulator will not interfere in a religious matter.797 
Another suggestion is to refer the issue of SSB member selection to an 
international body funded by charity, which would comprise globally recognised 
scholars capable of assessing the competence of potential candidates.798 However, it is 
questionable whether financial institutions would voluntarily adhere to the control of 
such a body. Unless it were backed by central banks, it could be problematic for a 
cross-border financial institution to operate in countries with different approaches 
towards Islamic finance.  
5.4.5.2.  High Remuneration 
Classical Islamic scholars have always stressed the importance of the 
independence of the muftī (a scholar who provides a Shari‘ah answer) from the 
mustaftī   (an individual who asks the question).799 Initially, classical fiqh jurists 
debated whether it was permissible for the muftī to receive payment from individuals 
in exchange for answering a religious question.800 Proponents of prohibiting this 
                                                 
795 "Federal Law No-(6) of 1985 concerning Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions and Investment 
Companies". Article 6. See also: al-Ṣalāḥīn, "Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Wa 
Dawruhā Fī al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah  " p258; Qaṭṭān, "Hayʾah al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Akhtiyār 
Aʿḍāʾihā Wa Ḍawābiṭhā  " p10. 
796 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), "Shari’ah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(BNM/RH/GL_012_3)" p29. 
797 Ainley et al., Islamic Finance in The UK : Regulation and Challenges, p13. 
798 Laldin, "Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah," p10. 
799 Bāryān, "Asālīb Tafʿīl Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah " p26-30. 
800 While it is allowed within the Maliki, Shafi`i and minority Hanbali schools of thought, it is not 
lawful under the Hanafi and mainstream Hanbali schools of thought. See: al-Shabīlī, "al-Raqābah al-
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remuneration argue that allowing such a practise would endanger the scholar’s 
autonomy, since the Shari‘ah ruling may not be in favour of the individual. 
Consequently, as with judges and governors, the remuneration of scholars who 
provide a fatwa for the public should be paid by the Islamic state like any other public 
servant. 
However, it is unlikely that this debate applies to the current nature of SSB work. 
There is a major difference between answering general questions from the public, as 
discussed in the classical literature, and between ensuring Shari‘ah compliance in a 
private financial institution. The latter is an unprecedented situation for Shari‘ah 
scholars. It takes greater effort and more time, requiring scholars to review product 
documents and develop an understanding of complex financial instruments. Hence, 
most contemporary jurists hold the view that it is religiously lawful for Shari‘ah 
scholars to accept remuneration in exchange for time and effort provided to ensure 
Shari‘ah compliance.801 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of employing a “private scholar” in financial 
institutions has not gone without criticism from some official scholars appointed by 
the state.802 They have argued that such a practise has negatively resulted in a so-
called “fatwa shopping” situation, where some SSB members use jurisprudential ruses 
to offer resolutions that are tailored to suit the desires of the IIFS, although doing so 
could undermine the spirit of Islamic finance.803 In the eyes of these critics, banks are 
                                                                                                                                            
Sharʿiyyah ʿAlā al-Maṣārif:Ḍawābiṭhā Wa Aḥkāmhā Wa Dawrhā fī Ḍabṭ ʿAmal al-Maṣārif," p8-9; 
Fāris, "Ḍawābiṭ Wa Āliyyāt Akhtiyār Aʿḍāʾ Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-
Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah " p31-34. 
801  al-Shabīlī, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿAlā al-Maṣārif:Ḍawābiṭhā Wa Aḥkāmhā Wa Dawrhā fī Ḍabṭ 
ʿAmal al-Maṣārif," p9; Fāris, "Ḍawābiṭ Wa Āliyyāt Akhtiyār Aʿḍāʾ Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-
Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah " p32; Laldin, "Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ aʿmāl 
al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah," p10; Ḥamzah ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥammād, al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-
Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah (Amman: Alinvaais, 2006), p120. 
802 Warde, Islamic Finance in The Global Economy, p227-228. 
803 Ibid. 
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using their clients’ money to pay a high remuneration to SSB members in exchange 
for rulings with doubtful religious validity.   
It is probably the reports of high remuneration paid to some of the most popular 
Shari‘ah supervisors in the industry that provoked criticism on this issue. With no 
standard practise in IIFS,804 it seems to be important to address who should determine 
SSB remuneration and how it should be calculated. According to a study conducted 
by Abumouamer,805 for 75% of IIFS in the industry, SSB remuneration is decided by 
shareholders in their AGM; the board of directors determines it for 15.6%, and IIFS 
management fixes it for 9.4%. The calculation method varies from one IIFS to 
another. Some IIFS pay an annual or a monthly fee according to a set number of 
board meetings. Others pay a percentage of the bank’s overall profit.806 The latter is 
the case with Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, where SSB and board of directors 
remuneration is fixed in the annual budget to be between 5% and 10% of actual 
profit.807 However, such a practise can severely endanger SSB independence and raise 
a serious conflict of interest. This is because the higher the profit, the higher 
remuneration SSB members receive. For instance, if this method were followed by Al 
Rajhi Bank, which made SR 6,767 million in net profit in 2009,808 assuming that the 
total number of board of directors and SSB members is 15, with their remuneration 
set at 8% of the actual profit, each member would receive about SR 36 million. 
A related discussion in this regard is whether a Shari‘ah supervisor can receive a 
percentage of the revenue from a product approved by the SSB. Some scholars argue 
                                                 
804 Laldin, "Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah," p9. 
805 Abumouamer, "An Analysis of the Role and Function of the Shariah Control in Islamic Banks," 
p266. Compare with Faraḥ, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah al-Wāqiʿ Wa al-Mithāl " p33. 
806 Laldin, "Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah," p9. 
807 al-Ṣalāḥīn, "Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Wa Dawruhā Fī al-Maṣrifiyyah al-
Islāmiyyah  " p264; al-Islāmbūlī, "Dawr al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ Aʿmāl al-Muʾasasāt al-
Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah  " p7. 
808Alrajhi Bank, "2009 Annual Report," Alrajhi Bank, 
http://www.alrajhibank.com.sa/reports/Pages/default.aspx. accessed 10 March 2011 
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this is religiously prohibited, as it may cast suspicions over the validity of the 
fatwa.809 This is because IIFS use SSB judgment as a testimony endorsing the product 
in question as Shari‘ah compliant, and Islamic law does not accept testimony when a 
witness directly benefits from it. Given that SSBs are only paid when a product is 
approved, the more products they approve, the more profit they will make. However, 
Al-Shabīlī makes one exception,810 where the product is the innovation of a Shari‘ah 
advisor. He argues that since Shari‘ah also protects intellectual property, these 
advisors have the right to receive a percentage of the profit, provided that the product 
is approved by other SSB members.  
To limit the threat of high remuneration, Bahjat811 suggests issuing guidelines for 
the SSB fee, which would take into account the effort of the task and the average 
income in the country. Abumouamer812 suggests that SSB remuneration should be set 
by an international body such as the General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial 
Institutions. Such measures would help to standardise the SSB fee and protect the 
independence of its members.     
5.4.5.3.  Credit Facility  
Another important issue that should be addressed is whether SSB members can 
receive credit facilities from the IIFS for which they are reviewing products. Apart 
from IIFS in Syria813 and Qatar, to a limited extent, there are no restrictions on SSB 
members engaging in such relationships, despite the threat to Shari‘ah supervisors’ 
                                                 
809 al-Ṣāliḥ, "Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah  " p18. Yūsuf 
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813 Monetary and Credit Council [MCC], "Admission Rules of SSB of Islamic Banks Operating in The 
Syrian Arab Republic 404, MN, B4,"  http://www.banquecentrale.gov.sy/mone-poli-ar/cmc/cmc-0292-
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independence. In Qatar,814 the Central Bank only restricts SSB members from 
receiving credit facilities for commercial use, but not for personal use. If the regulator 
is using such controls to enhance Shari‘ah supervisors’ independence, the prohibition 
ought to be extended to credit facilities for both personal and commercial purposes.815  
5.4.5.4.  Ownership of Shares in IIFS 
In contemporary Islamic finance literature, SSB members are sometimes 
compared to external auditors. However, while the latter’s financial investment in the 
audited entity is strictly prohibited and is seen as a threat to auditor’s independence,816 
not all Shari‘ah scholars see SSB’s investment from the same perspective.817 Some 
scholars believe that it is religiously permissible for SSB members to own a small 
share in the institution (for example, less than 5%) if it is permissible by law. Such a 
percentage is not considered a large enough investment to endanger the independence 
of the SSB’s judgment.818 Moreover, it is argued that members should not be 
prevented from investing in an entity, as they are more aware than anyone else of its 
level of compliance. Shari‘ah scholars’ piety and ethical standards should avert the 
effect of any conflict of interest.819 However, others argue that since an SSB report is 
a testimony which certifies the compliance of IIFS, its members should be banned 
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819 Qaṭṭān, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah al-Faʿʿālah Fī al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah " p21. 
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from any action which may call its credibility into question.820 The decision of the 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy is in favour of the latter restriction.821  
Nevertheless, regulations are generally silent on this matter. This might be because of 
the unclear role and legal status of SSB members, which this chapter has already 
discussed. 
5.4.5.5.  Working in an Executive Position 
A Shari‘ah supervisor’s independence can be compromised if he takes on an 
executive role in the IIFS, since working in such a post may require him to take a 
supportive view of management’s actions and decisions. For instance, the Dubai 
Islamic Bank (DIB), one of the largest Islamic financial institutions in the United 
Arab Emirates, has an SSB which serves as an external Shari‘ah auditor, as well as an 
internal Shari‘ah unit, which acts as an internal auditor. The issue is that the same 
scholar, Hussain Hamed Hassan, chairs both the DIB’s external SSB and the internal 
Shari‘ah unit based at the bank.822 Moreover, Mohamed Abdulhakim Zoeir, who is a 
member of the SSB and its secretary, has also been appointed by the board of 
directors as an internal Shari‘ah auditor.823 In this situation, there is a potential 
conflict of interest, since two of the SSB members work as an external auditor and 
employee on the payroll of the bank. Surprisingly, when this issue was raised before 
                                                 
820 Ahmad ʿAbdAllāh Ibn Ḥumayd, "Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-
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26/9/2009), p6; Yūsuf ʿAbdAllāh al-Shabīlī, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿAlā al-Maṣārif:Ḍawābiṭhā Wa 
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the head of DIB's Shari‘ah Coordination Department, he argued that it presented no 
threat to SSB members’ independence, since they are protected by the general 
assembly of shareholders.824 It does not seem to be a matter for concern that the head 
of the external SSB is at the same time the head of the body which oversees the 
implementation of SSB decisions. Nevertheless, Qatar Financial Centre rules clearly 
prohibit the appointing of SSB members in executive positions.825 This is also the 
position adopted by the Financial Conduct Authority, as can be indirectly understood 
from its standard for directors known as the “Fit and Proper Test for Approved 
Persons”.826  
Considering these five roadblocks to SSB independence, scholars have made a 
couple of recommendations to enhance SSB autonomy. One suggestion by Grais and 
Pellegrini827 is to apply a mandatory rotation for SSBs. It has been argued that an 
enduring relationship between the Shari‘ah board and IIFS management can weaken 
the objectivity of its auditing. Thus, if a mandatory rotation were imposed to intercept 
such a relationship, the IIFS executive would not have the leverage of terminating 
SSB tenure to influence its decisions. However, apart from its cost,828 Summer argues 
that application of such a measure to external auditors would undercut inducements to 
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develop a reputation for integrity.829 Moreover, it might result in insufficient 
reviewing of Shari‘ah compliance during the transitional period, and it might also 
cause inconsistent implementation of Islamic finance within the same institution. To 
overcome the last two criticisms, Grais and Pellegrini830 suggest a partial compulsory 
rotation of SSB members rather than of the whole board. Such a solution would 
ensure greater independence for Shari‘ah supervisors and maintain the quality of 
Shari‘ah auditing as the remaining members would assure consistency in board 
resolutions.   
Clarifying the SSB’s role in the IIFS articles of association can also help to 
improve SSB autonomy. These articles should include provisions that clearly state the 
need for SSB independence and its power to access records and information required 
to ensure Shari‘ah compliance. In addition, they should state the Shari‘ah board’s 
position in the institutional structure and the IIFS policy for appointing, dismissing, 
and fixing remuneration of SSB members.831 
In terms of fiscal autonomy, it has been suggested that SSBs should have their 
own independent budget approved by shareholders at the AGM. It should be 
sufficient to meet the SSB’s needs for research, software, and expertise. SSBs should 
be able to spend their budget without the interference of the IIFS board of directors 
and management.832  
Admittedly, some of the suggested solutions are not always applicable—for 
example, where the IIFS operates within a secular environment or where regulators 
have a passive attitude towards Islamic finance. In this case, shareholders ought to 
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modify IIFS articles of association to enhance SSB independence, as this might be the 
only legally enforceable solution.    
Regulators as well as IIFS ought to play a proactive role in ensuring the autonomy 
of SSBs.833 First, they should assert SSB independence in their rules and guidelines, 
as is the case in Kuwait’s regulation of IIFS.834 Second, they should task the IIFS 
management with ensuring Shari‘ah board independence and preventing any conflict 
of interest. The Qatar Financial Centre, for example, currently takes such measures.835 
Third, to avoid the influence of a few individuals during the SSB’s appointment in the 
AGM, IIFS should submit SSB candidates to a regulatory body for final approval, as 
do regulators in Malaysia, UAE, and Syria.836  
A vital question for regulators is whether SSBs should be subject to the same strict 
independence requirements as auditors or independent directors are.837 SSB members 
are not outsiders, like auditors who are only concerned with ex post auditing. Neither 
are they part of the board of directors, like non-executive directors. There have not 
been any reports of a crisis due to a lack of SSB independence and conflicts of 
interest. However, the Islamic finance market is relatively new. Regulators should 
learn from auditing industry crises and start acting before scandals such as those faced 
                                                 
833 Notably, although the Islamic financial market in Syria is relatively new, regulators have addressed 
a lot of independent threats in this section. See: Monetary and Credit Council [MCC], "Admission 
Rules of SSB of Islamic Banks Operating in The Syrian Arab Republic 404, MN, B4". 
834 ʿAbd āl-Ḥamid  al-Baʿlī, "al-Qawānīn Wa al-Tashrīʿāt al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah Dirāsat 
Muqāranah " (paper presented at the The 7th Conference of Shari'a Supervisory Boards of Islamic 
Financial Institutions,Bahrain, Bahrain, 27/5/2008), p58. 
835 Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority (QFC), "Islamic Finance Rulebook (ISFI)" p13 section 
6.1.5. 
836 al-Khalīfī, "al-Naẓariyyah al-ʿĀmmah Lil-hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah " p33; Abdul-Rahman, The Art of 
Islamic Banking and Finance : Tools and Techniques for Community-Based Banking, p79; al-Ṣalāḥīn, 
"Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Wa Dawruhā Fī al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah  " p258-
59; Qaṭṭān, "Hayʾah al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Akhtiyār Aʿḍāʾihā Wa Ḍawābiṭhā  "; Monetary and 
Credit Council [MCC], "Admission Rules of SSB of Islamic Banks Operating in The Syrian Arab 
Republic 404, MN, B4" Art 3-5. 
837 On non-executive directors’ independence, see: Mallin, Corporate Governance, p174-75. 
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by Enron, Tyco International, and WorldCom838 occur. It is true that SSB members 
are generally well-regarded Shari‘ah intellectuals with a high ethical standard.839 
Nevertheless, they are human and they are not infallible. If Islamic finance leaders are 
serious about competing on a global level, they should note that the local reputation of 
a scholar’s integrity may not be sufficient to allay market suspicions over SSB 
conflicts of interest and lack of independence. 
5.4.6.  Conflicts of Interest 
The growth of the Islamic financial industry has outstripped the number of 
qualified Shari‘ah supervisors,840 resulting in the same Shari‘ah scholar holding 
appointments at many different institutions.841 A 2011 study conducted by Ünal842 
shows that the top 20 Shari‘ah scholars each sit on 14 to 85 board positions in the 
Islamic finance industry. The top 10 Shari‘ah scholars hold 450 SSB positions, which 
represent 39.44% of available positions in the world. Table 3 lists the top 10 SSB 
members worldwide. The second column shows the total number of board positions 
which each scholar holds in Islamic finance institutions. The third column represents 
the total number of positions that each scholar holds, including their membership in 
financial institutions, standard-setting organisations, national regulatory bodies, 
foundations, unions, and Shari‘ah consulting firms.  
                                                 
838  See generally about Enron, Tyco International, and other crises: Thomas Clarke, International 
Corporate Governance : a Comparative Approach  (London: Routledge, 2007), p14-16.  
839 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services". Fidād, "Taʿāruḍ al-Maṣāliḥ Fī Aʿmāl Hayʾāt al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah " 
p11. It is worth pointing out that 75% of the respondents in a study conducted in Malaysia in 2009, 
believe that the independence of the SSB is not affected by remuneration. The fact that Shari‘ah 
supervisors are generally full-time academics could be the reason for such findings: See Hassan et al., 
An Analysis of the Role and Competency of the Shari'ah Committees (SCs) of Islamic Banks and 
Financial Service Providers p48.  
840 Ghoul, "Shariah Scholars and Islamic Finance: Towards a more Objective and Independent Shariah-
Compliance Certification of Islamic Financial Products," p92. 
841 Siti Faridah  Abd Jabbar, "International - The Shari'a Supervisory Board: a Potential Problem in 
Islamic Finance," The Company lawyer 29, no. 1 (2008): p30.  
842 Murat  Ünal "The Small World of Islamic Finance; Shariah Scholars and Governance - A Network 
Analytic Perspective," Funds@Work, http://www.funds-at-work.com/fileadmin/downloads/Sharia-
Network_by_Funds_at_Work_AG.pdf.pdf. accessed 5 February 2011 
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Table 3. Top 10 SSB Members Worldwide 
Scholar name Positions in IFIs Overall positions 
Abdul Satar Abu Ghuddah 85 101 
Nizam Yaquby 85 95 
Mohammed Eid Elgari 71 86 
Abdulaziz Khalifa Al-Qassar 39 41 
Abdulla Sulaiman Al Manea  36 42 
Hussein Hamid Hassan 31 39 
Mohamed Daud Bakar 27 43 
Essa Zaki Essa 27 27 
Ali Al Qaradaghi 25 35 
Ajeel Jassim Al Nashmi 24 27 
Source: Ünal (2011) 
 
Although membership on multiple boards can give SSB members greater 
independence than they would have if serving just one institution, it raises concerns 
about breaching the confidentiality of IIFS. This risk arises because the role of SSBs 
is to ensure Shari‘ah compliance of a financial institution, so its members have access 
to all institutional records and sensitive information. To mitigate the risk of accidental 
or deliberate leaks of confidential information, IIFS management might try to conceal 
information from the SSB, which would affect the process of securing Shari‘ah 
compliance in the institution.843  
The potential abuse of sensitive information is a second concern related to SSB 
conflicts of interest. Because IIFS directors often discuss the details of any potential 
deals or investments to ensure their Shari‘ah compliance prior to their disclosure in 
the market, SSB members could theoretically use that information to their personal 
                                                 
843 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services". 
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financial advantage, especially when no regulations prevent SSB members and their 
relatives from investing in the company.844 
A third issue that results from multiple SSB membership is the creation of a 
“fatwa  shopping” phenomenon, where SSB members are hand-picked for their ability 
to provide a fatwa that suits the financial institution, regardless of its conflict with the 
spirit of Islamic law. The more lenient a Shari‘ah scholar is, the more his name 
appears on SSBs and the more he is sought after in the industry.845 This has led some 
Shari‘ah scholars to compete on the basis of their leniency, not on the quality of their 
supervision. 
Multiple membership in SSBs raises a fourth problem of granting a small group of 
people a considerable amount of power over the direction of the industry. As 
mentioned, Ünal’s 2011 study of SSB networks showed that almost 40% of Shari‘ah 
board positions in the world are held by the top 10 scholars; moreover, the top 100 
scholars sit on nearly 84% of the SSBs around the globe.846 This concentration of 
power is potentially very dangerous, since it places the future of the industry in the 
hands of an international Shari‘ah cartel.847 This situation may hinder the industry’s 
jurisprudential growth by closing the door for junior scholars to join the industry.  
A fifth concern is that membership on multiple SSBs can create a Shari‘ah 
compliance risk. Multiple membership places a Shari‘ah scholar under great pressure 
from different institutions to review contracts and sign off on documents. To cope 
                                                 
844Abd Jabbar, "The Sharia Supervisory Board of Islamic Financial Institutions: A Case for 
Governance," p244; Fidād, "Taʿāruḍ al-Maṣāliḥ Fī Aʿmāl Hayʾāt al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah " p17; Mūsā 
Ādam ʿīsā, "Taʿāruḍ al-Maṣāliḥ Fī Aʿmāl Hayʾāt al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah" (paper presented at the The 
8th Conference of Shari'a Supervisory Boards of Islamic Financial Institutions, Bahrain, 18/5/2009), 
p25. 
845 Abdulbari Mashal, "Dawr al-Maʿāyīr al-Sharʿiyyah  Wa al-Muḥāsabiyyah  Fī Tanẓīm al-
Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah  " (paper presented at the The 2nd Conference of Islamic Financial Services, 
Tripoli-Libya, 27-28/4/2010), p7. 
846 Ünal "The Small World of Islamic Finance; Shariah Scholars and Governance - A Network Analytic 
Perspective". 
847 Wright, "The Shariah Scholar Cartel". 
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with such tasks, SSB members spend less time ensuring Shari‘ah compliance so that 
they can deliver their approval quickly.848 This raises concerns over the quality of 
Shari‘ah auditing and can lead to huge liability for the audited entity and its investors. 
Lahem Al-Nasser,849 an expert in Islamic finance and the head of an Islamic banking 
advisory institution, questions the ability of SSB members with numerous board 
memberships in different countries to provide adequate Shari‘ah review, given the 
complexity of financial instruments and the amount of time usually spent in SSB 
meetings. In fact, the duration of an SSB meeting is not sufficient to read the 
documents presented, let alone to carefully check and understand all the details and 
structure of a proposed product. He recalls an incident where an SSB member 
approved 72 sukūks (Islamic bonds) in a single meeting, notwithstanding their 
complexity and controversial validity in the industry.850 Another researcher reports 
that some SSB scholars rely on the approval of other members of the board when 
ratifying products, rather than making an independent judgment.851 
Multiple membership on SSBs further jeopardizes Shari‘ah compliance because 
famous SSB members serve on numerous boards in different countries where various 
schools of thoughts are followed. SSB members sometimes dispute the religious 
permissibility of a product, and since decisions are made by a majority vote, Shari‘ah 
scholars might end up with conflicting views prohibiting a product on one board and 
approving it on another. 852 This inconsistency might confuse investors and shake their 
trust in the scholar.853 
                                                 
848 Siddiqui, "A Sharia Scholar’s Place on The Board"; Howladar, "Shari'ah Risk: Understanding 
Recent Compliance Issues in Islamic Finance".  
849 al-Nasser, "Waḍʿ al-Maṣrifiyyah al-Islāmiyyah Murbik Wa Naḥn Biḥājah ilā Wilādah Jadīdah ". 
850 Ibid. 
851 Zighībah "Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah 
Ahammiyyathā Muʿawwiqāt ʿAmalhā wa Ḥulūl Muqtaraḥah  " p27. 
852 Qaṭṭān, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah al-Faʿʿālah Fī al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah " p15. 
853 Ibid. 
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In the face of these criticisms, a few justifications have been offered for multiple 
memberships on SSBs. The Islamic finance literature has long cited the shortage of 
Shari‘ah scholars when rationalising multiple memberships.854 However, it is 
questionable whether there is a real lack of qualified scholars, or whether that is 
mainly an excuse for financial institutions to appoint certain SSB members. Zulkifli 
Hasan855 suggests that this supposed shortage is simply a myth, noting that despite the 
establishment of modern Islamic finance more than 30 years ago and the organisation 
of hundreds of conferences, workshops, and seminars, the same excuse is being used. 
He argues that there are numerous qualified Shari‘ah scholars who could be employed 
in the industry.856 Professor Mohammad Akram Laldin,857 a renowned SSB member 
and the director of the International Shari‘ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance 
(ISRA), shares the same firm belief that the market does not lack for Shari‘ah 
supervisors. Rather, Laldin contends that there is a sufficient number of proficient 
scholars for SSBs, but the industry has not given them the opportunity to sit on 
SSBs.858   
The claim of a shortage of Shari‘ah scholars is further discredited by the existence 
of many higher academic institutions which offer specialised education in Islamic 
law. These institutions are spread across the world, and thousands of students 
graduate from them every year. Saudi Arabia, for example, has nine universities with 
a special college for Shari‘ah law and Islamic studies.859 Egypt has the renowned Al 
Azhar University, where around 1,500 students graduate with a BA from Shari‘ah 
                                                 
854 Zulkifli Hasan, "Demystifying The Myth Of Shortage Of Shari’ah Scholars", Global Islamic 
Finance Magazine. accessed  
855 Ibid. 
856 Ibid. 
857 Ibid. 
858 Ibid. 
859Khālid  al-Mashūḥ, "Taṭwīr Kuliyyāt al-Sharīʿah " Alwatan, 
http://www.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleId=2887. accessed 10 July 2011  
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colleges every year, along with 300 Masters graduates and 30 PhDs.860 In Malaysia, 
there is the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF), which 
along with other top universities in Syria, Jordan, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Morocco, 
Algeria, Pakistan, India, and Indonesia offers special courses in Islamic 
jurisprudence.861 Accordingly, it seems safe to assume that there are many 
underutilised Shari‘ah specialists who could meet the demands of the Islamic finance 
industry.  
However, this assumption might not be completely accurate, as not all Shari‘ah 
graduates may be able to function properly on an SSB. In the words of one of the top 
10 SSB members, Hussain Hamid Hassan, “Graduating from a Shari‘ah college is not 
enough by itself”.862 This is because the standard curriculum in these academic 
institutions is not directed at producing professionals in Islamic finance, but rather 
general specialists in Shari‘ah law, of which Islamic finance is one complex part. 
Moreover, classes on Islamic finance often focus on the simple structures found in 
classical jurisprudence, creating a disconnection between the curricula taught in these 
universities and the financial instruments and vehicles used in the market.863 In short, 
a Shari‘ah graduate may not necessarily be able to assess whether or not a particular 
financial product is Shari‘ah compliant, because issuing such a judgment requires not 
only knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, but also an understanding of the actual 
implementation of the product in the financial industry.  
Nevertheless, this situation does not justify the domination of SSBs by just a few 
scholars. The majority of the top SSB members were full-time academics at one point, 
                                                 
860 Khorshid, "Shariah Board Accountability". 
861 Hasan, "Demystifying The Myth Of Shortage Of Shari’ah Scholars." 
862 Siddiqui, "A Sharia Scholar’s Place on The Board". 
863 Quṭb  al-Rīsūnī, "Naḥw Taʾhīl Ajtihādī LiʾAʿḍāʾ Hayʾah al-Fatwā bi-al-Maṣārifi al-Islāmiyyah" 
(paper presented at the Islamic Banking Between Reality and Expectations, Dubai, UAE, 31/5 - 
3/6/2009), p16-17. 
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and some still are. They share the responsibility with the industry for not partnering 
with academic institutions to teach the next generation of SSB members. In addition, 
Shari‘ah graduates’ lack of competence in this domain could be overcome in the short 
term through intensive courses and training programmes. In the long term, the focus 
should be on improving the quality of the education offered in Shari‘ah colleges to 
meet the needs of the modern Islamic finance industry. Malaysia has taken the 
initiative in this area by allocating the sum of 700 million ringgits for three 
established trusts devoted to Islamic finance education and training.864 These trusts 
include INCEIF, with a fund of 500 million ringgits, and ISRA, which was allocated 
100 million ringgits. 100 million ringgits were also provided to the Malaysia Central 
Bank Shari‘ah Development Fund, which is intended to increase the number of 
qualified Shari‘ah scholars and is open to citizens of all countries.865 
In this regard, it is worth pointing out the different attitudes of Malaysian SSB 
members towards regulation and reform, compared with their peers in the GCC 
countries.866 While the former acknowledge some of the issues arising from multiple 
SSB membership and have supported a governance reform, top SSB members in the 
Gulf seem to deny the existence of a real conflict of interests,867 and they firmly 
disagree with the idea of restricting Shari‘ah scholars to one supervisory board. They 
further justify the multiplicity of SSB memberships by comparing themselves to 
                                                 
864 Mushtak  Parker, "Islamic Banking Special Supplement: Shariah Governance a Challenge to Islamic 
Banking," Arab News, 
http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=9&section=0&article=127292&d=11&m=10&y=2009. accessed 
15 October 2010; Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), "Shariah Scholarship Award," Bank Negara 
Malaysia, http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=200&pg=618&ac=529. accessed 20 May 2011 
865 Parker, "Islamic Banking Special Supplement: Shariah Governance a Challenge to Islamic 
Banking"; Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), "Shariah Scholarship Award". 
866 This is the position of top SSB members in the Islamic finance industry, like Nizam Yaquby, 
Mohamed Al Qari, and Hussain Hamid Hassan. Needless to say, there are some GGC scholars who 
have called for limiting SSB membership numbers and agree with the Malaysian approach. 
867 It is interesting to see that Al Qari rejects concerns over conflicts of interest but in the same 
interview recalls an incident where he was advising two banks which were separately developing 
versions of the same product for nine months. See Wright, "The Shariah Scholar Cartel".  
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lawyers and accountants,868 notwithstanding the fact that SSB members do not adhere 
to a code of practise similar to that which governs these two professions.  
Popular SSB members further justify their multiple memberships by presenting 
themselves as lifesavers of the Islamic finance industry, citing as pretexts their 
experience and the exaggerated risk of handing SSBs over to young scholars.869 In 
fact, one top SSB member goes as far as faulting those who believe that Shari‘ah 
graduates from an appropriate educational background, given current curricula, could 
meet the demands of the industry.870 These behaviours call into question the 
credibility of claims that there is a shortage of Shari‘ah scholars and suggest that the 
real issues are rather those of bad governance practises and the old guard trying to 
protect their private interests.  
Perhaps the first solution that comes to mind when addressing the issue of 
conflicts of interest is to limit the number of SSB positions a Shari‘ah scholar can 
hold, as regulators in Malaysia and Pakistan already do. However, although this 
measure could overcome concerns about confidentiality, it could also preclude the 
creation of a professional market for Shari‘ah auditors by reducing the financial 
attraction towards the profession. Moreover, it could build a mutually beneficial 
relationship between SSB members and the audited entity, thus affecting auditor 
independence.871 Nonetheless, restricting the number of Shari‘ah supervisory 
positions per individual would facilitate the appointment of a new generation of 
Shari‘ah scholars and combat the domination of SSB membership. In a country where 
                                                 
868 Frederik Richter, "Top Islamic Finance Scholars Oppose Reform Effort," Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/01/islamicfinance-scholars-idUSLDE6B015920101201. 
accessed 3 December 2010; Siddiqui, "A Sharia Scholar’s Place on The Board"; Wright, "The Shariah 
Scholar Cartel"; El Baltaji and Anwar, "Shariah Scholar on More Than 50 Boards Opposes Limit Plan: 
Islamic Finance". 
869 Khorshid, "Shariah Board Accountability"; Siddiqui, "A Sharia Scholar’s Place on The Board". 
870 Wright, "The Shariah Scholar Cartel"; El Baltaji and Anwar, "Shariah Scholar on More Than 50 
Boards Opposes Limit Plan: Islamic Finance". 
871 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services".  
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there is a real shortage of Shari‘ah scholars, regulators could deal with the numbers 
involved in board membership on a case-by-case basis, according to the performance 
of the individual applicant, the category of the financial institution they are involved 
with, and the status of the scholar within the board (chairman vs. member).  
However, focusing on board membership numbers would not give regulators the 
full picture.872 Regulators should consider various factors when addressing this issue, 
for instance, the size of the financial institution where a scholar sits on the SSB, the 
category of the financial work (banking or insurance),873 the scholar’s standing within 
the SSB (chairman or member), and the ease of the scholar’s access to other powerful 
scholars in the industry, which can affect their perspective and influence. This last 
point can be illustrated with the case of Mohamed Ali Al-Tashkeri; although he 
generally only holds four positions, he is ranked as number 15 in terms of his ability 
to quickly access highly ranked SSB members in the industry. Another example is 
Ahmad Ali Abdulla, who is ranked as number 36 in terms of total board membership, 
but as number 19 when taking into account his close connection with other powerful 
Shari‘ah scholars in the industry who share board membership with him.874   
To fully understand the potential conflicts of interest facing an SSB member, 
regulators should also pay attention to his presence in standard-setting organisations, 
as well as in national and international regulatory bodies, and how this affects his 
membership on Shari‘ah supervisory boards in IIFS. For instance, Ünal’s 2011 study 
showed that the 12 most active scholars in the AAOIFI sit on 38.9% of the available 
                                                 
872 Ünal "The Small World of Islamic Finance; Shariah Scholars and Governance - A Network Analytic 
Perspective". 
873 In Malaysia, an SSB member cannot be appointed as a member of another SSB in the same industry. 
The banking and takaful (Islamic insurance) industries are considered different industries. See: Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM), "Shari’ah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(BNM/RH/GL_012_3)" p20.  
874 Ünal "The Small World of Islamic Finance; Shariah Scholars and Governance - A Network Analytic 
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boards in Islamic finance institutions. Moreover, they collectively hold 71.17% of the 
positions in standard-setting organisations, governmental units and consulting 
companies.875 This domination raises a serious concern about regulatory 
independence876: how can we be assured that standards and frameworks introduced by 
these entities follow public interests and are not affected by regulatory capture?877 
Accordingly, it is no wonder that the AAOIFI has so far failed to clearly address this 
issue and that its scholars have always objected to strict governance reforms.878 
Another possible remedy for conflicts of interest is to issue a professional code of 
conduct for Shari‘ah supervisors.879 Such guidelines should adequately address the 
way in which SSB members act when faced with a conflict of interest. The AAOIFI 
code of ethics for accountants and auditors of IFIs ignores this issue and instead 
directs its attention to general Islamic ethics, quoting Shari‘ah provisions, which 
makes it difficult to enforce in secular countries. In this case, regulators may extend 
the code for external auditors to include Shari‘ah supervisors.880 Nevertheless, the 
code should be overseen by a regulatory body and incorporate penalties for the 
violation of its duties. SSBs could then refer to this body with any concerns over 
conflict of duties.881  
Finally, investing in contemporary Islamic finance education and incentive 
training programmes for potential SSB members should pay off and reduce the 
                                                 
875 Ibid. 
876 Alsayyed, "Shari’ah Board, The Task of Fatwa, and Ijtihad in Islamic Economics, and Finance". 
877 Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory body, created to protect the public's interest, ultimately 
takes an action benefitting the industry which it is assumed to be regulating, rather than the public. See: 
Ernesto Dal Bó, "Regulatory Capture: A Review," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22, no. 2 (2006).  
878 See: Richter, "Top Islamic Finance Scholars Oppose Reform Effort". 
879 Fidād, "Taʿāruḍ al-Maṣāliḥ Fī Aʿmāl Hayʾāt al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah " p17; ʿīsā, "Taʿāruḍ al-
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(paper presented at the The 8th Conference of Shari'a Supervisory Boards of Islamic Financial 
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demand on “superstar” SSB members. Malaysia has the lead in this regard, with many 
academic institutions and funds dedicated to promoting Islamic finance. These 
include the INCEIF, Bank Negara, Shari‘ah Research Grants, and the Association for 
Islamic Finance Advancement (AIFA).882 By 2020, Malaysia aims to attract 55,000 
local and 28,000 international students to its Islamic finance courses.883 In the UK, the 
Islamic Finance Council UK, in association with the Securities and Investment 
Institute and Islamic Banking and Islamic Insurance, has introduced special courses 
designed to train a potential Shari‘ah supervisor.884 In addition, the universities of 
Durham, Reading, and Bangor are amongst those academic institutions offering 
postgraduate courses in Islamic finance across the UK.885   
5.4.7.  Lack of Competence 
SSB work has a religious nature, as its decision is regarded as fatwa (religious 
legal opinion). Therefore, its members must fulfil the ethical, educational, and 
technical requirements of qualified Shari‘ah scholars. As far as ethics are concerned, 
apart from being Muslim, scholars must meet the requirements of ʿadālah (upright 
character).886 This includes uprightness in religion, honesty, truthfulness, and good 
manners.887 
                                                 
882 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), "Shariah Scholarship Award"; The International Centre for 
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From the scholarly point of view, an SSB member must be classified as mujtahd, 
which includes being very well versed in Shari‘ah in general, with particular expertise 
in Islamic commercial law. He should be fluent in classical Arabic to be able to deal 
directly with Shari‘ah sources. He should also have a sufficient understanding of uṣūl 
al-fiqh (the principles of Islamic jurisprudence), maqāṣid al-sharīʿah (the objectives 
of Islamic law), and al-siyāsah  al-sharʿiyyah (Shari‘ah-based policy or politics).888  
From a technical perspective, scholars must be familiar with modern banking, 
business, and legal practises.889 This is crucial to avoiding any disconnection between 
the theoretical concepts of Islamic finance and its implementation in the market. A 
recent survey of Shari‘ah advisors, Shari‘ah bank officers, and regulators in Malaysia 
showed that 83% of respondents agreed on the necessity for legal expertise on SSBs. 
In addition, 63% of participants voiced fair support that business qualifications should 
be required from SSB members, while 17% firmly supported such a proposal.890   
English proficiency is another vital skill for SSB members, because contracts, 
forms, and agreements are frequently in English. Since most SSB members are not 
fluent in English, a translated version is usually provided. However, a poor translation 
makes it difficult for scholars to understand the actual terms of the agreement, which 
consequently affects the soundness of their judgment.891 Furthermore, communication 
skills and the ability to work on a team in a multi-disciplinary environment are 
                                                 
888 Fāris, "Ḍawābiṭ Wa Āliyyāt Akhtiyār Aʿḍāʾ Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-
Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah " p13-20,p 40-41; DeLorenzo, "Shari`ah Supervision in Modern Islamic 
Finance"; Qaṭṭān, "Hayʾah al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Akhtiyār Aʿḍāʾihā Wa Ḍawābiṭhā  " p4-5. 
889 Ghoul, "Shariah Scholars and Islamic Finance: Towards a more Objective and Independent Shariah-
Compliance Certification of Islamic Financial Products," p90; Khālid al-Muzaynī, "Tarshīd al-ʿAmal 
Fī al-Haʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Lil-muʾassasāti al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah" (paper presented at the Islamic 
Banking Between Reality and Expectations, Dubai, UAE, 31/5 - 3/6/2009), p12; Ahmad al-Ḍuwayḥī, 
"Ḍawābiṭ al-Ijtihād fī al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyyat al-Islāmiyyah" (paper presented at the Islamic 
Financial Institutions: Reality Features and Future Prospects, Dubai, UAE, 15-17/5/2005), p91. 
890 Hassan et al., An Analysis of the Role and Competency of the Shari'ah Committees (SCs) of Islamic 
Banks and Financial Service Providers p46. 
891 Ibn Ḥumayd, "Dawr al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah," p9; Qaṭṭān, 
"Hayʾah al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Akhtiyār Aʿḍāʾihā Wa Ḍawābiṭhā  " p18. 
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essential for SSB members, particularly when working with different departments in 
financial institutions to develop new products.892 
In practise, an ideal scholar of this sort is very hard to find; few Shari‘ah scholars 
meet all of these requirements, particularly in the technical realm. Most SSB members 
lack financial, economic, and legal backgrounds, which hinders their ability to express 
a sound Shari‘ah view on complex modern financial practises.893  
Perspective is another issue affecting SSB members’ competence. Shari‘ah 
scholars and bankers see from different standpoints.894 While the former focus on the 
Shari‘ah compliance of contracts, the latter aim to maximise profit in the most 
efficient way. This difference in mindset has resulted in Shari‘ah scholars proposing 
inefficient structures for contracts and products, thus creating a serious issue for 
financial institutions operating in a competitive environment.   
Furthermore, scholars’ limited exposure to international financial practise poses a 
Shari‘ah risk to financial institutions. This risk can occur when SSB members approve 
a product or contract before knowing its real implementation in the market, then 
revise their decision when they see the product implemented. For example, the 
renowned scholar ʿAbdAllāh Sulimān al-Maniʿ recanted his authorisation of ṣukūk al-
ijārah issued by the Bahraini government when he learned that possession of the 
underlying assets was not entirely conveyed to the lessor in the manner stated in 
ijārah (leasing) contracts in Islamic commercial law.895 Such incidents can profoundly 
damage the reputation and financial position of the institution. A number of financial 
                                                 
892 DeLorenzo, "Shari`ah Supervision in Modern Islamic Finance" p401; Hassan et al., An Analysis of 
the Role and Competency of the Shari'ah Committees (SCs) of Islamic Banks and Financial Service 
Providers p56-57. 
893 Bakar, "The Shari'a Supervisory Board and Issues of Shari'a Rulings and their Harmonisation in 
Islamic Banking and Finance," p78; Abdul-Rahman, The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance : Tools 
and Techniques for Community-Based Banking, p79. 
894 Hassan et al., An Analysis of the Role and Competency of the Shari'ah Committees (SCs) of Islamic 
Banks and Financial Service Providers p4-5. 
895 El-Gamal, Islamic Finance : Law, Economics, and Practice, p23. 
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institutions have exacerbated this problem by taking advantage of SSBs’ financial and 
commercial naiveté, either by not revealing all the required information or by 
presenting it in a way that guarantees SSB approval despite the fact the presentation 
does not reflect the product’s actual implementation in the market.896 This might help 
explain the inconsistent decisions of different SSBs in the industry concerning the 
same products.  
The first step in resolving the competence issue would be to establish specific 
standards for professionals working in Shari‘ah supervision. Currently, there are no 
standards or regulations, not even an IIFS article of association which stipulates 
detailed qualifications and technical experience for SSB members.897 AAOIFI and 
Malaysian standards, for example, do not require a specific degree or qualification to 
show that an individual has the expertise to do the job, but only require SSB members 
to be expert in fiqh al-muʿāmalāt (Islamic commercial law) or even Shari‘ah law in 
general.898 This might be because, in the early days of modern Islamic finance, 
financial institutions did not select SSB members based on their qualification for the 
task, but rather according to their reputation, which incentivised people to buy the 
IFI’s products.899  
Seeking the final approval of central banks in Malaysia and Pakistan before 
appointing SSB members might reduce the risk of recruiting unqualified people. 
                                                 
896 Abd Jabbar, "The Governance of Shari'a Advisers of Islamic Financial Institutions: The Practice in 
Malaysia," p313; Zighībah "Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah 
al-Islāmiyyah Ahammiyyathā Muʿawwiqāt ʿAmalhā wa Ḥulūl Muqtaraḥah  " p24. 
897 ʿUmar, "Aʿmāl al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Bayn al-Iāstishāriyyah al-Fardiyyah Wa al-Mihniyyah al-
Muʾassasiyyah  " p12-13; Bakar, "The Shari'a Supervisory Board and Issues of Shari'a Rulings and 
their Harmonisation in Islamic Banking and Finance," p76-78; Hassan et al., An Analysis of the Role 
and Competency of the Shari'ah Committees (SCs) of Islamic Banks and Financial Service Providers 
p7. 
898 The Pakistani requirements seem to be more specific in this regard; see: Aznan Hasan, "Optimal 
Shari’ah Governance in Islamic Finance," BNM, 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/microsites/giff2007/pdf/frf/04_01.pdf. accessed 17 October 2010 
899 Bakar, "The Shari'a Supervisory Board and Issues of Shari'a Rulings and their Harmonisation in 
Islamic Banking and Finance," p76-78; ʿUmar, "Aʿmāl al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Bayn al-Iāstishāriyyah 
al-Fardiyyah Wa al-Mihniyyah al-Muʾassasiyyah  " p12. 
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However, for Shari‘ah supervision to be regarded as a serious profession, like being a 
lawyer or accountant, individuals who wish to work on SSBs should obtain precise 
educational and technical qualifications designed for the task, and a governing body 
should be enabled by regulators to licence qualified Shari‘ah professionals to work in 
the industry.900 
As an immediate solution to this issue, some IIFS have taken certain measures. In 
the Sudan, for example, the legal department in the Islamic Co-operative 
Development Bank joins the SSB in the process of structuring contracts.901 Other 
financial institutions, such as the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, have appointed lawyers, 
accountants, and economists to their SSBs.902 The AAOIFI standard allows the SSB 
appointment of one person who is not a specialist in Islamic commercial law. 
However, while some argue that such experts should be given full membership on the 
board to ensure their objectivity and independence during SSB deliberations,903 others 
have criticised the right of non-Shari‘ah qualified scholars to vote on Shari‘ah-related 
issues.904 In addition, members of cross-disciplinary SSBs might find it difficult to 
reconcile different perspectives, posing the risk of communication failure between 
board members.905  
                                                 
900 "Aʿmāl al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Bayn al-Iāstishāriyyah al-Fardiyyah Wa al-Mihniyyah al-
Muʾassasiyyah  " p12-13; Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in 
Institutions Offering IslamicFinancial Services". Regulators in Malaysia are in the process of setting up 
a professional body which will carry out a similar function. See: Khalid  Qayum and Soraya 
Permatasari, "Shariah Experts Push for Certification of Islamic Scholars," Bloomberg 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-31/shariah-experts-prepare-first-certification-of-scholars-
islamic-finance.html. accessed 15 October 2010 
901 The Higher Sharia Supervisory Board for Banks & Financial institutions (HSSB), Nashʾat 
Wataṭawwur Wataqwīm Haʾāt al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah fī al-Jihāz al-Maṣrifī al-Sūdānī  1ed. 
(Khartoum: Central Bank of Sudan, 2006), p23. 
902 Ibid., p29. 
903 Bakar, "The Shari'a Supervisory Board and Issues of Shari'a Rulings and their Harmonisation in 
Islamic Banking and Finance," p78. 
904 al-Islāmbūlī, "Dawr al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Fī Ḍabṭ Aʿmāl al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah  
" p7; Hassan, "al-ʿAlāqah Bayn al-Hayʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah  wa al-murājiʿīn al-khārijiyyīn " p10-11. 
905 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services". 
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A final related question is whether SSB selection is currently based merely on 
qualifications to fulfil the task or on additional considerations as well. A recent survey 
conducted in Malaysia showed that new SSB members are mostly appointed as a 
result of suggestions from present members of the board.906 This raises the question of 
whether regulators should play a role in ensuring a more objective method for 
recruiting new Shari‘ah scholars, taking steps to prevent SSBs from being dominated 
by a small circle of Shari‘ah supervisors.      
5.5.  Conclusion  
This chapter has aimed to gauge the extent to which Shari‘ah supervisory board 
governance practises contribute to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance in the 
contemporary Islamic finance industry. In particular, seven issues have been 
identified as main factors responsible for reducing the level of Shari‘ah compliance in 
IIFS. These issues are the SSBs’ unclear functions and legal status, lack of 
accountability and transparency, and conflicts of interest and lack of independence, as 
well as the poor training and inadequate qualifications of SSB members.   
The chapter has proposed several suggestions to confront these challenges. For 
one, Shari‘ah supervision should be recognised as an independent profession. Like 
lawyers and accountants, its members should act within a framework that defines their 
legal status, role, and responsibilities. In cases where an IIFS is operating within a 
jurisdiction which does not favour Islamic finance or where regulators are passive, 
SSB members can take a proactive role in regulating Shari‘ah governance by working 
across SSBs to standardise their own contracts with financial institutions 
                                                 
906 Hassan et al., An Analysis of the Role and Competency of the Shari'ah Committees (SCs) of Islamic 
Banks and Financial Service Providers p50; Ünal "The Small World of Islamic Finance; Shariah 
Scholars and Governance - A Network Analytic Perspective". 
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Emphasising accountability and transparency in SSBs should not be perceived as 
showing less respect to Shari‘ah scholars or doubting their credibility, but rather as 
dealing professionally with an essential group in the industry and adding a layer of 
protection to public interests. This is particularly important if IIFS are operating in a 
global market where the local reputation of Shari‘ah board members may not be 
sufficient to allay stockholders’ suspicions over their reliability or SSBs’ lack of 
accountability and transparency.  
A vital point of this chapter is to stress that in order to maintain sound financial 
systems and investor confidence, regulators in Islamic and secular countries have to 
recognise the need for their involvement in regulating Shari‘ah governance in IIFS. In 
other words, a solid Islamic financial market cannot be established unless Shari‘ah 
governance is regulated. The next chapter further emphasises regulators’ role and 
suggests two public mechanisms to remedy the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance: 
establishing central Shari‘ah supervisory boards and enforcing compulsory disclosure.  
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Chapter Six: 
Public Mechanisms to Remedy Creative Shari‘ah 
Compliance 
 
6.1.  Introduction  
Previous chapters of this thesis have critically appraised justifications of creative 
Shari‘ah compliance practises in contemporary Islamic finance and examined how 
Shari‘ah supervisory board (SSB) governance practises and inconsistent fatwas 
contribute to this issue. Chapter five stressed the need for regulators to take a 
proactive approach towards Shari‘ah governance in the Islamic finance industry. This 
chapter suggests two public mechanisms that involve a national regulator in 
remedying the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance: establishing central Shari‘ah 
supervisory boards (CSSBs) and enforcing compulsory disclosure. 
The chapter is structured in nine parts including this introduction. Part 6.2 
provides an overview of regulators’ approaches towards CSSBs and addresses the 
rationale for establishing these boards. Part 6.3 discuss the tasks of CSSBs. Part 6.4 
and Part 6.5 examine CSSBs in Sudan and Malaysia, while Part 6.6 and Part 6.7 
evaluate regulatory approaches in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia towards 
Shari‘ah governance and CSSBs. Part 6.8 suggests enforcing compulsory disclosure 
as a remedy for creative Shari‘ah compliance, and Part 6.9 concludes the chapter.  
6.2.  Overview and Justification of CSSBs 
One of the main ways to remedy the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance is to 
establish a central Shari‘ah Supervisory Board (CSSB) to oversee Shari‘ah 
governance and the practise of Islamic finance in the financial industry. Regulators in 
Islamic and secular countries have different attitudes towards Shari‘ah governance 
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and the importance of a CSSB. According to Zulkifli Hasan,907 the regulatory 
approaches followed by authorities in various jurisdictions can be divided into four 
categories: 
1. Passive approach, where the regulatory authority does not intervene in 
regulating SSBs or play a role in ensuring Shari‘ah compliance. One entity 
that takes this approach is the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 
which has no specific regulations for Islamic finance. There is no CSSB, and 
the establishment of an SSB at individual institutions is a private matter and 
merely self-motivated.  
2. Reactive approach, which is more prevalent in secular legal jurisdictions 
such as the UK and Turkey. Authorities in these countries have licensed the 
establishment of many institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) 
and have amended tax regulations to accommodate some Shari‘ah-compliant 
products. There are no particular rules regulating IIFS, but they are obligated 
to conform to the established conventional legal framework. IIFS management 
bears responsibility for ensuring Shari‘ah compliance. The UK Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) plays no role with regard to Shari‘ah governance, 
but states that the status of SSBs should be merely an advisory one and that 
SSBs should not affect the operational aspect of IIFS.  
3. Minimalist approach, where authorities play a partial role in regulating 
Islamic finance. This approach is generally followed by regulators in Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, with the exclusion of Saudi Arabia.908 
                                                 
907 Hasan, "Regulatory Framework of Shari’ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and 
the UK." 
908 Hasan does include Oman in this category, as Islamic finance was not allowed when he wrote his 
article. However, in 2011, the Central Bank of Oman (CBO) authorised Islamic banking and licensed 
two local banks to offer Islamic finance products. The CBO opted for a decentralised approach with 
regard to Shari‘ah governance in IIFS, and AAOIFI’s guidelines will be used. See Oman, "Islamic 
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IIFS are expected to have an appropriate Shari‘ah governance arrangement in 
place without being required to have a specific structure. The national 
authority is likely to study the rulings of international standards-setting bodies 
such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), whose governance standard is favoured in Bahrain, 
Dubai, and Qatar.   
4. Proactive approach, which is applied in Malaysia, Sudan, Pakistan, 
Indonesia,909 and Brunei.910 Authorities play a very active role in regulating 
Shari‘ah governance. A CSSB at the central bank operates as the final 
authority in Shari‘ah matters. IIFS are required to follow detailed instruction 
issued by the CSSB and also to appoint Shari‘ah supervisors at the 
institutional level. Supporters of this model strongly believe that this 
“regulatory-based approach” is the best way to regulate, design, and ensure 
Shari‘ah compliance.911 
6.2.1.  Justifications for CSSBs 
Two main concerns have been raised about the need for CSSBs: establishing a 
CSSB can add another layer of cost, and a CSSB might slow the business activities of 
IIFS with bureaucratic procedures. Both of these concerns arise because such a 
national body is likely to study the ruling of international standards-setting bodies 
                                                                                                                                            
Banking Regulatory Framework " The Central Bank of Oman (CBO),, http://www.cbo-
oman.org/news/IBRF.pdf. accessed 20 May 2013; Bernardo Vizcaino, "Oman plans Islamic finance 
rules before year-end," Reuters, http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/islamic-finance-regulation-
idINL6E8EU1VI20120627. accessed 10 March 2013 
909 Humayon Dar, "Implementing Shari'ah Governance -Aawaiting Challenges" (paper presented at the 
Managing Shariah Risk through Shariah Governance, London, 10/8/2009). 
910 Hasan places Pakistan under a separate category titled “Interventionist Approach” due to the power 
of the Shari‘ah Federal Court over matters involving Islamic finance. However, because a central 
Shari‘ah board does exist at the State Bank of Pakistan, I opted to include it under the proactive 
approach. 
911 Hasan, "Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, GCC countries and the 
UK," p114. It is worth noting that in Iran there are no SSBs at the institution level, because the whole 
banking system is assumed to be interest-free. The sole authority on Shari’ah matters seems to be the 
Council of Guardians, which is a separate entity from the Central Bank of Iran.   
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such as the AAOIFI, the International Fiqh Academies, the International Shari‘ah 
Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), and the Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB) prior to issuing its binding opinion.912 This process could seriously 
affect product innovations and competition in the financial market. Nevertheless, 
supporters of a CSSB argue that it is important to protect the interests of depositors, 
investors, and shareholders who can be affected by the decisions of SSBs.913 A CSSB 
with a strong mandate would add another layer of protection to stakeholders by 
overseeing the work of SSBs at IIFS. It would define a framework with clear duties 
and responsibilities for SSB members and IIFS management. It would also have the 
power to hold SSB members accountable for their wrongdoing, which would make 
take extra care with their deliberations, decision-making, and auditing tasks.  
Moreover, a CSSB would help to maintain stability and confidence in the 
financial system by counteracting inconsistency in SSB decisions, which can shake 
the credibility of the Islamic finance industry by leaving stakeholders confused about 
which products are Shari‘ah compliant and which are not, and about what Shari‘ah 
compliance means. Chapter four of this thesis suggested that standardising the 
practise of Islamic finance by means of a defined authority can resolve this issue.914 A 
CSSB is the most appropriate body to conduct this task, as is the case in Malaysia and 
Sudan.   
In addition, establishing a CSSB would boost good governance practises on 
individual SSBs. Hasan915 studied SSB governance practises in Malaysia, GCC, and 
                                                 
912 Opalesque, "Discussion Board: Country versus Bank Shariah Boards," Opalesque, 
http://www.opalesque.com/OIFI112/Discussion_Board_Country_versus_Boards579.html. accessed 10 
December 2012 
913 Aldohni, "Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate Governance:The Dilemma of The Shari'a 
Supervisory Board." 
914 See 4.5:Remedies for Inconsistency, p123 
915 Hasan, "Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, GCC countries and the 
UK," p310. 
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the UK and categorised their practises into five levels: underdeveloped practise, 
emerging practise, improved practise, good practise, and best practise. Hasan 
concludes that the average score of IIFS Shari‘ah  governance in Malaysia falls into 
the “good practise” category, while the average scores of IIFS in GCC countries and 
the UK fall into the “emerging practise” and “improved practise” categories, 
respectively. Hasan attributes the good governance practises in Malaysia to its strong 
Shari‘ah governance framework and to the regulatory authority’s proactive approach. 
He suggests that less interference from regulators leads to weaker governance 
cultures. He further argues that simply establishing a Shari‘ah governance framework 
would not be sufficient to improve the governance practises in the market; rather, 
“supervision and enforcement are essential to ensure compliance with the existing 
rules”.916 IIFS cannot be expected to “develop and portray strong Shari‘ah governance 
practises voluntarily and without proper supervision”, given the immaturity of the 
Islamic finance industry and the lack of motivation to implement these practises.                       
Finally, Shari‘ah is one of the main sources of the law in most Islamic countries. 
In some countries such as Saudi, any rules that contradict Shari‘ah are deemed 
unconstitutional.917 Al-Baʿlī918 argues that this situation provides a strong justification 
for establishing a CSSB to oversee IIFS transactions and ensure a general compliance 
with Islamic law.    
                                                 
916 Ibid., p312. 
917Saudi Arabia, "The Basic Law of Governance,"  
http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/aboutKingDom/SaudiGovernment/Pages/BasicSystemOfGovern
ance35297.aspx. accessed 11 May 2013Article 7 
918 ʿAbd āl-Ḥamid  al-Baʿlī, "Tanẓīm al-ʿalāqah ban al-Maṣārif al-Islāmiyyah Wa al-Bunūk al-
Markaziyyah Wa al-Bunūk al-Taqlīdiyyah al-Ukhrā" (paper presented at the Islamic Financial 
Institutions: Reality Features and Future Prospects, UAE, 15-17/5/2005), p437. 
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6.3.  Tasks of CSSBs 
CSSBs have no standard set of tasks; their role can vary from one country to 
another.919 Supporters of establishing a CSSB disagree on the tasks which should be 
assigned to it. On the one hand, it could be limited to overseeing the process of 
appointing SSB members and the procedure of approving new products. On the other 
hand, its mandate could be widened to include holding SSB members accountable, 
setting compulsory standards, and approving products. A survey of the literature 
suggests the following duties for central Shari‘ah supervisory boards920.  
1. Setting Shari‘ah standards and rules for financial transactions. SSBs at the 
institution level can make ijtihad on the condition that it does not conflict with 
these standards. 
2. Setting the framework which regulates the governance of SSBs, including the 
mechanisms of appointing their members and determining their remuneration 
as well as reviewing cases of conflict of interest.  
3. Setting the standard and the process of internal Shari‘ah review within Islamic 
financial institutions (IFIs).   
4. Overseeing the processes of converting conventional financial institutions into 
fully flagged IFIs.   
5. Issuing Shari‘ah rulings on financial issues referred to it from different bodies 
including the central bank, SSBs, and arbitrators. 
6. Promoting coordination, collaboration, integration, and the exchange of 
Shari‘ah opinions among SSBs.  
                                                 
919 Opalesque, "Discussion Board: Country versus Bank Shariah Boards". 
920 See for example: Fidād, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Wa Dawruhā Fī Ḍabṭ Aʿmāl al-Maṣārif al-
Islāmiyyah," p19. Yūsuf ʿAbdAllāh al-Shabīlī, "al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah ʿAlā al-Maṣārif:Ḍawābiṭhā 
Wa Aḥkāmhā Wa Dawrhā fī Ḍabṭ ʿAmal al-Maṣārif" (ibid.), p27-28; al-Muzaynī, "Tarshīd al-ʿAmal Fī 
al-Haʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Lil-muʾassasāti al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah," p23; Grais and Pellegrini, 
"Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering IslamicFinancial Services"; 
Garas and Pierce, "Shari'a Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions." 
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7. Approving widely used contracts and new financial products which can be 
deemed shifts in the industry.  
8. Issuing a report certifying each SSB’s procedure of issuing fatwas.  
9. Acting as a mediator to resolve disputes between an SSB and the IIFS 
management or board of directors.921 
In addition, a CSSB can function as a unit within the state central bank, as is the 
case in Malaysia, Sudan, and Pakistan, or under the supervision of a different entity, 
as is the case in Kuwait and UAE.922 The former boards tend be more active in 
practise than the latter. For example, in Kuwait and the UAE, the final authority in 
Islamic financial matters is a committee at the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic 
Affairs.923 However, as Mashal notes,924 its supervision in Kuwait is limited because it 
only applies if there is a disagreement between the SSB members within one IIFS. In 
this situation, the management of the IIFS can refer the matter to the Fatwa 
Committee at the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs. The CSSB in UAE, in 
theory, has a stronger mandate than the one in Kuwait. For example, it is tasked with 
conducting ex post Shari‘ah audits925 on IIFS and approving the appointment of SSB 
                                                 
921 Opalesque, "Discussion Board: Country versus Bank Shariah Boards". 
922 Garas and Pierce, "Shari'a Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions," p391. 
923 See: Kuwait, "Central Bank of Kuwait Law No. 30/2003 " CBK,, 
http://www.cbk.gov.kw/www/law_iii.html#ch3_10. accessed 8 September 2011, article 93United Arab 
Emirates, "Federal Law No-(6) of 1985 concerning Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions and 
Investment Companies," Central Bank of United Arab Emirates,, 
http://www.centralbank.ae/pdf/LawNo6-1985-IslaminBanks.pdf. accessed 10 November 2011, Article 
5.  
924 Abdulbari Mashal, "khuṣūṣiyyah wa Mutaṭalabāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah lil-Maṣarif al-Markazī 
ʿalā al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah" (paper presented at the The Seventh Conference of the 
Shariah Boards of Islamic Financial Institutions, Bahrain, 27 - 28/5/2008), p15. 
925 This thesis uses “Shari’ah review” and “Shari’ah audit” interchangeably. However, in some parts of 
the research, “Shari’ah review” has been used to refer to the Shari’ah assessment conducted by SSBs of 
IIFS, while “Shari’ah audit” has been used to refer to external Shari’ah assessment conducted by the 
general auditing committee in the IIFS or by an external party.      
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members as well as issuing a binding fatwa on certain cases. However, Mashal 
suggests that this central Shari‘ah committee is not active in practise.926 
The description of central Shari‘ah boards in Sudan and Malaysia in the following 
sections offers a better understanding about the nature of CSSB work.  
6.4.  The Central Shari‘ah Board in Sudan 
The case of the CSSB in Sudan tends to be overlooked in contemporary Islamic 
finance literature when discussing the role of regulators. The example of Malaysia is 
often pointed out, although Sudan has a very strong CSSB that predates the Malaysian 
one. This might be because Malaysia has more financial resources to showcase its 
experience. Moreover, the literature may focus on the Malaysian approach because 
unlike Sudan, which Islamised its whole financial system in 1991,927 Malaysia 
regulates Islamic finance alongside conventional finance in a dual financial system.928 
A key reason to shed the light on the CSSB in Sudan is its explicit charge to prevent 
creative Shari‘ah compliance,929 which makes it highly relevant to the discussion in 
this thesis.    
The Higher Sharia Supervisory Board for Banks & Financial Institutions 
(HSSB)930 was the first CSSB worldwide. The experience of the CSSBs in Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and Bahrain was highly influenced by the experience of the Sudanese 
HSSB.931 In fact, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) appointed the Secretary General of 
                                                 
926 Mashal, "khuṣūṣiyyah wa Mutaṭalabāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah lil-Maṣarif al-Markazī ʿalā al-
Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah," p16. 
927 Magda Ismail Abdel Mohsin, "The Practice of Islamic Banking System in Sudan," Journal of 
Economic Cooperation 26, no. 4 (2005): p30. 
928 Obiyathulla I. Bacha, "Dual Banking Systems and Interest Rate Risk for Islamic Banks," The 
Journal of Accounting, Commerce & Finance 8, no. 1 (2004). 
929 Sudan, "The Banking Business Organisation Act (2003)," CBOS,, 
http://www.cbos.gov.sd/en/node/434. accessed 27 May 2013 , Chapter 3.  
930 This is the translation found at the central bank and on the HSSB website. However, the English 
verision of The Banking Business (Organization) Act, 2003 translated it as the Higher Sharia 
Commission of Control on Banks and Financial Institutions. 
931 The Higher Sharia Supervisory Board for Banks & Financial institutions (HSSB), Nashʾat 
Wataṭawwur Wataqwīm Haʾāt al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah fī al-Jihāz al-Maṣrifī al-Sūdānī  p75. 
204 
 
the Sudanese HSSB as a member of its Shari‘ah Advisory Council.932 The HSSB was 
first established by the Sudanese finance minister’s decision in 1992. This decision 
was later incorporated into the Banking Business (Organisation) Act of 2003.933 This 
act states that the HSSB is an independent body whose members are appointed by a 
presidential decision in consultation with the finance minister.934 It is to consist of 
seven to 11 part-time employees who are experts in Shari‘ah, economics, banking, 
and law. The majority must be Shari‘ah scholars. The Banking Business 
(Organization) Act defines four objectives of the HSSB:  
1. Issuing Shari‘ah fatwas and guidelines to unify the Shari‘ah bases of the 
banking and financial industries.  
2. Auditing the policies and performance of the Central Bank, and the activities 
of banks and financial institutions, to insure they are in line with the law and 
the objectives of Shari‘ah, as well as with Islamic economic principles.  
3. Refining the laws, regulations, and guidelines of the Central Bank, banks, and 
financial institutions to prevent any usurious transactions or hidden legal 
ruses, as well as anything that might result in consuming the people’s wealth 
counter to Shari‘ah law. 
4. Working with the relevant authorities to develop and implement Islamic 
structures for transactions which are appropriate to all financing needs, as well 
as developing financial instruments suitable for the secondary market.  
Moreover, the Banking Business (Organization) Act of 2003 assigns six functions 
to the HSSB935:  
                                                 
932 Ibid. 
933 Sudan, "The Banking Business Organisation Act (2003)". Chapter 3.  
934 Ibid. 
935 Ibid. 
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1. Forming and expressing an opinion on matters brought to its attention by the 
finance minister, the Central Bank governor, bank managers, or other 
stakeholders, and issuing related fatwas, recommendations, and advice. 
2. Assisting IIFS and the auditing control unit at the Central Bank in performing 
their duties in accordance with the provisions of Shari‘ah. 
3. Assisting the Central Bank and IIFS in developing and implementing training 
programs to teach the staff of these entities about banking and Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
4. Assisting research departments in developing academic research and 
encouraging publication which serves its goals and duties.  
5. Addressing any Shari‘ah disputes that arise between the parties subject to the 
articles of this Act and their clients, and issuing related fatwas and 
recommendations. 
6. Performing any other functions that the HSSB deems necessary to achieve its 
objectives, subject to the approval of the finance minister. 
A few additional privileges apply to the HSSB. The fatwas of the HSSB in 
banking-related matters are binding upon the Central Bank and IIFS unless challenged 
in court. However, the HSSB has no jurisdiction over any case submitted before the 
courts or in which a ruling has been issued by the relevant court.936 In addition, the 
HSSB can summon any employees or clients of an IIFS if it deems it necessary. It can 
also request documents and inspect the activities of IIFS either directly or via the 
central bank.937 One interesting example illustrating the authority of the HSSB is its 
1995 decision to seize the non-Shari‘ah-compliant income of a Sudanese bank and 
                                                 
936 Ibid. 
937 Ibid. 
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give the bank the right to appeal.938 This decision is understandable given the 
completely Shari‘ah-compliant financial system in Sudan, but it is highly difficult to 
apply it in other Islamic countries.   
However, despite the act’s clear statement that the HSSB is independent, the 
HSSB budget, the terms of service of its Secretary General, and the remuneration of 
its members are determined by the finance minister in consultation with the Central 
Bank governor. This relationship could affect the independence of the HSSB, since it 
is tasked with auditing the Shari‘ah compliance of the Central Bank. Indeed, the 
relationship between the HSSB and the Central Bank is not entirely clear. Is the 
HSSB working as a subunit of the Central Bank and reporting to its governor? What 
is the status of its resolutions in practise if they conflict with the Central Bank 
governor’s view? In addition, despite the strong mandate of HSSB, this mandate 
notably does not specify its authority to license SSB members. A survey conducted by 
the HSSB939 shows that the appointment of 60% of SSB members in Sudan was not 
subject to the approval of the HSSB. Moreover, there seems to be ambiguity in 
practise regarding the relationship between the HSSB and individual SSBs. In the 
same survey mentioned earlier, 65% of SSBs in Sudanese banks deemed their 
relationship with the HSSB a coordinating one, while 25% of SSBs deemed it 
obligatory and 10% regarded it as advisory.940  
6.5.  The Central Shari‘ah Board in Malaysia  
The centralised approach of Shari‘ah governance at Bank Negara Malaysia is of 
particular interest because Malaysia—unlike Sudan—has dual systems of 
conventional and Islamic finance. In addition, the Malaysian approach is relevant to 
                                                 
938 The Higher Sharia Supervisory Board for Banks & Financial institutions (HSSB), Nashʾat 
Wataṭawwur Wataqwīm Haʾāt al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah fī al-Jihāz al-Maṣrifī al-Sūdānī  p86. 
939 Ibid., p120. 
940 Ibid., p119. 
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this thesis’s focus on the UK because Malaysian law is generally based on the 
common law system,941 and because Malaysia managed to integrate Islamic finance 
practises within a legal system that is not originally based on Shari‘ah. The BNM has 
taken a gradual approach towards regulating Islamic finance since the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act in 1958 up to the 2009 Central Bank of Malaysia Act.942 Today, 
Malaysia has one of the most sophisticated Shari‘ah governance systems in the 
world.943 There are two national Shari‘ah boards in Malaysia: the Shari‘ah Advisory 
Council of Bank Negara Malaysia (SAC of BNM) and the Shari‘ah Advisory Council 
of the Securities Commission (SAC of the SC).944 The BNM established its SAC in 
1997, and in 2009, based on section 51 of the Central Bank Act, it made the SAC the 
sole authority in determining Shari‘ah matters for any financial activities regulated by 
the BNM, such as Islamic banking and takaful945 business.946 The SC established its 
SAC in 1996 in accordance with section 18 of the Securities Commission Act 
(1993)947 for the purpose of advising the SC and ensuring the Shari‘ah compliance of 
the Islamic capital market.948 This means that neither the SAC of the SC nor any 
financial institutions regulated by it are obligated to follow the resolutions that the 
SAC of BNM issues. In theory, the existence of two national Shari‘ah boards could 
                                                 
941 See: Malaysia, "Civil Law Act  67  (1956),," The Commissioner of Law Revision, Malaysia, 
http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%202/Act%2067.pdf. accessed 10 May 2013Section 3 & 5.  
942 Hasan, "Regulatory Framework of Shari’ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and 
the UK," p85. 
943 See about the Shari’ah governance in Malaysia: Hasan, "Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Financial 
Institutions in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK." 
944 Hasan, "Regulatory Framework of Shari’ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and 
the UK," p85. 
945 Takaful is defined as a “mutual guarantee provided by a group of people against a defined risk or 
catastrophe befalling one’s life, property or any form of valuable things.” Syarikat Takaful Malaysia 
Berhad, "Glossary of Takaful,"  http://www.takaful-
malaysia.com.my/corporate/takafuloverview/pages/glossarytakaful.aspx. accessed 11 April 2014 
946 Malaysia, "(ACT 701) Central Bank of Malaysia Act ". 
947 "Securities Commission Act 498 (1993)," Securities Commission 
http://www.sc.com.my/eng/html/resources/guidelines/SCA2005.pdf. accessed 10 May 2013 
948 Hakimah Yaacob, "The New Central Bank Of Malaysia Act 2009 (Act 701): Enhancing The 
Integrity And Role of The Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) in Islamic Finance,"  ISRA Research paper  
6/2010.(2010) http://www.kantakji.com/fiqh/Files/Markets/B103.pdf accessed 10 May 2013 
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lead to conflicting views. However, in practise, the juristic resolutions of the two 
boards show small differences in their Shari‘ah view.949 This similarity is mainly 
attributed to the fact that the two SACs are chaired by the same person and consist 
generally of the same members.950 This significant overlap raises the question of 
whether it would be more efficient to update the law and have a single national 
Shari‘ah advisory board.   
The functions of the SAC of BNM and SAC of the SC are almost identical, with 
the latter specialising in issues related to the Islamic capital market. Section 52 of the 
Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 states the following main tasks of SAC of BNM: 
1. To ascertain the Islamic law on any financial matter and issue a ruling upon 
reference made to it in accordance with the relevant part of the Act; 
2. To advise the Bank on any Shari‘ah issue relating to Islamic financial business, 
the activities or transactions of the Bank; 
3. To provide advice to any Islamic financial institution or any other person as 
may be provided under any written law; and 
4. Such other functions as may be determined by the Bank.951 
In addition, section 56(1) of Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 and Section 316F 
of the CMSA assign a new function to both SACs. If a Shari‘ah question arises before 
a court or an arbitrator in a case related to Islamic finance, then the court or the 
arbitrator must consider any published ruling of the SACs or refer the question to the 
                                                 
949 Ibid., p11. 
950Ibid. Securities Commission, "Members Of The Sc's Shariah Advisory Council," SC,, 
http://www.sc.com.my/main.asp?pageid=251&menuid=277&newsid=&linkid=&type. accessed 15 
May 2013; Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), "Profile of current SAC members (2010 - 2013)," BNM,, 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=7&pg=715&ac=802. accessed 16 May 2013  
951Malaysia, "(ACT 701) Central Bank of Malaysia Act ".; "Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 
(CMSA)," Securities Commission,, http://www.sc.com.my/eng/html/cmsa/cmsa2007/cmsa2007.pdf. 
accessed 29 May 2013 Section 316B 
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appropriate SAC for a binding ruling. However, Yaacob952 questions whether a civil 
judge can be compelled to refer a question to an SAC or to comply with its decision. 
In other words, what would happen if the judge declined to adhere to the SAC ruling? 
Theoretically, there seem to be legal justifications for the court to do so. The judge, 
for example, might rely on section 5 of the Civil Law Act 1956, which makes the 
English law the applicable law to commercial matters in the absence of any other 
written law.953 In addition, according to the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, the 
court is the highest body which can determine right and the wrong in a particular 
case.954 The court is not constitutionally allowed to relinquish this right by yielding to 
the ruling of a lower body such as the SAC of BNM or the SAC of the SC.955   
The issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance at hand does not seem to be a main 
concern of the SAC of BNM, in contrast with the central Shari‘ah board in Sudan. 
According to Yaacob,956 when a product is submitted before the SAC or an SSB at the 
IIFS level, Shari‘ah scholars will base their decision on the theoretical description 
presented; they will not investigate how this product is likely to be implemented in 
practise. As mentioned in chapter five,957 one cause of creative Shari‘ah compliance is 
that some IIFS deliberately present their product in a way which ensures the approval 
of Shari‘ah scholars, though in practise the product is not Shari‘ah compliant.958  
But is it permissible from a Shari‘ah point of view for SSB members to approve 
products based on IIFS presentations without taking into account how they will be 
                                                 
952 Yaacob, "The New Central Bank Of Malaysia Act 2009 (Act 701): Enhancing The Integrity And 
Role of The Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) in Islamic Finance". p14. 
953 Malaysia, "Civil Law Act  67  (1956),". , section 5 
954 Shamil Bank Bahrain v. Beximo Pharmeticals Limited & Ors [2003] EWHC 2118,,(2003). 
955 Yaacob, "The New Central Bank Of Malaysia Act 2009 (Act 701): Enhancing The Integrity And 
Role of The Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) in Islamic Finance". p15. 
956 Ibid., p18. 
957 See: p191 
958 Abd Jabbar, "The Governance of Shari'a Advisers of Islamic Financial Institutions: The Practice in 
Malaysia," p313; Zighībah "Hayʾāt al-Fatwā Wa al-Riqābah al-Sharʿiyyah Fī al-Muʾasasāt al-Māliyyah 
al-Islāmiyyah Ahammiyyathā Muʿawwiqāt ʿAmalhā wa Ḥulūl Muqtaraḥah  " p24. 
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implemented in reality? A well-established principle in fatwa literature is that a mafty 
(the scholar who issues a fatwa) needs to take into account the consequences of the 
fatwa before issuing it.959 Put differently, a Shari‘ah scholar is required to consider 
what actions may be taken based on his fatwa. Approving a particular product which 
is Shari‘ah compliant on paper but not in practise does not comply with this principle, 
because people are going to buy this product based on this fatwa and, in doing so, 
unwittingly deal with a non-Shari‘ah-compliant product.  
There is also a question about the lack of a clear mechanism to hold SAC 
members accountable.960 In other words, who is “guarding the guardians” to make 
sure they are not abusing their position? Section 87 of the Central Bank Act protects 
any employee of the bank or any person appointed under the Act, such as SAC 
members, from liability as long as their actions were made in a good faith.961 It is not 
clear how “good faith” might be interpreted; what standard of care does a scholar 
need to meet to be deemed as acting in good faith? For example, can one fail to 
investigate how a product will be implemented in practise and still satisfy the standard 
of acting in good faith? Does this fulfil the duty of the SAC set forth in section 52, “to 
ascertain the Islamic law on any financial matter and issue a ruling”? Arguably, the 
current legal provisions in the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 and the Capital 
Markets and Services Act 2007 do not provide a sufficient mandate to prevent the 
practise of creative Shari‘ah compliance.  
6.5.1.  BNM Shari‘ah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions 
To fully understand the functions of the SAC of BNM, it is important to consider 
the Shari‘ah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions issued by the 
                                                 
959 See: Ibrāhīm Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt, ed. Mashhūr Ḥasan Salmān, vol. 5 (Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 
1997), 177. 
960 Yaacob, "The New Central Bank Of Malaysia Act 2009 (Act 701): Enhancing The Integrity And 
Role of The Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) in Islamic Finance". p23-24. 
961 Malaysia, "(ACT 701) Central Bank of Malaysia Act ". 
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BNM. To that end, this part of the chapter outlines this document, which provides the 
most comprehensive Shari‘ah governance framework in the world. It ensures that 
sound Shari‘ah governance is accomplished by establishing a central Shari‘ah board 
and an SSB at every Islamic financial institution.962 The framework aims to spell out 
how the BNM expects IFIs to arrange Shari‘ah governance to ensure the Shari‘ah 
compliance of all their activities.963 It also aims to inform the different parties 
involved in Shari‘ah governance (i.e., the board of directors, IFI management, and 
SSB members) of how they can fulfil their responsibility in relation to Shari‘ah and 
delineate the tasks of different units that the framework requires.  
The framework consists of six sections, dealing mostly with the governance issues 
raised in chapter five.964 Section one highlights the overall requirements of the 
Shari‘ah governance framework and its main structures. Section two deals with the 
accountability and the duties of the board of directors, IFI management, and Shari‘ah 
committees.965 Section three is intended to protect the independence of the Shari‘ah 
committee; it outlines the role of the board of directors in this regard. Section four 
deals with the competence issue.966 It outlines the required qualifications of persons 
involved in implementing the framework to ensure their capability of undertaking 
such task, and it asks IFIs to have an official procedure in place for evaluating 
Shari‘ah committee members individually. The assessment should cover the 
members’ knowledge, competence, input, and effectiveness. Section five tackles 
confidentiality and consistency issues. It establishes the minimum rules which protect 
                                                 
962 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), "Shari’ah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(BNM/RH/GL_012_3)" p1. 
963 Ibid., p2. 
964 Ibid., p4. 
965 Appendix 4 provides more details about the duties, responsibilities, and accountability of the 
Shari‘ah Committee. Ibid., p29. 
966 Appendix 2 outlines in detail the “Fit and Proper” criteria of the Shari‘ah Committee and the 
process of disqualifying SSB members.  
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the confidentiality of the financial institutions and ensure a degree of regularity in 
Shari‘ah committee rulings. Section six focuses on Shari‘ah compliance and research 
tasks. It sets the duties of four units which IFIs are required to establish, namely, units 
for internal Shari‘ah review, Shari‘ah auditing, Shari‘ah risk management, and 
Shari‘ah research. 
The internal Shari‘ah review is a regular evaluation undertaken by Shari‘ah 
officers to ensure that IFI activities are in line with Shari‘ah. The task includes 
suggesting corrective actions to solve noncompliance and governance processes to 
prevent repetition of any problems.967 The Shari‘ah audit is a periodic evaluation (at 
least once a year, depending on the risk profile of the IFI) that independently 
examines the compliance level in IFI business operations and the effectiveness of 
internal control mechanisms for Shari‘ah compliance.968 The audit should pay special 
attention to IFI financial statements; review the organisation’s structure, people, 
processes, and IT system for compliance with regulatory requirements; and assess 
whether the IFI’s Shari‘ah governance procedure is adequate.969 The BNM has the 
power to appoint, at the expense of an IFI, a third party to undertake a Shari‘ah audit 
on IFI activities if the BNM deems this action to be in the IFI’s interest.970 
The Shari‘ah risk management unit is tasked with detecting and controlling any 
potential Shari‘ah non-compliance risks which need to be mitigated to prevent the 
IFI’s exposure to intolerable risk.971 This unit is integrated with the IFI risk 
management structure, but as Shari‘ah risk is more complex than conventional risk, 
and as its management requires a different knowledge base than the one used in 
                                                 
967 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), "Shari’ah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(BNM/RH/GL_012_3)" p23. 
968 Ibid. 
969 Ibid., p24. 
970 Ibid., p25. 
971 Ibid. 
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managing risk in conventional finance, the task is assigned to risk officers with 
appropriate qualification in Shari‘ah.972 Lastly, the Shari‘ah research unit is tasked 
with undertaking research on Shari‘ah issues. The framework also calls for it to 
distribute Shari‘ah rulings to the internal and external stakeholders. 
The responsibility for setting up a strong Shari‘ah governance structure is clearly 
placed upon the IFI, and in particular on its board of directors.973 While the Shari‘ah 
committee is held liable and “accountable for all its decisions, views and opinions 
related to Shari‘ah matters”,974 the board of directors is responsible and accountable 
for the general governance of the institution. The IFI management is also responsible 
for implementing SAC and Shari‘ah committee decisions. Moreover, it bears the 
responsibility for identifying and referring any Shari‘ah matter to the Shari‘ah 
committee for a decision, as well as for providing the Shari‘ah committee with 
accurate and full information which the committee needs to consider before issuing its 
fatwa.975 The management is expected to provide adequate resources and a workforce 
appropriate to the size of the institution to implement the Shari‘ah governance 
framework. The guidelines further assert the management’s duty to “develop and 
adopt a holistic culture of Shari‘ah compliance within the organisation”.976    
One notable feature of the framework is that it clearly states the procedure which 
the management ought to follow if they learn of non-Shari‘ah-compliant activities 
within the IFI. First, they should immediately notify the board of directors, the 
Shari‘ah committee, and the BNM. Secondly, the IFI should immediately stop 
engaging in new operations linked to the non- Shari‘ah-compliant business activities. 
Thirdly, they must draw up a plan to remedy the issue within 30 days of learning of 
                                                 
972 Ibid. 
973 Ibid., p5. 
974 Ibid., p11. 
975 Ibid., p12. 
976 Ibid.  
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the incident.977 The plan should be jointly approved by the IFI board and its Shari‘ah 
committee. As a stopgap measure, when the BNM reasonably suspects that an IFI is 
undertaking non-Shari‘ah-compliant business activities, it is authorised to directly 
instruct the IFI to take rectifying action.978 In a further step to ensure Shari‘ah 
compliance, Shari‘ah committee members will not be in breach of the confidentiality 
and secrecy code if they report serious non-Shari‘ah compliance to the BNM in good 
faith.979  
To prevent conflicts in SSB rulings which might undermine Shari‘ah compliance, 
the framework states that the Shari‘ah committee needs to follow a well-structured 
and documented procedure of Shari‘ah decision-making. Moreover, it strongly warns 
Shari‘ah committee members not to undermine SAC decisions. However, the Shari‘ah 
committee is permitted to follow a more strict Shari‘ah view than the SAC.980    
Finally, the framework allocates an appendix to emphasising an important 
Shari‘ah compliance issue which was obscurely treated in the Central Bank Act of the 
BNM. It stresses that compliance with Shari‘ah should be maintained during all the 
stages of the product development process. It acknowledges that Shari‘ah non-
compliance can happen in pre-approval phases (e.g., incorrect structuring of products) 
or post-approval phases (e.g., misrepresenting products in marketing or after offering 
them to clients). It also stresses that ensuring Shari‘ah compliance is a continuous 
process. The Shari‘ah committee must certify any new products and support its 
decisions with pertinent juristic reasoning and literature. Legal agreements and 
product documents must be checked in detail. Moreover, the appendix details the 
process followed in the pre-product approval and post-product approval phases. The 
                                                 
977 BNM has the right to extend this duration. Ibid., p14. 
978 BNM has the right to extend this duration. Ibid. 
979 Ibid., p20. 
980 Ibid. 
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latter includes auditing the implementation of products in the market and conducting 
the internal Shari‘ah review and Shari‘ah governance auditing mentioned earlier in 
the framework. 
One missing feature of the system is that new products are not submitted to the 
SAC of BNM for final approval. This might be intended to provide flexibility and 
speed to encourage market innovation. Nevertheless, seeking the approval of the SAC 
as a final stage before offering the product on the market might help to avoid conflicts 
in fatwas and maintain a standard rather than waiting for conflicting products to be 
offered on the market and cause a problem. One might argue that this problem is 
avoided by asking the Shari‘ah committee to observe SAC rulings and decisions 
before approving products. Still, not all newly structured products have been 
addressed in SAC rulings and decisions.  
Overall, however, the BNM offers a very well-structured Shari‘ah governance 
framework which largely was adopted in the Islamic Financial Services 
Board standards for best practises of Shari‘ah governance.        
6.6.  UK Regulators’ Approach towards Shari‘ah Governance   
As discussed above, a form of central Shari‘ah supervisory board (CSSB) with 
strong legal power acting within a Shari‘ah governance framework would be an ideal 
solution to strengthen Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic finance industry. However, 
this remedy might not be desirable in some countries for various reasons. Wilson981 
suggests that former Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK was hesitant to 
follow the Malaysian approach of a centralised Shari‘ah board because of the 
sensitivity of giving less decision-making power to individual SSB members. Yahia982 
                                                 
981 Wilson, "Regulatory Challenges Posed by Islamic Capital Market Products and Services." 
982 Abdul-Rahman, The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance : Tools and Techniques for Community-
Based Banking, p79. 
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suggests another reason that central bankers should not regulate Shari‘ah governance: 
requiring an official board that is tasked with applying a particular religious law might 
result in religious discrimination lawsuits brought by consumers following other 
religions. Most importantly, UK regulators deem establishing a central Shari‘ah board 
a religious matter that is beyond the legal authority of a secular regulator.983 
Many researchers summarise the attitude of the UK regulatory authority towards 
regulating Islamic finance by quoting Callum McCarthy, the chairman of the former 
Financial Services Authority: “No obstacles, no special favours”.984 However, a 2003 
speech by Michael Foot, then the managing director of the FSA, stressed the 
importance of explaining the nature of the product to the consumer who is buying it, 
and emphasised that product providers must comply with basic EU Directive 
requirements for consumer protection. The FSA, Foot said, would ensure sufficient 
disclosure during transactions. He further stated that the FSA would  
no doubt continue to play that role in respect of sharia’a compliant products 
too (and in some case our rules will leave us no choice). However, I think it 
is also true to say that we shall be looking for help from experts wherever we 
can find them. And I should also add – though it is probably unnecessary for 
me to say this – we shall have neither the ability nor the desire to monitor a 
bank’s actual sharia’a compliance. That has to be something for the sharia’a 
board and for the institution itself.985 
This statement was made during the early days of implementing Islamic finance 
products in the UK. However, the position of the FSA did not change much with 
regard to Shari‘ah   governance, as can be seen in its 2007 paper titled “Islamic 
Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges”. The FSA seemed to be keen on 
stressing its nature as a secular authority and leaving the responsibility for ensuring 
                                                 
983 H. M. Treasury, "The Development of Islamic Finance in the UK the Government's perspective" 
p19. 
984 Callum McCarthy, "FSA encourages growth of Islamic finance in the UK," FSA, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2007/121.shtml. accessed 10 May 2013 
985Michael Foot, "The Future of Islamic Banking in Europe," FSA, 
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Shari‘ah compliance to the IIFS, and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) which 
replaced the FSA in 2013 has followed in its footsteps in this regard.986 The FSA 
seemed to be aware of some of the issues in the industry, such as the lack of 
standardisation and possibility of Shari‘ah arbitrage, and to recognise that ensuring 
Shari‘ah compliance is a continuing process. However, Zulkifli Hasan987 notes that 
the Shari‘ah governance practises of several financial institutions in the UK show that 
IIFS are entirely free to arrange their Shari‘ah governance without subjection to 
regulatory policies or guidelines.   
Similarly, in 2008, HM Treasury published a document outlining the 
government’s perspective on the development of Islamic finance in the UK.988 It 
stresses the treasury’s aim to regulate Islamic finance to the same standard achieved 
in conventional finance and pledges that regulators will act to ensure that Islamic 
finance consumers enjoy the same level of advice and transparency available to 
conventional finance consumers.989 It also emphasises the importance of international 
standards and that these standards should be accessible to those who need it in IIFS. It 
states that the UK authorities have a good relationship with international Islamic 
standard-setting bodies and meet with them on equal terms, follow their recent 
developments, and attends their conferences.990 However, the responsibility for 
assuring consumers about the authenticity of Shari‘ah-compliant products is placed on 
the Islamic finance sector. The document clearly shows that the government does not 
plan to follow a state-led approach taken by other countries such as Malaysia.991 This 
is because the authorities in the UK regard themselves as secular bodies and think that 
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987 Hasan, "Regulatory Framework of Shari’ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and 
the UK," p104. 
988 H. M. Treasury, "The Development of Islamic Finance in the UK the Government's perspective". 
989 Ibid., p18. 
990 Ibid., p21. 
991 Ibid., p19. 
218 
 
such a rigid approach could slow development in the industry and further fragment 
the market, especially for IIFS active in more than one jurisdiction.    
Two main questions need to be addressed in this area. First, is the process of 
ensuring Shari‘ah compliance in fact a private religious matter beyond the power of a 
secular financial regulator? And how does requiring IIFS to establish a Shari‘ah 
auditing unit that checks for adherence to an international standard conflict with the 
secular nature of a regulator? Wilson992 acknowledges that central banks and 
regulators are not able to bear the responsibility for Shari‘ah compliance. However, he 
believes that they are responsible for making sure that an adequate process for 
ensuring Shari‘ah compliance exists in financial institutions. In addition, these entities 
should familiarise themselves with the implications of Islamic finance and promote 
efforts towards following international Shari‘ah standards. Moreover, they should be 
concerned with corporate governance issues, which include examining the power of 
the SSB, and their duties towards consumers and IIFS management. 
The second question in this area is whether regulators, by not regulating Shari‘ah 
governance (and not trying to prevent creative Shari‘ah compliance in IIFS), are 
fulfilling their obligation to protect consumers, one of the main objectives of any 
financial regulator.993A study funded by the Dutch Central Bank suggests that Islamic 
financial consumers enjoy less protection than their counterparts in conventional 
finance.994 Consumer protection was one of the main regulatory objectives of the 
former Financial Services Authority, as is stated in the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000.995 The Financial Services Act 2012 shifted this duty to a newly 
established institution, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Article 1B (3) of the 
                                                 
992 Wilson, "Regulatory Challenges Posed by Islamic Capital Market Products and Services." 
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Act lists consumer protection as the first of the FCA’s operational objectives,996 which 
is defined in section (1C) as “securing an appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers”. To determine what is appropriate, the FCA must consider different 
factors such as the different degrees of risk associated with various types of products 
and transactions, the differing levels of experience and knowledge of consumers, the 
needs of consumers to access well-timed information that is fit for their purpose, and 
consumers’ different expectations in regard to different types of investments or 
transactions. However, consumers, as a general principle, should be responsible for 
their decisions.  
In line with the factors mentioned above, the question is to what extent the FCA 
has fulfilled its duty of consumer protection in the Islamic finance market. The 
explanatory notes of the 2012 Act suggest that the FCA can, for example, specify the 
way in which a service provider must disclose certain information to its consumers 
before entering into an agreement. It also can require certain elements which the 
provider advice should cover to ensure that it is not misleading. However, it is worth 
noting that these FCA objectives do not force a “statutory duty” upon the FCA to act 
to ensure an appropriate level of protection for all consumers. Rather, they give the 
FCA authority to act, for instance, to protect a single group of persons who can be 
included under the definition of “consumer”.997 
The FSA’s 2012 annual report emphasised a new strategy for protecting 
consumers.998 The strategy was first devised in 2010, and the Business Plan of 
2011/12 offered new details about how this strategy should be implemented. It 
                                                 
996"Financial Services Act 2012" p20. 
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acknowledged that the FSA needed to take a more proactive role to avert any 
problems for consumers. It pledged to focus on ensuring better access to information 
for consumers, as well as earlier, stronger regulatory intervention. The Business Plan 
suggested adopting a business model and strategy analysis to detect potential risks in 
firms’ conduct which could be further examined via intensive supervision. Moreover, 
it continued, products would receive more attention, particularly in the design phase at 
firms, to ensure that they suited the needs of their targeted customers.999 This tactic 
aimed to avoid detriment to consumers at a very early time in the product’s life 
cycle.1000 The Business Plan also created a unit of Consumer Affairs to provide better 
engagement with consumers,1001 and it committed to taking tougher enforcement 
actions in cases of poor dealing with consumers and mis-selling.1002 The plan paid 
special attention to certain areas including structured products and mortgage advice, 
where most Islamic finance business is concentrated. As of 1 January 2013, the Retail 
Distribution Review (RDR) came into force, requiring firms to clearly explain their 
services and charges to consumers. The new rules also aim to improve the ethical 
code and the professional standards of investment advisers.1003 
However, Jonathan Ercanbrack1004 points out some distinctive risks linked with 
Shari‘ah-compliant products and criticises how financial regulators in the UK dealt 
with them. He argues that their reticence to regulate the religious aspect of these 
products and its equivalent regulatory treatment of the Islamic and conventional 
financial sectors inadequately mitigated the unique risk associated with Islamic 
finance, which occurs because the main motivation for Muslim consumers to buy 
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these products is their Shari‘ah-compliant nature. The current regulatory approach of 
the FCA seems to ignore the reputational risks which can occur with these 
products.1005 
Similarly, Rider1006 suggests that regulators in secular countries, such as the FCA 
in the UK and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US, are mainly 
concerned with the compliance of Islamic financial products with the standards for 
conventional products. The Islamic nature of the product is seen as an extra element. 
If an IIFS were offering as Shari‘ah-compliant a product that does not actually 
comply with Islamic law, it might be liable for breach of contract or 
misrepresentation. It could be also liable for mis-selling under various consumer 
protection laws and regulations. For example, the UK Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits “misleading actions” where wrong 
information is provided about the nature or the main features of a product which 
“causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he 
would not have taken otherwise”.1007 Under this Act, the plaintiff needs to prove that 
the service provider has knowingly or carelessly undertaken the misleading action.1008 
Another relevant legislation in this regard is the Fraud Act 2006, which make it an 
offense for a person to gain or intend to gain money by deceitfully making a false 
representation. The representation, either expressed or implied, is deemed false “(a) if 
it is untrue or misleading, and (b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, 
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untrue or misleading”.1009 In addition, the act makes it an offense for a person to fail 
to disclose information that he is required by the law to disclose when he intends by 
doing so to make “a gain for himself or another, or to cause loss to another or to 
expose another to a risk of loss”.1010 
Furthermore, according to the sixth principle of the FCA “Principles for 
Business”, firms are required to treat their clients fairly and pay attention to their 
interests.1011 The FCA thus aims to ensure that consumers will receive “clear 
information, suitable advice and an acceptable level of service”.1012 The FCA 
acknowledges that Shari‘ah-compliant products are sometimes based on complicated 
or uncommon structures, and therefore emphasises that IIFS should make sure their 
clients properly understand their products. This is particularly important at a time 
when many newly developed financial products are offered in the market.1013 
Additionally, principle nine of the FCA “Principles for Business” states that “a firm 
must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary 
decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment”.1014 Here, what 
matters is the suitability of the advice for the consumer, not the financial performance 
of the product. If the recommendation was suitable at the time of sale, and the risk 
involved was clearly explained to the consumer, negative return on the investment 
cannot by itself be a ground of claiming mis-selling.1015  
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To what extent do providers of Islamic financial products comply with these 
requirements? Hainsworth1016 suggests that because of the different interpretations of 
Shari‘ah, it is unlikely that an IIFS would itself make a representation or provide 
advice with regard to the Shari‘ah compliance of particular products. Rather, 
international practise tends to reveal the names of SSB members who approved the 
products, as well as publishing their fatwas. For the same reason, Hainsworth also 
highly doubts that the relevant authority (now the FCA in the UK) would examine 
IIFS compliance with Shari‘ah.1017 He suggests that its focus would be directed 
towards the compliance of IIFS with governance standards published by the IFSB and 
AAOIFI. Although they are not legally binding, these standards may become relevant 
in assessing the compliance of an IIFS with this principle or other principles.1018   
Nonetheless, with no adopted Shari‘ah standard, it would difficult to prove an 
offense under the various laws mentioned above. To overcome this problem, the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the Islamic Finance Council, and the Utrujj 
Foundation have published a draft of an Islamic Finance Transparency Standard.1019 
The aim of this standard is not to standardise Shari‘ah per se, but rather to standardise 
the procedure for ensuring Shari‘ah compliance in a way that protects consumers.1020 
Due to the absence of Shari‘ah governance standards in the UK, the MCB and its 
partners raised concerns over the practise of some IIFS who are profiting from selling 
Shari‘ah -compliant products to the Muslim community without putting in place an 
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adequate process to ensure that these products and services do actually comply with 
Shari‘ah.1021  
The Islamic Finance Transparency Standard also notes that existing international 
standards such as those of AAOIFI and IFSB are primarily known to practitioners.1022 
When ordinary consumers buy Shari‘ah-compliant products, they cannot 
independently ensure that what is presented to them is actually Shari‘ah-compliant. It 
is improbable to assume that general consumers with no personal research would 
know which product best serves their interests. Given that the market is relatively new 
and lacks a published standard, ordinary consumers are vulnerable to abuse by 
dishonest service providers. Publishing and adopting a user-friendly standard would 
raise the awareness of consumers as well as removing suspicions of part of the 
Muslim community about the Shari‘ah authenticity of these products.1023   
As mentioned earlier, the FSA wanted consumers to be informed about the basis 
on which an IIFS presents itself as conducting Shari‘ah-compliant business. However, 
the research conducted by the MCB suggests that many IIFS have not communicated 
these grounds to their consumers.1024 It further notes that the FSA did not taken any 
action in regard to this matter while it existed, notwithstanding that all financial 
institutions are required by law to advertise in “fair, clear and not misleading” 
ways.1025 The MCB hopes that extensive compliance with the proposed standard in 
the market will help to reveal those IIFS that do not comply with this rule1026    
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The Islamic Finance Transparency Standard has been drafted so that it should not 
pose a challenging burden to market players or be seen by prospective service 
providers as a barrier to entry.1027 After receiving feedback on the standard, the MCB 
aims to promote the standard’s adoption by creating informal associations with 
community organisations and other relevant institutions. It also plans to design a 
stamp which IIFS can use to certify that they comply with the Islamic Finance 
Transparency Standard. The standard will be revised every two years to ensure that it 
accommodates the latest developments and practises in the market.1028 The standard 
can be used by any financial institution offering Shari‘ah-compliant products in the 
UK, provided that its products, documentation, and process have been verified by an 
independent competent Shari‘ah expert. The name of that expert should be stated in 
all marketing material, and the expert’s qualifications and the relevant fatwas should 
also be accessible on the IIFS website. Finally, a regular Shari‘ah audit needs to be 
undertaken by a “Shari‘ah expert(s) or other suitably qualified person” to ensure that 
implementation of the products is in line with Islamic law.1029 
However, is not clear how the MCB will ensure that IIFS continually comply with 
the standard. How it will check whether a regular Shari‘ah audit has been conducted? 
The language of the draft suggests that the financial institution will be responsible for 
complying with the standard without supervision by the MBC. Without establishment 
of a self-regulatory body, this standard may be abused by service providers and 
further harm the confidence of consumers in the market. This might be the case, 
taking into account that such a standard will be funded by the very institutions that 
use it. Moreover, since the draft of the standard was published on 6 October 2008, 
there have not been any publications in response to the consultation or any update.  
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In summary, the FCA’s current approach with regards to Shari‘ah governance is 
not adequate to protect consumers from creative Shari‘ah compliance. The secular 
setting of the regulatory authorities in the UK should not hinder the FCA from 
ensuring that proper governance culture is adopted within SSBs. The FCA ought to 
strongly encourage IIFS and other relevant organisations in the UK to form a self-
regulatory body for Islamic finance.1030 In addition, other regulatory mechanisms 
discussed in chapter seven can be employed to protect vulnerable consumers from 
abuse by dishonest service providers. 
6.7.  Saudi Regulators’ Approach towards Shari‘ah Governance   
The choice of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as a reference is motivated by 
the fact that despite the huge and growing market for Islamic finance, which by the 
end of 2007 controlled over 75% of the finance market in Saudi Arabia,1031 specific 
regulation of the industry is non-existent, as neither the legal instruments nor the 
appropriate body exist to oversee the industry. Rodney Wilson1032 has observed that 
“the sensitive issue of Shari‘ah compliance was not really addressed by SAMA [Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency]”,1033 nor was it tackled by the Capital Markets Law of 
2003.1034 These omissions are particularly ironic given the number of sukūk issuances 
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and hedge funds as well as large Shari‘ah-compliant mutual funds businesses in Saudi 
Arabia.1035 
Unlike in the UK, the regulation of Shari‘ah governance in Saudi is not hindered 
by the secular setting of the regulatory authorities. In fact, article one of the Basic 
Law of Saudi Arabia, which establishes the kingdom’s governing principles, states 
that Islam is the official religion and that the Quran and the sunnah, the two primary 
sources of Shari‘ah, are the constitution of Saudi.1036 Article seven of the Basic Law 
states that the government derives its power from these two holy sources and that they 
are “rule over any State Laws”.1037 
Article two of the law of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, which acts as the 
central bank of Saudi Arabia, further affirms the supremacy of Shari‘ah in Saudi law. 
It states that SAMA “shall not pay nor receive interest, but it shall only charge certain 
fees on services rendered to the public and to the Government, in order to cover the 
Agency's expenditures. Such fees shall be charged in accordance with a regulation 
passed by the Board of Directors and approved by the Minister of Finance”.1038 
Moreover, the law makes it clear that SAMA cannot act “in any manner which 
conflicts with the teachings of the Islamic Law. The Agency shall not charge any 
interest on its receipts and payments”.1039 In reality, however, conventional finance is 
practised,1040 and interest is legally enforced by the Banking Disputes Settlement 
Committee of SAMA, which has jurisdiction over any banking dispute in the KSA. 
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It is not clear why the Saudi regulator has so far been reluctant to introduce a 
framework for Shari‘ah governance and Islamic finance in general. Is it because they 
are not sufficiently convinced by the model of Islamic finance?1041 Is it because 
issuing a framework for Islamic finance officially acknowledges the existence of non-
Shari‘ah-compliant practises? Or is it because SAMA does not see a need to regulate 
Islamic finance, since it is market driven? There is no official explanation or academic 
studies that clearly discuss this issue. Nevertheless, it seems that the authorities are 
hesitant to regulate Islamic finance due to the political sensitivity of such action or 
disclosure. The absolute monarchy system in Saudi Arabia seems to base its political 
legitimacy on enforcing Shari‘ah as a governing law.1042 Therefore, one might argue 
that the regime is keen to avoid any public action that might question its legitimacy. 
In fact, practicing usury is one of the justifications used by al-Qaadah and other 
radical groups to declare the Saudi state as non-Islamic or apostate and to justify its 
attacks.1043          
Ahmed Al-Saleh,1044 the head of the legal department at SAMA, addresses this 
question by arguing that Islamic finance regulations have been introduced in other 
countries to resolve  the obstacle of taxes which disadvantage Shari‘ah-compliant 
products on the market. In Saudi, Islamic finance products do not face any taxation 
issues; therefore, there is no need to introduce a specific Islamic finance framework. 
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In addition, Al-Saleh argues that Saudi is in essence an Islamic country with a free 
market, and the Islamic finance industry has been flourishing there over the last 25 
years without the need to introduce special regulations for Islamic finance. When Al-
Saleh was asked whether SAMA has a duty to protect consumers from being sold 
Shari‘ah-compliant products which in reality do not comply with Shari‘ah, he 
answered that SAMA’s main concern is protecting depositors and ensuring that banks 
comply with the capital adequacy requirements. How banks repackage products for 
their customers is beyond the mandate of SAMA. If a client believes that he has been 
mis-sold a Shari‘ah-compliant product, then he should submit his claim before the 
relevant court, which will examine the product based on the approval decision of the 
Shari‘ah supervisory board of the bank in question. Answering a question about the 
role of SAMA in raising consumer awareness about the Shari‘ah compliance of 
financial products, Al-Saleh said he believes that this function is also outside the 
scope of SAMA, as stated in its law. This task should be carried out by civil society 
organisations, not by SAMA.1045  
Al-Saleh’s argument that Islamic finance regulations are only needed when there 
are tax issues for Shari‘ah compliant products is not convincing. While this might be 
the case for some non-Islamic countries such as the UK, many Islamic countries such 
as Malaysia and Sudan have introduced Islamic finance regulations and Shari‘ah 
governance frameworks, though they do not have any taxation obstacles to Islamic 
finance products. Shari‘ah governance guidelines have been introduced in many 
countries with the aim of enhancing corporate governance values such as 
accountability and transparency across the Islamic finance industry and particularly 
on Shari‘ah supervisory boards.   
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Many Islamic finance professionals in KSA also disagree with the view of Al-
Saleh. Majed Alrasheed,1046 head of the Shari‘ah unit at Bank Albilad, and Yaser Al-
Marshdiy,1047 head of the Shari‘ah Group of Alinma Bank (these institutions are two 
of the main fully-flagged Islamic banks in KSA), believe that the Islamic finance 
industry in Saudi is in need of a Shari‘ah governance framework. Sheikh Abdullah 
Bin Sulaiman Al Manea, one of the top Shari‘ah scholars within the Islamic industry 
and the chair of most SSBs in Saudi, even publicly criticised SAMA for being “one of 
the main obstacles preventing the Kingdom from being the centre of Islamic banking 
around the world”.1048 He demanded that SAMA issue a specified framework for 
Islamic banking as is the case in conventional banking.   
Given that current SAMA rules and regulations do not contain any specific 
provisions for Islamic finance or Shari‘ah governance, to what extent do they protect 
Saudi consumers from creative Shari‘ah compliance? Certain provisions within these 
regulations address consumer protection, corporate governance, conflicts of interest, 
and transparency.1049 For example, the Implementing Regulations of the Law on 
Supervision of Finance Companies states that some provisions obligate finance 
companies to clearly describe the terms and type of a financing contract. It prohibits 
finance companies from issuing statements or presenting products in a way that can 
directly or indirectly misinform or deceive consumers.1050 In addition, SAMA 
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published a draft of the principles for protecting bank clients, including general 
principles regarding fair trading, disclosure and transparency, financial education and 
awareness, and protection of the financial interests of clients. However, these general 
provisions do not adequately protect consumers who choose to buy Shari‘ah-
compliant products on religious grounds. SAMA’s main concern, as Al-Saleh 
confirmed, seems to be financially protecting depositors rather than overseeing the 
Shari‘ah-compliant element of IIFS products. Although these provisions can be used 
by consumers to sue banks for mis-selling, SAMA ought to play a role in holding 
banks accountable for breaching consumer protection regulations, rather than relying 
on consumers to take legal action.   
What is the best way to regulate Shari‘ah governance to strengthen Shari‘ah 
compliance in Saudi Arabia? As mentioned earlier, despite the growing business of 
Islamic finance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, no legal framework surrounds the 
work of more than 50 SSBs in the KSA.1051 An IIFS voluntarily and unilaterally 
appoints a Shari‘ah supervisory board to review its products, and it and commits to 
implement fatwas and decisions issued by the SSB. The private sector has yet to form 
a strong self-regulatory body that compensates for SAMA’s lack of regulatory action. 
According to Majed Alrasheed,1052 a committee for Islamic finance has been 
established by banks offering Shari‘ah-compliant products in the kingdom. It holds 
four meetings per year which are attended by a representative from SAMA. The 
committee has not yet issued any guidelines or played an active role in terms of 
Shari‘ah governance. It has been trying to introduce an ethical guideline on the 
process of approving Shari‘ah-compliant products, and it also sometimes tries to 
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speak with SAMA about some issues which these banks are facing. However, even if 
such guidelines were issued, they would not be enforceable, nor would the committee 
assess IIFS compliance with them. 
Several suggestions have been made to overcome the absence of a framework for 
Islamic finance in the KSA. The Abdulaziz AlGasim Law Firm has proposed a draft 
for a law establishing The Committee of Developing Islamic Financial Services 
(CDIFS).1053 AlGasim believes that the lack of supervisory authority has achieved an 
effect in direct opposition to the objectives of Islamic finance.1054 His law firm is not 
in favour of a centralised SSB, especially in terms of standardising Shari‘ah rulings. It 
is proposing strong corporate governance rules while leaving Shari‘ah standard-
setting to private SSBs.1055 The CDIFS would be overseen by a board of directors 
consisting of the finance minister, the governor of SAMA, the chief of the Capital 
Market Authority, its CEO, and three experts in Islamic finance services. The board 
would coordinate the policies of these authorities towards the development of the 
Islamic finance industry without overlapping with the powers of the authorities who 
supervise IIFS. It would act as an advisory body as well as a supervisory one on 
matters that do not fall under the authority of the three entities.1056 
The objectives of establishing CDIFS include organising and promoting Islamic 
financial services to secure Saudi Arabia’s leadership in the industry,1057 transferring 
knowhow and expertise from other countries to the Saudi market, improving the 
efficiency of the industry, and promoting fair dealings, transparency, consumer 
                                                 
1053 Abdulaziz AlGasim Law Firm, "al-Khadamāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah  fī al-Mimlakh al-
ʿarabiyaah al-Suʿūdiyyah: al-Tanmiyyah wa al- Ḥawkamah," (Riyadh2009). 
1054 Ibid., p1. 
1055 al-Saud, "Siyāsah al-Jawdah al-Sharʿiyyah fī al-Maṣrifiyaah al-Islāmiyyah". p16. 
1056 Abdulaziz AlGasim Law Firm, "al-Khadamāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah  fī al-Mimlakh al-
ʿarabiyaah al-Suʿūdiyyah: al-Tanmiyyah wa al- Ḥawkamah," p46. 
1057 Ibid. 
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protections, and the integrity of the financial system, in addition to enhancing the 
compatibility of Islamic finance products with the objectives of Shari‘ah.1058 
To achieve these objectives, CDIFS would have the power to issue Shari‘ah and 
accounting best practise standards, raise consumer awareness, review the standards of 
their protections,1059 promote standardisation, and oversee IIFS compliance with these 
standards. It also would have power to set the requirements for licences for providing 
Islamic finance services.1060  
Articles 12, 13, 15, and 16 of the proposed law represent further attempts to 
regulate Shari‘ah governance. Article 12 establishes, by a decision of the council of 
ministers, an independent association for Shari‘ah supervisory boards which would be 
under the supervision of CDIFS. The association would set the requirements for 
practicing Shari‘ah auditing, its code of ethics, and the training and the discipline of 
SSB members as well as reviewing implementations of the Shari‘ah standard.1061 
Article 13 of the proposed law imposes a duty on all IIFS to review the Shari‘ah 
compliance of their products and services through a licensed Shari‘ah auditor. The 
CDIFS would issue rules regulating the profession of Shari‘ah auditing, which 
include, inter alia, the way of appointing Shari‘ah auditors, auditors’ committee 
membership requirements, and restrictions on multiple memberships on auditing 
committees.1062 The rules would also set the requirements for licensing Shari‘ah 
auditing firms, which would include disclosing Shari‘ah auditing fees and the 
procedure of Shari‘ah auditing, documenting and publishing SSB rulings, and 
providing CDIFS with a summary of the principles approved by the firm’s SSB.1063 
                                                 
1058 Ibid., p47. 
1059 Ibid., p48. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Ibid., p51. 
1062 Ibid. 
1063 Ibid. 
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Besides this, CDIFS would regulate internal Shari‘ah auditing, its procedures, and the 
specifications and duration of the auditing reports. IIFS would provide CDIFS and 
general consumers with a copy of the report of the external Shari‘ah auditor.1064 
Article 15 specifically addresses the issue of transparency. It states that CDIFS 
would issue rules for the transparency of Islamic financial services, which are to be 
updated regularly. The rules would enforce the duty of documenting and recording the 
activities and the process of Shari‘ah supervision and auditing, as well as 
documenting the Shari‘ah principles which are to be made public and to be submitted 
to CDIFS. The rules would require publication of the principles which the SSBs have 
approved. CDIFS would also organise a periodic conference where disputed issues 
would be presented and decided.1065 
Article 16 deals with international Islamic financial products offered in the Saudi 
market. It states that CDIFS would oversee services provided by international IIFS 
and issue rules regulating the process of approving international Shari‘ah-compliant 
products and services to the Saudi market in a way that complies with the principles 
of fatwa in Islamic legal theory.1066 
The proposed law of CDIFS thus generally deals with most Shari‘ah governance 
issues. If enacted, it would be a good step in the right direction. It follows an approach 
that is less centralised than the one applied in Malaysia. However, the enforcing 
power of CDIFS is not clearly defined; that is, its supervisory function is not 
distinguished from its advisory function. Besides, since the draft of the CDIFS law 
was published in 2009, no comments have been made by the regulatory authorities, 
which suggests that CDIFS is unlikely to be enacted in the near future.     
                                                 
1064 Ibid., p52. 
1065 Ibid. 
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CDIFS is not without its detractors, though. Abdalaziz Ibn Sttam al-Saud criticises 
the AlGasim firm’s proposal, arguing that such an arrangement gives the government 
too much control over Islamic finance industry.1067 It is inappropriate, he contends, for 
a governmental department to assess the Shari‘ah quality of SSB decisions. 
Alternatively, Al-Saud suggests establishing a professional non-governmental body 
that specialises in issuing and reviewing Shari‘ah quality standards, called the Saudi 
Authority for Islamic Financial Standards (SAIFS). The board of SAIFS would 
consist of a chairman to be appointed by a royal decree, representatives of the relevant 
governmental bodies, and experts representing professional, financial and economical 
bodies.1068 It would have a general association of professionals in the relevant area. 
SAIFS would not have the function of issuing fatwas or approving products; its task 
would be to issue standards which can be used to implement SSB fatwas and to 
properly audit them. In addition, Al-Saud suggests that there should be a body within 
the Saudi judicial system which can assert Shari‘ah standards to add a certainty to 
these standards and lower their legal risk.1069 He suggests that this task should be 
conducted by the general committee of the High Court in Saudi. As for issuing fatwas, 
this responsibility should be assigned to a subcommittee of the Council of Senior 
Ulama, the official body of fatwas in Saudi Arabia.1070 Al-Saud’s aim seems to be 
focusing SAIFS’s work on Shari‘ah quality standards and utilising existing official 
bodies to undertake other tasks that are usually carried out by the central Shari‘ah 
board in other countries. However, is not clear how Al-Saud categorises SAIFS as a 
non-governmental body when its chairman is appointed by a royal decree and its 
board consists of many governmental bodies’ representatives. Besides, the structure 
                                                 
1067 al-Saud, "Siyāsah al-Jawdah al-Sharʿiyyah fī al-Maṣrifiyaah al-Islāmiyyah". p16. 
1068 Ibid., p69. 
1069 Ibid., p70. 
1070 Ibid., p66. 
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Al-Saud is proposing assigns many tasks to various bureaucratic state authorities, 
such as the general committee of the High Court and the Council of Senior Ulama, 
and this might not suit the needs of the financial industry, which requires speed and 
flexibility.      
Al-Muzaynī,1071 a Saudi Shari‘ah  scholar, suggests establishing the Supreme 
Commission for Financial Fatwa (SCFF), an independent self-regulatory body 
regulating the governance of SSB. The members of SCFF and its head would be 
yearly elected by representatives of IIFS. The aim of this body, according to al-
Muzaynī, would be to ensure stability in the Islamic finance industry, eliminating 
irregular fatwas as well as enhancing the credibility of SSB fatwas. It also should aim 
to protect SSB members’ impartiality and independence and ensure that their fatwas 
are not influenced by pressure from IIFS, the central bank, and the market. The SCFF 
should not aim to achieve absolute uniformity in fatwas or to overlook emergencies 
and the special circumstances of each IIFS. It should aim for harmonizing fatwas and 
enhancing the ethical aspect of Shari‘ah-compliant products rather than preventing 
any new ijthad.1072 
The tasks of SCFF, according to al-Muzaynī, should include promoting 
coordination and collaboration1073 and exchanging Shari‘ah opinions among the SSB 
members of the SCFF. If there is an inconsistency between SSBs, the matter should 
be referred to the SCFF, which would issue a binding opinion on it. Only widely used 
contracts and newly innovated financial products that could shift the industry should 
be submitted before the SCFF for approval. The SCFF would also issue a report 
                                                 
1071al-Muzaynī, "Tarshīd al-ʿAmal Fī al-Haʾāt al-Sharʿiyyah Lil-muʾassasāti al-Māliyyah al-
Islāmiyyah," p20. 
1072 Ibid., p22. 
1073 Ibid., p23. 
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certifying the procedure for approving Shari‘ah-compliant products in each member 
SSB.1074  
Out of the three suggestions discussed here, al-Muzaynī’s proposal seems most 
suitable in the short term for the Saudi situation, because the SCFF is a self-regulatory 
body which does not require the involvement of governmental entities. However, 
although fully flagged Islamic financial institutions might agree to such proposal, it is 
unlikely that all Shari‘ah-compliant product providers would comply with SCFF 
decisions. This could be especially the case for conventional financial institutions 
offering Islamic windows. Nevertheless, in the long term, a stronger regulatory action 
is required from the Saudi authorities. Many observers such as Alrasheed1075 believe 
that SAMA eventually will be forced to regulate the Shari‘ah governance in IIFS. 
Establishing a central Shari‘ah board is not the only way to remedy creative 
Shari‘ah compliance. The next section discusses another public mechanism: enforcing 
compulsory disclosure by regulators to remedy creative Shari‘ah compliance 
6.8.  Compulsory Disclosure  
One of the remedies which can be used to prevent creative Shari‘ah compliance is 
increasing the level of disclosure that regulators require of IIFS. This tool can 
particularly be utilised by regulators in secular countries to increase consumer 
protection without the need to enact a Shari‘ah governance framework. Consumers 
should be fully aware of the role and the status of SSBs to be able to make an 
informed decision. They should be able to trust that an IIFS is a truly Shari‘ah 
compliant if it presents itself that way.1076 
                                                 
1074 Ibid., p24. 
1075 A personal interview with Majed Alrasheed on 12/4/2013., Riyadh Saudi Arabia 
1076 Verhoef, Azahaf , and Werner, Islamic Finance and Supervision: an Exploratory Analysis, p28. 
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However, in practise, many IIFS are not transparent with their consumers about 
what they do to ensure the Shari‘ah compliance of their activities.1077 For instance, 
according to Section 4.4A1078 of the UK Conduct of Business Sourcebook 
(MCOB),1079 financial institutions which offer home purchase plans (Shari‘ah-
compliant mortgages) are required by the FCA to provide clients with an Combined 
Initial Disclosure Document (CIDD).1080 This FCA form is the only document which 
has a section informing consumers about the product’s compliance with Shari‘ah. The 
section asks firms to include the following statement in their CIDD: “Our services are 
regularly checked by [name(s) of scholar(s)] to ensure compliance with Islamic law. 
Ask us if you want further information about the role of our scholar(s)”.1081 However, 
this requirement is only limited to Islamic financial products under home purchase 
plans and is not extended to other Shari‘ah-compliant products offered in the industry.    
To remedy this lack of transparency, regulators should enhance disclosure in two 
areas: the annual reports of SSBs and the Shari‘ah governance of IIFS. To make 
annual SSB reports more effective, a report issued by the Islamic Finance Council UK 
(IFC) and the International Shari‘ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance 
(ISRA)1082 suggests that SSBs follow the practise of conventional auditing when 
describing an institution’s Shari‘ah compliance. This schema includes four types of 
auditing opinions, namely, unqualified opinion, qualified opinion, adverse opinion, 
                                                 
1077 Ibid. 
1078 Financial Services Authority, "Mortgage Market Review (Conduct Of Business) Instrument 2012," 
FSA,, http://media.fsahandbook.info/Legislation/2012/2012_46.pdf. accessed 10 May 2013 
1079 This section comes into force on 26 April 2014. Prior to that, the requirement is included under 
4.4.1R of MCOB. 
1080 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), "Combined Initial Disclosure Document " FCA,, 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/handbook/cobs6_annex2_20130401.doc. accessed 1 March 
2014 
1081 Ibid. 
1082 Islamic Finance Council UK (IFC) and International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic 
Finance (ISRA), "Enhancing Shari’ah Assurance," IFC,, http://www.ukifc.com/ifc-isra-launch-
pioneering-shariah-assurance-report. accessed 16 May 2013 
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and disclaimer.1083 The unqualified opinion is issued where the auditor deems that a 
financial statement is fair and accurate and was conducted in line with an appropriate 
standard of financial reporting. The qualified opinion is where the auditor cannot 
issue an unqualified opinion, but the discord is substantial enough to require issuing 
an adverse opinion or a disclaimer. For example, an SSB can issue a qualified opinion 
if limited incidences of noncompliance with Shari‘ah occurred or if the SSB was not 
granted full access to product documentation. It also can be used where a product is 
based on a structure or a contract which is known to be not accepted in certain 
jurisdictions. For example, a product that is based on innah is likely to be rejected by 
Shari‘ah scholars in GCC countries, but not in Malaysia. The report can include a 
paragraph clarifying why a qualified opinion has been issued. This kind of disclosure 
will raise the transparency level of IIFS activities and give peace of mind to 
international investors. The adverse opinion is issued where the auditor deems the 
discord substantial and requiring disclosure. Finally, a disclaimer is usually issued 
where the scope of auditing is substantially limited, to an extent which disables the 
auditor from reaching an opinion on the financial statements of IIFS due to the lack of 
evidence.1084  
The report also suggests that SSBs use what is known in conventional finance 
auditing as the Emphasis of Matter paragraph (EMP),1085 where the auditor can draw 
users’ attention to an important matter presented in the financial statements which he 
feels is essential to understanding the report. SSBs could include a similar section in 
their annual report which can be titled Matters of Shari‘ah Emphasis (MSE), where it 
can raise its concerns over certain issues with regard to the Shari‘ah compliance of an 
IIFS. For example, an MSE could be used to criticise the heavy use of certain product 
                                                 
1083 Ibid., p15. 
1084 Ibid. 
1085 Ibid. 
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structures by the IIFS which are seen as not in line with the spirit of Islamic law, or it 
could be used to highlight particular areas which were not adequately addressed by 
the IIFS management. The possibility of inserting an MSE section within the SSB 
annual report would put pressure on IIFS management to comply with SSB decisions 
as well as enabling SSB members to fulfil their duty of care towards stakeholders in a 
very transparent way. International standard-setting bodies such as AAOIFI and IFSB 
can help to issue guidelines as to when these recognised opinions and MSEs can be 
used in SSB annual reports.1086 
The annual reports of SSBs could additionally be improved if regulators set 
further requirements for disclosures in relation to non-Shari‘ah income 
purification.1087 For example, what is the value of the income? How much was 
purified during the period of the financial statement, and why was the rest not 
purified? It also should indicate the nature of the charities which benefit from the 
purification process and their relation to the IIFS. The management should include a 
statement confirming that the IIFS has not benefited from the money allocated for 
purification. 
Moreover, the IFSB standard on Transparency and Market Discipline (IFSB-4)1088 
provides several provisions which can be used to increase the level of Shari‘ah 
compliance in the industry. For instance, it recommends IIFS disclose whether they 
only offer Shari‘ah-compliant services or provide conventional finance with Islamic 
                                                 
1086 Ibid. 
1087 Ibid., p23. 
1088 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), "Disclosures to Promote Transparency and Market 
Discipline for Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services," IFSB,, 
http://www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb4.pdf. accessed 19 May 2013 
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windows.1089 It also suggests disclosing any losses resulting from non-compliance 
with Shari‘ah.1090 
With regard to enhancing disclosure in relation to the Shari‘ah governance of 
IIFS, chapter five mentioned that SSB members’ independence can be affected if they 
have any financial or personal interests in the IIFS.1091 The IFC/ISRA 
recommendations for SSB reports suggest establishing an appropriate mechanism of 
disclosure to mitigate these risks.1092 Similarly, transparency is also needed for 
Shari‘ah  consultancy and auditing firms, particularly in areas related to the 
governance and management structures of auditing firms, their quality and control 
systems, policies and procedures with regard to human resource and training, and 
codes of independence and ethics. Section six of the IFSB Standard on Transparency 
and Market Discipline is dedicated to Shari‘ah governance disclosures of an IIFS in 
terms of its structure, procedures, and functioning.1093 IFSB strongly recommends 
following the approach of “comply or explain”. The standard includes the 
requirements of qualitative and quantitative disclosures shown in Table 4. If this 
standard were adopted, it would provide a high level of disclosure which would 
increase transparency within the industry and help consumers to make an informed 
decision.    
  
                                                 
1089 Ibid., p6. 
1090 Ibid., p22.  IFSB define Shari’ah non-compliance risk as “the risk that arises from an IIFS’s failure 
to comply with the Shari’ah rules and principles determined by the Shari’ah Board of the IIFS or the 
relevant body in the jurisdiction in which the IIFS operate.” 
1091 See: 5.4.5. The Lack of Independence of SSBs; p167  
1092 Islamic Finance Council UK (IFC) and International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic 
Finance (ISRA), "Enhancing Shari’ah Assurance" p16. 
1093 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), "IFSB-4" p28. 
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Table 4. IFSB Shari‘ah Governance Disclosures 
Qualitative  
Disclosures 
1 A statement on the governance arrangements, systems, and controls 
employed by the IIFS to ensure Shari‘ah compliance and on how 
these meet applicable national or international standards. If there is 
less than full compliance with desirable standards, the reasons for 
non-compliance should be explained. In countries where national 
guidelines on Shari‘ah governance in IIFS exist, and the related 
governance requirements of the IFSB’s Corporate Governance 
Standard are followed, a statement of compliance with these 
standards (and reasons for any non-compliance) should be provided. 
2 Disclosure of how non-Shari‘ah-compliant earnings and 
expenditures occur and the manner in which they are disposed of. 
3 Disclosure of whether compliance with Shari‘ah rulings is 
mandatory or not. 
Quantitative  
Disclosures 
4 Disclosure of the nature, size, and number of violations of Shari‘ah   
compliance during the year 
5 Disclosure of annual zakat contributions of the IIFS, where 
relevant, according to constitution, general assembly, or national 
requirements. 
6 Disclosure of remuneration of Shari‘ah board members 
Source: IFSB Standard on Transparency and Market Discipline (IFSB-4)1094 
Disclosure in the manners mentioned above can be initiated voluntarily in a sort of 
self-regulation. Alternatively, standard-setting bodies and national regulators can 
impose minimum disclosure requirements for SSBs and Shari‘ah auditing firms.1095  
6.9.  Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested two public mechanisms where a national body is 
involved in remedying the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance. The first one is to 
establish a central Shari‘ah supervisory board (CSSB), either as a self-regulatory body 
or as a unit within the central bank which acts as the authority overseeing the Shari‘ah 
governance and the implementation of Islamic finance in the financial industry. Two 
cases of central Shari‘ah boards in Sudan and Malaysia have been shown to offer a 
better understanding about the nature of CSSBs’ work. In addition, the attitudes of 
                                                 
1094 Ibid. 
1095 Islamic Finance Council UK (IFC) and International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic 
Finance (ISRA), "Enhancing Shari’ah Assurance" p18. 
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regulators in the UK and KSA towards Shari‘ah governance and CSSBs have been 
discussed in detail. 
This remedy might not be desirable in some countries, mostly because 
establishing a central Shari‘ah board is deemed a religious matter that is beyond the 
legal authority of a secular regulator. Nevertheless, this chapter has argued that 
making sure that IIFS have an adequate process of ensuring Shari‘ah compliance and 
that SSBs have a proper corporate governance culture does not conflict with the 
secular nature of a regulator. Moreover, this chapter has argued that regulators risk 
breaching their obligation to protect consumers, one of the main objectives of setting 
up a financial service authority, if they do not regulate Shari‘ah governance and do 
not try to prevent creative Shari‘ah compliance in IIFS. The current approach 
followed by the FCA in the UK and SAMA in KSA with regard to Shari‘ah 
governance is not adequate to protect consumers from creative Shari‘ah compliance. 
The FCA and SAMA ought to strongly encourage IIFS and other relevant 
organisations in the UK and Saudi to at least form a self-regulatory body for the 
Islamic finance industry. 
The second public mechanism proposed in this chapter is increasing the level of 
disclosure required by regulators from IIFS. This tool can particularly be utilised by 
regulators in secular countries to increase consumer protection without the need to 
enact a Shari‘ah governance framework. This chapter recommends that regulators 
enhance disclosure in two areas: the Shari‘ah governance of IIFS and the annual 
reports of SSBs. In addition, the chapter recommends adopting the IFSB Standard on 
Transparency and Market Discipline (IFSB-4). It would provide a high level of 
disclosure which would increase transparency within the industry and help consumers 
to make informed decisions.   
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The next chapter suggests several private mechanisms to remedy creative Shari‘ah 
compliance which can be employed without governmental involvement.  
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Chapter Seven: 
Private Mechanisms to Remedy Creative Shari‘ah 
Compliance 
7.1.  Introduction  
The previous chapter provided public mechanisms to remedy creative Shari‘ah 
compliance. This chapter suggests potential mechanisms to remedy creative Shari‘ah 
compliance which can be employed by private actors in the industry without 
government involvement. These remedies are particularly useful when institutions 
offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) are operating within a jurisdiction where 
regulators cannot or prefer not to be involved in regulating Shari‘ah governance. 
The first four mechanisms suggested in the chapter are external, meaning they are 
applied by a third party outside the financial institution, such as a Shari‘ah compliance 
rating provided by rating agencies. The remainder are internal mechanisms, meaning 
they can be employed within the financial institution, such as a whistle-blowing 
policy 
The chapter is structured in eight parts, including this introduction. Starting with 
external mechanisms, Part 7.2 and Part 7.3 examine how Shari‘ah compliance ratings 
and Shari‘ah indices can be used to reduce creative Shari‘ah compliance. Part 7.4 
highlights the threat of self-review and examines what role private Shari’ah auditing 
firms can play in countering this threat. Part 7.5 suggests the adoption of international 
standards related to enhancing Shari‘ah compliance. Moving to the internal 
mechanisms, Part 7.6 suggests the adoption of a whistle-blowing policy for serious 
Shari’ah-compliance violations. Part 7.7 advocates characterising an IFI in its articles 
of association as an entity that fully complies with Shari‘ah ruling. Finally, Part 7.8 
concludes the chapter. 
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7.2.  Shari‘ah Compliance Rating  
One of the external tools to secure Shari‘ah compliance is the use of rating 
agencies to rate the Shari‘ah compliance of an IIFS or a product with the objectives of 
Islamic law. The Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) was one of the first 
rating agencies to issue a rating based on the Shari‘ah compliance.1096 IIRA was 
established in 2005 by shareholders from eleven countries, including multilateral 
development institutions, top banks, and other financial institutions and rating 
agencies. Grais and Pellegrini1097 suggest that private rating agencies have not 
acquired the expertise or seen sufficient incentives to conduct a Shari‘ah compliance 
rating. Therefore, the task remains with ultimately government-sponsored institutions 
such as the IIRA. Although the primary focus of IIRA is to provide a credit rating for 
IIFS,1098 it offers other specialised ratings such as corporate governance ratings, 
fiduciary ratings, and Shari‘ah quality ratings. The latter focus is the one relevant to 
this chapter’s discussion.  
In its methodology for Shari‘ah quality ratings,1099 IIRA states that it aims to offer 
investors an independent evaluation of the Shari‘ah compliance of either IIFS or 
Islamic finance products such as Ṣukūk. IIRA’s goal is to become a reliable reference 
in the market for those who seek quality with regard to Shari‘ah compliance. One 
advantage of the existence of Shari‘ah compliance ratings as a tool is that it could 
create an environment where IIFS would compete to achieve the highest rating, which 
                                                 
1096Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA), "Corporate Profile," IIRA, 
http://www.iirating.com/CoperateProfile.aspx. accessed 10 May 2013 
1097 Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services". p17. 
1098Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA), "Rating," IIRA, 
http://www.iirating.com/RatingNavigations.aspx. accessed 13 May 2013 
1099 "Methodology for Shari’ah Quality Rating," IIRA, 
http://www.iirating.com/Documents/ResearchReports/sharia_methd_eng.pdf. accessed 10 May 2013 
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in turn would increase the level of Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic finance industry 
as a whole.1100 
The Shari‘ah quality rating is conducted by specialists overseen by a board of 
Shari‘ah scholars.1101 For a rating assignment, a team of three scholars who have no 
relation with the audited entity are selected by the secretariat of the Shari‘ah Board, 
which will review the finding of the rating specialists. IIRA management offers 
technical support to the board and helps to obtain the required information for the 
rating from the IIFS, including its product structure, related fatwas, and the financial 
statements of the last five years.  
When describing its methodology,1102 IIRA states that it strives to provide its 
services to investors following different sects and schools of thought, and therefore it 
does not seek to issue a fatwa or comment on the decision of SSBs. Rather, IIRA’s 
main task is to assess an IIFS’s compliance with decisions issued by its Shari‘ah 
supervisory board. However, IIRA made it clear that this does not mean that its 
Shari‘ah board will not thoroughly review decisions issued by an SSB of an IIFS. 
IIRA will objectively evaluate any reservations on some fatwa expressed by other 
Shari‘ah scholars. Besides this, IIRA’s assessment will take into account the power 
and the resources available to an SSB to do its task.1103 For example, it might consider 
whether an IIFS has internal mechanisms for ensuring Shari‘ah compliance, such as a 
Shari‘ah unit to review its compliance with the decisions issued by its SSB as well as 
how it deals with non-Shari‘ah-compliant income.1104 
IIRA’s methodology also involves examining the structure of assets and liabilities 
in a product, the IIFS process of Shari‘ah authentication of a product, and the 
                                                 
1100 Ibid. 
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1102 Ibid. 
1103 Ibid. 
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credibility and the independence of SSB members who approve a product.1105 The 
Shari‘ah quality rating is further influenced by other factors such as the IIFS’s 
disclosure of business activities to its clients, the disclosure of its profit and loss 
calculation method, the Shari‘ah compliance of its ethics code, and its compliance 
with international standards in Islamic finance such as the Shari‘ah standards of the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI).1106 When rating Islamic windows offered by conventional financial 
institutions, IIRA reviews the procedures taken to ensure that Shari‘ah-compliant and 
conventional funds are not commingled.1107   
As can be seen in table (3), which shows the process of Shari‘ah quality rating, the 
assessment process is only conducted upon IIFS request.1108 The result will not be 
made public before the approval of the IIFS, which can discuss and appeal the result 
of the rating. IIRA states that it takes this route because it does not want to have a 
negative impact on the Islamic finance industry. The rating is valid for one year, 
during which time IIRA watches and gathers information from the rated IIFS. The 
rating result might be modified subject to information collected during this year. In 
case an IIFS chooses not to renew its agreement, its IIRA rating will be publicly 
withdrawn.  
However, a Shari‘ah compliance rating as described in the IIRA methodology is 
unlikely to improve the level of Shari‘ah compliance in the industry, as is advocated 
in this chapter, because IIRA only conducts Shari‘ah compliance rating at the request 
of an IIFS and does not publish the result without IIFS permission. This means that 
                                                 
1105 Ibid. 
1106 Ibid. 
1107 Ibid. Other factors have been stated in the IIRA methodology of Shari’ah quality rating, but they 
are not directly related to Shari’ah compliance. For example, the IIRA reviews IIFS accounting policies 
and practises and its presentation of financial statements as well as its compliance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
1108 Ibid. 
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only good ratings will be published, as no IIFS would agree to publish a negative 
rating. As mentioned, IIRA seeks the approval of an IIFS before rating its Shari‘ah 
compliance because IIRA does not want to have any negative impact on the industry. 
This stance may suggest that IIRA aims to promote IIFS business rather than 
increasing the compliance level and protecting consumers. This assumption is further 
supported by the fact that at the time this chapter was written, all seven IIFS rated by 
IIRA have been given the second-highest rating possible (AA; see Table 4 for rating 
definitions).1109 IIRA and other rating agencies should conduct unsolicited Shari‘ah 
compliance ratings based on the information disclosed by IIFS, as is the case in credit 
ratings.1110 This would encourage IIFS to disclose more information about their 
Shari‘ah-compliant products and Shari‘ah governance structure, and generally 
increase the level of Shari‘ah compliance in the industry.    
Another issue with the IIRA Shari‘ah quality rating is the names of scholars on its 
Shari‘ah supervisory board.1111 The name list shows the presence of many scholars 
who are among the top Shari‘ah scholars in terms of multiple board membership in 
IIFS.1112 This cast doubt on the independence of the IIRA Shari‘ah quality rating. 
Besides, some of these Shari‘ah scholars have been responsible for authorising some 
of the most conventional structures in the Islamic finance market, such as organised 
                                                 
1109 "Press Releases," IIRA, http://www.iirating.com/ResourceCenterNavigation.aspx. accessed 12 May 
2013. Only two withdrawals have been announced, one of them because of reasons related to Shari‘ah 
compliance (i.e., the resignation of two senior management persons from the Shari‘ah compliance 
department). See: "IIRA withdraws AA (SQR) rating assigned to Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad " 
IIRA, http://www.iirating.com/Documents/PressReleasePdf/SQR_withdrawal_of_Syarikat_TM.pdf. 
accessed 11 May 2013. 
1110 Financial Times Lexicon, "Unsolicited Rating," Financial Times,, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=unsolicited-rating. accessed 18 May 2013; Winnie P. H. Chan Kam 
C. Poon, "Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings : a Global Perspective," Asian Development Bank 
Inst., http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2010/08/24/4048.solicited.unsolicited.credit.ratings.global/. 
accessed 11 May 2013 
1111 Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA), "Methodology for Shari’ah Quality Rating" p6. 
1112 Compare it with the names in Ünal "The Small World of Islamic Finance; Shariah Scholars and 
Governance - A Network Analytic Perspective". 
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tawarruq.1113 For example, Sheikh Nizam Yaquby has publicly challenged the 
International Fiqh Academy Council prohibition on organised tawarruq.1114 Even if 
the subcommittee selected by the IIRA SSB to rate an IIFS has no direct relation with 
that IIFS, it would be difficult for scholars to be objective about the performance of an 
SSB that is headed by their colleague in the Shari‘ah supervisory board of IIRA. This 
might be especially the case taking into account the high religious status which 
Shari‘ah scholars usually enjoy in their societies. This situation poses a serious 
question about conflicts of interest in the IIRA Shari‘ah board, and whether IIRA is 
able to achieve its primary task with its current SSB members.   
For the Shari‘ah compliance rating to help increase the level of compliance in the 
industry, it should be carried out by more independent rating agencies, and a higher 
weight should be given to the substance of products in the results of the rating. Some 
credit rating agencies such as Moody have expressed concern over the substance of 
some products and their non-Shari‘ah-compliance risk, which might have an impact 
on the credit profile of an IIFS.1115 Prominent credit rating agencies might do well to 
employ Shari‘ah experts and extend their services to include Shari‘ah compliance 
rating. With the industry expanding, Shari‘ah compliance ratings will be necessary to 
prevent the spread of creative Shari‘ah compliance practises.   
 
                                                 
1113 See: Mohammed Khnifer, " Yaʿqūbī li "ālāqtiṣādiyah": Lam Ataḥadda Majmaʿ al-Fiqh Bifatwā al-
Tawarq waʿalā al-Fuqahāʾ al-Tafrīq bana «al-Munḍabiṭ» wa«ghari al-Munḍabiṭ»", Alaqtsadyh, 
52/07/2010 http://www.aleqt.com/2010/07/25/article_422297.html. accessed 11 May 2013; 
Muḥammad al-Hamazānī, "Raʾīs Haʾah Sharʿiyyah fī Akbar Bank Islāmī Uḥarim  al-Tawaruq  wa 
Uaṣifuh bi al-Ribā al-Mastūr", Asharq Al-Awsat, 14/9/2010 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?issueno=11700&article=586625#.UeYQQNLl4VR. accessed 10 
May 2010 
1114 Khnifer, " Yaʿqūbī li "ālāqtiṣādiyah": Lam Ataḥadda Majmaʿ al-Fiqh Bifatwā al-Tawarq waʿalā al-
Fuqahāʾ al-Tafrīq bana «al-Munḍabiṭ» wa«ghari al-Munḍabiṭ»."; al-Hamazānī, "Raʾīs Haʾah 
Sharʿiyyah fī Akbar Bank Islāmī Uḥarim  al-Tawaruq  wa Uaṣifuh bi al-Ribā al-Mastūr." 
1115 See for example: Howladar, "The Future of Sukuk: Substance over Form?"; "Shari'ah Risk: 
Understanding Recent Compliance Issues in Islamic Finance". 
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Table 5. Shari‘ah Quality Rating 
 
  
Issuer/Client 1 Signs agreement for rating with IIRA 
 2 Submits preliminary information materials to IIRA 
IIRA 3 Tells the Secretariat of the Shari‘ah Board to formulate 
the Shari‘ah Quality Rating Committee 
 4 Conducts a preliminary study and sends the preliminary 
information to the Shari‘ah Quality Rating Committee 
Shari‘ah Quality Rating 
Committee 
5 Liaises with IIRA to submit a detailed questionnaire to 
the issuer/client 
 
Issuer/Client 6 Provides detailed information in response to detailed  
questionnaire 
IIRA 7 Establishes with the Shari‘ah Quality Rating Committee 
the points to be covered during due diligence 
 8 Conducts pre–due diligence meeting analysis 
 9 Conducts due diligence meetings 
 10 Conducts post–due diligence analysis 
 11 Submits report to Shari‘ah Quality Rating Committee 
Shari‘ah Quality Rating 
Committee 
12 Decides the preliminary/initial rating 
IIRA 13 Notifies issuer/client of the preliminary/initial rating 
 14 Discusses the rating rationales and issues with 
issuer/client 
Issuer/Client 15 May appeal based on any new facts or information 
Shari‘ah Quality Rating 
Committee 
16 Deliberates on appeals by issuer/client and gives decision 
IIRA 17 Communicates the decision of the Shari‘ah Quality 
Rating Committee to the issuer/client 
Issuer/Client 18 Consents to release of the rating to the public 
IIRA 19 Releases the rating to media 
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Table 6. IIRA Rating 
 Source: IIRA, “Methodology for Shari‘ah Quality Rating”  
AAA 
(SQR) 
In IIRA’s opinion, an entity/instrument rated AAA (SQR) conforms to highest 
level of standards of Shari’a requirements in all aspects of Shari’a quality 
analysis 
AA(SQR) In IIRA’s opinion, an entity/instrument rated AA (SQR) conforms to very high 
level of standards of Shari’a requirements in all aspects of Shari’a quality 
analysis 
A(SQR) In IIRA’s opinion, an entity/instrument rated A (SQR) conforms to high level 
of standards of Shari’a requirements and has very few weaknesses in some 
areas of Shari’a quality analysis 
BBB(SQR) In IIRA’s opinion, an entity/instrument rated BBB (SQR) conforms to 
moderately high level of standards of Shari’a requirements and has few 
weaknesses in some areas of Shari’a quality analysis 
BB(SQR) In IIRA’s opinion, an entity/instrument rated BB (SQR) conforms to 
satisfactory level of standards of Shari’a requirements and has some weaknesses 
in some areas of Shari’a quality analysis 
B(SQR) In IIRA’s opinion, an entity/instrument rated B (SQR) conforms to adequate 
level of standards of Shari’a requirements and has weaknesses in some areas of 
Shari’a quality analysis 
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7.3.  Shari‘ah Indices 
Shari‘ah indices are a second tool that can be used to increase the level of Shari‘ah 
compliance. These indices were initially developed for Shari‘ah-compliant investment 
in stock markets. They can be issued individually by Shari‘ah scholars or in a more 
organised way by financial institutions such as credit rating agencies. One of the first 
attempts to create a Shari‘ah-compliant index was the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Index (DJIMI),1116 which was established in 1999 in Bahrain to help Muslim investors 
who wanted to invest in the Dow Jones stock market. It has now issued a family of 
indices in at least 69 countries. The DJIMI has its own Shari‘ah supervisory board, 
which has an advisory role and submits recommendations to the DJIMI steering 
committee, which in turn has the power to issue final business decisions.1117 
Currently, there are several Shari‘ah-compliant indices issued by various companies, 
including Standard & Poor’s, the Russell-Jadwa Shari‘ah Index,1118 Thomson Reuters 
Islamic Indices, and FTSE Shari‘ah Global Shari‘ah Global Equity Index.1119 Besides 
these, several Shari‘ah scholars have issued unofficial Shari‘ah indices in addition to 
the percentages of non-Shari‘ah income which investors need to purify by paying it to 
charity.1120 
The basic methodologies for calculating these indices are generally based on the 
business activities and the debt structure of the listed companies. The index first 
                                                 
1116 M. Fahim Khan and Mario Porzio, Islamic Banking and Finance in the European Union: A 
Challenge  (Edward Elgar Ltd, 2010), p137. 
1117CME Group Index Services, "Guide to the Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes," CME Group Index 
Services,. accessed 15 May 2013 
1118 Jadwa, "Launch of the Russell-Jadwa Shariah Indexes," Jadwa 
http://www.jadwa.com/en/news/news/news-2009/launch-of-the-russell-jadwa-shariah-indexes.html. 
accessed 22 May 2013 
1119 FTSE Group, "FTSE Shariah Global Equity Index Series," FTSE,, 
http://www.ftse.co.uk/Indices/FTSE_Shariah_Global_Equity_Index_Series/index.jsp. accessed 22 May 
2013 
1120 ʿAbdālʿazīz                al-Fūzān, "Qāʾimah al-Ashum al-Mubāḥah," The message of Islam 
http://main.islammessage.com/newspage.aspx?id=9663. accessed 28 May 2013; Yūsuf ʿAbdAllāh al-
Shabīlī, "Qāʾimah al-Ashum al-Jāʾizah    " Shubily, http://www.shubily.com/index.php?news=348. 
accessed 10 May 2013 
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excludes any company that engages in prohibited and harmful activities, such as the 
manufacturing of alcohol, pork-related products, entertainment, tobacco, and 
conventional financial services.1121 Listed companies then are screened to assess their 
capital structure. Their debt level should be less than 33% of company capital. 
These Islamic financial indices help to increase the general level of Shari‘ah 
compliance in some Muslim countries such as Saudi in the sense that they encourage 
companies to use Shari‘ah-compliant financing methods rather than conventional 
ones. However, they are not sufficient to deal with the issue of creative Shari‘ah 
compliance or to substitute for the role of Shari‘ah compliance rating agencies, 
because Islamic indices are limited to the capital market, which tends to attract certain 
types of investors. It does not include other Shari‘ah-compliant products which 
usually are used by general consumers.  
In addition, the methodology of composing Shari‘ah-compliant indices is fairly 
controversial among Shari‘ah scholars.1122 For example, there is no agreement 
regarding the accepted level of debt or the percentage of non-halal income of a 
company to be included in Shari‘ah-compliant indices.1123 Also, should the 
calculation of the debt structure be based on the book value or the market value of the 
company?1124 There is also the question of whether financial statements represent a 
reliable account for screening non-Shari‘ah-compliant liability and assets. In short, 
neither Islamic indices nor Shari‘ah compliance ratings as currently practised by IIRA 
represent the desired form of Shari‘ah compliance rating.  
                                                 
1121 The DJIMI SSB does not allow investing in companies involved in these activities where impure 
sources exceed 5% of their revenue. See CME Group Index Services, "Guide to the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Indexes" p5. 
1122 See Grais and Pellegrini, "Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering 
IslamicFinancial Services". p17. 
1123 Ibrāhīm al-Sakrān, al-Ashum al-Mukhtanliṭah  (Wahaj al-ḥayāh Lil-ʿlām, 2005); ṣāliḥ al-ʿIṣaymī, 
al-Ashum al-Mukhtaliṭah fī Mīzān al-Sharīʿh  (al-Tadmuriyyah, 2008). 
1124 Abdul-Rahman, The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance : Tools and Techniques for Community-
Based Banking, p365. 
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7.4.  Private External Shari‘ah Auditing Firms 
One of the remedies which can help to strengthen Shari‘ah compliance in the IIFS 
are the use of private Shari‘ah auditing firms (SAFs), or Shari‘ah consulting firms 
(SCFs),1125 as they can be called sometimes, to mitigate the risk of self-review. IIFS 
tend to employ an SSB to ensure the Shari‘ah compliance of its business activities. 
The tasks of the SSB usually consist of structuring Shari‘ah-compliant products (ex 
ante review), and also verifying that implementations of these structures are in line 
with Shari‘ah (ex post review).1126 The objectivity and the independence of the SSB 
are endangered since Shari‘ah scholars have two roles: structuring the product and 
ensuring its compliance. This leads to what is known as a “self-review threat”.1127 A 
report issued by the Islamic Finance Council UK (IFC) and the International Shari‘ah 
Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) 1128 suggests following the guidelines 
of auditing in the conventional market where auditing firms might be restricted from 
providing advisory services and auditing the same work on which they had 
consulted.1129 Accordingly, the task of designing and approving Shari‘ah-compliant 
products should be separated from the task of ensuring their compliance.1130  
The first SAF emerged in 2003 in Kuwait, and others have been subsequently 
established in the remaining GCC countries in the addition to the UK.1131 The 
                                                 
1125 See: Abdulbari Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: 
al-ḍawābiṭ wālʾāliyāt   " (paper presented at the The Seventh Conference of the Shariah Boards of 
Islamic Financial Institutions, 27 - 28/5/2008). 
1126 Islamic Finance Council UK (IFC) and International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic 
Finance (ISRA), "Enhancing Shari’ah Assurance" p10. 
1127 Ibid. 
1128 Ibid., p11. 
1129 See: The Auditing  Practices Board, "APB Ethical Standard 5: Non-Audit Services Provided To 
Audited Entities  " Financial Reporting Council (FRC),, https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/APB/ES-5-(Revised)-Non-audit-services-provided-to-(2).pdf. accessed 1 March 
2014  
1130Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ 
wālʾāliyāt   " p8.  
1131 ʿAbd al-Sattār al-Qaṭṭān, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-
mutaṭallabāt" (paper presented at the The 8th Conference of Shari'a Supervisory Boards of Islamic 
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emergence of these firms has been attributed by some researchers to the fact that some 
SSB tend to take a long time to approve the compliance of IIFS products and 
transactions, due to the shortage of Shari‘ah scholars, among other reasons. This 
might have caused IIFS to miss some investment opportunities which cannot tolerate 
such delay. Therefore, IIFS have been motivated to assign the task of SSBs to private 
Shari‘ah auditing firms, which can provide the service at a lower cost and in a more 
efficient way because of its specialized and full-time staff.1132 There is no standard 
legal framework for SAFs. While some of them are authorised by central banks, as in 
Kuwait and Bahrain,1133 others are only registered as companies with the ministry of 
commerce.1134 
SAFs offer several services to their clients.1135 For example, they can function as 
an SSB of an IIFS, with the Shari‘ah board members of the SAF acting as the SSB 
members of the IIFS. In this position, they can provide an ex ante and ex post Shari‘ah 
review. The SAF would carry out its meeting preparation and any secretarial work 
that is usually done by an internal SSB. This service is the most popular one of SFAs, 
and it is commonly used by new IIFS. SAFs can also provide external Shari‘ah review 
and report back to the SSB or to the management of the IIFS. The review can be 
conducted to examine the compliance of an IIFS with the decisions of its SSB. 
                                                                                                                                            
Financial Institutions, Bahrain, 18-19/5/2009), p4. According to al-Qaṭṭān, at least there are 20 SAF in 
GCC and 8 in Kuwait.  
1132Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ 
wālʾāliyāt   " p3; al-Qaṭṭān, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-
mutaṭallabāt," p5. 
1133See for example: Shariyah Review Bureau, "About Us," Shariyah Review Bureau,, 
http://www.shariyah.com/?page_id=15. accessed 18 May 2013. Some SAFs in the UK are regulated by 
FSA; see: Simply Sharia, "About " Simply Sharia,, http://www.simplysharia.com/About/1/. accessed 
14 May 2013 
1134 al-Qaṭṭān, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-mutaṭallabāt," p8; 
Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ 
wālʾāliyāt   " p4. 
1135"Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ wālʾāliyāt   " 
p4; al-Qaṭṭān, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-mutaṭallabāt," p6; 
Shura Sharia Consultancy, "Home," Shura,, http://www.shura.com.kw/home/pages/default.aspx. 
accessed 18 May 2013 
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However, Mashal1136 notes that SFAs have not been successful in marketing this 
service. Its credibility and professional integrity have not reached a level which gains 
the trust of SSBs. Besides, SSBs have yet to realise the importance of auditor 
independence and the danger of self-review. 
Another service that SAFs offer is supervising the conversion of a conventional 
financial institution into an Islamic financial institution. SAFs can offer alternative 
Shari‘ah-compliant procedures and product structures.1137 In addition, SAFs can be 
hired by an IIFS to develop Shari‘ah-compliant products or services. However, some 
SAFs have not realised that a task like this requires a highly skilled, multidisciplinary 
team, which might explain why conventional finance consulting firms have attracted 
more clients for such tasks (e.g., developing sukūk structure) though they are not 
specialists in Islamic finance.1138 Other services offered by SAFs are calculating 
IIFS’s zakāh, developing Shari‘ah-compliant indices, organising workshops and 
training programmes,1139 and acting as mediators in disputes between IIFS.1140   
However, it is doubtful that SAFs in their current situation will do much to 
improve the industry’s level of Shari‘ah compliance. This is because SAFs lack the 
legal framework for their activities, a situation which has resulted in a few 
unprofessional governance practises.1141 For example, there is a question about the 
independence of SAFs’ Shari‘ah supervisory boards,1142 as some SAFs are owned by 
                                                 
1136 Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ 
wālʾāliyāt   " p4. 
1137 Ibid., p6. 
1138 Ibid., p7. 
1139 Ibid.; al-Qaṭṭān, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-mutaṭallabāt," 
p4. 
1140 "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-mutaṭallabāt," p6. 
1141 Ibid., p8. 
1142 Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ 
wālʾāliyāt   " p7. 
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IIFS, law firms, and Shari‘ah scholars.1143 In addition, the absence of a professional 
standard for SAFs leads to many conflicts of interest. For example, an SAF might 
have other financial interests with the audited IIFS, such as conference sponsorships. 
Mohamad Nedal Alchaar, the Secretary-General of AAOIFI in 2010, expressed the 
organisation’s concern over some SAFs owned by Shari‘ah scholars receiving 
favoured treatment from IIFS. In particular, concerns have been raised over potential 
cases of conflict of interest, breach of confidentiality, and the impact of competition 
between SAFs.1144 Besides, some SAFs agree to only provide a fatwa service to IIFS 
without an ex post review of the actual implementation of this fatwa in these 
institutions. Consumers might be misled by the impression that the Shari‘ah 
compliance of IIFS activities is regularly checked by this specialist SAF. In some 
cases, an SAF provides ex ante and ex post Shari‘ah review to one IIFS, which leads 
to the danger of self-review. Like SSBs, SFAs should not combine the service of 
product development with the ex post Shari‘ah review.1145 To avoid this issue, Mashal 
and other researchers1146 suggest a framework where ex ante and ex post Shari‘ah 
review are performed by separate auditors. The ex ante Shari‘ah review would ideally 
be provided by an IIFS’s own SSB, while the ex post Shari‘ah auditing is performed 
by an SAF, thereby avoiding the threat of self-review.1147  
Moreover, it is worth noting that SAF decisions are not binding on IIFS.1148 
Therefore, Shari‘ah compliance might be questioned if an SAF is acting as the SSB of 
a bank. An IIFS might not want to restrict itself to one SSB since using an SAF’s 
                                                 
1143 Hasan, "Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, GCC countries and the 
UK," p85; Dar, "Implementing Shari'ah Governance -Aawaiting Challenges." 
1144 El Baltaji and Anwar, "Shariah Scholar on More Than 50 Boards Opposes Limit Plan: Islamic 
Finance". 
1145 Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ 
wālʾāliyāt   " p14. 
1146 Ibid., p8. 
1147 Ibid. 
1148 Hasan, "Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, GCC countries and the 
UK," p86. 
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fatwa services can offer more flexibility for product approval. This may explain why 
SAFs are widely used by conventional institutions offering Islamic windows.1149 This 
brings into play the issue of “fatwa shopping”, where IIFS search the market seeking 
approval for a particular product.1150 In this sense, SAFs contribute negatively to 
Shari‘ah compliance and actually facilitate the practise of creative Shari‘ah 
compliance.  
In addition, some SAFs provide services which are beyond their speciality, for 
example, marketing initial public offerings (IPO),1151 translating contracts, evaluating 
SSB staff, and assessing the economic feasibility of Shari‘ah-compliant products. 
Providing such services distract SAFs from their original task of Shari‘ah compliance 
auditing and call into question their credibility.1152      
To solve these issues, regulators need to consider a legal framework establishing a 
supervisory body,1153 preferably a self-regulated one,1154 to license and oversee SFA 
conduct, ensure compulsory reporting, and preserve confidentiality and 
transparency.1155 This framework should help to define the scope and the procedures 
of SAF services, and how its work is different from that of SSBs, internal Shari‘ah 
auditors, and external financial auditors. The programme of Certified Shari‘ah 
Adviser and Auditor (CSAA),1156 established by AAOIFI, is a good step in 
                                                 
1149 Ibid., p319; Dar, "Implementing Shari'ah Governance -Aawaiting Challenges." 
1150 Dar,"Implementing Shari'ah Governance -Aawaiting Challenges." 
1151 Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ 
wālʾāliyāt   " p8; al-Qaṭṭān, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-
mutaṭallabāt," p7. 
1152 "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-mutaṭallabāt," p8. 
1153 Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ 
wālʾāliyāt   " p13 & p16. 
1154 al-Qaṭṭān, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-mutaṭallabāt," p13. 
1155 Hasan, "Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, GCC countries and the 
UK," p319. 
1156Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), "Certified 
Islamic Professional Accountants (CIPA)," AAOIFI, 
http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi/ProfessionalDevelopment/CertifiedIslamicProfessionalAccountantCIPA/t
abid/76/language/en-US/Default.aspx. accessed 14 May 2013 
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recognising external Shari‘ah auditing as a profession. AAOIFI1157 also has issued a 
code of ethics for accountants and auditors of Islamic financial institutions which can 
be adopted by SAFs.1158 
7.5.  International Islamic Financial Standards 
International regulatory and standard-setting bodies are among the main players in 
the Islamic finance industry which could have an impact on Shari‘ah compliance. In 
particular, two international bodies have been actively engaged with the Islamic 
finance industry.1159 Those are the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). The 
former’s standards are more directed towards individual IIFS, while the latter’s 
standards are more focused on national regulators.1160 
AAOIFI is an independent international non-profit corporation established in 1990 
in Algiers and registered almost a year later in the Kingdom of Bahrain.1161 AAOIFI 
mainly issues Shari‘ah, accounting, auditing, governance, and ethics standards for 
IIFS. It is supported by more than 200 institutional members from 45 countries. 
AAOIFI standards generally enjoy a good degree of recognition, and its 
pronouncements have an impact on the market.1162 They have been adopted by 
                                                 
1157 "AAOIFI Key Publications," AAOIFI, 
http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi/Publications/KeyPublications/tabid/88/language/en-US/Default.aspx. 
accessed 23 May 2013 
1158al-Qaṭṭān, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ausus wa al-ḍawābiṭ w al-mutaṭallabāt," p14; 
Mashal, "Sharikāt al-Āsitishārāt al-Sharʿiyyah wa Hayʾāt al-Raqābah al-Sharʿiyyah: al-ḍawābiṭ 
wālʾāliyāt   " p9.  
1159 Andrew Henderson, "Islamic Financial Institutions," in Islamic Finance: Law and Practice, ed. 
Craig Nethercott and David Eisenberg (Oxford Oxford University Press, 2012), p57 
1160 Hasan, "Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, GCC countries and the 
UK," p86. 
1161 Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), "Overview," 
AAOIFI, http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi/TheOrganization/Overview/tabid/62/language/en-
US/Default.aspx. accessed 18 May 2013 
1162 For example, see the impact of AAOIFI Statement on sukūk market in: Farmida Bi, "AAOIFI 
Statement on Sukuk and its Implications," Norton Rose Fulbright, 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/16852/aaoifi-statement-on-sukuk-and-its-
implications. accessed 20 May 2013 
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various countries including Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and Syria and 
other international financial centres such as Dubai International Financial Centre and 
Qatar Financial Centre. As well, regulatory authorities in other countries, including 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Australia, South Africa, and Indonesia, have issued guidelines 
which are based on AAOIFI’s standards and decisions.1163 At the time of writing this 
chapter, AAOIFI published 48 Shari‘ah Standards, 23 Accounting Standards, 5 
Auditing Standards, 6 Governance Standards, and 2 Codes of Ethics.1164 
However, concerns have been raised about the regulatory independence of 
AAOIFI.1165 A recent study by Ünal showed that the 12 most active scholars in 
AAOIFI dominate 38.9% of the available boards in Islamic finance institutions. 
Moreover, they collectively hold 71.17% of the positions in standard-setting 
organizations, governmental units, and consulting companies.1166 To put it plainly, 
how can we be assured that standards and frameworks introduced by this entity follow 
public interests and are not affected by regulatory capture?1167 Accordingly, it is no 
wonder that AAOIFI has so far failed to clearly address the issue of multiple board 
membership and that its scholars have always voiced their objection to strict 
governance reforms.1168 
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) was established in Kuala Lumpur in 
2002 and launched its operations in 2003. It functions as an international standard-
setting body of regulatory and supervisory authorities which have an interest in 
                                                 
1163 Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), "Overview". 
1164 "AAOIFI Key Publications". 
1165 Alsayyed, "Shari’ah Board, The Task of Fatwa, and Ijtihad in Islamic Economics, and Finance"; 
Alkhamees, "The Impact of Shari’ah Governance Practices on Shari’ah Compliance in Contemporary 
Islamic Finance," p153. 
1166 Ünal "The Small World of Islamic Finance; Shariah Scholars and Governance - A Network 
Analytic Perspective". 
1167 Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory body, created to protect the public's interest, 
ultimately takes action benefitting the industry which it is assumed to be regulating rather than the 
public. See: Dal Bó, "Regulatory Capture: A Review".  
1168 See: Richter, "Top Islamic Finance Scholars Oppose Reform Effort". 
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developing a sound and stable financial market. IFSB aims to develop a prudent and 
transparent Islamic financial industry by issuing or amending existing international 
standards to be compatible with Islamic law and recommending their implementation. 
In this regard, IFSB supplements and builds on the work of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, and 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. By the end of 2012, IFSB had 
184 members, among them 55 regulatory and supervisory bodies, eight global 
intergovernmental organisations, and 121 market players working in 41 countries.1169 
Since its launch, the IFSB has issued 19 Standards, Guiding Principles, and Technical 
Notes for the Islamic financial industry. Most of these standards are within the 
domain of prudential regulation, capital adequacy, and risk management.1170 Four 
standards are relevant to the discussion of this chapter: the Guiding Principles on 
Shari‘ah Governance Systems (IFSB-10), Conduct of Business for Institutions 
Offering Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-9), Corporate Governance (IFSB-3), and 
Transparency and Market Discipline (IFSB-4). The standard most interrelated with 
the issue of Shari‘ah compliance is the first one (IFSB-10). The paragraphs below 
offer some details of this standard.       
The IFSB Guiding Principles on Shari‘ah Governance Systems unsurprisingly 
shares a core similarity with the Shari‘ah Governance Framework issue by Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM) discussed in chapter six The standard begins by defining the 
Shari‘ah governance system and its scope. Section I then sets out the IFSB’s general 
approach to the Shari‘ah governance system. It lays out ex ante steps that should be 
taken into account at the stage of designing and developing the product, as well as ex 
                                                 
1169Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), "Background," IFSB, 
http://www.ifsb.org/background.php. accessed 20 May 2013 
1170 Ibid. 
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post considerations after offering it to consumers.1171 These ex ante and ex post 
procedures are deemed as crucial aspects of good governance practises in various 
globally recognised governance standards. They include defined terms of reference 
for the mandate and obligations of SSB members, a clear operating procedure and 
lines of reporting, and the implementation of a code of professional ethics. 
Part II deals with the issue of SSB competence. It introduces several procedures to 
make sure that only qualified and skilled members are appointed to the Shari‘ah 
board, and that their proficiency and professional development are continuously 
assessed. Part III focuses on protecting SSB independence, especially from IIFS 
management. It underlines different issues resulting from potential conflicts of 
interest and suggests ways of dealing with them. Part IV highlights the significance of 
preserving confidentiality by SSB members and recommends that IIFS have a risk 
management strategy in place in the event of damaging leakage. Part V is concerned 
with enhancing the consistency of SSB decisions, which is vital to strengthening 
SSBs’ credibility and integrity. It suggests best practises when consensus decision 
cannot be reached by SSB members.1172 In short, the standard provides solutions for 
the SSB governance issues discussed extensively in chapter five. 
IFSB acknowledges that with regard to a Shari‘ah governance framework, there is 
no “single model” or “one-size-fits-all” approach. An IIFS should adopt a Shari‘ah 
governance structure that is appropriate and adequate for its size, the nature of its 
business and its complexity. Different jurisdictions might take different approaches to 
this matter. While some national regulators follow a more centralised approach for 
Shari‘ah governance, others have decided to leave it to the market to decide what 
system of governance is sufficient to provide the credibility for its Shari‘ah-compliant 
                                                 
1171 "IFSB Guiding principles on Shariah governance systems for institutions offering Islamic financial 
services" p8. 
1172 ibid., p5. 
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products and services. IFSB stresses that stakeholders should share the responsibility 
for ensuring a sound and effective Shari‘ah governance structure. This task should not 
only be the burden of SSB members. Rather, regulatory bodies, management, and 
consumers should play a role in ensuring the effectiveness of the Shari‘ah governance 
structure.1173 
Other standards of IFSB include many principles which can also be relevant to the 
issue of Shari‘ah compliance. For example, the first principle of the IFSB Guiding 
Principles on Conduct of Business (IFSB-9) is about honesty and fairness. It states 
that an IIFS should be careful not to intentionally or accidently mislead stakeholders 
about the Shari‘ah compliance of its products or services, or to mislead consumers by 
withholding substantial information.1174 Noncompliance with this principle is further 
illustrated by the example of manipulating the process for obtaining SSB approval by 
not disclosing substantial information that the Shari‘ah board needs to ensure the 
Shari‘ah compliance of a particular product. 1175In addition, where the Shari‘ah 
compliance of a product (e.g., some sukūk structures) is disputed among Shari‘ah 
scholars, the principle of due care and diligence can be exercised by taking into 
account that some investors from different geographical areas might follow a school 
of thought that deems the structure of such a product as non-Shari‘ah compliant. As a 
result, these investors might find themselves forced to dispose of this product, 
possibly at a loss, and to donate any profit to charity.1176 Furthermore, principle seven 
of the IFSB Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business states that an IIFS must be 
able to show that its business activities are governed by an efficient system of 
                                                 
1173 Ibid., p4. 
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Shari‘ah governance and that it manages its operations in a socially responsible 
way.1177   
However, despite the participation of many national regulators on IFSB 
committees, its guidelines and standards are not binding.1178 Malaysia, the host 
country of the IFSB, might be the only notable example which incorporated a lot of 
the IFSB standards into its national legal framework. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, 
an active IFSB member, has not adopted any IFSB standards related to Islamic 
finance and Shari‘ah governance.1179 There is a lack of literature regarding the actual 
impact of IFSB standards on the practises of the Islamic finance industry. In fact, a 
study conducted by Zulkifli Hasan suggests that IIFS have a low level of awareness 
about the development of Shari‘ah governance standards and best practises.1180 More 
than 22% of the surveyed Islamic financial institutions had no knowledge about 
existence of the IFSB Guiding Principles on Shari‘ah Governance Systems (IFSB-10), 
and only 45.7% of Islamic financial institutions have implemented the AAOIFI 
governance standards. Nevertheless, the IFSB effort provides a strong infrastructure 
for developing the Islamic finance industry and for harmonising Islamic finance 
national regulations across the globe.    
Indeed, there are other international organisations which generally contribute to 
the development of Islamic finance. One example is the General Council for Islamic 
Banks and Institutions (CIBAFI),1181 which aims to promote research and 
development in Islamic finance as well as product registration. Another example is 
                                                 
1177 Ibid., p15. 
1178 Bahrain's central banker supports making IFSB standards mandatory: Blake Goud, "Bahrain's 
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1179 See: Saudi Regulators’ Approach towards Shari‘ah Governance p228.  
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the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which has issued 
a special report analysing the application of its own objectives and principles of 
securities regulation for Islamic securities products.1182 It recommends national 
regulators define their approach towards regulating Shari‘ah compliance,1183 and it 
suggests that regulators who are involved in determining Shari‘ah compliance 
disclose key resolutions and the reasoning behind them. Moreover, it encourages 
regulators to ask IIFS to adopt a Shari‘ah-compliant risk management strategy.1184  
The four external mechanisms discussed thus far—Shari‘ah compliance ratings, 
Shari‘ah indices, private Shari’ah auditing, and the adoption of international standards 
related to enhancing Shari‘ah compliance—can be buttressed by the judicious 
application of the following internal mechanisms to remedy creative Shari‘ah-
compliance. 
7.6.  Whistle Blowing 
One of the remedies which can be used to remedy creative Shari‘ah-compliance in 
the Islamic finance industry is to legally authorise SSB members to blow the whistle 
if their decision has been ignored or if they see a serious breach of Shari‘ah 
compliance with the management and board of directors refusing to take action.1185 In 
addition, whistle blowing is important to secure compliance, since direct access to 
shareholders might not always be available to SSBs; even if they do have access, 
dominant shareholders might not be interested in a dispute between the SSB and the 
management, with whom they likely have a close relationship.1186 Rider1187 questions 
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whether SSB members can realistically be expected to blow the whistle, given that 
they are usually appointed and compensated by IIFS management or the board of 
directors. Would it be morally right for SSB members not to do more than raise the 
matter with management? Do scholars, in the eyes of Shari‘ah, have a responsibility 
to take further actions such as reporting the matter to regulators or issuing a public 
statement? Muslims in general and particularly those who have Shari‘ah knowledge 
are prohibited from concealing the truth.1188 Verse 2:2591189 of the Quran reads, 
“Indeed, those who conceal what We sent down of clear proofs and guidance after We 
made it clear for the people in the Scripture—those are cursed by Allah and cursed by 
those who curse”. Additionally, verse 3:187 reads, “And [mention, O Muhammad], 
when Allah took a covenant from those who were given the Scripture, [saying], ‘You 
must make it clear to the people and not conceal it’. But they threw it away behind 
their backs and exchanged it for a small price. And wretched is that which they 
purchased”. 1190Another ḥadīth of the prophet Muhammad states, “He who is asked 
about knowledge [of religion] and conceals it, will be bridled with a bridle of fire on 
the Day of Resurrection”.1191   
However, SSB members might not be able to blow the whistle in non-Islamic 
jurisdictions even if they wanted to do so, since regulators in countries where a 
special framework of Islamic finance is absent might not be officially interested to 
hear about non Shari‘ah-compliant incidents, as long as an IIFS is in compliance with 
the conventional legal framework. In fact, blowing the whistle in this case might hold 
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ʿilm," Ibnothaimeen.com, http://www.ibnothaimeen.com/all/khotab/article_121.shtml. accessed 23 July 
2013. 
1189 Saheeh International, Translation Of The Meanings Of The Glorious Quran. 
1190 Ibid. 
1191 Abu Dawud, "Sunan Abi Dawud: Knowledge (Kitab Al-Ilm)," Sunnah.com, 
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SSB liable for breaching the confidentiality provision in their contract and their 
fiduciary duty, as well as for interfering with the business of IIFS.1192 Moreover, they 
might be sued by the IIFS in question for defamation. 
Nevertheless, regulators ought to avoid uncertainty in this situation and arrange a 
channel of communications with SSBs so that members can report their concerns. 
Doing so is crucial because if a serious breach of Shari‘ah compliance comes to light, 
it might cause consumers to lose confidence in the IIFS and boycott its products and 
services. This would affect the IIFS credit profile and ultimately have an impact on 
the stability of the financial system. In Malaysia, SSB members will not be in breach 
of the confidentiality and secrecy code if they report serious non-Shari‘ah compliance 
to Bank Negara Malaysia in good faith.1193  
In fact, the Islamic Financial Services Board suggests in its Guiding Principles on 
Conduct of Business for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IFSP-9)1194 
that all IIFS should have a whistle-blowing policy in place. It should embolden IIFS 
personnel to immediately notify the management about any suspected violation of 
business conduct principles. The policy should explain the procedures for reporting 
such incidents, the actions that the management must take when it learns about the 
violation, and the IIFS’s duties to prevent the violation from reoccurring.  
7.7.  Characterising the Articles of Association     
A second internal mechanism for strengthening Shari‘ah compliance in Islamic 
financial institutions is for IIFS to characterising themselves in their articles of 
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association as an entity that fully complies with Shari‘ah ruling.1195 This remedy can 
be used in particular where an IIFS is operating within a jurisdiction where regulators 
cannot or prefer not to be involved in regulating Shari‘ah governance. IIFS articles of 
association can include provisions for setting up an SSB and defining its power;1196 
the duties of its members; the policy of appointing, dismissing, and fixing 
remuneration of SSB members; and the process of ensuring Shari‘ah compliance. 
Moreover, IIFS articles of association should include a default clause which identifies 
the relationship between the board of directors and the SSB and the applicable 
procedure in case a conflict arises between the two boards. 
In Saudi Arabia, for example, where there is no framework for Shari‘ah 
governance in the financial sector,1197 Al Rajhi Bank has clarified its policy towards 
the power of its SSB. It regards SSB decisions as obligatory for the departments and 
management of the institution, and it makes executive directors at all levels 
responsible for implementing SSB resolutions. Any violation of SSB pronouncement 
while offering products or services, without prior authorisation from the board, is 
firmly outlawed, and all violators are disciplined.1198 Such steps seem to be more 
visible than the involvement of regulators, especially in non-Muslims countries.   
7.8.  Conclusion  
This chapter has suggested six private mechanisms to remedy creative Shari’ah 
compliance and addressed their limitations. These mechanisms include adopting a 
Shari‘ah compliance rating, Shari‘ah indices, private Shari‘ah auditing, international 
standards related to enhancing Shari‘ah compliance, and a whistle-blowing policy for 
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serious Shari‘ah-compliance violations, as well as characterising an IIFS in its articles 
of association as an entity that fully complies with Shari‘ah ruling. 
The implementations of these measures involve major players in the industry, 
such as central banks, SSBs, private Shari’ah auditing firms, rating agencies, 
international standard-setting bodies, and shareholders. These remedies can be used in 
particular where an IIFS is operating within a jurisdiction where regulators cannot or 
prefer not to be involved in regulating Shari’ah governance.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has investigated the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance in the 
Islamic finance industry with a focus on the regulatory approach in Saudi Arabia and 
the UK. Creative Shari‘ah compliance can be defined as compliance with the letter 
but not the objectives of Shari‘ah. As the introduction to this study showed, Islamic 
finance industry practises have come under scrutiny in recent years, with strong 
critiques levelled against many institutions that claim to provide Shari‘ah-compliant 
Islamic financial products and services, while such services or products in fact 
undermine the spirit and the objectives of Shari‘ah. Financial instruments based on 
the profit- and loss-sharing model are deemed by Shari‘ah scholars and Muslim 
economists to be the most compliant with the objectives of Islamic law. Nonetheless, 
research has shown that they are the least practised forms of Islamic finance; in 
contrast, institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) offer mainly debt-based 
instruments.  
While many researchers have noted this gap between the theory and practise of 
Islamic finance, no study has provided a sustained analysis of the issue. This thesis 
undertakes such analysis and, in doing so, significantly contributes to the sphere of 
Islamic finance in three main ways. First, it critically appraises justifications of 
creative Shari‘ah compliance practises. Second, it examines how Shari‘ah supervisory 
board )SSB) governance practises and the inconsistent fatwas issued by SSBs 
contribute to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance in contemporary Islamic 
finance. Most importantly, it suggests regulatory mechanisms which regulators can 
employ in Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and in secular countries such as the 
United Kingdom to deal with the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance. 
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Chapter one of this thesis provided an overview of Islamic law and its key 
features. The main sources of Shari‘ah are the Quran and the sunnah. The secondary 
sources include ijma (consensus), qiyas (analogical reasoning), and urf (custom). 
Many different sunnī schools of thought have been formed, including the main four 
sunnī schools which remain in the Islamic world today, namely the Ḥanafī School, the 
Mālikī School, the Shāfiʿī School, and the Ḥanbalī School. In Shari‘ah, the starting 
assumption of all contracts is their permissibility. However, for a contract to be 
Shari‘ah-compliant, it must avoid certain prohibitions. These include ribā (usury), 
gharar (excessive risk or uncertainty), and maisir and qim’ar (gambling). The chapter 
categorised Shari‘ah-compliant financial instruments into two broad groups, equity-
type contracts and debt-financing contracts, and detailed some examples of 
instruments in each group. 
In addition, chapter one gave an overview of the objectives of Islamic law. 
Muslim legal theorists agree that the overall objective of Shari‘ah is to bring benefit to 
and remove harm from all human beings. In particular, Shari‘ah promotes well-being 
by protecting five essential principles: the preservation of religion (dīn), the 
preservation of life (nafs), the preservation of intellect (ʿaql), the preservation of 
posterity (nasl), and the preservation of wealth (māl). Anything that contributes to the 
preservation of these five principles benefits the public and is desired, while anything 
that harms them is against the public interest and its elimination is required. The 
principles of Islamic finance seek to realise social justice through the circulation of 
resources, efficiency in consumption, and satisfying people’s basic needs. The 
prohibition of ribā and gharar serves to achieve the same result of social justice. Ribā 
is seen as an unjustified growth in wealth at the cost of the fair circulation of 
resources, while the uncertainty caused by gharar potentially leads to disputes within 
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the community. The prohibition of riba suggests that cooperative and participatory 
funding (equity-based financing) is the ideal form of financing in Shari‘ah; it is 
regarded as a mechanism for the fair mobilisation of wealth, which increases 
productivity and achieves the well-being of the people. 
Chapter two examined whether creative Shari‘ah compliance is a phenomenon 
new to Islamic law. Classical Shari‘ah scholars have addressed the practise of creative 
Shari‘ah compliance under the term ḥīlah. The chapter investigated the position of 
Islamic schools of thought on ḥīlah and its interrelationship with the debate on form 
and substance in Islamic finance. It surveyed whether classical Islamic jurisprudence 
provides a justification for using ḥīlah (a legal ruse) to practise creative Shari‘ah 
compliance. 
This chapter’s key argument is that addressing the issue of form and substance in 
Islamic finance necessitates a distinction between two connotations: permissibility 
(ṣaḥīḥ diyānatan) and validity (ṣaḥīḥ qaḍāʾan). In Islam, every action generally has 
two dimensions: hidden and manifest. “Permissibility” here refers to the inward, 
hidden dimension of a contract, where it is characterised, for example, as prohibited 
or permissible. It concerns the accountability of a person to Allah in the hereafter. 
“Validity” refers to the outwardly manifest dimension of a contract, where a judge 
rules whether it is valid and thus legally enforceable or not. The outward dimension 
concerns individuals’ rights in this world. 
From a permissibility perspective, the research concluded that there is no authority 
for utilising a form to circumvent the spirit of Shari‘ah law in finance. However, from 
a judicial validity perspective, if such a form had been used in a contract and disputed 
before a judge, it could be deemed valid according to some schools of thought, 
including Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī. In addition, some classical jurists accepted some ḥīlah 
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on individual cases as exceptions to the general rule or to the judicial context. 
However, applying ḥīlah on a systemic level, as many financial institutions currently 
do, removes its legitimacy. Accordingly, Shari‘ah supervisory boards should not rely 
on such precedents to structure or Islamise financial products. Modern economic and 
finance knowledge put contemporary scholars in a better position than classical jurists 
were to determine whether a certain product complies with the spirit of Islamic law or 
not. Insisting on justifying the use of some ḥīlah because it was mentioned in the 
classical literature would only harm the industry of Islamic finance. Ultimately, 
people would come to realise that there is no difference between conventional 
products and so-called Shari‘ah-compliant products except that the latter are more 
expensive.  
Chapter three illustrated creative Shari‘ah compliance in the Islamic finance 
industry by examining tawarruq, one of the most common structures used by IIFS. 
After defining tawarruq and its various forms, the chapter addressed Shari‘ah 
scholars’ views on the permissibility of tawarruq. It showed that while most scholars 
deem jurisprudential tawarruq as makrūh (discouraged, but not prohibited), the 
majority of scholars deem the organised tawarruq used by IIFS prohibited; they see it 
as ḥīlah (a legal ruse) to circumvent the Shari‘ah prohibition on ribā (usury). The 
ultimate goal of organised tawarruq structures is to provide a sum to be paid later 
with a fixed return. IIFS and their clients are not interested in the underlying 
commodity, which is only used as a means to overcome the Shari‘ah restriction 
against giving a usurious loan. Last, the chapter argued that organised tawarruq is 
worse than ribā since it casts doubt on the authenticity of Shariah-compliant products; 
does not carry any social, economic, or equity benefits; and has the same 
disadvantages as a usurious loan.    
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Chapter four examined the inconsistency in the fatwas issued by Shari‘ah 
supervisory boards that reside in IIFS as a key factor contributing to the issue of 
creative Shari‘ah compliance. It addressed the debate for and against standardisation. 
It investigated the causes of juristic differences, namely, variable Quranic recitation, 
using words with multiple meanings, lack of knowledge of ḥadīth, adopting certain 
legal principles, disregarding the change of maṣlaḥah (public interest), and the 
structure of the fatwa. The chapter concluded that juristic differences are inevitable 
because Islamic law has not been received as ready-made rules for implementation. 
Unlike modern laws, where interpretation is not always required, in Shari‘ah, 
interpretation of its sources is necessary to understand the intention of the lawgiver. 
The interpretation process does not take a speculative nature, but is rather governed 
by a well-stated approach and methodical tool known as ijtihād, which a jurist uses to 
extract the law on a given matter. 
The chapter argued that juristic differences pose a serious challenge to compliance 
in the Islamic finance industry. It assessed the aptness of standardisation as a remedy 
for inconsistencies in fatwas issued by SSBs. It further argued that it is possible for a 
state to enforce a particular Shari‘ah interpretation, and that such a solution has been 
justified by classical and contemporary Shari‘ah jurists. However, it might be difficult 
to use this remedy at a global level due to the lack of political will or legal power to 
regulate religious matters in secular countries. Accordingly, this chapter suggested 
that efforts be directed towards establishing a Shari‘ah standard which codifies 
various practises of Islamic finance, even if they are deemed highly controversial. 
Such well-defined standards would facilitate the task of regulators, courts, and rating 
agencies, as well as gradually encouraging IIFS to be more transparent with their 
clients about which fatwa or school of thought they are adopting, rather than using the 
276 
 
general label of “Shari‘ah compliant”. With such a level of disclosure, the market 
would hopefully move towards adopting best practises. 
Chapter five explored definitions of SSBs in the Islamic finance literature as well 
as highlighting their importance in IIFS structure. For IIFS to gain the trust of their 
Muslim clients, they normally incorporate a religious board in the form of an SSB. In 
theory, the function of the SSB is to ensure that IIFS operate within Shari‘ah norms 
and teachings. The chapter examined the impact of regulatory issues surrounding 
SSBs on Shari‘ah compliance in the contemporary Islamic finance industry, 
identifying seven challenges as major factors contributing to the issue of creative 
Shari‘ah compliance in IIFS. These are SSBs’ unclear functions and legal status, lack 
of accountability and transparency, and conflicts of interest and lack of independence, 
as well as the poor training and inadequate qualifications of SSB members. 
The chapter put forth a few suggestions to confront these challenges. Crucially, it 
stressed that to maintain sound financial systems and investor confidence, regulators 
in Islamic and secular countries have to recognise the need for their involvement in 
regulating Shari‘ah governance in IIFS. In other words, a solid Islamic financial 
market cannot be established unless Shari‘ah governance is regulated, ideally by a 
centralised body. In addition, Shari‘ah supervision should be recognised as an 
independent profession. Like lawyers and accountants, its members should act within 
a framework that defines their legal status, role, and responsibilities. In cases where 
an IIFS is operating within a jurisdiction which does not favour Islamic finance or 
where regulators are passive, SSB members can take a proactive role in regulating 
Shari‘ah governance by working across SSBs to standardise their own contracts with 
financial institutions. Emphasising accountability and transparency in SSBs should 
not be perceived as showing less respect to Shari‘ah scholars or doubting their 
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credibility, but rather as dealing professionally with an essential group in the industry 
and adding a layer of protection to public interests. This is particularly important if 
IIFS are operating in a global market where the local reputation of Shari‘ah board 
members may not be sufficient to allay stockholders’ suspicions over their reliability 
or SSBs’ lack of accountability and transparency.  
Chapter six suggested two public mechanisms where a national body is involved 
in remedying the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance. The first one is to establish a 
central Shari‘ah supervisory board (CSSB), either as a self-regulatory body or as a 
unit within the central bank which would oversee the Shari‘ah governance and the 
implementation of Islamic finance in the financial industry. The chapter examined the 
central Shari‘ah boards in Sudan and Malaysia to offer a better understanding about 
the nature of CSSBs’ work. The chapter then discussed the attitudes of regulators in 
the UK and KSA towards Shari‘ah governance and CSSB in detail. 
This remedy might not be desirable in some countries mostly because establishing 
a central Shari‘ah board is deemed a religious matter that is beyond the legal authority 
of a secular regulator. Nevertheless, this chapter argued that making sure that IIFS 
have an adequate process of ensuring Shari‘ah compliance and that SSBs have a 
proper corporate governance culture does not conflict with the secular nature of a 
regulator. Moreover, this chapter argued that regulators risk breaching their obligation 
to protect consumers, one of the main objectives of setting up a financial service 
authority, if they do not regulate Shari‘ah governance and do not try to prevent 
creative Shari‘ah compliance in IIFS. The current approach followed by the FCA in 
the UK and SAMA in KSA with regard to Shari‘ah governance is not adequate to 
protect consumers from creative Shari‘ah compliance. The FCA and SAMA ought to 
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strongly encourage IIFS and other relevant organisations in the UK and Saudi to at 
least form a self-regulatory body for the Islamic finance industry. 
The second public mechanism this chapter proposed was increasing the level of 
disclosure which regulators require from IIFS. This tool can particularly be utilised by 
regulators in secular countries to increase consumer protection without the need to 
enact a Shari‘ah governance framework. Consumers should be fully aware about the 
role and the status of SSBs to be able to make an informed decision. They should be 
able to trust that an IIFS is truly Shari‘ah compliant if it presents itself that way. In 
particular, regulators should enhance disclosure in two areas: the Shari‘ah governance 
of IIFS and the annual report of SSB. The chapter suggested that Shari‘ah auditing 
should follow the practise of conventional auditing, where four types of auditing 
opinions are recognised, namely, unqualified opinion, qualified opinion, adverse 
opinion, and disclaimer. In addition, regulators need to set further requirements for 
disclosures in relation to non-Shari‘ah income purification. For example, what is the 
value of the income, how much was purified during the period of the financial 
statement, and why was the remainder not purified? It also should indicate the nature 
of the charities which benefit from the purification process and their relationship to 
the IIFS, and include a statement confirming that the IIFS has not benefited from the 
money allocated for purification. Finally, the chapter recommended adopting the 
IFSB Standard on Transparency and Market Discipline (IFSB-4), which would 
provide a high level of disclosure and would increase the transparency within the 
industry, helping consumers to make an informed decision. 
Chapter seven proposed six private mechanisms to remedy creative Shari‘ah 
compliance which can be employed without governmental involvement. The first one 
is a Shari‘ah compliance rating, where an IIFS or a product is rated according to its 
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compliance with the objectives of Islamic law. The chapter discussed the experience 
of the Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA), one of the first rating agencies to 
issue a rating based on Shari‘ah compliance. It argued that the Shari‘ah compliance 
rating as described in the IIRA methodology is unlikely to improve the level of 
Shari‘ah compliance in the industry. This is because IIRA only conducts Shari‘ah 
ratings at the request of an IIFS, and the result will not be published without the 
permission of the IIFS. This means that only good ratings will be published, as no 
IIFS would agree to publish a negative rating. IIRA seeks the approval of an IIFS 
before rating its Shari‘ah compliance, because IIRA does not want to have any 
negative impact on the industry. This may suggest that IIRA aims to promote IIFS 
business rather than increasing the compliance level and protecting consumers. IIRA 
and other rating agencies should conduct unsolicited Shari‘ah compliance ratings 
based on the information disclosed by IIFS, as is the case in credit ratings. This would 
encourage IIFS to disclose more information about their Shari‘ah-compliant products 
and Shari‘ah governance structure. Shari‘ah compliance ratings should be carried out 
by more independent rating agencies, and a higher weight should be given to the 
substance of products in the results of the rating. This would generally increase the 
level of Shari‘ah compliance in the industry.  
The second suggested private mechanism is the use of Shari‘ah indices. These 
indices were initially developed for Shari‘ah-compliant investment in stock markets. 
An index can be issued individually by Shari‘ah scholars or in a more organised way 
by financial institutions such as credit rating agencies. The chapter examined one of 
the first attempts to create a Shari‘ah-compliant index, the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Index (DJIMI), and addressed its shortcoming. The calculation method for these 
indices is generally based on the business activities and the debt structure of the listed 
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companies. This method of composing Shari‘ah-compliant indices is fairly 
controversial among Shari‘ah scholars. Besides that sentiment, there is the question of 
whether financial statements represent a reliable way to screen for non-Shari‘ah-
compliant liability and assets. In short, neither Islamic indices nor Shari‘ah quality 
ratings as currently practised by IIRA represent the desired form of Shari‘ah 
compliance rating. 
The third proposed private mechanism is the use of private Shari‘ah auditing firms 
(SAFs). This thesis argued that the task of designing and approving Shari‘ah-
compliant products should be separated from the task of ensuring their compliance. 
While the internal SSB can approve Shari‘ah-compliant products (ex ante review), 
SAFs should conduct the ex post review to mitigate the risk of self-review. SAFs 
would verify that the implementations of these structures approved by the internal 
SSB are in line with objectives of Shari‘ah. The chapter highlighted some of the 
limitations of this mechanism. For one, the lack of a legal framework for SAF 
activities resulted in unprofessional governance practises, including potential cases of 
conflict of interest, breach of confidentiality, and inappropriate competition between 
SAFs. Moreover, an SAF decision is not binding on IIFS. Therefore, Shari‘ah 
compliance might be questioned if an SAF is acting as the SSB of the bank. IIFS 
might not want to restrict themselves to one SSB, since using SAFs’ fatwa services 
can offer more flexibility for product approval. This may explain why SAFs are 
widely used by conventional institutions offering Islamic windows. This brings up the 
issue of “fatwa shopping”, where IIFS search the market seeking approval for a 
particular product. In this sense, SAFs contribute negatively to Shari‘ah compliance 
and actually facilitates the practise of creative Shari‘ah compliance. To solve these 
issues, the chapter recommends that regulators consider a legal framework; establish a 
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supervisory body, preferably a self-regulated one, to license and oversee SAF 
conduct; ensure compulsory reporting; and preserve confidentiality and transparency. 
This framework should help to define the scope and procedures of SAF services, and 
how their work is different from that of SSBs, internal Shari‘ah auditors, and external 
financial auditors. 
The fourth proposed private mechanism is adopting international standards related 
to enhancing Shari‘ah compliance. In particular, the chapter discussed two 
international standard-setting bodies which have been actively engaged with the 
Islamic finance industry. Those are the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB). The former’s standards are more directed towards individual IIFS, while the 
latter’s standards are more focused on national regulators. IFSB has so far issued four 
standards relevant to the discussion of this research. These are the standards on 
Guiding Principles on Shari‘ah Governance System (IFSB-10), Conduct of Business 
for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-9), Corporate Governance 
(IFSB-3), and Transparency and Market Discipline (IFSB-4). 
This chapter highlighted two limitations to the effectiveness of international 
standards as a mechanism to remedy creative Shari‘ah compliance. First, concerns 
have been raised about the regulatory independence of AAOIFI. There is no assurance 
that standards and frameworks introduced by this entity follow public interests and are 
not affected by regulatory capture. Second, despite the participation of many national 
regulators on IFSB committees, its guidelines and standards are not binding. 
Malaysia, the host country of the IFSB, might be the only notable example which 
incorporated many of the IFSB standards into its national legal framework. On the 
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other hand, Saudi Arabia, an active member in IFSB, has not adopted any of the IFSB 
standards related to Islamic finance and Shari‘ah governance. 
The fifth proposed private mechanism is to legally authorise SSB members to 
blow the whistle if their decision has been ignored or if they see a serious breach of 
Shari‘ah compliance with management and the board of directors refusing to take 
action. This chapter argued that whistle blowing is important to secure compliance, 
since direct access to shareholders might not always be available to SSBs. Even if 
they do have access, dominant shareholders might not be interested in a dispute 
between the SSB and the management, with whom they likely have a close 
relationship. However, this mechanism has some limitations. SSB members might not 
be able to blow the whistle in non-Islamic jurisdictions even if they wanted to do so. 
This is because regulators in countries where a special framework of Islamic finance 
is absent might not be officially interested to hear about non Shari‘ah-compliance 
incidents, provided that the IIFS is in compliance with the conventional legal 
framework. In fact, blowing the whistle in this case might leave SSB members liable 
for breaching the confidentiality provision in their contract and their fiduciary duty, as 
well as interfering with the business of their IIFS. Moreover, they might be sued by 
the IIFS in question for defamation. Nevertheless, regulators ought to avoid 
uncertainty in this situation and arrange a channel of communications with SSBs for 
members to report their concerns. If a serious breach of Shari‘ah-compliant comes to 
light, it might cause consumers losing confidence in the IIFS and boycotting its 
products and services. This would affect the IIFS credit profile and ultimately have an 
impact on the stability of the financial system. 
The last proposed private mechanism is characterising an IIFS in its articles of 
association as an entity that fully complies with Shari‘ah ruling. The articles of 
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association of an IIFS can include provisions for setting up an SSB and defining its 
power; the duties of its members; its policy of appointing, dismissing, and fixing 
remuneration of its members; and its process of ensuring Shari‘ah compliance. 
Moreover, IIFS articles of association should include a default clause identifying the 
relationship between the board of directors and the SSB and the applicable procedure 
in case a conflict arises between the two boards. Such a step seems to be more visible 
than the involvement of regulators, mainly in non-Muslims countries. These 
mechanisms discussed in chapter seven can be used in particular where an IIFS is 
operating within a jurisdiction where regulators cannot or prefer not to be involved in 
regulating Shari‘ah governance. The implementations of these measures involve 
major players in the industry, such as SSBs, private Shari‘ah auditing firms, rating 
agencies, international standard-setting bodies, and shareholders.  
This research has raised many questions in need of further investigation. The first 
one is whether the current financial system, and particularly the banking sector, will 
ever be an appropriate venue for offering authentically Shari‘ah-compliant products. 
Commercial banks play the role of a financial intermediary by accepting deposits and 
lending money at interest. The profit- and loss-sharing model which is the ideal form 
of financing in Islam is alien to the banking environment. Accordingly, further 
attempts to “Islamise” the practise of banks might lead to promoting creatively 
Shari‘ah-compliant products, such as tawarruq, which try to replicate the outcome of 
debt-based conventional products. Another question worth investigating is the role of 
lawyers in contributing to the issue of creative Shari‘ah compliance. Although 
Shari‘ah products are ultimately approved by the SSB, lawyers are heavily involved 
in structuring Shari‘ah-compliant products. Many top law firms have teams of lawyers 
dedicated to the needs of the Islamic finance industry. Finally, the discussion of this 
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thesis has been theoretical, with examples mainly from retail banking. There is thus a 
need to conduct empirical studies about the existence and the size of creative Shari‘ah 
compliance practises in other areas of the financial industry, including the insurance 
market and the capital market. 
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